The Russian Federation has already lost – the question of how much more harm can it do? [Analysis]

krzysztofwojczal.pl 3 years ago

If you would for a minute quit reflection of current events and then look from a broader position at Moscow's global power strategy and position, there should be no doubt. Russia's going down. The problem is that Vladimir Putin grabbed the Ukrainians' legs and the European Union and the burden of the Russian calf tries to drag others under water. By blackmailing a drowning man:

"or you will agree to my terms or I will drown us all."

The Ukrainians, however, do not intend to yield and with determination cut off another Russian knuckles clenched on their ankles. The West delivers tools to defenders. At the same time, he tries to cut off the umbilical cord connecting European countries to Russia. The question is, are European lungs sufficiently educated to breathe gas and oil on their own?

The Russian Federation has already lost – the question of how much more harm can it do?

Thesis from the header should not be considered as wishful thinking. Russia was heading for disaster even before a full-scale invasion of Ukraine and drastic sanctions resulting from this action. For a reason, American analysts pointed out that after 2030 Russia would cease to be an opponent and a concern for the United States. Apparently, either Vladimir Putin read their reports, or the conclusions coincided with what came out of Russian analysis. That is why it is likely that drastic steps have been taken. Only that the deficiency of success in Ukraine – and that was most likely expected to be taking power in Kiev within a maximum of 2-3 days – resulted in a regular war. With all the consequences. The processes that have so far slow digested Russia have now accelerated. While it can be said that time was moving out in 2021, it is besides late for Moscow now. On each plane. The riders of the Russian apocalypse just boarded horses and set off to reap their harvest. From Vladivostok to Kaliningrad. It is worth mentioning any of this spooky company.

Regression symptoms

In 2019, Russian GDP, calculated taking into account the purchasing power of money, was 3.3 times higher than PKP Poland (RUS: 4.2 trillion usd, POL: 1.4 trillion usd). It's worth adding dynamics to the comparison. The distance between Poland and Russia was decreasing with each year, and let us remind that 38 million people work for Polish GDP, while for Russian 144 million people (the Russians are about 4x more). Suffice to compose that for respective years the value of Polish imports (calculating into dollars) has been higher than Russian. In another words, we are a more absorbent outlet for abroad partners and companies. In fact, our territory lies right next to the largest and richest marketplace in Europe (Germany). We are well communicated with the economical centre of Europe. Poland has a comparatively tiny and compact territory, easy to communicate and handle. Goods scope everywhere and society is much more rich and willing to consume. Unlike in a Russian space of 17 million kilometres and extending across the full Asian continent. Emptyness, mediocre communication, immense distances between cities located behind Ural is an crucial logistical problem. The Russian marketplace is immense in area, but comparatively tiny in volume of turnover.

It is worth pointing out that in 2012, Russian GDP (which was already converted into dollars) counted around 2.3 trillion dollars. In 2019 it was just little than 1.67 trillion usd, and 2020 ended with a regression to 1.48 trillion usd. For comparison, Poland jumped from $498 billion to $594 billion between 2012 and 2020. In another words, in 2020 our GDP was 40% of Russia's GDP.

And now it is worth to add that according to Russian economist Tatiana Michałowa, as a consequence of war and sanctions, Russian GDP will decrease in the coming months to the level of 1995 (395 billion dollars – that is 200 billion little than Polish GDP!).

In 2012, we could pay about 11 cents for the ruble. By 2020 only six cents was enough. present it is simply a currency at the level of garbage (3 cents a ruble – the state of March 2022).

However, the hard economical situation in the country and social impoverishment are not fresh to the Russian authorities. Actually, it's been permanent for centuries. Sometimes things get a small better, sometimes people die of hunger. However, the capital at the disposal of the authorities is crucial for the Kremlin. For which you can keep a power apparatus and make native technologies (especially military ones).

The phenomenon of bankruptcy

By 2020, the value of the sale of fossil fuels represented half of the value of all Russian exports, which besides corresponded to the value of half the state budget. The gross from hydrocarbon extraction translated straight into nearly 15% of the country's GDP and indirectly had even more impact. With 90% of all Russian gas exports to Europe and Turkey.

There were already many factors at the time, which foretold the problems of the Russian budget. The independency of Poland and its environment from Russian gas (investments in Baltic Pipe, pipelines, LNG terminals). The EU's climate policy (setting on RES) and the announced revolution in the automotive manufacture (exit from oil). The entry into the European marketplace of large player hydrocarbons in the form of the United States. The second have entered the EU marketplace with their own natural materials thanks to shale gas and oil technologies.

The hope for Vladimir Putin in this respect was to invest in Nord Stream II, but it was not expected to be an economical argument (for it is oil and not gas that the Russians gain the most) but only a political instrument of force on Poland and another countries of Central and east Europe (such as Ukraine). However, the plan burned down in the face of sanctions against the NSII and then after it was built, due to political pressures (officially procedural issues) that prevented the gas pipeline from running.

At the same time, EU and US sanctions inactive maintained (after 2014) did not let for the acquisition of technology and capital that would let Russian hydrocarbons to be extracted from the Arctic region. Without utilizing these resources – as estimated in 2019 by Russian energy minister Aleksandr Novak – in 2035 oil extraction could fall even half (due to the exhausting, presently exploited deposits).

So it was clear to the Russians themselves that the stream of cash flowing from the sale of hydrocarbons would shortly turn into a barely dripping spring. For these reasons, alternatively of waiting for a slow outflow of capital, Putin decided to act. As a result, the West intends to completely cut off Russian natural materials today.

What appears to save the Russian budget is simply a sharp emergence in the price of energy natural materials. After the 2014 invasion, the oil price fell from about $110 (February 2014) per barrel to $31 (February 2016). Later COVID offset the price to up to $ 27 per barrel (April 2020). Today, the price has again jumped to over $100 so the Russians push their pockets in cash. The natural gas quotations were almost twin.

Unfortunately, however, the Russians do not have the biggest impact on the marketplace prices. The United States and, above all, OPEC are of large importance in this regard. It has been different in the past, but it is the US that has strong influences and arguments that can influence the decisions of arabian oil exporters. And just wait for specified an agreement to be reached. Lowering the price of energy natural materials would have a crucial impact on the Russian budget.

Transactions are not everything. For politics besides counts in economics. The sale of Russian energy resources takes place in dollar transactions. Meanwhile, due to sanctions, the Russians have a problem spending these dollars. They may accumulate them, but for the minute it is like collecting waste. That is why it was decided to force the recipients to pay in rubles. Which would besides support the position of Russian currency. The problem is that settlements in garbage rubles only discourage customers from Russian natural materials.

This is where we come to the issue of Russian multiannual preparations for possible sanctions and economical isolation. due to the fact that the Kremlin authorities collected gold stocks as well as another than dollar currencies. It was expected to be a rain check. The problem is that after the February attack on Ukraine any of these reserves were frozen as part of sanctions. And the resources in Russia are fundamentally hard to cash. For the purposes of the interior market, the Moscow central bank can print as many rubles as it needs (inflation costs). However, if you want to get parts, goods and technology from outside (although from China), the garbage ruble is no longer suitable. Even the Chinese will not want to accept as payment for their goods the equivalent of waste paper, which cannot be utilized in dealing with anyone another than Russia itself. And that gives emergence to a risk. due to the fact that the collapse of the ruble and the spiral of inflation makes it possible that if the Chinese gain on the Russian marketplace on 1 day of 1000 rubles, on the next day this amount may represent a much lower value. So the sale in Russia of Chinese products – in exchange for ruble – becomes unprofitable. On the another hand, if the Russians have so far imported something from the west, it means that they were not paid to import the same products from China or were not available there. So replacing the supply chain will be problematic or more expensive. Especially since if the Russians are to import by paying yuan, the head-on ruble course will make buying anything abroad (whether it is China or any another country) highly expensive. All of this is going to hit the private sector.

At the moment, inflation levels in Russia are hard to measure. The authorities acknowledged that inflation was 12.5% between March 2021 and March 2022. It should be assumed that, as in Turkey, the authoritative communications on this issue are importantly understated.

For all these reasons, the Russian economy and manufacture will endure due to the fact that any trade links with the West, a substitute from China, cannot be replaced. The Russian private sector is in a lost position. Chinese goods – if at all possible – will be expensive. The hazard of dealing with the Russians will be high. Of course, the Kremlin authorities will cope with the most urgent needs. They can pay the Chinese for the most urgent needs in gold, mottos and natural materials. But private companies will no longer have that option. In addition, it should be remembered that specified squandered reserves (gold, abroad currencies) will rapidly end. At the end of 2021, Russian reserves were valued at $624 billion, allowing Russia to meet import needs for a year. Gold accounted for 21% of that amount. It is hard to estimation how much of the Russian reserves were located abroad (so now it has been frozen). Nevertheless, we can be cautious that in six months Russia will gotta tighten its belt firmly.

The Phantom of Corruption

In Russia, corruption is simply a natural tool for the functioning of society, the state and its elite. Moscow corrupts disobedient regions. From the central budget, immense sums go to problematic regions, which guarantees the loyalty of the apparatusists there. Examples of Dagestan or Chechnya are the most clear. At the same time, the Kremlin authorities buy the favour of the captured or dependent areas, i.e. Crimea, Donbas, Abkhazia or South Ossetia for cash. The funds provided by Moscow sometimes represent 90% of the budget of the administrative unit. Of course, it's all at the expense of regions that pay a lot more than they get out of it. This is peculiarly the case for those districts that are celebrated for extracting energy resources. This in turn awakens their reluctance to the Moscow authorities.

In interior politics, at elite level, this is similar. Vladimir Putin has made himself dependent on the top and most influential oligarchs, providing them with good contracts and jobs, from which they derive tremendous profits. In 2016, 1% of the richest part of the Russians owned nearly 43% of national assets. Social inequality continues to grow and the mediate class is poor. In 2018, 3% of the richest Russians owned 89% of all financial assets in the country. A 100 richest oligarchs had more savings in their accounts than the remainder of the Russian population. This phenomenon kills initiative and entrepreneurship in society, and so negatively affects innovation. A society made up of masters and serfs has no chance of developing as rapidly as part of a capitalist and democratic world. The hold is increasing.

Corruption at the lowest level of society and state administration, in turn, simply like cancer, slows down and degrades the actions of subsequent state bodies. Social morality is besides distorted. The state functions increasingly little efficiently at each next level of the administrative or social pyramid.

Knowing all of this, we request to ask ourselves what will happen to Russia as: a state, a social and administrative structure if there is no cash in the register? Will the regions that have already demonstrated separatist sentiment stay loyal? Will Putin's people be loyal?

The spirit of backwardness

All this together makes Russia incapable to stand alone in the technology race with the West and with China. And that straight threatens the state. Imagine a situation in which Russia's atomic arsenal would become obsolete adequate to halt acting as a deterrent... so Vladimir Putin, like Peter the Great, would like to make a technological leap in Russia. The point is that for centuries – due to many different factors – specified a leap in Russia could only take place thanks to the engagement of the state. And only by learning from the outside.

Meanwhile, Russia was cut off from know-how and technology from the west, The Chinese do not intend to share their own findings with it either, and the proverbial Ivan has no materials, resources and adequate motivation to make technological advancement simultaneously on all levels. Based only on its own method thought, Russia must limit itself and choose the sphere of engagement. Of course, the Kremlin always bet on reinforcements. Which closes the technology cycle in Russia. due to the fact that investigation in the field of military is urgently guarded in Russia, and military technology does not soak as well into the business-commercial sphere as it does in the west. As a result, the money pumped into armaments, even depletes and withdraws the remainder of the country in improvement (as it was in the times of the USSR). Meanwhile, the inefficient economy and mediocre society are incapable to bear the development. A globalised planet in which countries focusing on selected areas can exchange technologies from different levels is moving forward. Russia stands inactive and only on selected episodes with large effort tries to pursuit the others.

Humanitarian ankle

However, economical and economical problems are not the only ones. Russia is dying out. The birth rate has dropped dramatically since 1995 (as in Poland). In Russia, there is little than 1.6 children per woman, with children among cultural minorities far greater than in native Russians. On the 1 hand, fewer children are born. On the another hand, the inefficient and underfunded wellness care strategy and the disastrous social situation in terms of drugs, alcoholism, or the AIDS epidemic contribute to premature death. The average life expectancy in Russia is about 72 years (66 for men, 77 for women). In Poland, we live 5 years longer on average, and our country does not constitute the planet leader in this respect. By 2030, the number of Russians could be reduced by 3.5 million people – without taking into account disasters, wars or pandemics. In the meantime, it is not known how much toll COVID-19 took in Russia.

An additional problem is the pension system. Around 2050, a generation of modern 30-year-olds in Russia will retire. If all of them had lived to the retirement age, the strategy in Russia could have collapsed.

To prepare for the increasing problems Vladimir Putin tried to improvement the pension strategy quickly. However, the waves of protests delayed and diluted the program. In 2018, the final version was passed, in which the retirement age in Russia will gradually be raised by 2028 from 55 years for women and 60 for men to 60 years for women and 65 for men (now it is 56 and 61). The earlier thought of jumping and abrupt raising of retirement age met with large social opposition. And no wonder. If the Russians live on average as long as present in 2028, they will enjoy only a year of retirement. A fewer years ago, it looked even worse due to the fact that a statistical man in Russia lived for little than 65 years (it can be maliciously written that retirement in Russia would only be paid after death).

However, this terrible state of Russian society will rapidly change. The war on Ukraine, drastic sanctions, increasing poverty, deficiency of resources for wellness care – all of this together can effectively solve possible problems of the pension strategy in Russia. The cost of speeding up the depopulation of the state and consequently weakening it on almost all another plane.

Demons of War

Vladimir Putin – making a full-scale invasion of Ukraine – lost years of reasonably skillful abroad policy. Which is not a novelty, but alternatively a replay of 2013, erstwhile Russia broke the terms of the 2009 US reset. After the deal with Barack Obama, Putin obtained everything he expected. The agreement to make a political and economical block of Eurosia from Lisbon to Vladivostok. economical and technological cooperation. Acceptance of Western Europe's dependence on Russian energy natural materials. In addition, the Americans liquidated the 2nd U.S. Navy Fleet, which was liable for the North Atlantic and thus counterbalanced the Russian North Fleet. What focused the most attention in Poland is the fact that Barack Obama resigned from building a rocket shield in Poland and the Czech Republic.

However, appetite grows as you eat. Vladimir Putin helping Bashar Asad in 2013 began the game against the US. He thought his political alliance with Germany was unquestionable, especially due to Berlin's energy dependency. All of this ended with the separation of Ukraine from the Russian sphere of influence, the withdrawal of Poland, Romania, the Baltic States from the German sphere of influence and the American engagement in the region of Central and east Europe. Russia's reaction was an invasion of Crimea and Donbas, which in turn put Russia under sanctions not only from the US but besides from the European Union. From this point on, the road began for Russia on an equal footing in terms of economy, improvement and the situation of society. On a political level, however, the Kremlin authorities tried to usage their cards.

In the following years, Putin tried to strengthen the anticipation of energy blackmail against Europe (Nord Stream II) and at the same time exploit the argument of force. He increased the subordination of Lukashenka, limiting the improvement of Ukraine (e.g. by freezing the conflict in Donbasa). The Russians defended Assad in Syria. They won Turkey at the Kurdish table. They managed to keep influences in the Zakaukazi, where the Azerbaijani-Armiaan tension occurred. They demonstrated their position in Kazakhstan, where there were changes in unofficial governance. At the same time, cooperation with China looked rather stable, and the common enemy in the form of the US united the interests of Beijing and Moscow.

February 24, 2022 Vladimir Putin turned over the chess table again, where he carefully moved the figures for the last 7 years.

One-way ticket

All the above processes are described in more item in the book: ‘Third Decada. planet present and in 10 years’. I besides put there thesis that Vladimir Putin has no chance of getting a satisfactory deal With the Americans. The discrepancy of expectations on both sides is besides large and can not be reconciled. The United States – after experience with the 2009 failed reset – expects iron guarantees that Russia will not turn against them again, at the hardest time for Americans. For example, erstwhile competing with China, which could outweigh the scales on the Beijing side and undermine Washington's efforts to keep its own position and to halt China's course. specified a warrant could be the full Russian dependence on the sale of energy natural materials to Europe on the political will of the US. The problem is that specified a dependence has not been built, and Germany, which could support the US in this respect, has proved to be an unreliable partner.

On the another hand, the Russians had no intention of fighting China (at any level) and in the interest of the US. For Moscow, it would be suicide. Putin wanted to build a political and economical task based on the Berlin-Moscow axis (+ Paris). Which besides excluded dependence on the US. Washington decision-makers could not agree to this due to the fact that that would mean a complete collapse of the American planet and of hegemony, and without the support of Europe, Americans would have a immense problem competing with China.

So much for geopolitical issues. The invasion of February 24 completely overestimated the arguments. The war crimes committed in Ukraine by Russian troops and the fact that they were carried out on the basis of previously issued orders from the “mountain” itself should dispel all dreams of an agreement on the U.S.-Russia line or even more: West-Russia. In addition to political and economical arguments, there was another. Much more crucial and related to the credibility that is of large importance in abroad policy.

Russia has no chance of a handshake with the West, relationship or even alliance. For no 1 wants to be a friend of the individual who invites to dinner will start with cutlery to top the host's household as shortly as this 1 has gone to the kitchen to service a baked turkey.

And this problem of a possible return to even a correct relation with Russia is not related only to Vladimir Putin. For the Russian press is almost plainly writing about the criminal politics of the authorities, presenting it as right. Meanwhile, support for Putin grows in Russia. Which should bring the hopes of even the top supporters of the settlement policy towards Moscow.

All of this may lead to 1 peculiar conclusion. In the interests of the US, but besides of the full West (including Poland) is neutralizing Russia as such. To bury it so hard that for the next 100 years the Russians think about interior problems and have no time or strength to engage in abroad policy. And to think about returning to the empire from the times of the USSR or the Tsarate.

Putin, Russia and the Russians served themselves a one-way ticket. And it seems that both in Washington and in the European capitals of the elite are beginning to ripen to that thought. For Russia has not left its possible partners a choice.

A Chinese lifeline?

Throughout this arrangement, China is now the last hotel for Russia. But it is simply an illusion. Beijing authorities are not among those that aid and strengthen competitors for free. And that is indeed the Russian Federation. The Chinese will make good usage of Russia's weakness to dictate the advanced price for their help. However, it should be remembered that the economy and prosperity of the mediate State depend on supply chains, and mainly on maritime routes. These are controlled by the United States and their allies. The Chinese don't care about fighting in Russia's interest against hegemon. Beijing would have lost the most. The construction of the mediate class in China, which would replace export profits by home demand, was not completed. Beijing needs an injection of western cash. In fact, the Chinese economy depends on the supply of oil by sea (mainly from the mediate East). The Chinese besides import LNG. Without these natural materials, the improvement of the Centre would not be possible.

In another words, Americans have arguments to convince the Chinese to halt supporting Russia. China needs time to make and become independent of the US and the West. And to gain this time, they will be ready to exposure the Russians. Especially if it would lead to a confrontation on the Washington-Moscow line. It should be remembered that while Americans do everything to safe NATO, they are not peculiarly keen to face Russia due to Ukraine. The reason is one. They fear that engaging against Moscow will encourage Chinese to open a fresh front in the Far East. Therefore, they carefully look both ways and look forward. If Beijing had guaranteed that there would be no second front... So for Chinese to provoke a fight between competition and to gain additional years of peace can be an unrejected temptation.

Of course, China wants to get the best price from the Americans in exchange for neutrality. Therefore, it is very possible that there will besides be a very strong political confrontation on the Washington – Beijing line – which, however, should not end in war. The conflict could thwart many plans.

Both powers – both China and the US – feel unprepared to clash. The Chinese have not yet completed the interior marketplace and are inactive energy dependent on gas and oil imports. The Americans feel that they should limit China's growth right now, but they cannot do so in a situation where the position of Western Europe is inactive uncertain on this issue, and the Russians are keen to redecorate the east of Europe and undermine the credibility of the US as a safety guarantor. Which would hit the full American alliance system.

This all leads to the conclusion that Russia will become the first victim of its own aggressive policy. It is simply a pity that the price for Putin's geopolitical mistakes must be paid by Ukrainians.

Further destiny of Ukraine

At this point, it should be stated that the text goes from an analytical section to speculation. However, it is worth considering how further war can take place in Ukraine. Many commentators point out that Putin changed the strategical objectives of the war. The forces are being moved south and east, and the main nonsubjective of the war is to take over Donbas and the confederate coast of Ukraine. There were besides voices in public space that the longer the war will continue, the better for Ukraine. The flowing support allegedly strengthens the Ukrainian army with each day, while the Russians endure crucial losses. Personally, I find that besides optimistic. Above all, the addition of equipment to Ukraine from the west is simply a drop in the sea of needs. Secondly, the Russians have quite a few equipment and mobilization capabilities. They are stronger as a state and as an army looking overall. The war on demolition will be a disaster for Ukraine. besides on the issue of the demolition of a state that even if it survives, it will gotta rebuild for decades. With luck for Ukrainians, the Russians rush to settle, due to the fact that for them, too, all next day of war is simply a immense cost. Therefore, there is hope that the war can settle in months alternatively than years (although a longer script cannot be ruled out). If so, then the Ukrainians might have a chance to settle the main battle.

Strategic objectives of war

In addition, despite appearances, the strategical goals of war have not changed. Just as I raised it before a full-scale Russian invasion, Russia would gain nothing by taking 1 or 2 additional districts of Ukraine. Yes, it will be a military success. Yes, this will weaken Ukraine even more. But from a geopolitical and strategical point of view, this will not completely improve Russia's global position. On the contrary, the scope of sanctions and the devastation of Russia's image are so immense that the Kremlin authorities were in a much worse position than before the February invasion. In another words, if Moscow does not take control of Kiev and the full Ukraine, then war will prove to be a full disaster from a political and economical point of view.

Only bringing all Ukraine back to the Russian sphere of influence will Putin in the next step endanger the full West and NATO. Putting the full army in an additional Ukrainian direction will origin tremendous force on Poland and the full east flank of the North Atlantic Pact. The force – which in Russian imaginations – would force Americans to agree to Russian conditions. Either that, or the U.S. would gotta lead the second long Cold War with Russia, deploying immense forces in Europe and giving up the fight for hegemony against China for a fewer years.

This is Vladimir Putin's goal, his last hope. In my opinion, it's burning. For Americans should not step down. Losing in rivalry with Russia would mean defeat in the full game of maintaining a planet primacy. If the U.S. could not cope with the economical dwarf that is the Russian Federation, then the allies could begin to turn around from Washington. And bet on partnership with China for fear of their own safety (especially in the Far East).

Belarusian factor

Returning to military issues and war in Ukraine. The engagement of Ukrainian forces throughout the state border is besides crucial for the Russians. For this we could usage assistance from the Belarusian army, as well as the usage of forces from Transnistria.

Furthermore, if Kiev remained the main nonsubjective of the war, in my opinion the current retreat from the north and north-east is simply a tactical retreat from the Russians. After which there will be reorganization, better preparation of the offensive plan on this episode, then reopening the attack. During this time, the Russians will effort to engage as many Ukrainian forces as possible in the south and in Donbasa. To weaken the direction of Kiev. At the same time, political movements towards Belarus can be expected. Lukashenko seems to have failed as a unchangeable and loyal ally. Belarus troops did not support the Russian invasion. The kind of partner who fails is unnecessary to Putin. Either Lukashenko surrenders to the Kremlin's will, or he will be replaced. This second option could besides explain the complete withdrawal of Russians in the north and north-east of Ukraine. They didn't gotta make specified a large retreat. But they did. If Putin had planned to exert force on Minsk, then it would be better if the Russian troops fighting in Ukraine were not dependent on Belarus' communication and logistics chains.

At the same time, the forces withdrawn from Ukraine were not transferred and are inactive in Belarus. What could be specified a threat to the Ukrainians as well as additional force on Minsk.

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Ukraine did not win

I'm certain many have been inspired by the course of the fighting. However, it should be pointed out that Ukrainians have a problem on the southeast front. And the Russians won't let go. Putin can't afford to lose the war. If Moscow decides to invade, stubbornness (although first failures) and readiness to endure crucial losses should be expected to accomplish strategical objectives. This kind of approach ended the russian Union in Afghanistan (where the war lasted 10 years), but nothing has changed since then. The state governed in an authoritarian way works like this – only triumph matters, regardless of the cost.

A fresh origin is emerging in the current situation in Ukraine. Mud time. The first phase of conflict failed, logistics problems, besides tiny forces designed to invade, disregard the opponent and the request for reorganization. It all made us watch any kind of war pause for weeks. However, from April in Russia, a partial collection of any vintages began, so fresh blood may enter front units. It will not be a first-class soldier, but mass, abundance and equipment can do their job.

So it can be assumed that the Ukrainians are facing a much harder test than the 1 they passed in the first period of full-scale war. Only this time the Russians may not make the same mistakes. This may mean that without real assistance from 3rd countries, The Ukrainians can't handle it.

Western attitude – expanding acceptance for firm action

Although the countries of the widely understood West have become powerfully active in the assistance of Ukraine, this support is indirect. The transfer of funds, arms and supplies to Ukrainians surely helps and affects Russian losses. There is no uncertainty that this kind of NATO activity will extend the period during which Ukraine will be able to defend itself. However, 1 should be aware that this country is much weaker than the Russian Federation.

To weaken the Russian Federation, the Western planet has imposed additional sanctions, but it is inactive not enough. The Kremlin authorities derive tremendous financial benefits from the sale of oil and gas to Europe – even though the export scale has decreased. The OPEC attitude is of large importance to Russia's ability to cut off from profits from the sale of black gold. However, Saudi Arabia – which plays the largest function in this organization – does not intend to increase mining so far. Therefore, the price of energy natural materials remains advanced and supply is insufficient to meet the advanced request on the market.

Consequently, it can be argued that if the Russian Federation decides to fight for the final victory, then the defeat of the Ukrainians seems to be a substance of time. Destroyed by the invader, the state and its economy, as well as the losing army in equipment – with limited resources – will not be able to defend the country indefinitely. However, the scale of the aid is simply a drop in the sea of need.

So the question remains, what is our (as Western) goal and priority? Is it helpful to keep a clean conscience, or does it have a real effect of maintaining Ukraine's independency and the task of the Russian Federation to be so severe as not to endanger anyone for decades to come?

In the context of the interests of Poland, the Baltic States, Romania, Finland, but besides the United States, this second option is not only more favourable, but it can even decide the destiny of these countries in the long term. Turkey would besides very much like to destruct the Russian threat in the Black Sea and in the Transcaucasia region. In another words, for this group of countries, the issue of neutralising Russia should be overriding. Especially since there is simply a perfect situation at this point to accomplish this goal.

Fully active in the war in Ukraine Russia cannot afford to open the front in another directions (especially against stronger NATO). Therefore, the Kremlin authorities are now toothless, although Vladimir Putin tries to convince the planet otherwise.

However, democratic states have a problem taking measures that seem to be risky in the eyes of the public. Furthermore, all decisive step requires formal and legal justification. Consequently, the US and another countries’ attitudes so far have been reserved for any initiatives that could pose greater risks (such as the issue of Migów 29 or the possible armed peace mission in Ukraine).

Nevertheless, in fresh days much has changed. The crimes committed by the Russians in Ukraine – as a consequence of both military initiative and political decisions – make western decision-makers no longer restrain the ties described above. Crimes committed on civilians have shaken global public opinion. Western societies halt reasoning in the context of business and emotional: a note of empathy for Ukrainians and disgust with the acts of aggressor begin to prevail on a scale showing an acceptable advanced limit of aid.

At the same time, politicians besides gained formal arguments. If the Russians commit murders on civilians in occupied areas, it is apparent that there are grounds for specified actions that will limit the anticipation of territorial expansion to the aggressor.

In another words. From a political and moral point of view, the possible introduction of a peace mission or the creation of a sanitary cordon in Ukraine would have the top possible basis. The troops of allied states, at the request of the Ukrainians, could enter Ukraine and safe the territories not yet occupied by the Russians. Especially those located west of Dnieper. With each next week of war, in which the Russians commit more and more crimes on civilians (let's callback yesterday's rocket attack at the railway station in Kramatorsk), there will be more casualties. Social awareness of the request to take preventive action in the west will increase. And with it, acceptance and even force on Western politicians to yet end this bloodbath in Europe. This will besides affect the acceptance of higher costs (e.g. for oil) at the cost of abandoning Russian natural materials.

In all this historical analogies to Hitler's times and politics appeasement will besides play an expanding role. Remembering the experience of planet wars, Europeans begin to remember what a deficiency of firmness can lead to against dictators seeking war.

The process of increasing politicians and society to make certain decisions is in different dynamics. With respect to the war in Ukraine, 1 should hope that awareness of the request for action will prompt decisive decisions before Moscow deals with Kiev. In this context, the prolonged war and the extraordinary stubbornness and determination of the Ukrainians are undoubtedly of large importance. However, it should be remembered that each subsequent week of hold gives birth to more victims, and Ukraine is not prepared to wage war on specified a large scale over the years. It would be disastrous for the Ukrainians if the Russians led to a tactical truce – which resulted in no increase in sanctions against Russia by the West – and could then much better prepare another hit on the weakened and exhausted Ukrainian state after the war.

In my assessment of the operation of the Russian Federation – so the troops in the area Ukraine as well as diplomatic and political movements in the global arena – they can break through among western intellectual decision-makers a stalemate that does not let appropriate consequence to aggression. Putin's relentless attitude and complete deficiency of reflection and shoe will gotta consequence in a complete shut-off of Russian energy supplies. At the same time, the option of giving Russia a challenge on the Ukraine's terne will become for parts of NATO states not only a slogan thrown into space, but possibly the only option giving hope of stopping Moscow in its war march.

Russia's decay and its consequences

Vladimir Putin decisively and confidently leads the Russians towards a geopolitical and economical defeat. The result of the war in Ukraine will only decide whether the Russian Federation will have the chance to drag another state down with it. Consequently, it is up to the decision of the West – and especially the United States – whether Russian aggression in Ukraine will be the latter.

It seems that the processes initiated – negative for Russia – lead to a reasonably optimistic conclusion. Ukrainian opposition gives the West an chance and time to: reflection, preparation and appropriate action. In turn, the Russian way of conducting war only increases the determination of Ukrainians, while at the same time prompting the West to increasingly decisive movements. And even Putin's final triumph in Ukraine may not be adequate to accomplish the goals.

The Russian Federation – in the average and long word – has no chance of returning to the table on its terms. That is, to get capital, technology and consent to make a separate block in the global strategy of forces. As a result, the increasing interior problems – whose negative processes accelerated – sooner or later implode. Which can end with the dissolution of Russia itself (by disconnecting any areas where separatist sentiment has only been put to sleep) and even a civilian war over the full state.

There will then be immense rifts in the regions that have so far constituted a Russian buffer or a region of influence. This is not only about east Europe, but besides about the Caucasus, the Bisku East and Central Asia. It is besides worth remembering that in any cases Russia acts as a stabiliser (vide protection against the Kurds, Assad, Armenia). Russia's falling out of the function of an crucial player in the global arena could origin quite a few chaos.

India will find itself in a fresh situation, which will only stay reliance on the United States (which has been avoided like a fire for years). The Chinese and the Americans will re-start the fight for influence in Central Asia, where large geopolitical changes may occur. In the last fewer days, there has been a change of power from Pakistan, where Imran Khan lost his Prime Minister's seat due to a vote of distrust. Khan led pro-Chinese abroad policy, resulting in a affirmative position towards the Kremlin (because of Moscow-Pekin's tactical partnership). However, he lost the support of an army that has de facto power in Pakistan. This could have been due to American actions that allowed Pakistani troops to reopen to cooperation with the US. Importantly, Imran Khan was a reasonably secular, reasonable and very popular Prime Minister who managed in a beautiful crazy place full of radicals (I urge an earlier but very current analysis of 2018: ‘Pakistan. Enemy of geopolitical hell?”. Its successor may have much greater problems with maintaining order in an ethnically heterogeneous country and extinguishing all animosity. Which could besides have a profound impact on global safety due to the fact that Pakistan is simply a nuclear-weapon state. The situation in the region is further compounded by the fact that in neighboring Afghanistan, the power was regained by the Taliban, who, after stabilising their power, will have ambitions to destabilise and absorb the full region. This may be highly dangerous if planet powers capable of countering would be swallowed up by completely different problems. This issue requires a separate analysis, but it is crucial adequate that it could not be overlooked.

In the Transcaucasia, isolated Armenians would find themselves in an highly hard situation. In turn Georgians could play something for themselves in the resulting confusion (Abchasia. South Ossetia), especially if a Chechen or Dagestan rebellion broke out in Russia. With Russia inactive, Turks could realize their own dream and make a Turkish-Azer axis reaching the Caspian Sea. Where there are riches in the form of natural gas. This would besides give Ankara access to the culturally close countries of Central Asia, although the multitude of fronts and engagement in many another directions would alternatively prevent Erdogan from playing a decisive function in that region.

In the event of neutralisation of Russia, Poland could gain the most. We are faced with a historical chance that arose without our participation. And besides regardless of our actions, the current events push us in a favorable direction for Poland. Warsaw became a partner, an ally and a standing for Kiev. For the first time since the 17th century, Ukrainians have seen Russians as a deadly enemy, Germans as an unreliable partner, and Poles as the top allies. On the social level, Poles have already won. If Ukraine survives, it will be possible to build a political Polish-Ukrainian partnership, as well as bring Ukraine into the EU and NATO. In what we should be active and even crucial. The Warsaw-Kijów block would be hard adequate to think about focusing another countries around the region. The Baltics or Romania could supply political facilities to co-decision on the European Union. The inter-sea block – which Józef Piłsudski dreamed of – would have the chance to be and to play an important, equivalent function in shaping Europe. This, of course, is the most optimistic option. But it's entirely possible.

There may besides be immense threats. interior chaos in Russia can be highly dangerous not only for Moscow itself, but besides for the environment (especially in the context of atomic weapons). At the same time, it is worth noting that in case the Chinese neglect to build their independency and Prosperity They could fall into massive economical turbulence. Which in turn would radicalise the actions of their political class. interior social force – caused by crises – could push Chinese elites to do what Vladimir Putin decided to do. In both cases we are dealing with a akin cultural mentality, an autocratic system, as well as a smoky chauvinism that can easy be fuelled. Thus, Beijing authorities can besides look for solutions in military expansion.

However, speculation so far ahead should only be considered as 1 of the many different possibilities. Which allows us to hope that the planet can cope with the challenges ahead better than in this alternatively pessimistic scenario.

Challenges for Poland

In this context, the Warsaw authorities will gotta make an effort to make full usage of the favourable trend for Poland. From the position of our national interest, Ukraine cannot lose and fall into the Russian sphere of influence. If this had happened, the Polish state would have been under Russian force and a threat of war for the next fewer years. We would gotta focus on defensive thinking, which would narrow down our political capabilities. Moreover, Poland would become even more dependent on the safety of allies. This, in turn, would make us dependent on the political level, so Warsaw would have much more limited area for manoeuvre erstwhile it comes to carrying out its own interests. 1 that wouldn't should be cared for by allies.

Nor should economical aspects be overlooked. The takeover of power by Moscow over Ukraine would affect the migration of millions of refugees to Poland. It would be us who would be the main burden of surviving for arrivals, and possible EU financial assistance for this intent would be another tool for force on the authorities from Warsaw. In addition, it is worth remembering that while our labour marketplace can absorb, for example, 1 million or 2 additional workers – which would benefit the economy – 4-5 million refugees could be overloaded by the Polish state. besides at the administrative, financial (aid) level or on issues as proselytical as accommodation and catering. A akin effect can be achieved not only by the failure of Ukraine, but besides by a prolonged long-term conflict.

If the Russians had suffered defeat in Ukraine and Kiev remained outside the Moscow sphere of influence, a number of options would have been opened up before Poland. First of all, it should be ensured that the Kiev authorities see Poland as the most crucial partner. This can be helped by geography itself, as Poland leads the most convenient transport routes from Ukraine to the west of Europe. Warsaw would gotta become the most crucial advocate for joining the EU and NATO. Germany must not be allowed to act as a State inviting Kiev into the community and the North Atlantic Pact.

Polish-Ukrainian economical negotiations, which should take place before Ukraine joins the EU, would be highly important. Then Polish business and business could spill over Dnieprem much earlier than Western economical giants. That would give us any advantage.

Poland has adequate capital, assets and arguments to be an crucial pillar in Ukraine's reconstruction programme.

It would be highly important, in all scenario, to build large and modern Armed Forces. If Ukraine had lost, Polish land forces with 4 divisions would have been besides modest. On the another hand, the failure of the Russian Federation would should be linked to the resignation of an aggressive attitude towards NATO, but it could destabilise an internally immense state. Under specified conditions, the Polish Army could be a political tool that would supply safety guarantees to weaker or weakened countries of the region (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Belarus, Ukraine). This in turn leads to the conclusion that the Polish Armed Forces should be prepared for different scenarios. Maintaining appropriate balance and maintaining and even expanding offensive possible could be crucial for the interests of the Polish State.

Simplification of the taxation strategy and the introduction of a business-friendly state programme is of paramount importance! Recent changes in this area have devastated the image of the country and government, even though the assumptions of the alleged "Polish Deal" were in rule correct.

Our economy is developing rather well, despite the increasingly complicated requirements and procedures for doing business. And right now we can besides usage the possible of Ukrainians coming to Poland. Of course, this should not be done in specified a way as to differentiate the legal situation of Poles and Ukrainians. The request for systemic reforms.

Challenges for Europe

The challenges facing the European Union and Europe as specified are addressed by many experts and politicians. These include:

the improvement of refugees from Ukraine,
limiting and even stopping imports of energy natural materials from Russia,
cutting Russia from European supply chains,
ensuring the safety of the continent by expanding the military capacity of NATO and EU countries,
filling the gap in the supply of agri-food products from Russia and Ukraine (predicted harvest problems in Ukraine through prolonged war).

All of these are highly urgent and request immediate action. However, in the average and long term, Europe can face even more dangerous processes.

We will remind you that Ukraine is not only the granary of Europe, but besides the main exporter of agricultural products to North Africa and to the mediate East. Consequently, if these regions are affected by food shortages, which will consequence in a immense increase in food prices, then many countries can encounter a repeat of the alleged "Arab Spring". Social rebellion, power coups, and consequently even civilian wars. Chaos in the mediate East and North Africa can have a immense impact on Europe's security. On many levels. It is via the Suez Canal that energy resources from the Persian Gulf go to Europe (which may shortly prove essential due to the suspension of supplies from Russia). It is through the Suez Canal that products and intermediates from China go to Europe. Finally, it is through the Mediterranean that many migrants from Africa and Asia go to the Old Continent.

At the moment, the food marketplace is inactive partially based on stocks from last season. However, these supplies are about to run out. The deficiency of harvest in Ukraine (being 1 of the largest producers of wheat and oil plants) will be a problem not only for this country, but besides for a large part of the world.

At the same time, the food area can be utilized politically. 1 could imagine a situation where, for example, Turkey would block the shipping of Russian agricultural products to Syria. Especially since Recep Erdogan is not 1 of Bashar Assad's friends and would gladly take part in the dismantling of the Syrian state or at least set up governments in Damascus that would favour Turkey. Similarly, the situation in Libya, where civilian war continues, could be played. At the moment, Lebanon is on the verge of a breakdown, where the detonation in the Beirut harbour has deprived the country not only of warehouses with agricultural produce, but besides devastated the wharf that could not accept supplies from outside. For example, Egypt, which has become 1 of the largest food importers in the region, will be in a hard situation.

In another words, the mediate East and North African powder barrel was re-connected to the smoky fuse. Meanwhile, the United States may not be as active in the region as it has been so far. Especially since the rivalry with Russia and China has gained fresh momentum. In this context, regional players specified as Turkey, Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia will be liable for events in the mediate East. The clashing interests of these countries can bring chaos comparable to that of 2014 in Syria and Iraq, erstwhile we faced the violent expansion of ISIS and the threat of the collapse of the Damascus and Baghdad authorities.

Potential chaos in the mediate East will have a immense impact on Europe. In this context, countries from the south of the EU (France, Spain, Italy or Greece) should make a block liable for stabilising the abovementioned regions (and, as it were, entering US shoes). The problem is that all these countries are consumed by immense interior problems... Which is not optimistic.

Summary

With all this in mind, 1 thing seems certain. The failure of Ukraine would be detrimental to NATO, the EU and individual countries (such as the US or Poland). If Moscow had subjugated Kiev, the Kremlin authorities could not only put military force on the West but besides increase their influence in North Africa and the mediate East – due to the fact that Russia would control a immense part of the agri-food sector (summated possible of Russia and Ukraine in this respect). This is besides understood by the Turks – powerfully active in the Levant and Libya cases.

In addition, the script in which the war in Ukraine would prolong would be very unfavourable for the countries of the Old Continent. For chaos in the mediate East and North Africa would destabilise economically (import of natural materials and goods), politically and humanitarianly (refugees) rich countries of the European Union. Of course, any subsequent day of war would besides hit the vital forces of the Russian Federation. It would negatively affect countries bordering Ukraine.

For all these reasons, the best script for Russia would be a swift victory. For the West besides – only that the triumph of Ukraine.

Which can lead to the conclusion that the West will become bolder and more openly supported the still-fighting Ukrainians. Especially in the context that even the Russian business of Ukraine may not stabilise the situation. It is highly likely that Ukrainians could proceed to fight the diversion-partisan battle.

In another words, Russian action does not give the West a choice, and in my opinion it is expected that the increasingly bold consequence to the mark in the form of the task of the Russian side of painful war and economical disaster. What to want for.

In the long term, however, it should be remembered that the affirmative ending of the war in Ukraine will not mean peace. The Russian Federation will be willing to execute tense and possibly even desperate actions for the next fewer years – before the interior collapses occur. This - in the absence of success in Ukraine - would be closer, given that the unwinnable war would undermine Vladimir Putin's leadership. Which seems to be 1 of the most crucial factors in the stableness of the Russian Federation.

Krzysztof Wojchal

geopolitics, politics, economy, law, taxes – blog

Selected sources:

https://businessinsider.com.pl/economy/inflation-in-Russia-raised-by-sanctions-government-next-new-data/lj3dx45

https://www.rp.pl/economy/art19090471-Russia-with-greatest-gold-and-currency-in-history

https://wid.world/country/Russian-federation/

https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/04/12/richest-3-russians-hold-90-of-country-financial-assets-studies-a65213 – reading 22.07.2020.

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