Invisible War – Offensive of Russian Intelligence?

Written by Jan Starostwa, Ksawery Stawiński
Analysis in Brief

"The analysis is to present the ways Russia's intelligence services infiltrate Western states, especially those located in Europe.

– GRU, or Chief Intelligence Board, is liable for abroad intelligence of the Russian Federation. Its main objectives are to gather information, sow chaos in Europe, quarrel NATO states and polarize society. The most efficient GRU branches are the unit ,,29155’.

– After the disgrace of an elite group of spies, Russian intelligence introduced "New Tactics". It is based on the recruitment of subcontractors of diversion actions in social media. The chain of intermediaries makes it hard to detect the actual power of diversion.

– The collective Western possible is greater than Russian in all respect. Russian services are fighting him soft power. The Kremlin's agentura focuses on bringing the ideological upheaval to the European countries. To this end, it implements a strategy which covers 4 main stages.

– The fresh exchange of prisoners in Ankara is evidenced by the revival of the function of intelligence services in global relations. Poland was active in it.

Russian interview in Europe

After the dissolution of the USSR, KGB departments became Russian intelligence agencies. Each has a circumstantial space for its activities.

Foreign Intelligence is primarily dealt with by GRUs. The Chief Intelligence Board is liable for collecting information, mostly of a military nature. He is part of the Russian Federation's armed forces, so he is subject to the General Staff and the Ministry of Defence. He frequently collaborates with SWR, or intelligence agency, which focuses on obtaining abroad civilian information related to diplomacy. The GRU besides cooperates with the FSB, the interior safety Agency and counterintelligence[1].

The Chief Intelligence Board consists of 15 ,,, Authorities”. Boards from 1 to 4 divide the planet into individual areas of operation. Management boards from 5 to 15 deal with circumstantial aspects of intelligence activities (e.g. military technology, space intelligence, NATO, etc.). Management boards are divided into departments or circumstantial units. The second are always marked by a string of digits (e.g. 54777, 74455).

Regional management

1. First Management Board: European Union
2. Second Board: North America, South America, United Kingdom, Australia, fresh Zealand
3. Third Board: Asia
4. Management Board Fourth: Africa

Special Mission Management Boards

• Management Board Fifth: Operations Interview
• Board Six: SIGINT Interview
• The Seventh Board: NATO
• Management Board Eighth: Specnaz
• Board of Nine: Military Technology
• Board Ten: Military Economy
• Board Eleven: strategical Doctrine
• Board of 12: Information Operations
• Board of Thirteen: Space Intelligence
• Board of Fourteen: Operational and Technical
• Board of Fifteen: External Relations

Detailed information on the structure of Russian intelligence is not available to the public[2].

The GRU deals with operational and survey activities. It is frequently carried out by people associated with top level diplomacy. The Russian embassy in Prague, whose staff had up to 150 people, is peculiarly important. It was referred to as the Moscow intelligence center for our region of Europe. The Embassy in Austria besides employed over 100 people[3].

In this context, 1 of the most dynamic structures of the GRU is the Unit 29155, which was created around 2007. He has many employees who are managed by General Andrei Awerianov[4]. In addition to diplomats, it besides includes "illegals" – persons in no authoritative way related to the structures of the state for which they work. They are legitimized with false documents, and for circumstantial operations, even the full imaginary résumé. It is simply a form of deep conspiracy[5].

The main successes of unit 29155 in fresh years:

– The poisoning of Sergei Skripal, a double agent working for the UK services[6].

– Poisoning Emilian Gebre, who supplied Ukraine with weapons in 2014[7].

– Detonations in ammunition warehouses in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria[8].

– effort to make a coup in Montenegro and destabilise Moldova[9]

– The origin of the ,syndrom Hawaiian” in diplomats[10].

– Ordering killings of American soldiers operating in Afghanistan[11].

– Cyber hack into computers at the Chemical Weapons Prohibition Organization in The Hague[12].

– Taking control of Wagner’s African branch[13].

Many another events have not been officially linked to Unit 29155, but in them you can find its characteristic modus operandi. Thanks to these actions, Awerianov became the commander of the Russian diversion forpost on the Old Continent.

Main objectives of Unit 29155:

1. Slowing down arms supply to Ukraine,
2. Creating tensions between NATO allies,
3. Deepening social polarisation,
4. Disinformation sowing,
5. Invoking chaos in Europe.

In wider public awareness, but besides counterintelligence of Western states, Unit 29155 appeared around 2019[14]. It turned out that the elite nature of a peculiar intelligence group could pose a threat to the Kremlin, despite the usage of "illegals".

An investigation was conducted that exposed a large proportion of the members of the organization. All due to frequent contacts between the employees of Unit 29155. They were carefully followed, which allowed the most crucial officers to be exposed. According to an investigative writer who participated in the improvement of the GRU branch, the training of fresh agents takes about 5-6 years. In addition, after the escalation of the war in Ukraine there was a mass exodus of Russian diplomats from Europe to Russia[15]. Unit 29155 was able to work out the collective work of anointers and investigative journalists ,bellingcat”[16], combined with the efforts of the intelligence services of the West[17[18[19].

Despite this blow, Russian intelligence did not stay passive, and the unit itself inactive works. Moscow has adapted to fresh challenges. In order to avoid further mass embarrassment, the fresh GRU tactics were put into effect. The Russians started recruiting subcontractors of their operations online.

People Needed in the force Service[20]

The fresh Tactics is primarily intended to prevent another GRU blast. Russian spies are becoming increasingly hard to work in Europe personally. The increased restrictions on entry related to the war in Ukraine and the improvement of the unit prompted decision-makers in 29155 to change their methods of action. Recently, Russian intelligence has been searching for subcontractors of individual operations. He peculiarly pays attention to people who are already on the Old Continent. GRU conducts recruitment mainly on social media.

Workers are mainly sought in criminal environments and within pro-Russian political groups of a given state. GRU does not care about the ideology of its subordinates: it is eager to usage the aid of left-wing activists and those on the right-hand side of the political scene. Remuneration frequently pays in cryptocurrency[21].

Main tasks of people recruited by social media:

1. Acts of sabotage and diversion,
2. arson,
3. Robbery and intimidation.

The Benefits of fresh Tactics

The Kremlin creates spy chains of connections which make it increasingly hard for GRU officers to deconspiration. The top-ranking personnel of Unit 29155 search for alleged "groups". They are highly placed, most frequently in Western countries, where diversion is to be carried out. Their task is to recruit fresh GRU collaborators, frequently among pro-Russian groups, utmost activists, people crucial in the criminal environment, etc. These in turn commission circumstantial tasks to their subordinates. Interestingly, tasks can come from circumstantial social media users, i.e. web developers who give instructions to their followers[22].

The longer the chain, the harder it is to detect the real employer. Moscow can control the diversion to which the hands of people already in the country and frequently its citizens apply. Thanks to this tenure, GRU workers do not gotta appear in person, making it hard to exposure them. The frequency of contacts between individual officers of the unit drops, which promotes the maintenance of conspiracy.

The fresh tactics consist in the posting of parts of the simplest tasks to the citizens of a given country, as well as the way they are recruited – through social media. The net opens the door to a wide spectrum of possible collaborators, which can only be utilized in 1 tiny action. It is more hard to connect them to Moscow, especially if they are separated by a long chain of intermediaries.

However, this does not mean that classical spies, known from Unit 29155, have ceased operating in Europe. Among the prominent people among the «groups» include Eduard Szysmarów. The Russian embassy's attaché in Poland was responsible, among another things, for attempting to assassinate the Prime Minister of Montenegro[23].

How do we destabilize the country with our services?

A immense asymmetries of possible between Russia and the collective west – demographic, economical or technological – force the Russians to search alternate solutions for equalizing opportunities. The goal is achieved by exploiting the possible of the protest and stimulating it alleged soft power.

The goal is to destabilize, make chaos and manage it. This is achieved in a transparent or undisclosed way. Impact agents are formed, which include economic, political, military and social movements, extremist political parties and media. [24] The object of manipulation is usually minorities or marginalized political groups or organizations. Verified patterns of ideological upheaval are divided into 4 stages. Be aware that these are long-term measures.

1. The phase of demoralization – from 15 to 20 years. It includes the breakdown of unity, the demolition of social capital and the generation or expansion of divisions in society. It focuses on discrediting historical, moral, spiritual patterns and destroying assurance in institutions, administrations and states. The goal is to take control and manipulate social groups.
2. The destabilization phase – from 2 to 5 years. It includes temper radicalisation in key areas for the economy and state safety architecture, strengthening and inspiring discontent and escalation of interior conflicts.
3. The phase of creating and managing the crisis – from 2 to 6 months. It is characterized by a violent economical collapse. The acts of panic utilized are intended to exacerbate social confusion and exacerbate interior conflicts to lead to protests, civilian wars and coups. This is intended to service as an excuse for the parties to take power favouring the Kremlin or to justify ‘brotherly intervention’ to reconstruct order.
4. The standardisation phase – the end of the crisis following a war or coup. It is intended to stabilize society managed under the fresh establishment. The fresh order requires adaptation of all areas of social and political life. [25]

Exchange of spies in Ankara as an example of Russian service activities

The first exchange of spies between superpowers took place on February 10, 1962 on a celebrated spy bridge. It might seem that 62 years later these times have passed. However, the extraordinary activity of Russian intelligence (GRU) in fresh years has announced another hot time for intelligence services.

On 1 August 2024, the largest exchange of prisoners since the Cold War took place at Ankara Airport. It included 26 people in prison in 7 Western countries. 10 people, including 2 minors, were relocated to Russia, 13 to Germany, 3 to the US. [26] The exchange was attended by people who were serving prison sentences in the USA, Germany, Poland, Slovenia, Norway, Russia and Belarus.

It was not a classical exchange of spies on the Glienicke Bridge known during the Cold War. Rather, a joint NATO operation aimed at freeing penal opponents, journalists and citizens who were unjustly convicted of espionage. This is to be a clear signal from the west that "its citizens (not spies) will not leave".

Putin's message is clear – we will not leave our spies, even if we are to “put all American who sets ft on Russian soil.” It is worth noting that the operational usefulness of specified a spy is practically zero. He was exposed, so he can only ride around Russia as a hero and participate in training fresh spies. [27]

In Russian and Belarusian penal colonies, however, Andrzej Poczobut – a well-known Belarusian writer holding 8 years imprisonment – and Marian Radzajewski – a Polish businessman from Białystok, who was sentenced to 14 years for espionage and who never confessed.

Minister of abroad Affairs Radosław Sikorski, argues that the Polish authorities are seeking the release of Andrzej Poczobut all day. It is worth noting that the current exchange of prisoners was preceded by negotiations with Moscow, not with Minsk. Negotiations on the release of Pochobut must be conducted straight with Minsk. However, Pochobut himself may be an obstacle, which assured him that he did not want to leave Belarus. [28]

They returned to Moscow, among others:

1. Artiom Dulcew and Anna Dulcew – utilizing the names Ludwig Gisch and Maria Rosa Mayer Munos – SWR staff (foreign intelligence services),
2. Wadim Krasikov – FSB agent, sentenced in 2021 for the assassination of Chechen-Georgian dissident Zelimach Singhszwili. He did life in Germany.
3. Paweł Rubcow a.k.a. Pablo Gonzales – detained in Poland in 2022 at the Ukrainian border a fewer days after the Russian invasion of the country. He claimed to be a Spanish journalist. He worked on Zanna Niemcowa, daughter of murdered Russian oppositionist – Boris Niemcowa. Polish leftist communities reacted with outrage at the news of the arrest of "Pablo Gonzales". There have been voices of violations of the regulation of law and restrictions on freedom of expression against “Spanish journalist” [29].
4. Władysław Kluszin, Vadim Konoszczenko, Michał Mikuszyn and Roman Seleznikov.

Such a large exchange of prisoners shows that despite the war in Ukraine diplomatic channels are expensive. The place of exchange is not random either. Turkey, although a associate of NATO and maintains good relations with the West, can besides deal with Putin.

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21. Ibidem (accessed 31.08.24)
22. "The biggest prisoner exchange. erstwhile intelligence officer speaks about Polish thread”, Sylwester Ruszkiewicz, Virtual Poland, 02.08.2014., https://news.wp.pl/biggest-changed-prisoners- former-officer-interview-talk-about-Polish-watt-7055763173882432a (accessed 31.08.24)
23. Ibid (accessed 31.08.24)
24. "Russian operational art. explanation and Practice", publishing home Foundation past and Culture, Marek Depczyński, Leszek Elak, publishing home Foundation past and Culture, Warsaw 2024
25. Ibid