What lessons should be learned from the EU's consequence to crises specified as the COVID-19 pandemic or the Russian war in Ukraine? How can the European Union act more effectively in times of crisis and reduce bureaucratic procedures? What is the EU's overall strategical and geopolitical vision? And what should we know about the referendum on EU integration in the Constitution and the Moldovan presidential elections? Leszek Jażdżewski (Fundacja Liberte!) talks with Nicu Popescu, an analyst under the European Power programme at the European abroad Affairs Council (ECFR), who previously served as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of abroad Affairs and European Integration of Moldova from August 2021 to January 2024 and Minister of abroad Affairs of Moldova from June to November 2019.
Leszek Jażdżewski (LJ): In a paper written by you together with Laurence Boone for the European abroad Affairs Council (ECFR), entitled "Better Firefighting, Reading Europe for an Age Between War and Peace", you propose to make a European version of the US Defence Production Act (US defence Production Act, DPA). Why do we request it?
Nico Popescu (NP): The starting point for this paper is the request to increase the velocity in administrative decisions. We have so compared this where Europe is presently in safety with fire trucks, police cars or ambulances. Most of the time these vehicles decision at average speed, but erstwhile an emergency occurs (accident or another incident), they turn on sirens due to the fact that they must rapidly scope the scene. If a fire truck, police or ambulance doesn't arrive in time, people could die. Any delays are so dangerous.
As far as European safety is concerned, we are now witnessing the top war on European dirt since planet War II. In the face of specified a crisis, resources, defence spending are needed, but we must besides act rapidly – erstwhile it comes to placing arms orders or strengthening electricity and energy infrastructure. In a crisis situation, a simple pace for administrative procedures cannot be applied.
Our institutions became highly slow, as if they were stuck in traffic. If we look at how slow European Union countries are spending money from the NextGenerationEU Fund (COVID-19 reconstruction fund), we will see that most EU countries spent about 1 3rd of the money they were going to spend. Moreover, a very tiny part of cohesion funds was spent on time.
Furthermore, imagine that during planet War II, erstwhile Americans and British made public purchases for the intent of carrying out a landing in Normandy in 1944, they would apply today's public purchasing procedures. If that were the case, the landing in Normandy would have taken place at the earliest in 1950 or 55 – surely not in 1944. That is why we must act rapidly in times of crisis.
We request to be able to rapidly place orders for military equipment as well as for various non-military areas – specified as energy or infrastructure modernisation. It is not only about spending more money (although more funds are needed) but besides about utilizing our existing funds, which should be easier to shift to fresh priorities, due to the fact that there is simply a war in the area.
LJ: Should cohesion funds be utilized for these purposes? Or do we request fresh legislation, or do we request a fresh institution to effort to mobilise and institutionalise them? How do you think this imagination can be achieved in practice, given that many countries hold their prerogatives in these circumstantial areas and only in times of crisis the EU manages to increase its usual consequence rate?
NP: We request both. We request fresh administrative procedures, which will be based on laws or regulations - and we request them at both EU and national level.
In our publication, we argue that we request a European counterpart to the US Defence Production Act, which is simply a legal act adopted in the early 1950s in the United States and allows the American executive authority to spend money rapidly in crisis situations. Therefore, they sometimes usage it to support investigation or order arms, but they besides usage it for non-military purposes. It was used, for example, to facilitate the import of solar panels into the United States in the context of the request to accelerate the green transition. They even utilized it to make baby milk.
The US Defence Production Act is simply a reasonably flexible legal instrument that allows you to act rapidly in crisis situations and put aside peace procedures that are usually slow. In Europe, any countries do so at national level.
In 2022, in the face of the Russian war in Ukraine, Germany adopted a legal act called LNG Acceleration Act as they had to rapidly build LNG terminals alternatively than at a standard rate, at which formalities last 5 years before physical infrastructure could be built.
Now in the Netherlands, the government is discussing a bill that is to more or little mimic the American Defence Production Act. However, the problem is that not only Germany or the Netherlands request specified legislation, and not only in the LNG sector. We request them at European level if we want to make cross-border projects quickly. Therefore, we must not only work on the legal side, but besides find better ways to reallocate existing measures.
Although we have unused funds in the budget of the European Union (as well as in improvement banks specified as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank or the Council of Europe improvement Bank), all these banks have funds, but usually do not have peculiar procedures to accelerate the allocation of funds in crisis situations for countries that request urgent solutions to pressing problems.
That is why this advice (in the light of fresh news that the European Union is looking for ways to facilitate the reallocation of petition measures) is completely logical. This is something we all request to do, due to the fact that Europe can no longer be as slow as it was in responding to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, or to the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. We all request to respond to crises much faster.
LJ: east EU members undoubtedly consider Russia an existential threat to their security. This approach is reflected in the GDP allocated to defence in the Baltic countries, as well as in Poland and Romania. At the same time, it is hard to imagine that Italy or Germany share the same perspective. Is it possible to introduce a fresh common model of consequence to specified an crucial threat without escalation of the war in NATO?
NP: Firstly, it is in the interests of all (including Italy, Portugal or Spain) that Europe should be strong so that NATO and the European Union can survive. If the Russians proceed to decision forward in Ukraine and if they scope the external border of NATO and the European Union (the borders of Poland or Romania), then they will even more endanger the full western democratic organization architecture.
Some say that Ukraine's assistance poses besides much hazard in terms of atomic tensions with Russia. In fact, I believe that it is the opposite, and the best way to minimise the future hazard of atomic tensions is to make certain that Russia does not get besides close to the European Union border and does not do so with conventional weapons. The best way to halt future risks – whether conventional or atomic – as far as possible from NATO's political agenda and borders and the European Union is to guarantee that the Russian army is as far distant as possible from NATO and EU borders. And the only way to do that is to aid Ukraine supply conventional weapons.
It is simply a sad reality, but it is definitely an crucial issue. The way this war changes Europe represents an existential threat not only to the safety of many European countries, but besides to the organization architecture in which Europe (including Western Europe) has been built in the last 80 years.
This is so a threat to all, including Italy and Portugal. no of these countries are large adequate to substance in a globalised planet without allies. If we compare this with the threat that COVID-19 posed to the European economy, then it should be remembered that the European Union borrowed EUR 800 million. In the meantime, she was incapable to draw up a money lending strategy to keep the war as far distant from the borders of the European Union as possible. So it's kind of a paradox.
LJ: With respect to ammunition production, what should be done with unused production capacity in EU factories? What about the interconnectors between Moldova and Romania that were not created at the time erstwhile they were very needed? And finally, within existing institutions, government and funds, what can we do differently to improve the situation, provided there is political will to do so?
NP: Interconnection between Moldova and Romania arises but it is besides slow. It should be ready – and it would have been if urgent safety procedures had been followed, which did not happen. There are many another Kafkovsky examples of this phenomenon.
In 2020 or 2021, the Ukrainian Road Construction Agency received large funds (EUR 100 million) for road renovation in the Luhansk Oblast. And then, erstwhile the war began, and Russia began to occupy the region, Ukraine could no longer repair roads in this part of its territory. Therefore, this EUR 100 million was to be allocated for another purposes to Ukraine. However, the procedure was so terribly slow that at 1 point Ukraine decided that it was not worth trying to change the allocation of funds. In a crisis situation, this was completely absurd. It was not possible to usage this money for another intent (e.g. grain retention or electrical infrastructure) due to the fact that peacetime procedures were applied to a situation that required fast solutions – not 2 years of paperwork.
There have been many another absurd situations of this kind, which means that the European Union needs to revise its procedures in a way that allows for peculiar procedures in the event of a war or a major crisis, otherwise Europe will become weaker and lose its global dimension, but besides its coherence and ability to compete in the economical sphere.
We see that many European voters are dissatisfied with the ruling parties. We can observe the failures in France, Germany and large Britain. In Britain, the government lost the election only a fewer months ago. There is no uncertainty a large opposition to the ruling parties. However, if we look at how rapidly the European Union is spending funds from the COVID-19 recovery fund, this is absurd.
Therefore, alternatively of uncovering ways to spend money rapidly to stimulate the European economy, as well as making European political systems not so powerfully influenced by the popular vote of voters, we have created procedures that are so impervious that they prevent governments from spending money rapidly to relieve the burden of the economy after COVID-19 or aid Ukraine rapidly adequate in a wide scope of issues. This creates a dangerous situation for Europe.
LJ: Does the European Commission meet general expectations? What needs to happen to become a little complex bureaucratic institution, and a more strategical actor who sets his own goals and is more flexible in achieving them erstwhile things turn bad?
NP: What has happened in the last 3 years (also in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic) has caused political awareness that something needs to be done urgently. surely the leadership of the European Commission, as well as the management of the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, see the burning nature of what needs to be done. However, we inactive request appropriate legal procedures to be developed by legal departments and hazard analysis bodies. They all operate on protocols that have been designed not for the crisis, but for a slow, free, peaceful pace. That is why it is not just a substance of political will.
There is very frequently political will, but we besides request appropriate adjustments to the institutions that will let swift administrative proceedings. We have inactive not seen the appropriate adjustment of the European institutions, which would make Europe better prepared for crises - besides in the future.
LJ: This brings us to the discussion of the enlargement of the EU to Moldova. What is the current situation in Moldova after Russia's full invasion of Ukraine? And what was the reason for the fresh referendum with the presidential election?
NP: Apart from Ukraine, Moldova is the country most affected by the negative consequences of the war. I do not want to underestimate the impact of the war on Ukraine due to the fact that it was a million times more dramatic and tragic. But of another countries, Moldova is most likely the most affected country in many areas.
Moldova had to deal with the large exile crisis. Compared to the population of Moldova, its GDP and resources to manage it, this was much more hard than in Slovakia, Armenia or Poland. Moreover, Moldova had serious economical problems due to the war. Investors were much more careful in investing their money in a country just outside the war zone.
As a result, the costs of regional logistics, supply and transport chains increased. In the meantime, many people in France or Poland were dissatisfied with inflation, while in Moldova all these problems were even greater, and the government had little financial means to compensate and alleviate the economical shocks caused by the war. The context is so complicated.
Over the past fewer weeks, Moldova has held presidential elections and a referendum on the introduction of a mention to EU accession to the Constitution. Maia Sandu won the presidential election and regained her ticket with 11% advantage, which is truly an amazing result.
Meanwhile, worldwide, especially in democratic states, the current rulers are being punished by voters. Over the past fewer years, fresh governments have come to power in the United States, Poland, large Britain, Germany, Finland and Italy, and people have been dissatisfied with inflation and price levels. As a result, the Moldovans one more time advocated a pro-European government, elected Maia Sandu for a fresh word and voted in favour of a referendum on the EU, clearly demonstrates a very advanced degree of resilience to existing problems.
Nevertheless, these problems proceed to weaken the Moldovan economy, the level of optimism in society and assurance in the political strategy in general. All these structural problems have been exacerbated in Moldova in fresh months by a very aggressive Russian programme to buy votes on a massive scale.
Russia has distributed at least 138,000 bank cards to Moldovan citizens through oligarchs, representing around 10% of the full number of voters in Moldova. any of these people were paid for respective months to get them to vote in the way Russia told them to. The authorities know all telephone number related to the case due to the fact that the persons who installed the Russian bank's application received text messages during the installation process and cash payments to their bank accounts, which was recorded in the mobile operators' data.
It's not just speculation. We are talking about a reasonably clear situation where almost 10% of voters installed the Russian bank app on their phones and received cash for their vote. This is simply a very dramatic fresh form of hybrid war that complements misinformation and many another methods to destabilise Moldova.
The good news is, between the first and second rounds of presidential elections, the authorities have rather importantly opposed this strategy of buying votes. Therefore, judging by the results – although it is hard to give precise figures – it seems that the opposition to this mechanics worked to a greater or lesser degree on a crucial number of people who sold their vote in the first circular of presidential elections, but who had their opposition to specified a proceeding in the second circular erstwhile they saw that the point was not that you would get 100 euros for selling your vote, but that you could besides be fined, detained or could be brought against you by the police and end up in the justice system. This most likely stopped many people from selling their votes in the second round, and consequently the results better reflected the will of the voters.
LJ: It appears that Maia Sandu wanted to make the presidential election a referendum on Moldova's European future. In retrospect, did the polarisation of voters along organization lines in the EU substance make sense? possibly this is an issue that would enable more voters to support the European Union?
NP: It is besides late to speculate about what would be better, and in retrospect it is always easier to have a circumstantial opinion. The EU referendum showed that in the first circular of Maia Sandu received 43% of the vote, while the amendment of the constitution and the introduction of a mention to the EU or respective references to the EU to the Constitution gained 50.4% of the vote. That is why, in the first round, more people voted for the EU than for Maia Sandu.
At the same time, around 10% of the votes bought besides affected the final result, which became little convincing erstwhile all public opinion surveys came forward. I myself was active in carrying out civilian society activities aimed at informing about the European Union and resisting lies and propaganda spread about the EU.
Consider another analogy. Everyone considers Donald Trump the recently elected president. erstwhile we look at media reports and communications from the Democratic Party, people are talking about Donald Trump's crushing triumph and giving him a mandate to implement his political priorities. However, if we look at the exact numbers, Donald Trump was voted the same number of people as in 2020 (74 million, 49.9% of all voters). This is so somewhat little than the consequence of the EU referendum in Moldova. Despite this, it was around the result of the referendum that a serious discussion was brewing.
However, the debate on the referendum is already over. The Constitution is already being amended. And now the current and future governments will gotta make certain that they implement the essential reforms as shortly as possible to bring Moldova into the European Union.
It became clear what we already knew about Brexit and the French referendum on the European Constitution in 2005, which did not respond positively. The referendum is no uncertainty a double-edged sword. Sometimes a question is asked, and very frequently voters answer, which is not the answer to that question, but alternatively a reflection of what they think about government or the economy.
LJ: How will Moldova change its position in the face of the imagination of EU integration? How will the Moldovan government address the issue of parliamentary elections that may be even more crucial to Moldova's future? And what is to be expected in the field of integration with the EU and at national level on these issues?
NP: The next year will be very hard for Moldova. We are facing parliamentary elections, and developments in Ukraine stay unclear. We do not know how the front line will move, whether there will be a peace agreement and how long it will last. Therefore, all these talks between the fresh American administration on the future of Ukraine cast a shadow on Moldovan politics and social attitudes towards national political players, as well as towards Europe, the United States and Ukraine. All this creates a very hard context for the situation in which Moldova is located.
In addition, the force from Russia is not weakening. Russia is most likely inactive investing money in its election plan, refining it, trying to find better ways to enter the vote besides next time. Meanwhile, the Moldovan economy is inactive suffering from the effects of the war. We besides observe mass misinformation.
Moldova has survived many crises over the past 30 years. Regardless of this fact, even if last period Moldova one more time confirmed its willingness to enter the pro-European path. Nevertheless, the context is very complicated and it is likely to be so in the future.
It will so be highly crucial that Moldova continues to receive support from its partners and that this happens very quickly. due to the fact that erstwhile we talk about infrastructure improvement in Moldova, in a crisis situation it is truly not wise to offer grants and then spend 5 years on paperwork before these grants become real bridges and roads. 3 or 5 years is besides long.
There is so a request to increase velocity in the operation and scope of the assistance, which is highly crucial for Moldova's political and economical realities. This will have a crucial geopolitical impact on Moldova's global position in the region, which remains dangerous.
This podcast was produced by the European Liberal Forum in collaboration with the Movieno Liberal Social and the Liberté Foundation!, with the financial support of the European Parliament. Neither the European Parliament nor the European Liberal Forum are liable for the content of the podcast nor for any way of utilizing it.
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Read ECFR report: https://ecfr.eu/publication/better-firefighting-reading-europe-for-an-age-between-war-and-peace/
Dr. Olga Łabendowicz translated from English
Read English at 4liberty.eu
