Kai Kallas Age. Estonian diplomacy in salons

The Russian invasion of Ukraine acted as an accelerator for Estonian diplomacy. The communicative of a million-year country on the outskirts of the European Union on the reality of the threats on the part of Russia has become 1 of the major voices of the east NATO flank influencing the debate in the EU. This success of Tallinn was the consequence of a confluence of respective factors – an increase in European criticism of Russia, the effort of the state apparatus and the charisma of then Prime Minister Kai Kallas. It was her position, contacts and kind of policy that made Estonia's voice audible and Kallas herself managed to become head of EU diplomacy. However, the challenge for Tallinn and the erstwhile Prime Minister remains to keep the position gained. This is peculiarly crucial in the context of the translation of Kallas' views critical of Russia into political decisions against which any European countries will be skeptical.

Firstly, Ukraine

As a consequence of the outbreak of full-scale war in Ukraine, crucial changes took place in the improvement of Estonian abroad policy. Prime Minister Kaja Kallas played a key function (from 2021 to 2021), marginalising the position of successive abroad ministers^[1]. As a result, it was associated internationally as the face of Estonian diplomacy. The issue of political, moral and material support for Ukraine became a precedence of Tallinn's activity at this time^[2]. The symbolic words spoken by Kallas in April 2022 were: “What is the problem of our neighbour [Ukraine] present will be our problem tomorrow. We are in danger erstwhile the home of our neighbour is on fire”^[3].

Kallas's abroad policy course was barely different from before. This 1 has always been defined by the neighbourhood with the Russian Federation – it has conditioned the state's strategy and action. By 2004, Estonia's nonsubjective was to enter the Western structures – NATO and the EU – and to strengthen relations with the Nordic and Baltic countries. After 2014, safety issues came to the fore. This process has led to the improvement and strengthening of cooperation with individual countries. The most crucial partners in Estonia in this area are the USA and, subsequently, the United Kingdom, which is the framework country of the Alliance's national militant group^[4]. peculiar safety relations are besides linked with Paris – the French armed forces are present in Estonia, and this 1 actively engaged in French operations in the Sahel^[5]. Cooperation in the Nordic-Baltic region, with peculiar emphasis on Finland, which is part of the same cultural ellipse and is Estonia's closest economical partner, is besides an crucial place in neighbouring relations.

Kallas is on the line.

By the spring of 2025, Estonian military aid to Ukraine amounted to more than EUR 0.5 billion, humanitarian aid of more than EUR 26 million, and at least EUR 12 million were allocated for developmental aid to Ukraine.^[6]. Estonian support became an effective tool of public diplomacy there, which stressed that Tallinn is 1 of the leaders of aid for Kiev in relation to GDP^[7].

In addition, Estonia, being 1 of the first countries to officially inform about the dispatch of weapons (anti-tank grenades) to Ukraine, tried to break the political taboo on declarations of arms supply^[8]. Her support for Kiev and the clarity of the Estonian Prime Minister attracted the interest of Western media. Kallas powerfully criticized not only Russia's invasion and its war crimes, but besides the deficiency of leadership and even the failure of large European states – France and Germany^[9]. In this way she managed to build an attractive image for the media – a young, brave politician, in addition to the European liberal mainstream. The Estonian improvement Party, which Kallas then headed, belongs to the same political group (Renew Europe) as the revival of Emmanuel Macron.

The media success of Kallas, which was proclaimed “Estonian iron lady”^[10], the future Secretary-General of NATO or Vladimir Putin's individual opponent sought by the Russian MMA, positively influenced the designation of the full state.

Image success has been translated into a tool to advance Estonia's interests. Tallinn utilized the policy-specific instrument of tiny countries – ‘leadership through example’, which has proved effective in favourable conditions and in certain policy aspects. The implementation of national sanctions against Russia, decisions to increase defence spending or demands, specified as the transfer of 0.25% of GDP per year to support Ukraine, were a manifestation of Estonian ambitions to set abroad policy guidelines for another European countries. Estonia wanted to prosecute an effective policy above its capacity and resources, and media publicity around Kallas allowed this to any extent; Tallinn influenced the European debate.

Kallas, Macron and the road to Europe

As time passed, Estonian attempts to proceed the "exemplary" policy have lost effectiveness, and in any case not as effective as the media headlines and global popularity of Kallas might suggest. However, Estonians managed to advance their own proposals^[11], e.g. on the EU initiative to transfer artillery ammunition to Ukraine in spring 2023. Estonia besides appears to have been successful in spreading the thought of EU usage of frozen Russian assets^[12].

In 2023, however, her influence began to shrink. On the 1 hand, Kallas' problems in the country, linked to the scandal surrounding her husband Arvo Hallika, Estonian media revealed that the company in which he had participated, continued to operate in Russia. On the another hand, the embarrassment of large European countries has stopped. Their rapidly changing attitude towards the ongoing war to a more firm attitude towards Moscow and their recovery of initiatives led Tallinn to request to find a partner among them in order to accomplish his goals.

The rational choice was Paris – even despite Macron's epic criticism^[13]. A favourable condition was the changes in French abroad policy at the turn of 2022 and 2023, erstwhile the country moved from seeking an agreement with the Russian Federation to a more assertive position geared towards supporting Ukraine^[14]. Kallas' contacts among the European Liberals were surely a affirmative circumstance.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the French military presence in Estonia (existing since 2017) has been modified and adopted a continuous rotational model. It is temporarily expanded by reconnaissance, artillery and even company paratroopers as part of the exercise. Tallinn alternatively increased the interest in the French arms sector. In the summertime of 2023 he ordered more radars (GM 400) from Thales^[15], 12 self-propelled cannons were collected^[16] and an unspecified number of very short scope anti-aircraft missiles to MISTRAL systems^[17]. In the last 3 years, France has advanced to the 3rd (after Germany and the US) arms supplier for the Estonian Armed Forces.

In the fall of 2023 and in the spring of 2024, political convergence took place between Estonia under Kallas and France Macron. Kallas' frequent visits to Paris were to strengthen Tallinn's political strength, as well as to item Paris' efforts to support the fighting Ukraine and its presence on the east flank of NATO^[18]. The strengthening of relations besides increased Estonia's position on the European stage. Kallas' appointment as advanced typical of the Union for abroad Affairs in mid-2024 and its subsequent selection would not be possible without the support of the Liberal faction of the EP and France^[19].

Eternal Prime Minister

Kallas' appointment as head of EU diplomacy has raised concrete hopes in the east countries of NATO flanks, specified as Poland and the Baltic and Nordic countries. The main hope was to keep interest in war in Ukraine^[20] and changing European abroad policy to more active. The biggest anticipation in the region was a more stringent approach to the Russian Federation. Accordingly, Kallas brought Estonian sensitivity and position to her fresh work. This was reflected, for example, by her message during her first visit to Kiev as a advanced typical erstwhile she declared that "The European Union wants Ukraine to win this War’.

Prioritising the ongoing Russian invasion in any EU circles was perceived as Kallas' disadvantage as head of European diplomacy^[21]. Her declaration from Kiev met with the negative assessment of Olaf Scholz, critical of Estonia being Hungary. The dispute field in the Union is besides the mediate East policy, the Global South policy and the issue of EU enlargement. The optics of the front state, which Kallas presents, besides remains incomprehensible in confederate Europe. However, the main problem is not the European states and politicians who do not share their views, but their kind of politics.

The experience of erstwhile political activity of Kallas at national level indicates that it is hard to scope a consensus on issues which it considers to be of rule (e.g. support for Ukraine). In many cases, erstwhile she made decisions in Estonia, she acted against coalitionists or public opinion. The main feature of the erstwhile Prime Minister in the opinion of Estonian political life observers was the difficulty in building a compromise and teamwork within the government coalition^[22]. What characterized her actions in national politics – tenacity, tenacity and harsh language, she utilized to gain popularity in European salons. However, these features in an authoritative liable for implementing the EU policy based on building a broad consensus of 27 countries are alternatively counterproductive^[23].

It was Kallas' stubbornness that most likely led to the failure of 1 of her first major initiatives – the EU aid package of Ukraine^[24] – March 2025. European media has until late favoured Estonia's deficiency of professionalism and aversion to dialogue, claiming that it inactive acts as if it were in the position of Prime Minister^[25]. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Politico portals, citing Brussels politicians, pointed to its deficiency of wider consultation and seeking widespread support for the initiative before it was proposed. Kallas has a problem with the interior contradiction of her function – as the head of European diplomacy, she wants to be the leader of EU abroad policy in a time of worsening global situation, while at the same time having to play the function of a compromise midwife for the 27 associate States. Its primary challenge is to break the existing, rigid and conservative patterns of the functioning of the Brussels bureaucracy apparatus.

Looking for a fresh place in Europe

Kallas' departure to European level closed a phase in Tallinn's abroad policy. fresh Prime Minister Kristen Michal and erstwhile Head of National Diplomacy Margus Tsahkna^[26], who have assumed work for abroad policy, have neither a force of force nor a position comparable to the erstwhile Prime Minister. Although Estonia continues its policy, which Kallas has set up, this does not deliver the desired results. Tallinn's demands are no longer so medial, and consequently, they are little and little frequent in European debate. It is now only thanks to Kallas' presence in Brussels that it is possible to keep any of Estonia's informal impact on the EU agenda.

The key to Estonian achievements from the period 2022 to 2024 was the efficient leadership, which was able to attract the attention of the European elite and the media, while bringing respective Estonian support projects to the agenda. The problem now is not only the deficiency of a leader, but besides the request to adapt to the rapidly changing situation in the planet after Donald Trump assumed the office of president of the United States.

Tallinn must balance between the directions that have so far seemed synergistic – between more predictable cooperation with European allies (Great Britain and France) and cooperation with the presently unforeseeable United States. Lack of leadership and so failure of position of 1 of the leading support countries Ukraine and lobbying for a more assertive policy towards Russia is more the consequence of global change than actual marginalisation.

In the close future, Estonia's decline in European policy will be balanced by its commitment to regional cooperation, with peculiar emphasis on Nordic-Baltic 8 (NB8). Although this format has been in existence since the early 1990s, late its cooperation has been tightened, and for Tallinn NB8 it is simply a club of similar-minded countries.