The January Uprising, 1 of the biggest Polish uprisings, was praised as a heroic act. However, if they are assessed rationally, critical conclusions request to be drawn. For the full nation paid the price for a romanticist leap, and lost everything that was just to lose.
Liberal ruler – a sign of a weakness of the possessor?
Let us remind that the erstwhile uprising of 1831 cost Poles the failure of their own state (dependent but yet separate) and the conversion of the Polish Kingdom into a Russian province. Polish institutions – parliament, government, army, money, university – disappeared. For 25 years the country sank into the “night of Paskiewicz” i.e. vegetation under the regulation of the politician – commander of possessive troops.
The situation began to improve after the defeat of Russia in the Crimean war (against Russia, and in defence of Turkey, the erstwhile enemies – France and large Britain – allied themselves). The fall of the port of Sevastopol in 1855 was a shock to Russia – it was no longer Europe's first power. On the Russian throne there was a change – after despotic Nicholas I came his liberal boy Alexander II.
Nevertheless, there have been changes in the Kingdom – an amnesty was announced for erstwhile insurgents, relaxed russification, allowed to establish associations. The wave of patriotic demonstrations in 1860-1861 was bloodyly suppressed, but it besides had a affirmative effect, in the form of further liberalisation. Warsaw again gained the Polish higher school and the civilian regulation over the country took over the margrave of Wielopolski. In turn he did good work without publicity – as he could, so limited the tsaric activists, and introduced the Polish administration.
France will no longer support
At that time many Poles hoped to help... Emperor Napoleon. For France was ruled by Napoleon III (cesar since 1852), the nephew of the ruler of the same name. but Napoleon I (cessor 1804-1815) was a military genius, and thanks to his talent he temporarily ruled half of Europe. However, Napoleon III, although rather fluent in economics (a free trade supporter), did not have any shadow of the commanding capacity of the namesake. In the future, this was to painfully verify the war against Prussia (1870).
France, on the another hand, had no interest or chance to fight alone in the defence of distant Poland. This Polish Romantics did not take into account (because realistic reasoning of them was not their strong side).
January brand — Margrave error
At the end of 1862, the opponent of the conspirators, Margrave Wielopolski, bid. He appointed a brand for January 1863, i.e. conscription to the Russian army (and the service in this army lasted then and 20 years). At the same time, the Branka was to be based on name lists (not on a draw, as before). The calculation of margrabi was simple – to incarnate rebels into the army, send them into Russia, and proceed in peace to improvement the country. At the same time, he knew that the maximum goal was limited Kingdom autonomy—and he assumed that this was what he could achieve.
Wielopolski (politicist as intelligent as arrogant) however, has miscalculated. He underestimated his opponents – desperate conspirators. They were not deterred by the word of the planned brand, which became the date of the outbreak (as is known, the winter period is the hardest for guerrilla activities). possibly he just mistakenly assumed that opponents like him would be guided by a reasonable profit and failure account, so they would gotta let go. Either way, margrave lost, and together with him lost his concept – peaceful reforms and the autonomy of the kingdom within the Empire. erstwhile the uprising lasted six months – Wielopolski resigned and left the country.
Aleksander Sochaczewski "Good-bye to Europe" – a painting depicting exiles to Siberia after the January Uprising
The boys went into a fight without guns.
The uprising broke out in the mediate of winter, with forces of respective 1000 conspirators. They mostly had hunting firearms or scythes embedded in the storm. As an opponent, they had a regular Russian army of any 100,000 people, including in addition controlling all major cities, and late besides having railway transport (which was very useful in supplying supplies to Russians).
The insurgents did not have January or what their predecessors had 30 years ago – i.e. a tiny but regular, trained and well armed army. The 1863 uprising was necessarily a partisan war. This can only go in hard terrain (when central Poland is simply a lowland country), or with effective support from 3rd countries.
There were 2 candidates (in the imagination of insurgents) – France and Austria. no of them gave this aid due to the fact that they had no interest in it (and did not want to hazard war with Russia, inactive possibly dangerous). The insurgents did not consider this, due to the fact that geopolitics was alien to them, and alternatively of strategical reasoning they had militant phrases.
Neither the courage of the insurgents, nor respective capable commanders (led by the last dictator R. Traugutt) could overpower the Russian advantage in men and equipment. The disadvantageous power difference was simply besides big.
Losing Poles, Bismarck's Win
It was foreseeable that the Polish guerrillas lost to the regular army after a twelve months. The full nation paid for a romanticist outburst. The reforms of Poland were abolished, the Main School and the Polish administration were abolished, the russification of education was raging for 40 years (a good change brought revolution 1905). Poles paid for the uprising of thousands killed, the failure of wealth, the exile of many patriots to Siberia. All this during the reign of liberal Tsar Alexander, who did not violate (or even strengthen) the autonomy of specified Finland. Why? due to the fact that there were no rebellions there.
The enemy of Poles – Prussian Chancellor Otto Bismarck – did not lose his opportunity. On the uprising, he besides benefited, concluding a bilateral agreement with Russia, and providing a neutrality for Prussia in the coming wars with Austria and France. The effects of his actions (in the function of Prime Minister and Chancellor) were powerfully negative for Poles of Prussian partition. 1 can even hazard the thesis that he was the main winner of the failed uprising.
Without a rise, you can also
The best argument against the uprising (apart from Finland's example) is the destiny of the neighbouring Austrian Galicia. There was no mass uprising. After 2 lost wars (with France and Prussia), the Emperor from Vienna gave the Poles autonomy – this was a maximum to be obtained in the conditions of the time.
That's precisely how much he could and wanted to play Wielopolski margrave in the Russian partition (many more popular and richer). We would then have 2 “good” invaders (except Austrian and Russian) and only 1 “bad” (the Prussian one) who, in addition, could not afford besides much repression against Poles.
Instead, we played lost 40 years, human dramas (death, exile, exile) counted in thousands and strengthened the man to be fought (Bismarck). This is what happens erstwhile a nation is driven by a heartbeat alternatively of a reasonable calculation. Romanticism in politics just doesn't pay off.
Michał Wirtel
