"The planet under tension" is an first series of talks created by an apprentice of the Institute of fresh Europe. Its goal is to describe the most crucial challenges of the modern planet – from wars and crises to information safety and geopolitical change. The publications are created on the basis of discussions with people active in global affairs – analysts, diplomats, researchers and practitioners – in order to combine reliability with accessibility.
Society, army, power. Ukraine in the 3rd year of war.
Since 2014, the Ukrainian National defender has undergone a crucial transformation, responding to the challenges facing the country. Today, this model of formation functioning at the interface of the army, society and state can be an inspiration to many Western states. Since its inception, by today's function – including individuals specified as Azov, to issues of elite, controversy and information threats from Russia
The guest of the second interview in the “World under tension” cycle is Dr. Dariusz Materniak, a safety expert who specializes in Polish-Ukrainian relations and the situation in Central and east Europe. Editor-in-chief of the portalPolukr.net, president of the Polish-Ukraine investigation Centre Foundation, author of many analyses and expert comments on safety policy and global relations. In the conversation, he presents the subject of the National defender – its evolution, the place in Ukraine's defence strategy and the importance during the hybrid war.
Veronica Barankevy: From today's perspective, how do you measure the function of the defender in Ukraine's safety system? Is this a full pillar of state defence, or is it inactive a force of peculiar purpose?
Dr Dariusz Materniak: In my opinion, this is simply a very crucial component – and from the very beginning of the war, that is, since 2014, erstwhile the National defender was established as a separate formation. Although it was not entirely fresh – the National defender had already existed (1991-2000) before it was disbanded and replaced by the interior Forces – it was re-established in 2014 as a formation of a fresh character. And even then, she played an crucial role. First of all, due to the fact that the threats that occurred first in Crimea and then in Donbasa and in another regions did not belong, especially at the first stage, to those that could be neutralized only by classical military means.
The military fights in a way, I would say, mass. The imagination of war – which it learns in military academies, both in Poland, Ukraine and in most countries – is based on a classical model: artillery shelling, the usage of armoured-mechanized forces and aviation, leading to conflict resolution. Meanwhile, the situation at the beginning of the Donbasa conflict was different. There were irregular armed groups operating there, which usually mixed with the civilian population. It was impossible, contrary to what Russian propaganda says, to level the full region with the ground, to bomb it with aviation or artillery. More precise action was needed. And it was at the interface of the strictly military and civilian planet that an intermediate formation had to appear – between an army utilizing kinetic means of combat and structures liable for interior order. The creation of a National defender based on the erstwhile Home Army was so a very appropriate solution.
The defender responds to hybrid threats – it combines the competences and capabilities of military units (some of the subdivisions have, for example, tanks, artillery), but on the another hand it can act more flexibly – apply measures closer to police, soft, not necessarily immediately leading to shooting, large harm or casualties, especially among civilians.
In hybrid conditions, this is highly important. Therefore, I believe that the National defender is simply a essential formation and already present has its permanent place in Ukraine's defence system. And in my opinion, this place will be crucial for a long time.
VB: And what are the operational differences between defender units and regular armed forces? Do they have any clear specializations, specified as urban activities or infrastructure protection?
DM: Surely they disagree primarily in the doctrine of action. As I mentioned earlier, their actions do not necessarily boil down to massive shelling or the usage of classical military instruments. frequently these are orderly actions, geared towards cooperation with the civilian population – not always armed, but stabilising. specified specialization surely exists. It is easier to deal with hybrid formation threats, which besides have police competence. As far as specialisation is concerned, including in the field of combating terrorism, there is inactive an Omega unit operating in the structures of the National Guard, which was formerly part of the Ukrainian MMA and served as an anti-terrorism sub-unit.
Figure 1. "Omega" peculiar unit – an elite formation of the National defender of Ukraine, specialized in counter-terrorism and operations behind the lines of defence.
Source: Own improvement based onMilitaryLand.net
I'm going back to hybrid threats. These are frequently situations that cannot be clearly classified – these are not classical military threats, but besides not those that average police can handle. This is why the intermediate formation, specified as the Guards, can respond effectively to them. It is part of a broader trend, which began in the 1990s, during many peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, Somalia or another regions. Then, if I remember correctly, the Americans felt that a fresh formation – or alternatively a doctrine of action – was needed to aid them win the alleged "war of hearts and minds." It active activities carried out in areas of peace or stableness operations specified as those in Iraq or Afghanistan in 2001 and 2003 and later, as part of Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraq Freedom.
It was then, as a consequence of the experience of the mission, among others NATO and the UN, that the alleged CIMIC teams were formed – with the eng. Civil-Military Cooperation. The first was formed in the American Army, partially as a conclusion from the Vietnam War experience. There, the effort to gain the assurance of the civilian population was unsuccessful – mostly by inadequate measures. First the jungle and villages were bombed, and then they tried to fight for the trust of the same people. It just couldn't work. CIMIC teams were later besides formed in another armies that participated in peace missions. In Poland, if I remember correctly, the first specified structures began to be created on the occasion of the stabilisation mission in Kosovo, in the turn of 1999 and 2000. Currently, each brigade in the WP has its own section for civil-military cooperation – section S9. For example, the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian LITPOLUKRBRIG brigade in Lublin besides has a CIMIC team.
All this shows that today, in the armed forces – not only Ukrainians – there is simply a request for hybrid structures that are capable of acting under non-standard conditions akin to those in Ukraine between 2014 and 2021.
Because now we have a full-scale war – this is simply a completely different situation. But that period of counter-terrorism and subsequent combined forces operation was precisely that time “between”.
VB: And in the context of a long-term war, how do you justice a change in the model of the National Guard? Is it becoming more of a frontal formation, or is it inactive maintaining civilian and police functions?
DM: In any sense, he surely does – at least to any extent. This can be seen from the tasks carried out by the soldiers of the National Guard, not only on the front line or in the immediate back, but besides in the cities – most frequently I met them in Kiev, but besides in another smaller towns.
The evolution of the Guards towards a more frontal direction was evident especially at the time erstwhile fresh brigades began to be created – including the National defender Brigade. This was in early 2023, and the thought itself active a planned counteroffensive that yet began in June of the same year. It was assumed that after the front line had been moved and the occupied areas had been recovered, a formation capable of acting among civilians would be needed – and it was the defender who was to fulfil this role. The thought was good, although the offensive itself failed.
On the another hand, this evolution of the Guards was besides due to war necessity. The Ukrainian army suffered crucial losses, so it was essential to increase the front possible – both in terms of people and equipment. Hence the decision to make these fresh brigades – there was simply no another option.
In my opinion, this change was so mostly forced by the realities of war. This was a consequence to the needs of a country carrying out long-term armed activities.
VB: It is hard not to announcement that the defender began to make its capabilities more innovative – from cyberspace, through FPV drones, to reconnaissance. Does that mean that it ceases to be just a force of support and can already be called the leader of military innovation?
DM: A leader – hard to say. The improvement of these capabilities was mostly forced by the situation on the front line. If the unit operates and is liable for a circumstantial segment, it is natural that it must comply with the requirements imposed by the current situation. It was simply a necessity – in order to last in this episode and carry out tasks, it was essential to control to a way of functioning, which is utilized by another military units.
As much as 1 can talk about leadership in the field of innovation – I think it depends on people. Much depends on the approach of the leadership, both the management of the full formation and the commanders of individual units.
The brigade level is the level at which many fresh solutions are introduced or tested. In those units where there is simply a greater knowing of fresh needs, there are more frequent changes – in arms, equipment or tactics of conducting operations.
Figure 2. Transformation of the National defender of Ukraine (1991-2025)
Source: Own improvement based on open data
VB: Did Azov's successes affect the prestige of the full National Guard, but is this unit seen as a separate brand?
DM: Both, I think. Azov is definitely a brand in itself, but at the same time works in favour of the full formation. There are many individuals in the National Guard, but it is Azov who is the most recognisable and well-known – in a sense he "will carry along" the opinion of the full Guard.
VB: And to what degree is Azov's controversial past inactive present in the global debate? Are these allegations inactive hindering cooperation with Western partners, or have they been clarified?
DM: It keeps coming back. Even in Poland – if you look at social media – you can see that there are inactive stories created by Russian propaganda, which “will pull” behind this unit.
Does that make it harder to work together today? surely little than before. In the period 2014-2020, there were definitely more fake news about Azów – besides at global level. I remember that even in the U.S. legislature there were proposals to limit the cooperation or supply of arms to Azov, based mainly on information duplicated by Russian misinformation.
Today, most of these charges are rightly treated as part of Russia's information war. Although it must be admitted that in the past there have been people with a past in controversial organizations or utilizing highly controversial symbolism – I mean tattoos or pictures with symbols that can be misread or straight identified with neo-Nazi and akin movements.
This does not concern only Azov, but many Ukrainian formations – besides regular army. There is sometimes a deficiency of awareness among the soldiers themselves that any signs or symbols can negatively affect the image Ukraine as a state leading a fair defence war against the aggressor, Russia.
A simple example: at the station – whether in Lviv or Kiev – you can meet a soldier with an eagle-like patch of the 3rd Reich. The only difference is that he holds not a swastika, but a trident. But at first glance it looks very akin – it seems like a Nazi symbol. I realize that this is simply a kind of trolling, but many people in the West (and even more so in Poland) simply do not realize it.
Another example is simply a patch with skull and tibias – resembling the marking of the 3rd SS Division Totenkopf. specified symbols appear in soldiers unconsciously – without realizing that individual can photograph it and usage it as “proof” that neo-Nazis are fighting in Ukraine.
This phenomenon is not uniquely Ukrainian. In the past, pictures of American soldiers from Afghanistan with identical patches appeared – and there besides caused controversy: “Why does an American wear an SS symbol?” Of course, it can be explained and explained, but unfortunately it is inactive a average for Russian propaganda.
That's my private opinion – but I don't think it's worth making it easy for them. It is worth being aware of how these symbols can be received outside. At least I'd be more careful.
VB: You can see that both the full defender and its individual units are very active in media space – they run their own channels, print films, recruit through social media. How do you feel about that? Is it an effective form of morale and communicative building, or can there be any risks – information or imagery?
DM: It's just a sign of the times. In today's world, everything happens on the net – it is said in a half-eat that if something is not in Google, it can be considered that it does not be at all. It's normal, and to a certain degree you gotta accept it.
The media activity of the defender is simply a form of resource accumulation – it is both about obtaining social support and recruitment. In the case of Azov, the name and brand are already attractive. specified an individual with a strong image and presence on social media naturally recruits more volunteers than those who do not carry out specified activities or have a akin reputation.
But of course there are risks. You never know who reads this content. Sometimes they scope people who can usage them in a way that we would not want. And here it's hard to have a simple answer, due to the fact that you can't completely detonate this activity. any of the soldiers must be visible – it is inevitable.
On the another hand, where possible, care should be taken to defend your identity – not only your name, but besides your image. In Western countries, this problem is increasingly recognised. For example, pilots active in NATO Air Police missions in the Baltic countries frequently have classified data – their faces are not shown to prevent identification.
There were cases – most likely in the Netherlands – that the pilot data could be determined, and then these people received telephone calls with threats. They were threatened by them or their families. That's why it's truly worth protecting the anonymity of soldiers wherever possible.
Of course, you can never do that 100%. We live in a planet of social media, where everything is online – and you gotta deal with it to any extent, to a certain extent.
Figure 3. Online recruitment on the example of the Rubiż Brigade
Source: Own improvement based on the "Rubiz" brigade account on Instagram.
Figure 4. designation of Ukrainian National defender Units in Social Media
Source: improvement of her own author based on data from authoritative Instagram accounts (30.07.2025)
VB: On the another hand, Russia has been moving an information run against the defender for years, especially Azov. How do you measure the scale of this information war after 2022? Were the attacks directed solely at Azov, or were they against the full Guard?
DM: On the 1 hand, there has been a definite acceleration – there are more, more intensive, better organised actions. And unfortunately, sometimes they do. Even in Poland.
This can be seen by the attitude of any politicians or commentators, who, not necessarily pro-Russian, clearly present an anti-Ukrainian position. Unfortunately, this is the consequence of an effective and promoted Russian narrative.
On the another hand, as we say, the masks have partially fallen. Most people in the West, at least those critically thinking, began to see what Russia was and what methods it worked. The images from Ukraine, both regarding civilians and soldiers, prisoners of war or the elderly, show the actual face of Russian aggression. This is not easy to cover with any propaganda, although sometimes, unfortunately, it succeeds.
Russia is very active in this information war. But at the same time – I have an impression – in the West there is simply a increasing awareness of how large the threat is. I'm talking about Western European countries, the US or Canada.
This is different in the countries of North Africa or South America. The situation is much more complicated there. The perception of Russia – previously the russian Union, and present the Russian Federation – is completely different. I think we seldom think about it in Poland. We focus on our own position and frequently presume that another countries – especially those in our cultural ellipse – think similarly. Meanwhile, the farther distant from Europe, the little this awareness is.
VB: Guards are a unique formation – a small between army and police. How does the presence of the defender in everyday life – e.g. in the protection of infrastructure or public order – affect public assurance in the state and military?
DM: I'm certain it's positive. National defender soldiers are much more visible in the service than army soldiers. Their presence – whether on police stations, during patrols or during demonstrations and another events – builds a sense of safety and trust.
This clearly contrasts with the communicative of Russian propaganda, especially from 2014 to 2015. Then the defender was presented as a symbol of oppression—the “caratal battalions”, the torturers of Donbas, allegedly mobilized by force of men who applied only to “get the slave and land.” It sounds absurd, but these narratives were present and any people were truly afraid of them – especially in the first months of counterterrorism.
I remember being in Kramatorsk in 2018. At the railway station there, I saw a man wearing a T-shirt saying: “I am from the National Guard. I want 2 slaves and a land plot.” And that didn't surprise anyone anymore. Everyone approached it with distance and awareness that it was an ironic comment on Russian propaganda – having nothing to do with reality.
The attitude of the defender itself after 2014–2015, and especially after 2022, contributed to building a affirmative image of this formation. People began to see her presence as something normal, needed – not as a threat.
VB: I will go back to what you said at the beginning – about the hybrid model, which is now the National Guard. Do you think this model should be preserved after the war? Is it worth developing, or is it better to return to earlier structures or even combine the defender with the armed forces?
DM: From my perspective, this "between" model should be retained. The full-scale war, which has been going on since 2022, is an exceptional situation – it is the first specified war on the European continent in almost 70 years. And specified conflicts – large, conventional ones – are little and less.
If we look at the planet after 1991, there were only a fewer specified wars – Ukraine, Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, actions of Iran and Israel, but there is simply a alternatively exchange of rocket or air strikes. The vast majority of modern conflicts are low-intensity wars or operations conducted below the war threshold – destabilisation, sabotage, terrorism.
Russia has not only built a strategy of action in this grey region between war and peace – it has built the system's ability to operate at this level. What happened on Donbas until August 2014 perfectly illustrates this. At first, we had no classical war, but it was not peace either. They were not criminals, they were not classical terrorism – although akin measures were used. Regular Russian units only appeared in August 2014 – it was previously hard to call it a war in the classical and literal sense of the concept.
The full concept of the alleged hybrid war – frequently wrongly attributed to Valeria Gerasimov, the chief of general staff of the Russian army – is precisely that armed actions are the final stage. Before that, we have political, informational, economical campaigns, destabilisation, peculiar services activities. In Ukraine, this process continued at least since 2012 – even before Majdan. The political influence of Yanukovych's government, information operations, destabilisation of Crimea, alleged "putin tourists", armed takeovers of administrative buildings, Slavic... All of this was in the logic of the hybrid war.
Until February 2015 – the end of the conflict of Debalcev – there were actions that were hard for sure, irrefutablely attributable to Russia, due to the fact that Moscow, of course, denied – many did not believe, but any Western environments were fooled.
I estimation that 80-90% of this conflict were hybrid actions – in which neither police nor classical military were effective enough. The police had no resources and the military had instruments adapted to specified conditions.
This is where you see a place for a formation like the National Guard. This is where we compare to Poland. In our safety system, we don't have a defender equivalent.
The Territorial defence Army? To any degree – but it's inactive more military than a police formation. Yes, WOT has basic military training, combat capabilities, and in the future is even to receive his own artillery. This is partially a consequence to experience from Ukraine – that the brigade level unit will not stand and will not be able to carry out effective actions without the support of fire artillery.
We besides have Military Gendarmery, but it is simply a formation mainly oriented towards soldiers – it has more control and police functions inside the army. They meet at train stations, in cities, as a casual support of police activities, but it's inactive not the same.
Police? Above all, dramatically underinvestment, with serious staff shortages. And more importantly, it does not have the competence to act at the interface of peace and war, under hybrid threats. If we had something akin to Donbas, we'd gotta send an army based on the Police Act alternatively of the equivalent of the Guard.
We deficiency this mediate level – a flexible, militarized formation with civil-order competences. And unfortunately, we don't have an thought where to get this. A pity – due to the fact that the example of Ukraine shows that it can be crucial.
VB: I have a question about the universality of this model. Do you think that the experience of the defender – its transformation, its way of working – can be an inspiration to another countries? Is this a unique case tailored exclusively to Ukrainian realities, or alternatively an example for Central and east Europe?
DM: Definitely yes – and not only for Central and east Europe. Many countries may find themselves in a akin situation. Not necessarily in the face of a threat from Russia, but in the context of another challenges that arise at the interface between interior and external security.
Formerly, the division was clear: the external threat – war, tanks, aircraft, invasion. interior threat is crime, theft, murder. present this border is fading.
At a time of globalisation, many threats are of a suprastate nature – criminal organisations, terrorist groups, cyberspace activities. And erstwhile we have a state in the region, specified as Russia, which consciously uses these grey zones for its own purposes, we request fresh tools.
Therefore, safety systems – in Poland, Ukraine, but besides in many another countries – must transform. They must get fresh competences, fresh capabilities to respond effectively to the "between" risks. due to the fact that we seldom deal with pure peace or full war. We usually have quite a few shades of gray.
And here are 2 paths: either we make fresh formations, specified as the Ukrainian National Guard, which combine police and military competences, or we grow the current structures and give them fresh powers.
What happened in Ukraine is, in my view, a model example of transformation. That was the main thesis of my doctoral thesis. I believe that another countries can, and should, draw from this experience in building their own safety systems.
VB: And the final question – do you think the National defender has become 1 of the symbols of modern Ukraine? Is it going beyond the military formation and becoming part of the national identity?
DM: In a way, I'm certain it is. Especially between 2014 and 2021. It was then that the image of the defender was built as a formation that not only performs military functions, but besides actually participates in social life and builds trust in the state.
I had the chance to observe this especially in the east of Ukraine – in the Donbas region, by the then line of demarcation (today it is already a front line). In many places where it was hard to function due to fire or deficiency of roads, it was the defender that was present. Soldiers talked about settlements and individual homes that no 1 else could scope – either civilian services or relief organizations. Sometimes they were the only link to the planet – they brought basic things to people, they helped get to the doctor.
This built a very strong, affirmative image of the defender – not only as a cleaning force, but as a formation close to people. And this in turn translates into something wider – trust in the state as such. due to the fact that if people see that there is simply a structure that protects them, which is present, reacts and helps, they besides gain greater assurance in the full safety system.
This is very crucial – especially today, erstwhile Russia actively undermines assurance in state institutions. It works not only militarily but besides in information – it tries to break the unity, weaken morale, instill uncertainty towards power, troops, services.
Besides, akin processes can be seen besides in us. Take, for example, the situation at the border with Germany and the alleged "border defence movement". 1 of the ministers of the current government – and he correctly defined it – said that specified actions could be either conscious or unconscious, but in both cases it was an action to the detriment of the state. This undermines assurance in formations specified as border guards, police or military – and this is erstwhile assurance in the institution is 1 of the key elements of the state's resilience.
In the next talks of the “World under tension” cycle we will return to these topics – both in the context of Poland and another countries of the region and the world. We will talk, among others, about information war, social resilience, army transformation, threats to democracy and global geopolitical tension.
We encourage you to follow further interviews – due to the fact that the planet does not halt being under tension.
