On 16 December 2022 a debate was held with safety expert Artur Mick, analyst and editor of the fresh Deal Michał Nowak and the editor of the Defence24 portal Bartłomiej Wypartowicz. I had the pleasance of leading her as a moderator, of which I would like to study to you. The subject of the discussion was the war in Ukraine and its prospects in 2023.
Let us callback the events leading to a fresh phase of Russian aggression, and a peculiarly informing visit of US National Intelligence manager Avril Haines in November 2021 in Warsaw. It was then that the Polish government was warned about the impending aggression of the Russian Federation on Ukraine. Shortly after this gathering Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, but besides Minister Mariusz Błaszczak, undertook increased diplomatic activity aimed at consolidating allies against the upcoming threat.
Crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border
Artur Micek served as a soldier of the Territorial Defence Army on the Polish-Belarusian border during the migration crisis. In his opinion, if inactive in September it was possible to treat Belarusian-Russian actions as a fresh form of hybrid attack, then in November it was no longer possible to have any uncertainty that it was preparation for war. The information provided by the Americans was so full reliable.
The border crisis was a form of informing addressed to NATO. These actions were to item the importance of the ultimatum deposited by Russian diplomacy in December, erstwhile the Alliance was requested to retreat to the Elbe line, namely to return to the situation prior to the decision to extend the pact in 1997. They were formally submitted at the time erstwhile military preparations for the fresh invasion were already in completion. Artur Micek disagrees that allowing migrant groups would lead to interior destabilisation of Poland and the Baltic States. He leans towards the view that the political aspect was more crucial – an effort to quarrel Warsaw with Western allies.
In Michał Nowak's opinion, the political aspect was important, but did not bring the expected effects of the Belarusian authorities. Brussels supported Warsaw without any force to open the border. The interior destabilisation of Poland was 1 of the basic assumptions of the operation and was successful. In support of the thesis Nowak mentioned the behaviour of Polish politicians on the border and media atmosphere, which developed around the crisis. If migrants were allowed in, the Belarusian operation would be importantly intensified and the situation further escalated. Then the force would not apply to a few, but respective tens of thousands of migrants crossing the border. Moreover, actively addressing the objectives of the operation led to consolidation of Poland's cooperation with the Baltic States and the European Union.
One can see, therefore, an uninterrupted causal relation that tells us that the conflict had to be full developed sooner or later. The question is whether the authorities in Kiev were full aware of this.
Not all allies believed in American warnings. The war on the observed scale was not meant to erupt due to the fact that it seemed besides irrational. besides from Ukraine itself were voices calling on Washington to supply concrete evidence of the inevitability of aggression. An example of specified scepticism may be the fact that the decision to announce mobilization is greatly delayed. Its postponement, as well as the sinking temper of narrative, could, however, have been a deliberate act of Kiev to calm Ukrainian society on the 1 hand and not give Russians an excuse for further escalation. Unfortunately, the price of this policy was to contribute to crucial Russian advancement in the north and south of the country during the first hours of operations.
The reaction of Poland and the West in the first days of the war
Poland was a forpost of military aid to Ukraine, and besides actively contributed to breaking the opposition of Western allies, who initially refused to accept the handover of tanks or artillery to defenders. If they had already agreed, the first months of the war could have looked different. The West did not rather pass the exam during this period.
Poland and respective another countries have met skepticism and criticism of allies who inactive see the anticipation of negotiating. A very crucial part of the Polish aid was the immediate transportation of crucial supplies of russian ammunition and then dense military equipment, which can be estimated at a full of about 1500 vehicles. Without this ammunition, Ukrainians would not be able to sustain the efficiency of their artillery. At this point, it is worth noting that, as the practice has shown, artillery fire was a basic tool for both sides to build advantage on the battlefield.
So is the West helping adequate today? The answer is, half whistle.
The assessment should take account of the fact that, with global interests, the US must carefully manage resources so as not to weaken its possible in another parts of the world. Although they could give more, this does not mean that this is simply a zero-one situation. While the expectations of expanding American aid are well-founded, military training, as well as intelligence and reconnaissance, which is passed on to Ukraine by the West, are very crucial support. Both have a crucial impact on the course of war and its prospects. So the current aid looks much better than in the first days of the war.
The Next Weeks of War
I asked our guests about the scenarios towards which the conflict will be headed in the next fewer weeks. Which 1 of the first parties will proceed to resume offensive operations, Ukrainians or Russians? And will it be in winter or spring? And if so, where?
As Michał Nowak noted, at the time of our conversation, the Russians were attacking in Bachmut. If not to accomplish the desired success in Donbasa, then at least in order to weaken the offensive possible of Ukrainian forces.
For context, a somewhat broader image of the situation should be drawn. As far as we know from the words of General W. Deservator, the Ukrainians intend to launch a counteroffensive soon, which is why the weather stands in the way. It is besides warm to carry out an operation caught utilizing dense equipment, a mechanized-tank brigade that is incapable to decision around mud-covered Ukrainian steppes. A solid frost is needed to bind the dirt and let the military to usage maneuvering.
As far as direction of action is concerned, editor Nowak considers the Ukrainian attack carried out in the south, in the area of the Zaporo region, whose goal will be to cut the land corridor from Crimea to the Russian Federation. If it had happened, it would have been a large military and image success of the Ukrainians and a strategical defeat of the Russians.
– specified a solution would be very crucial in the context of ending the war on better conditions for Kiev. Meanwhile, an attack in the Kreminna-Swatowe area, in the north-east of the country, would not have given as good a propaganda effect. In addition, the area is more hard and more fortified by the Russians, so the moving of a larger attack operation carries a hazard of failure, which the possible profits do not compensate," said the expert.
Nowak believes that success on the battlefield is straight correlated with the level of support from the West. The better the Ukrainian troops are, the greater the help. On the another hand, the Russians could start their offensive action early in the spring.
Artur Micek takes the view that December and early January will only affect actions on the Swatwe-Kreminn line. The operation of this line is intended to let additional Ukrainian forces to be moved south without further attack towards Starobielsk. Like Nowak, he admits that the Zaporozh area is crucial for the further destiny of the war. However, he points out that it is improbable that Ukrainian forces would storm cities specified as Melitopol or Berdiansk.
In his opinion, the offensive will head for space between larger urban centres, in order to decision the front line as deep as possible and capture the artillery's communications routes of the Russian army. This action will effectively intersect the corridor, without having to occupy the full area.
It points out that achieving this goal will not be easy. Russia inactive has large offensive potential, and greater capacity to replenish losses in terms of surviving power. The Ukrainian offensive may happen at the earliest in mid-January, while its advancement will be based on the point-to-point usage of the opponent's weakness, by directing the evidence to a place of breach, alternatively than a general frontal attack on the full line of contact, as the Russians do.
Micek notes that the survey of Zaporozh's map and the imposition of sabotage operations carried out by Ukrainian peculiar forces propose saving certain bridge crossings and communication routes, precisely to let a smooth attack towards the Azov Sea. An crucial parameter determining the success of the operation is the fact that the Crimean Bridge is excluded, which effectively impedes the supply of Crimea.
“The Russians are not able to thwart the counterattack on Zaporozhye due to the fact that they focus on defending Swatwe-Kremienne lines,” says Micek.
Analyst besides doubts the anticipation of the Russian forces to take Bachmut due to the very good fortification of the area by the defenders. The possible fall of Bachmut could happen at the earliest in mid-January if the Russians manage to orbit the village from the south and north, by occupying smaller towns.
Bartłomiej Wypartowicz, unlike the predecessors, is of the opinion that the Russians will shortly regain their initiative at the front, performing a large, multi-vector offensive from late January to mid-February, depending on weather conditions. In his opinion, it would be conducted in parallel with parts of Belarus and Russian brian, Kursk and Bielgorod regions. At the same time, Russian forces withdrawn earlier from Chersonia, and gathered under Melitopol, will decision north, towards the city of Zaporozhye, and another auxiliary strike will come out of Lugansk, through fortifications in Popasna and further west with the task of occupying the full Donbas.
In his view, the argument in favour of specified a script is that at least 2 100 1000 of the mobilized Russians proceed to train. Moreover, in his opinion, the Russian economy inactive retains its possible and is able to supply military equipment to the army, even if it is not of the highest quality. The Kremlin has production reserves and warehouses with russian equipment. It will besides mobilise further conscripts.
– Putin has no way out, due to the fact that the war is not in a good way for the Russians, hence specified a large scale of attack will be a desperate effort to reverse the situation – says Wypartowicz.
He points out that Ukrainians are absorbed by repeated rocket attacks on energy infrastructure, which further impedes their preparation for their own attack activities. As long as the weather is mildly mild, the humanitarian situation is not tragic, but may deteriorate with the temperature falling.
Despite Ukraine's mediocre forecast and Russian initiative, Micek does not believe in the success of their plans. He believes that despite the scale of the operation described he will yet fail.
When asked about what Poland and the West could do to aid Ukraine and prevent it from losing, he pointed to the request to supply long-range rockets and the request to transform Ukrainians into equipment of Western provenance. She believes that the West has already invested so much in Ukraine that it will not let her to lose. However, before more Western equipment is transferred, warehouses and equipment of units from russian products, including tanks and aircraft, must be completely emptied. This equipment does not have a long future ahead of it, hence Poland can favourably “get free of” it without a greater risk. In Mick's opinion, there's no direct war in our country any time soon.
Micek besides pays attention to another aspect. The Ukrainian army should be urgently switched to western logistics standards, that is, a strategy based on pallets, which greatly improves the transport and distribution of materials. Especially since it has a conglomerate of various kinds of equipment and ammunition transferred to it from very different sources, which reminds us of the situation of the Polish army during the Polish-bolshevik War, and this requires very efficient logistics.
The West cannot let Ukrainian defeat and, as Michał Nowak expects, will increase military aid further in 2023, including likely to hand over F-16 aircraft. On the another hand, the full surrender of Russians and the recovery of all lost lands by Ukrainians are highly improbable at this stage. Ukrainians do not have adequate forces to recover Crimea and east Donbass.
Moreover, the demolition of these areas and the anti-Ukrainian attitude of the local population, reinforced by years of Russian propaganda, make their recovery unprofitable. Any reintegration would pose a immense political, economical and social challenge that could have a negative impact on the remainder of the country.
End of War Screenplays
In strategical terms, the Russian Federation has already lost the war. Experts considered the thesis in which this final negotiations were taken after another Russian offensive broke down, while Ukrainians regained the country's confederate circuits.
Bartłomiej Wypartowicz expresses the view that the conflict will end with the reflection of the south and the approach of Ukrainian forces towards Crimea. As a result, the peninsula will be recovered even without a fight, while Donbas, as unnecessary Ukraine and destroyed, will stay under the control of the Russian Federation.
Artur Micek is more cautious, paying attention to the decisive origin of Ukrainian tactics that make continuing the operation dependent on skillful management of the lives and wellness of soldiers. – The deficiency of a tendency to throw all your strength at hard sections may complicate the task. Unless the command actually decides on a massive hit on 1 episode only to guarantee a strategical triumph for the Ukrainian side, it speculates.
According to Michał Nowak, Ukrainians will gotta decide to change their tactics, but the Russians can number on that. There is simply a chance that Russian command is waiting for a Ukrainian strike in the south, which it intends to bleed out, and only after its failure will it decision with its own counterattack, besides in another directions. At the same time, Nowak does not believe in the script of starting an attack from Belarus or towards Kharkiv.
Nowak doubts that the Russians can accept the failure of Crimea, and in any case, he does not see a chance without having fought hard over the peninsula. He considers the Ukrainian attack in the south likely to succeed, although it is hard to estimation the chances of just entering Crimea. In his view, both parties are presently seeking the top possible control over the confederate and east areas of Ukraine in order to keep the best possible starting position for negotiations to be undertaken in mid-2023.
A script is excluded in which either side will win a full triumph in the war. According to Nowak, it is most likely to accomplish a " rotten compromise", the terms of the truce that will not be satisfactory to anyone. He argues that the war will not end until both sides make full usage of their possible due to the fact that they believe in success. Giving Donbas does not seem likely in terms of Ukrainians' social views. In his opinion, the government in Kiev would have a problem with the argument allowing the resignation of this site to the Russian Federation.
Bartłomiej Wypartowicz, on the another hand, allows a situation in which Russia ends the war without any preliminaries, as no of the objectives of the operation have been achieved. On the contrary, demilitarisation has led to militarisation, NATO's withdrawal has led to its enlargement to include Sweden and Finland and a possible sea cut off of Kaliningrad. Therefore, Moscow can simply keep East Donbass, reducing targets to a minimum, as no of the originally appointed ones are anymore attainable.
Possibility of interior destabilisation of the Russian Federation in the face of defeat
Already now Russian propaganda has changed the narrative, turning the main opponent from Ukrainians to NATO forces. For Russians, the failure to the full West is little compromising narratively than with the Ukrainians treated with superiority. Furthermore, even if Russian forces lose Zaporozhes, they can inactive build the impression that they have succeeded in defending Crimea despite all this. The practice so far shows that Russian society remains very susceptible to native propaganda, no substance how ridiculous it seems to us.
There are 2 scenarios in which changes at the Kremlin summits could prove to be detrimental to us. 1 is simply a case in which governments are taken over by individual even more confrontational than Putin, for example, a typical of the force departments. The second is erstwhile a “pseudo-democrat” is incarcerated as a leader, whose task will be to “soften” the attitude of the West, although it will not bring real changes to the neo-imperial politics of the country.
Regardless of events in the Russian Federation itself, we can already observe the erosion of its influence in the border, from Central Asia to Caucasus to Europe. The king is naked, as Michael Nowak signed, recalling an example of Azerbaijan-attacked Armenia, which, despite many requests, did not receive Russian aid. Where Russia had extended influences, she began to lose them.
Any another consequence of the war another than Russia's decisive triumph in the war against Ukraine will be interpreted by another states as its large defeat. Therefore, there will be another actors playing for these influences, and any countries will surely turn to another poles, whether it be Asia or the West.
Surely the military possible of Central and east Europe has been strengthened. The east flank states have armed themselves and their importance has increased, which is detrimental to the Russian Federation.
The Future of Belarus
So far Belarus has tried to keep a balance between east and west. But balance is in the past. president Aleksander Lukashenka plays for the remainder of his independency due to the fact that he allowed Ukraine to attack from the territory of Belarus, thus becoming an accessory to aggression and an ally of Russia.
According to Artur Mick, the biggest challenge for the West in 2023 will be not to settle the war in Ukraine, but to thwart Russia's absorption of Belarus. It is unclear whether the observed movements of Russian troops moving forces to Belarusian camps are intended to prepare for the attack or, rather, subject the neighbouring country.
Svetlana Cichanouska clearly did not meet expectations and did not lead to peaceful changes in Belarus. According to Michał Nowak, a possible, although unforeseeable, effort of armed uprising, led by forces of the Belarusian K. Kalinowski regiment fighting at the minute in Ukraine, which would be supported by Ukraine, Poland and the Western states, but without direct engagement of military forces.
Arthur Micek is skeptical of the possible of civilian war. According to him, Moscow is more likely to effectively take control of Minsk without a fight, which will compensate for Kremlin's defeat in Ukraine. With this he disagrees with Nowak saying that the Belarusians' tendency to protest is dangerous to political stableness in the Russian Federation, hence the request for its strong control.
Bartłomiej Wypartowicz does not agree with these opinions, which the Russian Federation does not think will full absorb Belarus. The establishment of the SRM and consolidation within this already existing format are sufficient. This will besides avoid greater protests by Belarusians against increasing dependence on Russia. Wypartowicz retains scepticism towards Minsk's ability to keep greater independence, as Alexander Lukashenka deprived himself of the anticipation of further manoeuvre after February 24, even though he inactive tries to hold the remaining independence. His turn to the West may have continued until the outbreak of post-election protests in August 2020, but present the dictator is entirely relying on Kremlin support. Paradoxically, the Belarusians' conflict for independency caused it to be even more threatened.
What action should Poland take in the close future?
The ongoing expansion of military capacity should be continued by the future government. This policy has a affirmative impact on the safety of Poles and builds among our partners in Central and east Europe the belief that Poland will aid in their defence. Warsaw should build a policy consolidating our region on the basis of the above scheme, and its component must besides be the assistance of Ukraine.
Poland must be an informal safety warrant and support for Kiev. This is not about a formalised, bilateral military alliance between states, but about making all effort to safe our neighbour, both through direct action and influencing allies' policies. It is crucial to build a affirmative image of Poland in the eyes of Ukrainians, who feel very large, multidimensional support of the Polish state and citizens. This asset should be utilized in the future to bring our peoples closer together.
It would not be beneficial to abandon existing plans in case the current conflict ended with Ukraine's victory. Recently, any media circles and politicians have criticised the government's fresh efforts to make a passive army reserve. However, the fact is that the current training of reserves is essential to the competences of the armed forces. It may be essential to reconstruct a limited form of collection or limited training for civilians in order to reconstruct the armed forces.
War wins reserve. Meanwhile, Poland has increasingly mediocre reserves all year. Without widespread training, this trend cannot be reversed. In 2022 the explanation fell that we did not request large armed forces, that there would not be a large conventional war in Europe. We start waking up from a dream. safety and peace require sacrifice. The Ukrainians pay with blood, but in our midst, controversy is caused by “the gift of sweat”.
We cannot afford to break arms and we cannot escape training, due to the fact that regardless of everything, the Russian Federation will stay a dictatorship that will endanger us in the next decades. We request Poles who want to fight. Ukrainians win on battlefields due to the fact that they had powerful reserves and have a strong national identity.
We must not forget these aspects, regardless of who will be the future government. At a time of globalism we meet with claims that borders do not substance that we live in the future without wars, in unity. That's not true, nothing like that happens. Hence, the arms are not enough, it is essential to influence the awareness of Poles, so that they want to fight for this Poland. Regardless of political views.
We're moving out of civilian defense. We do not see any action to address these deficits. As a society, we do not know where the shelters are, we do not know the alarm signals, and we are not prepared to face any possible armed conflict or akin crisis situation.
On the margins of discussions on military aspects, it is besides worth addressing economical issues. The Polish policy should be based on the continuation of the construction of the diversification of natural materials and energy and on the building of the region's independency from exports from the Russian Federation.
Conclusion
The image that emerges from the above discussion, despite any bitter conclusions, seems optimistic. Although experts disagree in the assessment of the continuation of armed action, they stay in agreement on their final effect. They consider it highly probable that the Ukrainian State will defend its sovereignty next year and that the war will end favourably for him. However, at this minute there is no single forecast as to the final affiliation of Crimea and Donbas.
Analysts believe that Russian efforts to regain the initiative and carry out another wide offensive, even at the same time from respective directions, will most likely not have the expected effect of changing the Kremlin's adverse view of war. On the another hand, the Ukrainians will not be ready to negociate until they usage the gathered forces to effort to recapture the lost territory. It is only erstwhile both sides engage with the remainder of their possible that the possible of real peace negotiations will become real.
Until then, Western support will be sustained, even though at first it was neither as large nor as dynamic as it should be. Moreover, there are many indications that Ukraine will receive Western military equipment, including F-16 aircraft, as part of this assistance. Before that happens, Poland should guarantee that Kiev receives all of the NATO's russian equipment, which will increase Ukrainian possible very rapidly in the current circumstances, and at the same time will not be associated with increased hazard to donors.
Another affirmative conclusion is that Poland has become and will stay a key partner of Ukraine, and the task of our country will be to support the neighbour besides in time that will happen after this phase of conflict. This, combined with the beginning of the arms policy, will lead to an increase in the regional importance of our country, which will be an crucial warrant of the safety and stableness of Central and east Europe.
The situation of Belarus is not obvious. A major challenge will be to thwart her incarnation into the Russian Federation, which may turn into a civilian war. Moreover, winning Ukraine in the war does not mean that individual with democratic views will appear in the Kremlin. On the contrary, it is more likely that another typical of the force departments or of the "democratic" figurehead will come to power, which will not change the neo-imperial Russian policy.
The final conclusion is, therefore, that in the long term, the competition with the Russian Federation for a fresh order is just beginning and much more ahead.
photo: twitter
