Summary of activities of Ukraine War Disinfo Group

Fakenews.pl is simply a associate Open Information Partnership – networks of independent organisations and individual partners focusing on combating and combating misinformation. Our editorial squad within the framework of global cooperation of organisations associated with OiP She participated in the work of Ukraine War Disinfo Woking Group, which aimed at qualitative and quantitative analysis of disinformation content regarding the war in Ukraine and the influence of pro-Cremlovian actors on information space in east Europe. The working group was composed of 13 organisations and think-tanks from the countries of the region:

Belarus Press Club BelarusBulgaria Centre for the survey of DemocracyCzech Republic PSSIEstonia DebunkEU.orgGeorgia GRASSHungary AtlatszoLatvia DebunkEU.orgLithuania DebunkEU.org, Northern Macedonia – MOSTRomania Global FocusSerbia the European Western Balkans, Slovakia Infocurity.skUkraine Detector Media and Poland Fakenews..

The consequence of the work of Ukraine War Disinfo Working Group is the study "Kremlin-aligned Influence Operations in east Europe and the War in Ukraine" covering the period from May to October 2022. On Fakenews.pl we have already published reports from June, 27 June to 4 July, 11-17 July, and 25 and 31 July, in this text we would like to present the results of the work of the editorial board Fakenews.pl relating to the Polish information space, entering them in the context and reality of Polish society.

Methodology

For the purposes of the report, the concept of misinformation was defined as:

• False or misleading, which were intentionally distributed by Kremlin-backed or Kremlin-related actors
• False or misleading, which matched existing procremlovian narratives and supported (justified) Russian goals and actions
• Based on verifiable sources whose transmission is intentionally designed to accomplish a circumstantial effect entering pro-Russian narratives, objectives and actions
• In addition, it is assumed that the dissemination of prokremlian disinformation may consequence from human ignorance and uncertainty or from mediocre journalism standards, if these content originates from prokremlian sources.

Content considered disinformation was assigned to 1 of the 7 main communicative categories. In addition, each of the main categories was divided into subcategories, which were defined together with the analysis of disinformation content and the emergence of fresh narratives or conceptual categories to which the content data referred:

1. Events related to the Russia-Ukraine War – 74 subcategories.
2. Refugees from Ukraine (Ukrainian Refugees) – 6 subcategories.
3. Economic (negative) consequences of sanctions imposed on Russia ((Negative) economical Consequences of Sanctions) – 16 subcategories.
4. Social situation of Russians and Russian-speaking minorities in a given country (Conditions of Russian and Russian-speaking Minorities) – 4 subcategories.
5. The threat of an escalation of the conflict to areas outside Ukraine (Military Threats to east Europe/Risk of War Expanding Beyond Ukraine) – 15 subcategories.
6. Military support for Ukraine (Military Aid to Ukraine) – 15 subcategories.
7. Other (Miscellaneous) — 65 subcategories.

Information space monitoring was done utilizing tools NewsWhip, CrowdTangle and another open-source tools and methods. It took 2 forms:

1. Monitoring of Polish-language media for the intent of compiling all articles that duplicated the narratives mentioned above, coming from sources recognised as formally or informally linked to or sympathetic to hostile countries.
2. Monitoring social media, analysis of conversations, conversations and another communication channels containing or reproducing disinformation content.

In addition, each of the entities of Ukraine War Disinfo Woking Group identified key channels of communication for a country whose information space was monitored by that entity.

The editorial fakenews.pl considered the main origin of disinformation (beyond web pages and Facebook) to be the communicator Telegram. The editorial monitored over 50 communicator channels that she recognized as sources of misinformation.

Key events

• 24 February – The beginning of the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine; a immense and unprecedented increase in disinformation content
• 24-27 February – First sanctions imposed on Russian banks and individuals and organisations associated with the authority in the Kremlin
• 28 February – Ukraine applies to join the European Union structures
• 4 March – Russian Federation troops fire on the atomic power plant in Zaporozh
• 4 April – Disclosure of war crimes committed by Russian troops on civilians in Buczy
• 14 April – The sinking of Moscow's warship in the Black Sea by Ukrainian forces
• 19 May – U.S. legislature approval of $40 billion support package for Ukraine
• 29 May – Serbian president Alexandar Vučić signs an energy agreement with Russia
• 30 May – president Joe Biden approves sending HIMARS rocket artillery strategy to Ukraine
• 6 June – start of systematic monitoring of disinformation content by Ukraine War Disinfo Woking Group (WG UWD)
• June – early July – Russian troops offensive in Donbasa; Sewerodonieck and Lysyczańska occupation
• 23 June – granting the position of candidate countries to the European Union to Ukraine and Moldova
• 29 July – demolition of the POW camp in Oleniwka
• August 20 – Daria Dugina's assassination
• 31 August – Victor Orban signed an energy agreement with Russia
• 6 September – the beginning of Ukrainian counteroffensive in the east
• September 26 – Nord Stream gas pipeline sabotage
• September 30 – Ukrainian request to join NATO structures
• 8 October – bridge detonation in Kerchen Strait
• October 10 – rocket attacks on Kiev
• 29 October – attack of Ukrainian troops on Sevastopol naval base in Crimea
• 30 October – end of systematic monitoring of misinformation by WG University of Warsaw

Results of the monitoring of misinformation

Maintaining the main narratives, visible evidence of country-specific strategies and adaptive responses to key events indicate a degree of coordination and plan of disinformation content.

Clearly, disinformation takes on the character of an institutionally managed social project, which is referred to as a troll factory. This subject is further described by the Center for east Studies in material about Putin propaganda.

In time, however, the content management strategies adopted became increasingly fragmented. In the face of the increasing failures of the Russian Federation both in the battlefield and internationally, the main narratives from the first days of the war began to be replaced by little targeted content, while the adaptation responses to key events are becoming little coherent and credible (some of the content responding to the same event stood in contradiction with each other).

As the conflict continued, disinformation began to mention increasingly to conspiracy theories and adopt a conspiratorial character. any content was even curiosal, specified as an effort to evoke fear (or laughter) reports about abroad visits or those on state kid trafficking in Ukraine, as we have written about in pages Fakenews.

Below we present the most frequently reproduced narratives in the Polish information space:

Events related to the Russian-Ukrainian War

1. Ukraine loses the war
2. Ukraine is simply a Nazi state
3. Poland will annex (part) Ukraine

Refugees from Ukraine

1. Refugees from Ukraine are treated better than Polish citizens
2. Refugees from Ukraine do not express gratitude and respect their help
3. Admission of refugees from Ukraine threatens the stableness of the host country

Economic (negative) consequences of sanctions imposed on Russia

1. Sanctions affect western countries more than Russia
2. Inflation and the energy crisis are caused by European and US policies
3. The West secretly cooperates with Russia

Social situation of Russians and Russian-speaking minorities in the country

1. Poland (country concerned) is rusophobic
2. Ukrainians discriminate against Russian-speaking people
3. Citizens of the Russian Federation are persecuted in a given country

Threat of escalation of conflict to areas outside Ukraine

1. Poland (country concerned) escalates conflict
2. Russia loses the war and uses atomic weapons
3. The West will sacrifice east Europe if conflict escalates outside Ukraine

Military support for Ukraine

1. Western military aid is misused / stolen
2. Military support of Ukraine weakens the countries that grant it
3. Military aid prolongs the war

Others

1. Poland (country) should not aid Ukraine or Ukraine due to past conflicts and historical events
2. The war in Ukraine is part of a global conspiracy
3. Activities of bioweapon laboratories in Ukraine

Two narratives, which were expected to be a kind of misinformation “rescription for Poland”, deserve a peculiar discussion.

‘Poland’ disinformation

What distinguishes the content distributed in the Polish information space is the dominance of 2 narratives. Which should not be peculiarly surprising, they were an expression of a nationalist anti-Ukrainian identity policy that powerfully refers to historical memory.

First of all, disinformation referred to the Volynian Reich and the broadly understood activities of Ukrainian Nationalists from the Second planet War. Thus, these contents were to identify modern Ukrainian society with Ukrainian Nationalists. == sync, corrected by elderman == We described past and we deconstructed the meanings of 1 of the photos utilized in disinformation.

In addition, the anti-Ukrainian narratives evoked historical events which were expected to strengthen nationalist sentiments and antagonize Polish society towards Ukrainians. For this purpose, the tragedy and emotions associated with the Warsaw Uprising were tried, among others, which besides We described. It is besides worth noting that there were besides content to show representatives of the Polish government as patients with the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism.

The second dominant communicative characterising the Polish information space was all the content concerning Ukrainian refugees, which can be described as "Ukrainianisation". This is not a fresh concept, but it took on a fresh dimension with the start of the Russian-Ukrainian War. This communicative aimed to antagonize Polish society towards refugees from Ukraine, presenting them as a threat to the interior stableness of the Polish state.

Number of narratives relating to refugees from Ukraine

In time, this communicative turned into a conspiracy explanation about the upcoming merger of Poland and Ukraine for the cost of losing the sovereignty of the Polish state and the national identity of Poles. The recently created state would take the name ‘Ucrotoline’ and service ‘Zionists’ from the US. However, the influx of refugees from Ukraine was to be a deliberate and planned action.

It is worth mentioning that the word "Ucrotoline" was first promoted by Russian media in 2019. More about the "Ukrainianisation" process (also in the context of Romania, Serbia and Hungary) can be found in the study published by Global Focus of 8 August 2022

The leading figure promoting the thesis about the Ukrainianization of Poland was Grzegorz Braun. Together with his political environment, he organized the “Stop of Ukrainianization of Poland” rallies throughout Poland. In July 2022, the organization of the Confederation of the Polish Crown, chaired by Braun, published a “analysis” of this phenomenon.

Brochure halt Ukrainianization of Poland

Here it is worth to add that Fakenews.pl published the report, which describes the connections between the utmost right and anti-vaccine movements and Russian propaganda.

Disinformation as an ineffective social project

As noted at the beginning of this report, disinformation is intended to have a circumstantial social effect. The goal of the Russian disinformation run was (and is) primarily to antagonize Poles towards Ukrainians, which would have both military and social dimensions. The Social Opinion investigation Centre regularly conducts investigation on the attitude of Polish society towards the war in Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees.

Test results from March 2022 they showed straight pro-Ukrainian attitudes of the Polish society, expressed at both the level of declaration and direct action. Declarations and attitudes of Poles towards the war in Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees are constant in time (May 2022, June 2022, August 2022).

Although social opinion studies most likely show changes in percent points, their nature is insignificant. Despite the protracted conflict, the majority of Poles inactive believe that the fight against Russia should be continued without making any concessions. The vast majority of respondents besides support the admission of Ukraine to the European Union, although compared to the fresh survey of March, the percent of people who believe that accession should be as rapidly as possible has decreased. The vast majority of Poles inactive believe that their country should accept Ukrainian refugees. For the past 3 months, about half of the respondents have declared that they are helping refugees personally or that individual from their household is doing so.

In mention to the “Stop of the Ukrainianization of Poland” run promoted by Grzegorz Braun, it is hard to talk about any influence on the moods of Polish society, erstwhile attendance in manifestations does not exceed 3 people.

Sanok, September 25, 2022

The quantitative results collected by CBOS are besides confirmed in qualitative studies.

31 October published test results conducted by Przemysław Sadura and Sławomir Sierakowski. These studies are the consequence of an in-depth qualitative analysis to reflect the lower classes and the mediate class of Polish society. Summarizing the study and following the authors' words, Poles are behind Ukraine, but against Ukrainians. At the ideological level, support and military action, Poles support Ukraine understood in terms of a sovereign national state fighting Russia, but have a negative attitude towards Ukrainians (which means not so much to Ukrainian citizens as an cultural group and an imaginary group rooted in past and culture). We have described this subject more widely in article concerning the character Stepan Bandera.

Summary

Briefly summarizing the report, we see that Russian misinformation was a broad social task adapted to the contexts of Polish society (at least at the beginning of the conflict). As you can see, it was an ineffective project.

Sources

Open Information Partnership: https://openinformationpartnership.org/

Global Focus: https://www.global-focus.eu/2022/08/ukrainization-in-pro-Russian-propaganda-in-romania-poland-serbia-and-hungary/

CBOS March 2022: https://www.cbos.pl/SAPCOMOM.POL/2022/K_038_22.PDF

CBOS May 2022: https://www.cbos.pl/SAPCOMOM.POL/2022/K_073_22.PDF

CBOS June 2022: https://www.cbos.pl/SpiritCOM.POL/2022/K_086_22.PDF

CBOS August 2022: https://www.cbos.pl/SpiritCOM.POL/2022/K_101_22.PDF

Center for east Studies: https://www.youtube.com/embed/wAVKw2u1LyI&t=1s

Research Sierakowski, Sadura: https://publications.political criticism.pl/polacy-za-ukraina-but-against-ukraincom-sierakowski-sadura-1100