
This week president Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin ‘negotiating’ the future of Ukraine above the heads of Ukraine and the remainder of Europe. This week, too, the European Commission has published extended proposals to Increasing Europe's military readiness before the summit where EU leaders will discuss defence and Ukraine.
So it seems that this is 1 of those weeks when, as Lenin would say, “all decades are happening” and decisions are made — or not taken — which can find Europe's future for a long time. However, which is hard to believe, Europe neglects the most powerful tools it has to influence both Russian and American calculations and force for itself a seat at the table. These are economical sanctions and, above all, Russian abroad exchange reserves frozen in the EU.
Europe may be militarily weaker than the US, but in 1 respect it is simply a planet superpower. With around $300 billion (about PLN 1.2 billion), which the Russian central bank held in western countries erstwhile Putin began full-scale aggression, more than 2 thirds are blocked by EU sanctions. Most of this amount is EUR 183 billion (about PLN 770 billion) according to fresh public information, consisting of a bank deposit at Euroclear, a Belgian bank and a securities depository.
It is simply quite a few money — the same or even more than the full Western aid to Ukraine. What happens to them can definitely tip the scales between Moscow and Kiev — on the battlefield or at the negotiating table. Returning them to Russia would give a immense rescue wheel to the economy that He's moving out of war skills and incapable to import more resources.. This would besides undermine the chances of securing Ukraine's resources in the coming years and denying the surrender proposed by Trump.
The reality looks even worse. Blocked abroad exchange reserves are the only reliable source, of which the irrefutable debt of Russia for damages caused by Russia in Ukraine can be settled (according to the latest estimates of the planet Bank, it amounts to up to $523 billion, or about PLN 2 billion). If the measures return to Russia, who will believe that the Kremlin will be forced to pay compensation under Trump's peace agreement?
After my discussions with high-ranking European political decision-makers, I fear even that erstwhile specified an agreement materializes, Europe will not argue inadequate reactions and that this is 1 of the reasons for unwillingness to transfer assets to Ukraine now.
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In July, EU sanctions, which include blocking Moscow's access to its reserves, will should be extended all six months. due to the fact that the vote must be unanimous, Russia-friendly EU associate States have the anticipation to end the full sanction strategy overnight.
In erstwhile renewal decisions Hungary has allowed matters to drag to the last minute to get maximum concessions. Their motivation to yet pull out the plug increases with the change of the US side in Russia's war against Ukraine — Budapest indeed speaks out about it. If Washington unilaterally abolishs sanctions and announces that they are an obstacle to peace, it will be hard to see unanimity in maintaining them in the EU.
At the time of the expiry of the sanctions, Moscow will retreat its money, and Euroclear will be able to do nothing but pay them. So with the current policy course, hundreds of billions will be sent back to Russia by this summer. This decision of Europe — or deficiency of it — will make Russia victorious.
Europe has waited besides long
This involves 2 crucial observations. Firstly, there are only 2 possible solutions to the current central bank of the Russian Federation's access to its assets. Firstly, money returns to Russia, which will happen without a major policy change. The second is to hand them over to Ukraine as compensation due to Russia's destructive aggression..
There is no 3rd option but to postpone the decision — and that is the end of time. For 3 years Europe has waited. Now he has to make a choice. And the longer she waits, the more her strength will weaken, as it will become increasingly hard to argue an agreement sponsored by the US.
The second issue concerns non-EU democratic countries. 16 percent of Moscow's cash claims against Euroclear number in pounds — on the last reporting day the amount was about £25 billion (approx. 125 PLN). For the balance Euroclear holds £25 billion in its own balance sheet in British institutions — I realize that any are deposited in the Bank of England and any in the alleged private correspondent banks.
Under British sanctions, the amount spent on Euroclear is not frozen. (Directly frozen is undisclosed but likely much smaller amount spent on the Russian central bank).
The seat of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. Illustration pictureStanley Kalvan / Shutterstock
So whether this money will be paid at the request of Russia, only depends on the decision taken (or not taken) in July in Brussels. It is astonishing that the British political class does not respect this as an affront to British sovereignty. The same applies to Canada, where Euroclear has about 22 billion Canadian dollars (about 60 billion PLN).
Returning Russia's money would be a strategical disaster. It would not only strengthen Moscow's advantage over Kiev, undermining everything Ukraine has done and Europe has helped it in the last 3 years. But it would besides show that even erstwhile Europe has power, it will not be used.
So who will be deterred by any another possible — of which military — which Europeans are expected to build now? Even tanks and rockets are only as powerful as the readiness to usage them in utmost situations.
Every time a question arises about blocked abroad exchange reserves, officials and politicians They say they request time to realize complications. Nobody say that. There was plenty of time to analyze, and everything's been analyzed. All you gotta do is make a choice. So let us repeat the answers to the main reservations.
Legality
It is said that confiscation is impossible under global law. However, many legal issues have been identifiedsolutions — the paper drawn up for the European Parliament.
Furthermore, there is no request to confiscate — forced to take ownership of the Russian central bank into its assets — in order to transfer its value to Ukraine. Bank regulations can be utilized to separate Russian assets and liabilities in a separate banking entity, separated from Euroclear Bank. This fresh bank could be bought by a consortium of friendly states and re-integrated into 1 of them. The consortium could instruct fresh management to transfer bank assets from cash to Ukrainian reparation bonds — bonds paid erstwhile Moscow compensates Kiev — or a trust fund whose financial decisions are linked to the reparations.
Precedent
The decision to usage abroad reserves to enforce the compensation for aggression — alternatively than waiting for a peace treaty in which the aggressor may dominate — would be a fresh precedent. But as the prominent economist Olivier Blanchard notes, this precedent would be good. It would mean that countries which are most in violation of global law should not anticipate protection under that law. And it would mean that real strength will stay behind Europe's declarations.
Financial implications
A lot of reservations concern the “euro damage” as abroad central banks would retreat their money. Most of them are at the level of economical illiteracy. First, reserve managers have nowhere to go. Secondly, the euro is simply a liquid currency; there is no mark for it. If it falls a little, it falls a little. So what? Thirdly, the euro area is not dependent on abroad capital. He is now a immense exporter of capital. As Mario Draghi stressed, Europe is failing to usage all its savings at home. This is the other of a situation where abroad investors must be satisfied.
Mario Draghi, erstwhile president of the European Central Bank during the ISPI Award ceremony. Milan, 9 December 2024.EPA/DANIL DAL ZENNARO / PAP
There's only 1 real threat. He is. organise a speculative attack on euro area government sovereign bonds. According to media reports, Saudi Arabia and another countries were threatened. Paris is peculiarly susceptible to specified risks due to the fact that it faces budgetary problems and is inactive in shock after it almost fell under the markets during the debt crisis in the euro area.
However, the euro area is well prepared to prevent specified an enemy. The European Central Bank's "transmission protection instrument" was designed precisely to prevent unjustified increases in the cost of lending to a country. The ECB would not have done its occupation if it had not utilized it if needed — and should have made it clear that it would. Eurogroup finance ministers could besides express their belief that the ECB has all the tools and is willing to usage them to neutralize a politically motivated speculative attack on 1 of its members.
Loan handling
The G7 countries and the EU began lending Ukraine to ‘extraordinary increase in revenues’ to be handled by gains on assets blocked in Euroclear. any politicians inform that the transfer of assets alone would remove this gross stream. They forget to say that This would besides be the case if sanctions were abolished and money went to Russia. But if the money goes to Ukraine, it's not a problem. The loans are in any event established as an work of Ukraine — a commitment which can be importantly easier to handle as a full of the assets than only a stream of profits from them.
Capacity of Ukraine to absorb measures
Even if in this war the EU and its allies decide to favour Ukraine alternatively than Russia, there are reasons not to give Kiev respective 100 billion in 1 coup. 1 of them is that Ukraine is incapable to absorb everything immediately. Another is that the country inactive has corruption problems and its political stableness is simply a hostage to how the war will go. However, structures can be created for the gradual payment of money.
A trust fund, jointly managed by Ukraine and its European friends, could have a charter that would pay money based on:
- recognised reparation claims;
- any reparations agreed between Ukraine and Russia;
- Ukrainian reparation bonds.
The part utilized for bonds could be gradually increased to encourage Russia to make concessions in any reparation discussion.
Choice between Russia and Ukraine
Repeat: all the request for analysis has been mostly met. Any claim that further answers should be sought should be seen as specified political cowardice. Europe must at least prevent the "default" return of assets to Moscow if politicians do not make any decisions.
For the EU, this means taking action to separate the Euroclear balance sheet related to Russia from the fresh banking institution with targeted investment instructions. For the United Kingdom (and Canada) this means parallel actions aimed at the segregation of Euroclear funds related to Russia in their jurisdictions and the direct application of national sanctions.
The time has come to make a political choice — a This choice comes down to favouring Russia or favouring Ukraine.
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