There are plans, but there are no resources. Will Europe be able to arm itself?

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One of the main topics in Europe in fresh weeks has been the reinforcement and release of military dependence on the United States, with which relations between Europeans have become increasingly strained since Trump came to power.

This is referred to by “politicists”, “experts” and “journalists”. Leading publishers dedicate their covers to this subject (for example, we post the cover of The Guardian Weekly).

Last week, the EU summit adopted a plan to increase military spending by expanding the budget deficit.

The main focus in backing the task is on Germany, where future Chancellor Merz wants to approve a plan to allocate EUR 500 billion for defence and another projects by expanding the size of public debt (Germany is the only large economy in Western Europe, in which the level of public debt comparative to GDP is comparatively low – 63%, while the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Spain already have a debt exceeding 100%).

The nonsubjective of all these activities is clearly defined – a drastic increase in defence and arms production spending, a simplification in dependence on the United States in the military sphere and an increase in Ukraine's support capacity. How realistic is it to accomplish these objectives?

First of all, it must be said that the economy and European finances are presently in far from the best shape. The main problem is the increasing deficiency of competitiveness of European producers over respective decades compared to another countries.

There are respective reasons: advanced taxes, advanced labour costs, bureaucratic state-to-business relation system, advanced energy costs and another natural materials, most of which request to be imported.

The consequence was the process of deindustrialisation – the massive relocation of production to China and another countries outside the West.

For a long time, all of these negative processes have been mitigated by the issue of money, allowing for advanced social standards to be maintained, despite a decline in competitiveness.

But everything has its limits.

Massive emissions in the COVID-19 era, as well as the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, which, as a consequence of a simplification in the supply of inexpensive Russian oil and gas, importantly exacerbated the problems of advanced energy costs, effectively exhausted the model on which the European economy was based.

Further mass printing of money threatens the foundations of the European financial strategy and can lead to massive inflation.

It is in these circumstances that the EU decides to allocate hundreds of billions to military needs. In addition, this is presented as a way to address Europe's economical problems by "promoting" its own production.

In reality, however, Europe's accession to the arms race will not solve its problems, but will importantly deepen them by threatening to disorganise the European economy. Like russian military spending, the russian economy derailed.

Firstly, the financing of military spending is in fact the same pure issue of money. Since the main purchasers of these products will be the budgets of EU countries (to supplement the stocks of their own armed forces and to supply Ukraine).

Only a tiny part of them are able to break into a global marketplace where competition is already very large. The fact that a crucial part of these expenditures is to be financed from the resources of Germany's expanding public debt means that, in the long term, the country, as before France, Italy and the United Kingdom, will fall into public debt, which could have very negative consequences for the financial stableness of the full European Union in the future.

Secondly, a crucial proportion of military resources will be spent outside the EU.

As Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission's chief, late stated, 80% of the Europeans' money spent buying weapons is spent outside the EU. First of all, in the United States.

Almost 2 thirds of the weapons purchased by the European NATO associate States between 2020 and 2024 came from the United States. This means that the vast funds utilized by Europeans to defend themselves are mostly utilized to support the American economy, not the European economy. If we effort to make a extremist change and buy only European weapons (as Macron insists), then it can take many years, even decades, to launch its own production. In that case, there can be no fast reinforcement.

In addition, the production of arms will affect increased imports of various types of natural materials, which will besides not have a affirmative impact on the EU trade balance.

Thirdly, defence spending can surely be financed not by expanding debt and emissions, but by reducing another budget items. Including social needs, as well as by "freezing" wage indexation.

However, this would mean the actual disintegration of the European welfare state and could lead to political instability throughout the EU.

Under these conditions, Europe will objectively find it hard to increase its own defence production and accomplish "strategic independence" from the United States. In fact, Europeans themselves admit this, as evidenced by the urgently convened summit in London following the scandalous conflict between Zelenski and Trump.

And that is why Europeans, despite harsh public rhetoric, powerfully advised Kiev to communicate with Trump and meet his demands. Including the ceasefire agreement, which had previously rejected both Ukrainian authorities and leading European countries.

"Strategic independency of Europe" (including military independence) will only be possible if the EU resolves its fundamental economical problems. Which will be very difficult.

And it's not actual that it'll work at all. In particular, in the context of Trump's threats concerning the imposition of duties on European goods. In specified circumstances, the thought that relations with the Russian Federation request to be restored to resume imports of low-cost energy resources and return to the Russian market, which would aid Europe solve its economical problems, is already beginning to be carefully pumped in Europe.

These voices have clearly not reached the mainstream yet; The overall trend is the opposite, moving towards a fast increase in common hostility between the EU and Russia. Moreover, the European Union is developing a plan to full retreat from Russian energy sources by 2027.

However, given the scale of the challenges facing Europe today, no deviations from the European course, even the most unbelievable from today's point of view, can be excluded. However, to normalise relations between Russia and the EU, at least the end of the war in Ukraine is necessary.

This is simply a fundamental condition for starting processes in this direction.

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There are plans, but there are no resources. Will Europe be able to arm itself?

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