Propaganda differs importantly from average fake news, which we discuss on our website all day. Propaganda content is frequently not based solely on false information, but alternatively on facts that are subsequently exaggerated, distorted or overly promoted on the web to make the impression that the problem is far more serious than in reality. specified narratives prey on emotions, primarily fear, fueling it to excessive size and causing it to disrupt a sober assessment of the situation. That is why Kremlin propaganda is peculiarly harmful.
Our weekly analyses (available Here.) are intended to present to readers current trends and changes in pro-Russian disinformation in Poland and Europe monitored primarily in the Telegram communicator and fewer websites and groups/pages on Facebook. Each analysis presents the most popular narratives of pro-Russian propaganda in the monitored period and discusses the most interesting aspects of it. It presents a full number of views of disinformation content and utilized by propaganda of the Russian Federation (for each country for the 3 most popular narratives).
Reports appear with any hold due to the request to process and compile data. They are open and are simplified versions of more detailed publications within the Open Information Partnership network. They can be utilized freely by readers, media and analytical centres with a clear indication of the source.
Analysis
More about our evaluation system:
The most popular narratives of pro-Russian propaganda in 12 countries of Central and east Europe (the highlighted narratives besides occurred in the erstwhile monitoring period):
- The country is Russian-phobic/Russian culture is attacked in it;
- The West intends to open the second front of the war with Russia;
- Importing Ukrainian products destroys the economy;
- Ukraine loses the war;
- Western governments are incompetent;
- Military support for Ukraine unnecessarily prolongs the losing war in advance;
- Ukrainian leadership is corrupt/incompetent;
- Russian troops decision forward/achieve crucial successes.
Poland – Nazis and banners
There are expanding numbers of narratives discrediting Ukraine, with peculiar emphasis on presenting this country as Nazi and accusing Ukrainian leaders of the fatal treatment of their soldiers and civilians. The increase of misinformation related to Nazism is peculiarly visible in the Baltic States, Belarus, Bulgaria and Poland, where accusations of utmost Ukrainian nationalism effort to straight link with the 1943 Volynska Reich.
Source: TelegramThis historical genocide connects with modern Ukraine, presenting it as a Nazi state; this message is further reinforced by mass-released films on the utmost right-wing channels in Telegram, where young men allegedly from Ukraine offend Poland. These films, at least any of which may be fabricated by Russian services, are presented as representing the full Ukrainian nation and are straight related to the communicative of supposedly ungrateful Ukrainian refugees in Poland. In fact, as we mentioned in previous analysis, public support for this kind of ideology is marginal in Ukraine – in the 2019 parliamentary elections a coalition of extremist and ultranationalist parties achieved 2.15%.
Ukraine loses the war
Narrations have been peculiarly popular this week that Ukraine allegedly lost the defensive war with Russia. The business of parts of Donbas and most of Bachmut is portrayed as a devastating defeat of Ukrainians. In fact, after fourteen months planned for 3 days of “special operation”, the Russian Federation army managed to take over about 18% of Ukraine's territory and about 3⁄4 of Bachmut – a city with a population smaller than Jelenia Góra. In view of the first plan, which was to occupy the full country, the successes of the Russian troops do not seem spectacular.
Source: Institute for the survey of War and AEI’s Critical Threats ProjectMade possible by the Dr. Jack London Geospatial Fund at ISW
The accusations of ill-treatment of Ukrainian soldiers by the authorities (saturated especially by prokremlian propaganda sources in Ukraine) focus mainly on activities around Bachmut, for which dense fighting continues. Pro-Russian channels on the Telegram blame the Ukrainian authorities for sending more and more soldiers to Bachmut, while the city's defence is allegedly entirely futile. specified posts are closely related to the communicative mentioned that Ukraine was losing the war and Ukrainian leadership was corrupt and incompetent.
Source: CHP/TelegramA typical example of this misinformation activity may be a case from Armenian information space. The communicative of the failure of war was promoted by a local pro-Russian channel, citing an allegedly Ukrainian origin that warned that soldiers, nevertheless critical of Ukrainian military leadership, are considered cowards and will be "removed" by peculiar SBU cells. Further analysis showed that the origin quoted by the Armenian channel impersonates a Ukrainian source, and in fact is simply a procremlovian disinformation centre. In the past, it has repeatedly spread prokremlian news, and in the lexical layer it has made mistakes typical of a Russian user trying to compose in Ukrainian.
The subject of Tatarski's execution is slow losing popularity
The execution of pro-Russian military blogger Wałdlen Tatarski, which occurred in St. Petersburg in early April, remains 1 of the crucial points of pro-Russian misinformation. The assassination is utilized to accuse Ukraine of terrorism and crimes against humanity. However, the number of news related to Tatar's death is gradually decreasing and is improbable to proceed to dominate disinformation narratives during subsequent monitoring periods.
Poland – 215 1000 views
Ukraine – 9.6 million views
Armenia – 61 1000 views
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia – 19,000 views
Belarus – 331 1000 views
Bulgaria – 502,000 views
Georgia – 5,000 views
Hungary – 25 1000 views
Moldova – 39 1000 views
Slovakia – 48,000 views
Source:
Ukraine War Disinfo Working Group, Monitoring study April 08-14, 2023
This study provides insights from the monitoring of narratives appearing on procremlovian websites and on social media in 12 countries of Central and east Europe, related to Russia's war in Ukraine. The data was collected and analysed by a number of NGOs, think tanks and researchers, and subsequently compiled by the Open Information Partnership (OIP) to advance the exchange of cognition across the OIP network and throughout the region.
