Propaganda differs importantly from average fake news, which we discuss on our website all day. Propaganda content is frequently not based solely on false information, but alternatively on facts that are subsequently exaggerated, distorted or overly promoted on the web to make the impression that the problem is far more serious than in reality. specified narratives prey on emotions, primarily fear, fueling it to excessive size and causing it to disrupt a sober assessment of the situation. That is why Kremlin propaganda is peculiarly harmful.
Our weekly analyses (available Here.) are intended to present to readers current trends and changes in pro-Russian disinformation in Poland and Europe monitored primarily in the Telegram communicator and fewer websites and groups/pages on Facebook. Each analysis presents the most popular narratives of pro-Russian propaganda in the monitored period, discusses the most interesting aspects of it and presents the full number of views of disinformation content and utilized by propaganda of the Russian Federation.
Reports appear with any hold due to the request to process and compile data. They are open and are simplified versions of more detailed publications within the Open Information Partnership network. They can be utilized freely by readers, media and analytical centres with a clear indication of the source.
Analysis
More about our evaluation system:
The most popular narratives of pro-Russian propaganda in 12 countries of Central and east Europe (the highlighted narratives besides occurred in the erstwhile monitoring period):
- Uninvolved countries decide to side with Russia alternatively of the West;
- the country is rustic/Russian culture is attacked;
- Western leaders are incompetent;
- NATO/US/ROAD is or will be straight active in the war;
- Western military aid is ineffective/will not affect the result of the war;
- military aid unnecessarily prolongs the war/threats civilians;
- Ukraine organises provocations;
- the country concerned, through its actions, escalates the war;
- the country afraid is at hazard of war or will be drawn into it;
- Ukrainian leadership is corrupt/incompetent;
- Russian troops decision forward/achieve crucial successes.
Despite the diversity of subjects of disinformation in all 12 countries, the communicative that The war will grow beyond Ukraine, was dominant throughout the geographical area during the period considered.
“Second Front”
Despite its detection in all 12 monitored countries, the communicative of the “second front” that the West would open against Russia was most visible in Armenia, Georgia and Moldova. specified messages intertwined with current accounts of mass protests in Georgia against the draft law on “foreign agents”. These protests were widely reported by pro-Russian disinformation centres in various countries, which focused on drawing similarities between protests and Euromaidan in Ukraine in 2014; both were presented as Western interference in the interior affairs of sovereign countries, driven by alleged objectives of installing “anti-Russian” governments and yet destroying Russia itself. Protests were a dominant subject besides during the erstwhile monitoring period on 12-19 March, and relations with them stay consistent: protests are presented as an effort to open the “second front” by the West.
Source: MRLs/TelegramThe most popular subject in Georgia besides gained popularity in Armenia, where the weakening strength of protests (translated by the ruling Georgian Dream organization giving up the bill under public opinion pressure) was utilized as a informing that since the West “failed” in Georgia, it would shift its attention to Armenia, trying to fuel anti-Russian sentiments. In the case of Armenia, disinformation centres promoted a communicative claiming that supporting Ukraine is dangerous as it will lead to the Kremlin refusing to aid Armenia in the event of an armed conflict with Azerbaijan or Turkey.
W Moldova's communicative of the “second front” was besides present, and the message focused on Transnistrian and Russian officials' claims that Ukrainian forces are preparing to carry out provocation there. Although these messages have been repeated in the Moldovan information space for respective weeks now, they proceed to be popular through the usage of fear of war in the country. Although the nuances and specificities of these narratives vary according to the context and country, the claim that the war will grow is the most expressive and coherent feature of the creamy disinformation campaigns throughout the monitored geographical area during the monitoring period.
Invariably, in all the countries where Ukrainian refugees are present, a communicative is promoted of the many serious threats they are about to pose to the interior safety of host countries. In Poland, popular far-right channels disseminate many information about the supposedly progressive Ukrainianization of Poland, frequently reaching highly absurd examples.
Orthodoxy and the far right
The second area on which the Cremel disinformation campaigns during the period considered were concentrated is religion. Narrations and content on this subject have intensified peculiarly in Georgia and Belarus, where pro-Russian propaganda centres condemned the Ukrainian authorities' decision to terminate the lease of the Peczerska Lavra due to its ties to the Russian Orthodox Church, which is inactive powerfully active in Russian influence operations. This step was utilized by pro-Russian sources to represent the authorities in Kiev as attacking Christianity, and Russia as a defender of faith, and thus justifying the invasion of Ukraine.
A notable feature of the transnational ecosystem of disinformation is the expanding promotion and intensification of Russian discrediting narratives Ukraine by local groups and far-right parties, especially in Hungary and Slovakia. In Poland, before the forthcoming parliamentary elections, utmost right-wing groups are eager to usage content from channels linked to Kremlin propaganda focusing on topics specified as Ukrainian refugees or Ukrainian military aid. The Baltic countries stay dominated by disinformation messages promoting the communicative of “rusophobia” and stressing that the rights of Russians and Russian-speaking people are consistently violated. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are the only countries in which this communicative frequently ranks among the most popular, and this situation is improbable to change.
Ukraine and Western support
In the Ukrainian information space, Russian propaganda channels maintained a well-known communicative about the invented utmost incompetence and corruption of the Ukrainian government. The main message of the posts was, among others, the incompetence of Volodymyr Zelenski. The emphasis was on the alleged fact that he was not seeking peace, but on the escalation of conflict. He was besides expected to cover up information about Russia's spectacular successes on the front. Thus, according to disinformation centres, Zelenski is focused exclusively on winning at any cost, regardless of failure and on his own interests (the upcoming elections).
Anti-Western narratives (with peculiar emphasis on the thought that the West is utilizing Ukraine to wage a replacement war) and disinformation related to events on the front stay unchangeable throughout the geographical area under discussion. specified communications proceed to frequently focus on Bachmut, where both sides endure dense losses – however, the Russian disinformation mostly exaggerates the Ukrainian side's problems and presents the Russian army as victorious, claiming that the final result of the war (the triumph of Russia) is doomed. There is besides a popular communicative that Ukraine, incapable to recapture Russia's captured lands, in fact lost the war, while the facts are rather different; Ukraine has effectively defended about 80% of its territory, which, with the asymmetry of forces, must undoubtedly be considered a success.
Source: ASJ/TelegramPoland – 126 1000 views
Especially popular in Poland was the communicative associated with the announcement by the British government that this would supply Ukraine with anti-tank missiles containing depleted uranium. The information centres related to Russian propaganda actively criticized this decision, pointing to its negative environmental impacts and threatening the West to escalate the conflict. The agenda on hypothetical “nuclear” missiles was distributed with a view to justifying the fear of a future “tactical atomic response”. president Putin falsely claimed that bullets with impoverished uranium have a “nuclear component”. In fact, anti-tank missiles containing this material have absolutely nothing to do with classical atomic weapons and have only an increased ability to penetrate armor of armored vehicles. Depleted uranium is not highly radioactive material, but as dense metallic it can indeed be toxic to humans and animals.
Source: Information Channel/TelegramThis communicative was peculiarly popular in the Telegram channel, gaining thousands of access due to the deficiency of knowing by the recipients of the difference between depleted and enriched uranium, utilized in atomic weapons production, which was utilized by Russian propaganda.
Figures for another countries (total number of views of disinformation content and utilized by propaganda of the Russian Federation):
Ukraine – 12 million views
Armenia – 28 1000 views
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia – 365 000 views
Belarus – 900 1000 views
Bulgaria – 22 1000 views
Georgia – 7,000 views
Hungary – 450 1000 views
Moldova – 150 1000 views
Slovakia – 107 1000 views
Source:
Ukraine War Disinfo Working Group, Monitoring study March 20 – March 26, 2023
This study provides insights from the monitoring of narratives appearing on procremlovian websites and on social media in 12 countries of Central and east Europe, related to Russia's war in Ukraine. The data was collected and analysed by a number of NGOs, think tanks and researchers, and subsequently compiled by the Open Information Partnership (OIP) to advance the exchange of cognition across the OIP network and throughout the region.
