Russia to Israeli attacks on Iran

In consequence to Israeli attacks on military and atomic installations in Iran on 13 June Vladimir Putin held telephone talks with Iran's president Masud Peseškijan and Israeli Prime Minister Binjamin Netanyahu, a day later – with US president Donald Trump, and on 16 June – with Turkey's leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In turn, the head of Russian diplomacy Sergei Lavrov contacted his counterparts from Iran and Turkey at that time. In authoritative communications, Moscow condemned Israeli attacks, making a proposal to mediate between the parties in the settlement of the conflict.

The Israeli-Iran confrontation gives emergence to both problems and benefits for Russia. The first include exposing the Kremlin's deficiency of influence on the situation and threats resulting from the possible neutralization of Tehran, a real ally of Moscow in its clash with Ukraine and the West. The benefits, on the another hand, tend to increase oil prices, helping to stabilise the Russian economy, and the anticipation of further utilizing Russia's offer of participation in the regulation of Iran's atomic programme surveillance – in order to improve its relations with the United States.

Comment

• Israeli strikes against Iran are a political and image problem for the Kremlin. Moscow, which offered the US its intermediation in regulating the control of Iran's atomic programme and signed with Tehran in January this year a fresh treaty on a comprehensive strategical partnership (see. New Russian-Iran Treaty: a shortlist in the face of Trump's presidency), had no effect on the course of events, especially with respect to stopping Israel's activities. Although the Russian-Iranian Agreement puts peculiar emphasis on cooperation in the field of defence and security, it does not contain provisions for common assistance in the event of aggression. Following this, Russia has limited itself to condemning attacks and identifying Iran's retaliatory attacks as self-defense actions, but has not declared any form of aid to Tehran.
• Invigorated Russian diplomatic activity in fresh days should be seen as an effort to mask weakness, in the absence of effective instruments of emphasis on both sides of the conflict. It seems doubtful that the Kremlin could play the function of mediator between Jerusalem and Tehran. The Israeli ambassador in Moscow spoke out of the question and Iran requested contact with Washington via Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman.
• The possible escalation of the conflict and destabilisation of Iran would have a negative impact on Russia's strategical situation. Cooperation with Tehran is an crucial origin for Moscow both in the context of the war with Ukraine (supply and production of Iranian drones mass-used on the front), as well as the rivalry with the West, headed by the US (actions striking the interests of Washington and its allies in the mediate East), as well as a stabilising component of the South Caucasus area. Neutralising specified an crucial partner (a de facto ally) would be a major strategical challenge for Russia.
• Moscow derives immediate benefits from the Israeli-Iran conflict. The most crucial of these is the emergence in oil prices and the chance for them to last in the longer term. This may importantly reduce the fresh strong financial force on the Russian budget by expanding the export gross of the natural material, which is simply a key stabilising component in the FR economy. another benefits for the Kremlin resulting from the escalation are the temporary distraction from the Western War in Ukraine (due to the situation in the mediate East Trump left the G7 summit in Canada).
• Moscow will proceed to convince the U.S. of its necessity in the process of agreeing with Iran a atomic control agreement, which is 1 of Trump's abroad policy priorities, and has attempted to usage possible approximation with Washington in its efforts to loosen the sanctioning government and make bilateral cooperation. However, this would require a prior deescalation of the Israeli-Iran conflict.