With Skibicki's disadvantage, Deputy Head of Ukrainian Military Intelligence HUR, he revealed that Russia was surpassing the monthly plans for producing the most crucial types of rockets. In July, it was to produce 87 Ch-101 missiles on a 72-piece plan. For Poland this is not a distant statistic from the front: specified a rocket in late July violated our airspace and fell on the Lublin region.
Russian war mill accelerates
With the disadvantage of Skibicki, deputy chief of the Chief Board of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, he transmitted data that sounded bad for Kiev and serious for Warsaw. As he stated RBK-Ukraine service, Russia executes monthly plans for the production of major rocket weapons of 110-120 percent. This means that the Russian arms manufacture maintains the rhythm of war and in selected segments can go beyond the plan.
The most striking is the example of Ch-101 maneuvering missiles. The plan for July was 72 pieces, and according to HUR data 87 were produced. In the case of 3M14 caliber missiles, the August plan is 26 pieces, the same was planned in July and 29 were created. Skibicki besides indicated that the implementation of the Ch-35 rocket plan reached 200 percent.
These are numbers from industrial warfare. Ukraine can make losses to Russia on the front and hit the aggressor's base, as we wrote on the occasion July losses of the Russian armyBut Moscow can inactive power a rocket machine. From the point of view of Poland, the worst would be to return to the illusion that Russian deficiencies themselves will halt the threat.
Ch-101 has already fallen in Poland
This case has a very circumstantial Polish dimension. In late July, the Russian Ch-101 rocket breached Polish airspace and fell on the Lublin Region. PAP informed behind Deputy Minister of Defence Cezary TomczykIt was a Russian Ch-101 rocket. According to later findings, the prosecution's rocket was to be produced in the second 4th of 2026 in the Moscow Oblast.
It's a very crucial detail. If a rocket manufactured only a fewer months earlier falls into Polish territory, then we are not just talking about exhausting post-Soviet magazines. We are talking about the current production of the state that is at war in Ukraine and at the same time investigating the resilience of the full east flank of NATO.
Therefore, the Polish debate on air defence must not end with slogans. A single system, even very effective, will not replace layered defense, recognition, ammunition, shelters, procedures and public readiness. This problem has already been shown in the text that Patriot himself does not solve the problem of Russian punches. A country that wants to last in this part of Europe must number its opponent's rockets as carefully as its own budgetary promises.
War on demolition and Polish Account
Russia is betting on the advantage of mass, backroom and time. It's an old imperial method: to push long, to usage your opponent, to terrorize cities, to destruct infrastructure, to force West fatigue. Skibicki's data show that Moscow did not quit this calculation. On the contrary, it is looking for a pace of production that will let regular strikes in Ukraine and keep political force on Europe.
For Poland, the proposal is simple. Ukraine's assistance must be subject to the Polish safety interest, not to the fashion of Brussels salons. Strong Ukraine binds any Russian resources, but Polish defence cannot be a replacement task of Kiev, Washington or Brussels. We must build our own ability to deter, our own production, our own stocks and our own civilian protection procedures.
There's no place for summertime in this case. If Russia increases rocket production, Poland should increase the pace of defence decisions. If Moscow can deliver a fresh Ch-101 projectile to the front in a fewer months, Warsaw cannot get stuck in tenders, competency disputes and conference propaganda of success for years.
Tough Realism alternatively of Calming
Skibicki estimated that Russia would not make a long pause in firing. This means that Ukraine will proceed to live under the force of raids, and Poland will proceed to neighbour with a war that can physically cross our border. The political intentions are not the most crucial here, but the facts: production, stocks, trajectory, consequence time, infrastructure resilience.
Polish national interest requires a cool conclusion. We must support the weakening of the Russian war device in Ukraine, but we must strengthen our own state even more. Air defense, the arms industry, services, civilian resilience and clear communication with citizens are not policy additives. It's a condition of freedom.
Russia understands strength and cost. If the West responds with communications, Moscow will respond with another series of rockets. If Poland takes the informing seriously, it can avoid the worst scenario: a situation where only the next bullet over our territory will awaken the political class from a comfortable sleep.
Source: Interia Events; RBK-Ukraine; Ukriform; PAP.
Source: Interia Events
