The following interview is simply a fragment of the publication of the Institute of fresh Europe – A year of fear and hope. What awaits Europe in 2023? [Report]
“Europe of homelands or federalization?” Shakespeare would ask if he could compose about the European Union. This is simply a fundamental question in the context of European integration, which is constantly accompanied by reflections on the future of cooperation on the Old Continent. Will it be essential to find answers soon? Will smaller alliances like the Visegrad Group or the Trimor? Politologist and writer Bartłomiej Radziejewski speaks about these dilemmas.
Michał Banasiak:
The year 2022 spared no problems for Europe. From the hard exit from the pandemic, through war, to the energy crisis and at least the spectrum of the economical crisis. In these hard moments, the states themselves have besides led policies for which the Union was liable in peaceful times – now criticised for tardiness or indecision. Is this why the debate on the future of the Union as it stands?
The thought of taking common debts to aid Ukraine is the announcement of an even deeper federalization than in the issue of covid debts. any have already talked about the Hamilton minute of the Union, and the debts proposed now would be even more common than those.
Bartłomiej Radziejewski:
I do not know if this year has anything fresh to discuss about the future of the Union. We live in our current emotions, and whenever something crucial happens, like now war or crises, we tend to bring everything to these events. So since the Union has now shown any weaknesses, there are plenty of votes that this is the reason for its reforms. And they are fundamentally right due to the fact that the Union has indeed proved moderately effective in dealing with the problems of the full alliance and its members. But the fact that the European Union is simply a geopolitically weak, undecisionable, having difficulty with consolidated action and full division, we already knew. The Union needs change regardless of war and this year's crises. All this has not revealed, and at most has highlighted EU problems.
So we're back to a structural dilemma: federalization or national states?
The European Commission, with a group of EU players, proposes to usage the Ukrainian War as an asumpt for deeper federalisation. The thought of taking common debts to aid Ukraine is the announcement of an even deeper federalization than in the issue of covid debts. any have already talked about the Hamilton minute of the Union, and the debts proposed now would be even more common than those. This is the EU mainstream, but possibly we should break through with a completely different reasoning and revive the debate on reducing the function of the Union and making it possible for national states to have more to say.
Recently, associate States have not regularly looked at the Union but have done their own thing. This has been the case with decisions to set up, send financial assistance to Ukraine, receive refugees, and even aid packages for economies, which has already been openly taking care of itself, without remembering the common marketplace or protecting competitiveness.
It was the same in the pandemic. There was a fast suspension of the Schengen area and everyone took care of themselves. Medical devices and later vaccines were bought by any at the expense of others. It was only later that the Union started working together and, in terms of economical support, announced a joint debt and recovery programme. He is not trivial, on the contrary, but he appeared late and was incapable to destruct the differences of interests. And they're powerful. Another is the perception of geopolitical threats in the east of Europe, another in the north-east – in Sweden and Finland, and completely different in Germany or France. Not to mention the south of Europe. National egoisms be and we will not destruct them.
Did the Union draw any conclusions from the brexit? In Brussels there was a reflection on the fact that the decision to leave the Union was at least partially linked to the deficiency of agreement on the direction and manner of integration?
The only lessons drawn by the European mainstream are possibly a sense of greater acceptance of the silent federalisation. due to the fact that there are no more vetting British. In fact, we deficiency the thought that we were doing something incorrect erstwhile individual leaves us. I see a major problem with learning from the European mainstream on my mistakes. What I observe in connection with the fresh right-wing wave in Europe, peculiarly Sweden and Italy, shows that at EU level there is not much desire to learn and change the way integration is carried out.
What does that mean?
It is not the structure of the Union itself that is to blame, but mediocre leadership. Both at Union and associate State level. Brexit showed it, too. Britain's punishment was announced to make brexit as costly as possible. That was expected to be a lesson for others. Meanwhile, it turned out that brexit was not someway excessive financially or economically. Here, too, is simply a vague signal for the future, which can besides be read as an incentive or at least no objection to others leaving the Union.
In fact, a quiet, crawling federalization of Europe is being carried out. No debate, no democratic mandate. Covering key areas specified as justice, energy policy, climate policy, finance, debt sharing. Fundamental things that the Union wants to decide without the consent of the nations.
Do you see, at a time of a few, respective years, erstwhile the Union must decide which way it is going? erstwhile can associate States no longer play cat and mouse and do it their own way and erstwhile in EU?
Today, indeed, countries are making decisions on an ongoing and alternatively opportunistic basis. In my opinion, European federalism has reached a highly paradoxical phase in its evolution. erstwhile you ask about the federalism of anyone dealing with European affairs, it will answer that it is fundamentally a dead thought or a half-dead idea. That he suffered specified large defeats in referendums in France and the Netherlands, and later, in the second decade of the 21st century; that he is in a deep retreat. In fact, a quiet, crawling federalization of Europe is being carried out. No debate, no democratic mandate. Covering key areas specified as justice, energy policy, climate policy, finance, debt sharing. Fundamental things that the Union wants to decide without the consent of the nations. And when, finally, the effects of this silent process become visible to everyone, we are threatened by mass rebellion and the overthrow of European integration.
Do we gotta decide?
It would seem so, but there is no readiness to build a European state. These ideas were rejected at various stages. There's no political moment. That's why it's not happening openly. This should, in my opinion, be an asumpt to stop, possibly even to look back and think about what is next. due to the fact that specified a diagonal, creeping push forward, without appropriate legitimacy, can end badly for integration.
Since camps in the associate States are increasing strong, if not anti-EU camps, at least anti-federalist camps, possibly they will yet be in the forum sufficiently present and influential to reverse this trend and start a serious discussion not about federalisation, but about national states.
That's how it should be. Coalitions of the willing. There's no strong ground for doing more.
Such formats as the Weimar Triangle or the Visegrad Group are a substitute for specified coalitions?
These are complementary formats. There is no way they are any alternate to EU integration. The Weimar Triangle has long played no role. The Visegrad Group did not play any function for a long time, and as it reactivated a bit, it was torn apart by the attitude of Hungary.
But within V4 we have, or have we had, any convergence of objectives, besides in the context of the Union.
There is simply quite a few discussion in the framework of the Tri-Morning, tiny investments, and there is inactive no single flagship investment with the possible to build fresh economical and political quality in the region.
When it came to it, however, the interests of Hungary and another members differed. Besides, there are no resources or political will in V4 to make it more than a discussion club plus. Weimar, in turn, has a problem with disparity of potentials, due to the fact that we have large global players and 1 medium. It's occasionally useful, but it's hard to tell him to play a bigger role. In order for any format of cooperation to actually have a political transformation, it takes a large deal of financial, human and organisational commitment. In our region, this brings in practice to whether the USA, Germany or both are active in a given form of cooperation. For the record, I am not saying that Central and east Europe could not make something of its own. On the contrary, it could and should. But it requires a lot more self-work. present we have the EU and NATO in practice with alliances. They have their problems, but they are very crucial and binding alliances.
Aspiration to be a serious alliance is reported by the Trimor. any of the criteria you're talking about are met by Americans.
The trim besides does not go beyond the expression of the discussion club plus. American support for this task was mostly verbal. This seems to have been linked to the occasional desire to make an answer for Chinese format 16 or 17+1. But we never managed to make this truly big. There is no money, no political will, but no appropriate approach. There is simply quite a few discussion in the framework of the Tri-Morning, tiny investments, and there is inactive no single flagship investment with the possible to build fresh economical and political quality in the region. 1 energy or road-rail task that would have the stamp of the Tri-Sea. You can hook up under Via Carpatia, but it would have been created without the Trimorese.
What does this inability to go from, as you put it, the debate club plus, to a peculiar alliance?
Because the Americans dropped the password, and only symbolic resources followed, which could not change the regional puzzle. Poland and others looked to the United States due to the fact that they themselves are not willing to put money and another resources to give it content. So we got what we got. And that's worth building relationships, exchanging thoughts, doing even smaller projects. But it is not something geopolitically significant, as announced at all step by Polish promoters of this project. The question could be asked: are we able to reduce social spending or education to spend on the Trimor? The answers can be easy guessed.
The basic card that we can put on the table, and we inactive do not, is our Polish imagination of the European Union and seeking allies for it.
The image outlined in our discussion shows that, despite rather many smaller and larger formats of cooperation in Europe, no of them have the real possible to make even quasi-alternatives for the European Union. It seems that alternatively of looking for a competitive forum for it, we should, or possibly even need, focus on working on what we have – the Union itself.
The European Union, with all its weaknesses, is simply a concrete one. It has a immense common market, common flows. It has its crucial importance on a global scale, which another projects mentioned here do not have and are not promising anything present to gain. If you want to think of an alternate to the Union, you request to think in terms of power alternatively than a regional cooperation platform. In terms of creating and exporting prosperity and security. Discussion forums with no crucial resources and small to contribute in the economical or safety context – they cannot be game banners.
So possibly Poland, as a associate of respective specified formats, with the mouths of a rather many group of politicians and analysts calling for changes in the Union, should redirect the resources devoted to this and focus on lobbying for changes that would interest us and benefit us?
The basic card that we can put on the table, and inactive do not, is our Polish imagination of the European Union and seeking allies for it. Of course, this search should begin at the phase of creating specified a imagination to include a conglomerate of interests, specified as the Central European ones. In my opinion, we are a large and crucial country adequate to make specified a vision. The Central European Region besides has interests different adequate from Western Europe to make them – we can lead this camp. It's not easy. It takes quite a few work, HR, money, but it's in range. Here and now. This imagination of ours should clash with another visions and we would have had a large deal of benefit from it. The discussion around it alone would add our brick to the pan-European agenda. So my basic advice for integration is, let's make our imagination and start fighting for it.
