During his 25th visit to China, Vladimir Putin failed to accomplish the most crucial economical goal – Xi Jinping's final approval of the contract for the construction of the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline. Despite the ongoing crisis in the mediate East and the blockade of the Strait of Ormuz, which hits Chinese energy supplies, Beijing remains steadfast in negotiations with increasingly dependent Moscow.
The Chinese-Russian summit, held on 20 May 2026 in Beijing, was full of diplomatic gestures. Xi Jinping called the relation of both countries “the strength of peace in the midst of chaos”, and Putin thanked the Chinese idiom, stating that “one day without you is like 3 autumns.” However, behind the facade of smiles lies the tough asymmetry of business, which was most evident in the deficiency of agreement on the energy megaproject.
Power of Siberia 2 suspended
The Power of Siberia 2 task involves the construction of a pipeline over 2,600 kilometres long, moving from the Jamal Peninsula in the Russian Arctic through Mongolian territory to Shanghai. With a capacity of 50 billion cubic metres per year, the pipeline would double the current Russian gas supply to the mediate State. The estimated construction time is 8 to 10 years, and costs go into hundreds of billions of dollars.
Although the Kremlin, with the mouth of Advocate Dmitri Pieskov, announced the accomplishment of a “general agreement” on the parameters and route, he acknowledged at the same time that the commercial details and agenda were inactive lacking. Moreover, Chinese media and officials have completely ignored the issue of gas pipeline in their summit summary messages.
The price remains a key point in dispute. Moscow expects a valuation based on a market-based formula, akin to that applied in Europe before the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In turn, Beijing, aware of Russia's desperation, demands prices close to the Russian interior marketplace and minimises risks through clauses protecting against mandatory gas collection (take-or-pay).
China's energy dilemma and the mediate east crisis
China's deficiency of consent seems amazing in the light of the current geopolitical situation. The conflict between the United States and Iran and the blocking of the Ormuz Strait pose a serious threat to Chinese energy security.
For the sake of clarity, let us look at the structure of gas supply to China:
Source of gas supply for China | Type | Status / Passage |
Australia | LNG (sea) | The largest LNG supplier – way through Malakka, not by Ormuz |
Middle East (Catar, UAE) | LNG (sea) | Approximately 30% of LNG imports – way through Ormuz, presently at risk |
Central Asia (Turkey, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan) | Gas pipeline | There are 3 pipelines, > 40 billion m3 per year |
Power of Siberia 1 (Russia) | Gas pipeline | It works, 38 billion m3 in 2025, 44 billion m3 at the end |
Myanmar | Gas pipeline | Works, 12 billion m3 per year |
Sakhalin (Russia) | Gas pipeline | Planned from 2027, 12 billion sqm per year |
Power of Siberia 2 (Russia) | Gas pipeline | Negotiations are deadlocked (50 billion m3) |
Around 20% of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade flows through the Ormuz Strait and nearly half of Chinese oil imports. As The Diplomat suggests, this crisis was intended to exposure the weakness of Chinese strategy, which is mostly based on open maritime routes controlled by Western forces.
So why didn't Beijing “turn off the cock” with Siberian gas?
As Carnegie Endowment notes, China has effectively diversified its sources of supply and has made immense investments in renewable energy and clean coal. Moreover, the mediate State has immense strategical reserves of oil, which it has not yet had to breach. Only imports of Russian oil and LNG have been increased, which is adequate to meet the needs of the Union on an ad hoc basis.
This situation sheds very circumstantial light on the analysis of specified centres as The Diplomat. due to the fact that what weakness of Chinese strategy can you talk of in specified a situation?
Asymmetry and “closing window”
The fiasco of negotiations exposes Russia's progressive vassalization towards China. In the face of Western sanctions and expanding Ukrainian drone attacks on infrastructure in deep Russia, Vladimir Putin needs economical success more than ever.
“The deficiency of a key agreement for the construction of the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline carries the hazard that the window of chance for Russia will close if Chinese renewable energy production becomes so large that fresh gas sources will cease to be interesting for Beijing”, says Alexander Gabuev of Carnegie Endowment.
For China, signing a 30-year contract for Power of Siberia 2 is not only an economical decision, but besides a strategical decision. Linking to internationally isolated Russia for decades carries political risks. In addition, Beijing strives to deescalate in the mediate East to stabilise global trade while Moscow uses higher energy prices caused by conflict.
Putin's visit to Beijing proved that although the alliance “without borders” is inactive in force in the rhetoric field, China's business is hard to calculate its own benefits. And there is no indication that this calculation will shortly change in favour of Moscow.
On the another hand, it is an excellent example of a Chinese strategy in which the safety and sovereignty of the state is the foundation of all action. And if centres like The Diplomat inactive don't notice, it's hard to be optimistic about the distant future of the West.
Source:
- South China Morning Post, “Putin left China, without a pipeline deal. Why diddn’t the Hormuz crisis open the valve?” (23 May 2026)
- Carnegie Endowment for global Peace, “Did Putin Return From China Empty-Handed?” (May 2026)
- Kyiv Post, “Putin Leaves Beijing Without Deal on Massive Siberian Gas Pipeline to China” (May 21, 2026)
- Institute for Energy Research, “Russia and China Meet But Do Not Close Gas Pipeline Deal” (26 May 2026)
- The Diplomat, “The Hormuz Crisis and China’s Energy safety Dilemma” (12 May 2026)
Leszek B. Glass
Email: [email protected]
