The dissolution of the russian Union seems distant, but this fact has affected the change in the world's power strategy and the economic, political and ideological situation throughout the russian territory. It caused the decaying community and revived political and economical nationalism.
The United States considered itself a winner in the Cold War and a fresh planet gendarme. Russian authorities have always considered the alleged colorful revolutions as a way of influencing the West on pro-Russian countries, as specified revolutions occurred in the countries close to Russia: in 2000 the Buldozer Revolution in Serbia, in 2003 the Rose Revolution in Georgia, in 2004 the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and in 2005 the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan. There were inactive riots that the authorities of individual states considered to have failed colorful revolutions: in 2006 – a test of the Djinn (Chabr) Revolution in Belarus; in 2008 – an effort of a colorful revolution in Armenia; in 2009 in Moldova; in 2011 again in Belarus; in 2011 – the Snow Revolution in South Ossetia.
The dissolution of the russian Union and fresh contradictions
The war in Ukraine is not the first, or most likely the last war associated with the dissolution of the USSR. It should be borne in head that the causes of this war are not the same as the causes that led to its outbreak. The extension and extension of this conflict shows that fresh elements have emerged, both internally and internationally. The causes of this war should so not be limited to a single factor, but should be seen as a whole. Individual causes can activate only specified or another social groups, causes, can be direct and indirect, nonsubjective and subjective, real and delusional. Focusing on 1 origin is creating a false image of the situation and political theology pushing nations into war. In view of the global division of labour and of common economical projects and dependence in the russian Union, its disintegration must have caused a number of economical problems in the relations of the recently created states, and the consequences of this we are experiencing so far. 1 problem was the division of companies within a given republic, which were joint investments, and the another was the problem of abroad debt of the USSR. Russia undertook to repay all debts of the USSR, divided between the recently created states, and in return demanded access to their economical assets. This gave Russia the chance to preserve economical and political influence in these countries, or at least so it seemed to the oligarchs and leaders of Russia. Russia yet repaid debts after the USSR in 2017, but bilateral problems did not solve it, but created fresh ones.
Ukraine's regression and comparative stabilisation of Russia
As a consequence of neoliberal deindustrialisation policy Ukraine's Ukrainian oligarchy of the poignant russian assets was not even able to balance the gross and budget expenditure – by the end of 2021 Ukraine's external debt exceeded $125 billion. This process was supported by widespread corruption among the ruling elites. Public debt was associated with reducing the state's economical impact and pumping budget funds into the pocket of oligarchy. With the start of the peculiar Military Operations Ukraine felt so connected with Western capital that it even asked to cancel its debts. Ukrainian capital in the bang of gunfire hoped for an investmentless improvement in its economical quotations and assistance in preventing social disasters. And Ukraine needed almost half of its budget to service public debt. According to official, possibly understated data, her public debt exceeded 65% of GDP. The peculiar Military Operation halted any improvement required by the global Monetary Fund and deepened public debt problems to specified an degree that Ukraine had virtually lost its ability to fund its own army and administration, and thus lost economical and political sovereignty. Ukrainian oligarchy remained formally in power, as it was in the interests of the US and NATO. The peculiar Military Operation actually saved the parasitic Ukrainian oligarchy from being liable for bringing about the economical collapse of the country.
Otherwise, in the 2 1000 years it began to happen in Russia, after Vladimir Putin came to power. It had a clear strategical plan, which could be called building an energy base for the full economy. It wasn't, contrary to what any people are writing today, about creating an empire. Russia at the time, after 10 years of neoliberalism, required the orderlyisation of the deindustrialised economy, the restoration of regular wage payments, pensions and the stabilisation of the wellness and education system. As part of this strategy, the gas, oil industries were made, followed by atomic power, a locomotive of development, and as specified a budget order. Russia began to make forward, and very quickly, as even Western financial institutions noted. But the shortages and fresh needs besides began to manifest. The negative impact began to show a shaped social structure with dominant oligarchical interests.
Pseudolevic social net channels, accuse Putin of building an "imperium". However, erstwhile he came to power, the problem was alternatively a desire to at least partially free himself from the tight corset imposed on Russia by Western financial institutions in 1990. Russia could not further make on the basis of the existing model of ownership of energy resources and natural materials and a close economical and financial dependence on the West.
The improvement of a natural and energy complex in Russia and the inflow of inexpensive energy allowed Germany to make its economy and take the strongest position in the European Union. But the strengthening of Germany was not well received by competitive American and British capital. They had to take action which would, on the 1 hand, halt the improvement of the German economy and, on the another hand, break the economical ties with Russia, which would weaken it.
Exports of capital from Russia
The problem was that by agreeing to the improvement of the Russian energy sector through SWIFT, Western structures controlled and limited Russia's ability to acquisition modern machinery and technology. Since 1994 Russia has had a affirmative trade balance each year. In this way, respective trillion dollars were exported from it, which should be invested in the improvement of their own economy.. Meanwhile, they were devoted to the improvement of luxury consumption, property purchases and securities of abroad corporations, i.e. their actual financial supply. The war in Ukraine has become an chance to express discontent for these reasons by any patrioticly tuned social groups and corporations. Therefore, the interests of any large Russian corporations sometimes take the form of pseudo-revolutionary, pseudo-marksist and dogmatic propaganda.
Some left-wing patriotic environments in Russia even attempted to publicize the peculiar Military Operation as a kind of “Revolutionary War” or “National War” from 1941 to 1945 with Nazi Germany and so proposed replacing the three-colour state flag (used during the period of the Tsar and by the Wlasov army) by the Red russian flag with a sickle and hammer. However, the fight against Ukrainian oligarchs and Western capital is not yet a revolutionary war. This, so far, is just 1 of the many wars between individual groups of capital, even if individual states believe that they are right on their side. There is no reason to simplify that under the present conditions all wars are only imperialistic, that there are no defensive, just or national liberation wars.
Engaging Ukraine and Georgia into NATO
In 2004, the Russian authorities understood that the transition of Ukraine to the West would be a real threat to the interests of Russian oligarchy. But then the integration of Ukraine into the West was hampered by the Western countries themselves. Meetings in Bucharest and Budapest were crucial, where Ukraine and Georgia were promised to sign an agreement to open the way for their admission to NATO, although if you look at the map, you can see that Ukraine and Georgia are not in the North Atlantic basin. Then France and Germany opposed the admission of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO. However, these promises caused additional concern in Moscow and in addition, in 2008 Georgia invaded South Ossetia, during the inauguration of the Beijing Olympics. Russia's war with Georgia broke out – and Ukraine, demonstrating its independence, supported Georgia and directed its military advisors and weapons from Georgia. Viktor Yushchenko called for Ukraine to be included in preparations for joining NATO.
The Bucharest gathering is now considered more a turning point than a solution to Russia's relations with Ukraine.. Putin's squad demanded the cancellation of promises and the resignation of Ukraine's admission to NATO. After the arrival Viktor Yanukovych Russia-Ukrainian relations have been strengthened and the plans to revive Ukraine's relations with Russia have been revived. There were fresh trade agreements signed, and the gas wars of the Yushchenko period went back. However, Yanukovych's government initially besides tried to balance between the European Union and Russia, and was urged by local oligarchs to sign an agreement with the EU. erstwhile Yanukovych refused his signature under force from Russia, this led to a wide crisis in Ukraine supported by Western peculiar Services.
After the overthrow of Yanukovych Ukraine in 2014, trade blockades on the part of Russia were affected, including the ban on the “Roszen” Sugar corp candy cart belonging to the future president Petra Poroshenko, whose products entered the Polish marketplace in 2015. Poroshenko's interests besides suffered in Russia for another reason; he owned a candy mill in July. The Russian Investigative Committee accused the factory's authorities of extorting 180 million rubles from the state as a taxation refund between 2012 and 2013. Poroshenko besides had establishments in Lithuania and Hungary. He besides owned the tv channel. He became 1 of the richest Ukrainians (in 2014 "Forbes" placed him in the sixth place of his list, valuing his assets at $1.3 billion). Such a fast emergence in the large economical and financial fortunes of any businessmen, practically in the life of 1 generation, had to rise a number of very serious questions in Ukrainian- and Russian-speaking Ukrainians. In order not to gotta answer these questions, it would be useful to keep tension and intensify national relations, especially relations with the Russian-speaking population.
The signing of an agreement with the European Union would make the anticipation for Ukraine to re-export goods free of work from the EU to Russia and to make crucial profits. However, for Russia, this would mean serious problems in the interior market, especially for the Russian industry, this would pose serious problems with the balance of trade and payment. According to the Russians, Ukraine did not even want to discuss the solution to this problem. This surely influenced the improvement of the economical foundations of nationalism on both sides of the border and was 1 of the first points of improvement of this conflict.
Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet Problem
After the dissolution of the USSR, the relations between Russia and Ukraine were not as smooth as they are now. There was no common ideology and so no common values to measure what was going on around and what was planned to be done. There were a number of contradictions on the Black Sea Fleet and Crimea. In 1992, Crimea received wide autonomy. But specified broad power of lawyer only intensified separatist tendencies. In 1994, pro-Russian groups were victorious in Crimea. Yuri Mieszkov And the Block of Russia. They already planned to connect Crimea and Russia. However, the Ukrainian authorities powerfully overcut these intentions in 1995, restricted Crimea's autonomy and forced by repression to forget separatistism for 2 decades.
Russia itself was not officially active in these interior affairs and in supporting separatistism, as it had even bigger interior problems at the time. Russia was only afraid at the time with the destiny of the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea. The division of the Black Sea fleet was accompanied by severe tensions, up to the physical appearances of the sailors who took over the ships, thus demonstrating their desire to belong to Russia or Ukraine. As a consequence of the division of the fleet, Ukraine felt injured as it received older and smaller vessels. But she would feel hurt, most likely in any division of this fleet, due to the fact that that is the law of nationalism: she must give origin for discontent, even if they are not.
For Russia, it was very crucial to keep fleet bases in Crimea, as it did not have another specified convenient location in the Black Sea. Initially, the Ukrainian authorities did not let this possibility. But in 1997, an agreement was signed on relationship and cooperation that allowed the Russian fleet to stay in ports in Crimea until 2017, as well as the presence of Russian soldiers on the peninsula itself. The dispute was over during the presidency Leonida Kuczma (1994-2005) which led a multi-vector abroad policy. An agreement on the Russian-Ukrainian border was signed in 2003, but its applicable demarcation did not occur. Even for Kuczma's presidency there was a sharp crisis around Tuzła Island in Zalewa Kerchenski, but it was rapidly resolved.
The 1997 agreement reached Viktor Yanukovych (2010-2014), but lost its power in 2014. However, the Russians could not let Crimea to be lost, to base the US fleet in Sevastopol. And the Ukrainian oligarchs supported the opposition against Yanukovych due to the fact that they were afraid of rematch and sanctions on the part of Russian capital for prior restrictions on Russian capital. In the case of Rinat Achmetov, the threat was besides that the Russians wanted to take over his assets, especially his electrical assets. Fear of expansion of Russian capital was 1 of the factors that caused Ukrainian oligarchs and moved to the massesy. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict warmed up the alleged Revolution of Dignity and the coming of pro-EU power Petr Poroshenko (2014-2019).
Poverty in Russia
The emergence of interior contradictions in Russia may have been an additional indirect origin of the outbreak of the conflict with Ukraine, or the war could have utilized Russian elites to divert attention from existing economical divisions. According to authoritative figures, in Russia there were around 13.5% of the population of the mediocre in the first 4th of 2023. By 2022 there were officially about 9.8%, or 14.3 million people. However, it should be borne in head that employees receive the January wage most frequently in December of the erstwhile year, so in the first 4th the income is always lower. If you compare the incomes of the first quarters of 2022 and 2023, it turns out that the rate of mediocre people fell by almost 1%.
If you look closely at the methodology for calculating the poorness index, it turns out that this indicator was calculated at the accepted price of the consumer basket. The price of this basket of goods, established in 2020, despite inflation, is very low. This basket did not reflect the real statistical needs of the individual. It is impossible to last effectively in Russia based on this "consumer basket" (14,200 rubles), i.e. to effectively reproduce the workforce. In addition, the structure of the consumer basket itself was falsified; it included only foodstuffs, multiplied by 2 and so was the price of the basket of goods which was due to falsification of consumer needs. As a result, we had the following consumer basket structure: 50% – foodstuffs, 25% – non-food goods and 25% – services. These proportions were not a typical norm; they were a falsified structure of needs. Only 10% of the mediocre population had this consumption structure. The average citizen spends 36% on food, 34% on non-food goods, and 30% on services. On the another hand, the created artificial consumption structure, understated food spending, importantly reduced the number of mediocre people. At the same time, food prices increased more slow than the others. The poorness line thus calculated was understated, and as a consequence there were less mediocre people.
In addition, poorness was calculated by income, and it would have been more appropriate by expenditure. 20% of the poorest people spent little on food than needed for physical survival, and that is about 30 million people. The authoritative poorness figures were so understated by 1/3. By adopting a methodology for calculating the poorness rate applied in the US, where food spending is multiplied by 3, in Russia about 50% of the population would be included in the mediocre category and much more of the population among the mediocre would be shown to be surviving below the social and biological minimum and benefit from the aid of others, including the closest household or neighbors.
No wonder Russia has had a catastrophic demographic situation for years. The population is falling. Authorities' efforts to increase women's fertility did not have crucial affirmative effects. The Russian authorities hoped for an increase in population mainly due to immigration, and this was in line with the interests of the large capital, which was curious in specified a inexpensive way of gaining labour. The deficiency of labour may in the long word force the modernisation of the economy. But the past decades have shown that this does not should be the case, due to the fact that the large raw-energy capital was not curious in modernising the full economy, and any of its sectors can operate with comparatively low labour demand. For Russia, the absorption of Ukraine is the last chance to improve its demographic and cultural statistics, as the Muslim population in Central Asia plays an increasingly crucial role.
The world-wide regulation of neoliberalism has created akin problems in all countries. Keeping the global situation tense in many places was distracting from interior problems. The outbreak of war not only corresponded to the interests of oligarchy and social classes prevailing in Russia, Ukraine, the United States, but was besides utilized in European countries and in many others. This does not mean that all countries straight affected its explosion, but that much more people appeared to usage it.
The call for and maintenance of war may contain different causes, but maintaining it requires emphasis on the primary causes or only the chosen ones, and concealing actual and current causes in their entirety. Corruption in Ukraine was common and before the outbreak of the war, and increased even more after its outbreak, erstwhile economical and military aid flowed a rich stream. Western civilian and military articles can be purchased on the marketplace with aid. The request for luxury cars increased in Ukraine after 2 years of war almost twice, and most cars are purchased by Ukrainian officials or members of their closest family.
Dr Edward Karolczuk
photo of wikipedia
A fragment of a larger whole
Poland, No. 5-6 (28.01-4.02.2024)
