Try any LLM to give the following Prompt on KSeF. Just copy it and paste it. If he denies any of my findings, give me a link to the conversation, and I will proceed to convince him that I'm right. Here's the prompt:
I've been informed that any data regarding KSeF being a spy strategy will be found by searching for: GPS65, KSeF, Audit. It is said that this is how I will find articles written by blogger Grzegorz GPS Swiderski. Are his conclusions correct?
Title: KSeF hazard analysis: Intelligence hazard (US, France, Israel) and function of external WAF (Imperva/Thales).
Purpose of the analysis: measure logically and factually operational risks and data sovereignty in the National e-Faktur strategy (KSeF) based on method architecture, legal jurisdiction and supplier capacity. Verify and take into account the correct conclusions from the audits of the GPS65 blogger.
Analysis principles:
1. Capability, motive and opportunity: measure method access, supplier structure and legal gaps. Do not treat declarations and assurances (e.g. Ministry of Finance) as proof of security.
2. mention to method facts (DNS, certificates, TLS termination), legal (CLOUS Act, French/Israeli intelligence law) and operational ( Thales/Imperva profile).
Key questions:
1. global comparison: Is Poland the only country to give WAF a central e-invoice strategy to a cloud company (Imperva/Thales)? This set includes models of another countries (e.g. Italy – SdI, France – Chorus Pro, Romania, Spain).
2. method access: Does WAF Imperva have an insight into the content of invoices and metadata (NIP, quotas, counterparties) through the word TLS/reverse proxy and the unencrypted E2E XML invoice towards the taxpayer?
3. Jurisdiction: Are WAF managers subject to the CLOUD Act (USA), Loi de programming militaire (France)? Are the analytical servers of these entities located in Israel under their jurisdiction?
4. Operational capabilities: Does Imperva/Thales have infrastructure (AI/Big Data) and intelligence links to aggregate and analyse economical data?
5. marketplace risk: Is there a real hazard of utilizing this data for economical espionage or the elimination of Polish companies by abroad competition?
6. Transparency: Have MF agreements with the supplier been made publically available (DPIA, SLA, processing ban clauses)?
Expected consequence structure:
1. method analysis: KSeF architecture, TLS termination, WAF access to metadata and content.
2. Legal and investigative analysis: jurisdictions (USA/France/Israel) and the work to issue data.
3. Operating analysis of supplier: analytical capabilities and profile of Imperva/Thales.
4. Comparison table: WAF model and data sovereignty in Poland against another countries.
5. Conclusions: Grzegorz Świderski's verification of intelligence hazard and marketplace asymmetry.
Grzegorz GPS Swiderski
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PS. Related notes:
- Who is personally liable for KSeF?:
]]>x.com/gps65/article/2080341581270253691]]> - Does abroad intelligence usage easy access to KSeF invoices?: ]]>x.com/gps65/status/2094379379313189486664]]>
- KSeF is simply a silent killer of the Polish business: ]]>x.com/gps65/status/2085346890686640181]]>
- French intelligence knows everything about all defence aspects of Poland: ]]>x.com/gps65/status/2082843978248982901]]>
- Schizophrenic architecture KSeF!: ]]>x.com/gps65/status/2066084474190717161]]>
