Conversation with prof. Michael C. Kimmage, Dean of the Faculty of past of the University of Catholic America in Washington. Prof. Kimmage deals with the technological past of the Cold War, the past of United States abroad policy and American-Russian relations after 1991. From 2014 to 2017, he worked at the State Department Policy Planning Office, where he was primarily liable for relations with the Russian Federation and Ukraine.
War returned to Europe for longer
Thank you, Professor, for joining us. First of all, we have heard and read a lot about your latest book The collisions... (Collisions...). Could you say a fewer words about the content and the main aspects of it?
Of course, yes. I'm trying to present in this book the historical context of this large and terrible war that is happening in front of our eyes, and I'm analyzing it first in 3 separate planes, which is why the book's title is The collisions..., not just Impact. Thus, 1 axis is evidently the axis of Russia-Ukraine. It's apparent why it's important. The second axis is no little crucial to me, and it would be the Russia-Europe axis. After all, it is known that the crisis in Ukraine begins, about speaking, in 2012-2013. It has much to do with the association agreement with the European Union, the European aspirations of Ukraine. Europe is simply a very crucial supporter and supporter of Ukraine, and for Russia most of the problems are whether Ukraine fits or not, into the European safety architecture. The 3rd axis is the Russia-United States axis, which in any cases moves us back to the Cold War, but also, of course, leads in the 21st century. And it is she who gives war something of its global specificities, due to the fact that it is, of course, a war and a European-Russian conflict, but it is besides transatlantic and global. So I look at the war from the position of 3 separate axes that I think are different. They all start in different ways, they act differently, and I say each will have a different end point. I would say it's 1 of the things that makes this war so hard to understand. Let me briefly draw my 4 conclusions. You know, I'm glad I can make any of these 4 points. I finish the book with predictions, which is simply a dangerous thing at the minute we're experiencing. I think 3 of my 4 projections are beautiful strong today. 1 of them is simply a small more controversial. I know that you will have questions about the 4th proposal for the United States and where they are going. The first conclusion is that the breakup of Russia with the West is both very deep and most likely very long lasting. This has happened on a political, surely military level, but it besides happens on a social and cultural level, and it is truly almost unprecedented in the past of Russia and the USSR, at least for the last 2 hundred, 3 100 years. So this process, I think, is fast, has taken place rapidly in the last 2 and a half years, but I think it will be a truly long-term fundamental feature of our environment. Secondly, and this proposal is very closely linked to the first proposal – Ukraine will be part of Europe and will be part of the West. I think it will. I think it's actually happening. And this is 1 of the things that caused this war. And of course it is no coincidence that erstwhile Russia breaks with the West, Ukraine becomes a part of it, due to the fact that in this conflict there is something almost symmetrical, mathematical or binary. Thirdly, I truly think that a widely understood Europe – whether we are talking about Poland, whether we are talking about the Baltic republics, whether we are talking about Western Europe or South Europe – will specify the war, which has not been fought for 30 years. However, this is simply a very typical situation in the past of Europe. So either we are going back where we have always been and in the mediate of Europe, in the heart of Europe, there is simply a war, or we are entering fresh realities. However, we must make a intellectual change, moving from Europe, which we usually associate with peace after the collapse of the russian Union, to a state of war that will not be short-lived. Finally, I foretell in the book that the United States will be heavy active in Europe. I think it's inactive possible. I'd be happy to explain. But I'm a small little certain of that conclusion than erstwhile I finished the book and wrote it about a year ago. That's my 4 forecasts. And that would kind of be a summary of it.
The request for Patience
Well, as you pointed out, predictions are always rather risky. Therefore, those who make forecasts are very courageous. But of course your predictions come from your experience, besides as a diplomat and a man who shapes politics in practice. So I have another question about the book as such. Predictions are very important, but do you make any recommendations? Are there any recommendations to avoid worst-case scenarios?
No, I don't urge anything straight in this book. I think, however, that the book’s reasoning has led to clear recommendations. 1 of them is – and it is not, as you know, any surprise, but needs to be stressed – to take Russia's military aspirations very seriously. These aren't small aspirations. Russia, I believe, has extremist plans for Ukraine and possibly the full region. Besides, Russia has a certain level of potential, little than itself thinks it does; but frequently bigger than we in the United States think it does. So in order to approach Russia's challenge, to be very sober and serious, I describe it in this book as a generational challenge. And that, in my opinion, is the way of thinking, in the intellectual and political sphere that we must adopt. This isn't about a part of territory here or there. These are very crucial questions concerning Russia's relation with Europe and, as we know, what opportunities Russia has for creating difficulties and problems in Europe. This is, you know, 1 of the political conclusions. Another policy proposal concerns what has failed in the past. I think that by knowing what has failed in the past, we can choose what will win in the future. What has failed in Ukraine in the past, until 1991, I mention to as half-step and half-measure policies. frequently the policy of the United States – I think that German-French policy besides – was to get free of visible problems and attempts to return to normal. So in 2014, with the annexation of Crimea, Russia's invasion of east Ukraine, to Donbas, as you know, there was a very, very poorly developed diplomatic solution to this problem, known as Minsk diplomacy. And it was actually a series of half-steps, half-measures, half-promises, you know, half-promises. I think we know for certain it's not working. So if we want to succeed, we request courage. There is simply a request for firm commitments. And I repeat again – a very serious approach to this problem. Finally, I think that this comes in a sense from points 1 and 2 – erstwhile it comes to political recommendations, patience is needed. This is not a problem that can be solved quickly. It's not a problem that can be solved easily. It will be a chaotic, long, brutal and hard war. So if we're going to succeed, we request to grow our potential. I am talking especially about the United States. I am not worried that Poland will have patience for this conflict. I think she's got adequate patience. However, if the United States is to win in working with its European partners and allies, it will request quite a few patience. Meanwhile, judging by America's fresh past – it's just not so sure. The United States was in Iraq for a while and lost patience. They were in Afghanistan for a while and lost patience. I think in this case the United States cannot afford to lose this patience. Therefore, we request to realize what patience means, to supply political justification and to effort to be as persistent as possible in it.
We realize Russia
You mentioned Poland. That's very interesting. Unfortunately, in Poland almost no 1 understands that Russia has any possible and opportunities, as you mentioned. And that, at least in my opinion, is the biggest problem. However, do you think that in the United States, not only in the intellectual class, but among decision makers – there are also people who understand, truly realize the motivation of Russia and the patterns of Moscow's behaviour in global politics?
In general, the answer to that question is yes. We have 1 of Russia's most skilled and capable American observers in the United States. This is CIA manager William Burns, Bill Burns, who was an ambassador to Russia earlier in his career. I don't know if he speaks Russian, but he learned Russia very carefully. And I don't think he's naive or misinformed about the kind of challenges and threats Russia poses. I think it's akin with president Biden. Nor do I think the Secretary of State Blinken suffers from deficiency of knowing and naivety. I would say the same about national safety advisor Jake Sullivan. For Biden's squad – I know that we will shortly decision on to Trump's squad – I would say that the problem is not deficiency of knowing or naivety. The problem is that they must reconcile different priorities – others for Germany, others for the UK, others for the European Union, others for France and – I am certain – others for Poland. We inactive have the full Asian theatre, which is not yet a theatre of war, but has this possible and surely has attracted the attention of American decision-makers for the last 10 years. The United States has all kinds of commitments in the mediate East, which is not presently a unchangeable region. And I hope that Europe is inactive at the top of their agenda. So there is no question that they will rush to compromise with Russia due to the fact that they believe that you can do business with Putin. possibly specified a mentality existed in the past, but I think the war completely eliminated it. The question is how to balance all these different priorities. And this is simply a real challenge: what Americans can decision or decision their attention to. And it's, you know, I think it's the closest thing you should be considering right now. How do they set priorities? I think that each of the 4 decision-makers I mentioned – Burns, Blinken, Sullivan and Biden – each has a somewhat different hierarchy of importance. I think out of these four, Sullivan is most focused on Asia. I believe that Blinken, Burns and Biden focus alternatively on Europe.
Frustration after 24 hours
And, as you mentioned, we were going to talk about a possible fresh administration of a possible fresh president. What would have changed if Donald Trump had been elected to his second term? I mean, of course, I've read your very analytical article in the "Wall Street Journal", but it says there are 3 different scenarios, if I remember correctly. So the first script is that nothing will change, right?
It's very possible. If we go back to 2017, I think the best tips for president Trump's second word can be derived from his first term. So that's what we request to analyze. Sometimes his statements are, you know, very varied and hard to understand. And that's why I don't attach that much importance to words, but I think it's crucial to pay attention to the actions of his first term. 2 countries entered NATO erstwhile Trump was president. United States spending on defending Europe increased alternatively than fell. It was Trump who provided the Ukraine with deadly military aid – Javelin anti-tank missiles, which were truly crucial at the beginning of the war. That's Trump's balance sheet. And this is besides the basis of Biden's administration policy. This may be the basis of another Trump administration policy. But saying that from 2017 to 2021, now and in the future this basis will not change is not an interesting communicative for journalists. However, it is not excluded that this will be the case. Many people in Washington are worried – I know that in Europe besides – that Trump will lose interest in Ukraine, that he will effort to make an agreement with Putin and someway destruct transatlantic relations. I think that, under Trump, relations between the United States and Germany and between the United States and the EU would be difficult. It's an integral part of his policy. But it's not due to Ukraine. And not due to Russia. These tensions are caused by another issues. Would Trump like to make a deal with Putin? He could do it. Suggests he might be interested. But the real question is, could president Trump make an agreement with Russia? I don't think so. I don't think that Ukraine will march mandatoryly to the rhythm of American verbs. If Ukraine does not agree, it will follow its own course. And I do not think that a country like Poland, if the United States were looking for an agreement with Russia, would necessarily go in this direction. I think this is actual for all European countries. European countries will make decisions based on their own interests. And if it were a origin of friction with the United States – well, that's hard. But I do not think that Europe will simply quit the war simply due to the fact that Trump will say that it should. So he may have a variety of ideas, but I would be amazed if he could implement them in practice. I think in any ways it is more likely that Trump will say that he can solve the war problem in 24 hours. In fact, he's said it a fewer times. I foretell calmly that this will not happen: that it will not solve the war problem in 24 hours. And what happens after 25 hours? I think Trump will start looking at the war with large frustration. He does not want to be seen as a loser. I don't want to be seen as weak. I don't think Putin will make it easier for president Trump to live in his second term. So, with these frustrations and difficulties, he could respond by doing 2 things that the Biden administration was unwilling to do. He could say to Ukraine: go ahead, usage American weapons to strike in Russia. He could besides start supplying Ukraine with advanced weapons that Biden's administration does not want to pass on. In short, Trump could escalate alternatively than deescalate. It is not impossible, it is not certain that this will happen, but it cannot be ruled out. In my opinion, this is simply a script that requires more attention, especially since it is not a script that most people are discussing.
Trump breaks the rules
Yeah, quite a few people in Europe... Although not only in Europe, even in Russia itself, 1 reads comments and opinions that many of them number on Trump to someway reduce the escalation of the conflict. In the meantime, as I recall, you even mention in your article the usage of tactical atomic warheads, right?
- Yeah.
Would this be possible within the next levels of the escalation ladder?
– I mean, it's highly unlikely. I don't want to conduct specified a reckless analysis, but I don't think Trump will operate according to the rules that another American presidents played. This can be seen in so many different areas, whether in terms of customs and trade, originally in American-Chinese relations. Trump treated Europe the way no erstwhile American president did. due to the fact that he likes to break the rules. It's part of his political brand. That's why I'd presume weapons issues could be the kind of stuff Trump breaks the rules about. Since the fall of 2022, erstwhile the war began to go badly for Russia, Putin threatened to repeatedly usage tactical atomic weapons. I can easy imagine Trump calling specified a threat, even if he did not plan to do so in fact as a bargaining chip, negotiating tactics or military tactics. And if he did, we'd just enter a fresh phase of the war. I think in the case of a possible Trump administration, we're far from utilizing tactical atomic weapons, but it's entirely possible to endanger them.
Personal dimension of policy
Do you think that various individual conflicts between politicians can someway affect the United States' policy towards Ukraine? I mean the stories about president Biden and his son's relation with Ukraine, which Trump and his supporters distributed. And also, very diplomatically speaking, any disagreements between the Zelenski administration and, say, people close to Donald Trump.
– It's a very important, very crucial question. The material on huntsman Biden is crucial to the American political right. This is an crucial subject for the Republican Party, which has been given quite a few attention. If you look at the comments of the Trump family, they are very negative towards president Zelenski. Not so much Trump, but Donald Trump Jr., Trump's son, who made a series of unpleasant comments about president Zelenski. In any parts of the Republican organization there are allegations that Ukraine is corrupt. That she's not worth American support. If we look at American writer Tucker Carlson, who was comparatively close to Trump, he makes this kind of statement. A number of people in the home of Representatives and others are talking about this. So this is simply a melody sung by the right, an anti-Ukrainian melody. And it matters. It will most likely be stronger in the year of the run in which it will be the rivalry of Trump and Biden. It's truly about American politics. I don't think this is about Ukraine. So I would consider it an crucial aspect, part of the picture, but I'm not certain how large that part is. The event that makes me skeptical about whether it is so crucial is that the anti-Ukrainian faction of the Republican organization has just lost a immense political battle. They tried to prevent the transportation of aid to Ukraine. The talker of the home of Representatives, of course a Republican, but put it to the vote. I think it was with Trump's permission. Then any tried to cancel the talker of the home of Representatives, but that didn't work either. So I think it is right to interpret that Trump felt that supporting Ukraine was better for the Republican organization than not supporting Ukraine. This has to do with the global situation, and possibly besides the American interior policy, where a certain anti-Ukrainian section is truly very, very tiny and surely not adequate to win the election. There are always games involving president Trump, erstwhile president Trump. That's how he works. Ukraine participates in these games, but I do not think it is simply a substance of deciding how it looks at Ukraine, even in the Trump circle.
America liked in Poland
You besides mentioned in your article about Trump's attitude to Poland, to our country. That was very interesting. I mean, will Trump have the same attitude towards Poland after the fresh change of the Polish government? We had a conservative government of law and justice behind Trump's erstwhile presidency. Now we have a more or little left-liberal government. And well, I realize that at the ideological level Trump might be closer, say, to Viktor Orbán and another conservatives from Central Europe. But will it be so close with Poland, with its fresh government, with liberals?
– It'll be little close. I think it has to be. It existed, precisely as you suggest, a kind of ideological relation with the erstwhile Polish government. However, I think there is another dynamics that makes it a small more complicated. I think Trump senses that the United States is rather popular in Poland. And it's not the United States Joe Biden, nor the United States Donald Trump. The point is that the United States is popular as a friend of Poland. Warsaw was in 2017 the mark of president Trump's first state visit to Europe. I think it confirms what I'm talking about. Trump, of course, met with a very warm reception. And for him, it's a small mutual. If he feels like he likes him, he likes him in return. And I think he is right to think that in countries like France and Germany the question of assessing what the United States represents and what the United States as a partner is simply a small bit more contentious. There may be more misunderstandings and possibly more skepticism towards the United States. So if I were to think about this issue from the position of the Polish government, then of course it is incorrect to talk on any side in another people's political elections. And that's not what the Polish government does. But if Trump was elected, we could kind of advertise the Polish enthusiasm towards the United States, which actually exists, and usage it to influence various kinds of matters. I think there are good and bad countries in Trump's planet map. And Poland is 1 of the good countries there. This is therefore, of course, an asset for Poland in the case of Trump's re-election.
Russia won't attack NATO.
And 1 more question about Poland. There are many discussions in our country about a possible Russian military threat. What do you think of him? Basically, you are right that Europe will be a theatre of war as specified in the coming years. But do you think, in the short term, that there is simply a threat of escalation of war for Poland as well?
– I think this is something that we should all discuss as far as possible. We cannot be amazed as in 2022. And we surely cannot be amazed as in 2014. It was then easy to say that the annexation of Crimea would never happen, and the massive invasion of Ukraine of 2022 would never happen. quite a few people said that. They were wrong. Thus, we cannot let specified reasoning to prevail. Again, erstwhile it comes to these matters, we must have any kind of intelligent pessimism. We request to think about what it might look like. For me, the essential condition for the spread of war outside Ukraine is that Ukraine will truly start losing this war. And we're not in that place yet. I don't think that's gonna happen. That's my opinion. However, if this were to happen and Russia was to go to the west of Ukraine, I do not think that this is simply a script of Russia entering straight into Poland or entering straight into the territory of the Baltic Republic. However, I think that membership of NATO is important. Nor do I see what Russia can gain in the territory of 1 of these countries, given the risk. I think that Russia would alternatively effort to win the war in Ukraine, to divide and conquer Europe internally, and to effort to divide European countries into those that are so afraid of Russia that they are ready to compromise and make separate agreements with Russia. On the another hand, there are those European countries, i.e. the Baltic countries, Poland, Scandinavia, which are so afraid of Russia that they would think of acting truly on their own, not passing through Brussels or Washington, but taking matters into their own hands. If this had happened, if Europe had been divided and conquered in this way, it would have simply become weaker and weaker in transatlantic relations, little cohesion, little organisation, little cooperation. And I think that this is an environment in which Russia would like to act and put force on it that it can take up even more territory in Georgia, it can take up territory or more territory in Moldova, it can formally annex Belarus. All of this is in a sense possible, but it besides contributes to a broader climate of fear that Russia will effort to exploit. For me, it is simply a bad adequate script that we request to carefully rethink its meaning. And that, of course, is the justification for giving Ukraine serious military and another assistance. But I think that specified a forecast would most likely be irresponsible if we said: well, first Ukraine falls and then Russia marches on Warsaw. In my opinion, this simply goes beyond Russia's capacity, most likely not its ambition, and it is not the right reason to worry. I mean a somewhat more dispersed threat of average severity. But again, I would like to stress that the threat in itself is bad enough.
Repellent effectiveness
Well, you mentioned that in 2022, in February, many people were amazed by Russian intervention in Ukraine. But do you think we could have avoided it? I mean the West as such. You remember Russian proposals for negotiations of December 2021, proposals for a complex fresh safety architecture in Europe, etc. I'm not saying the West could agree to these Russian proposals. I'm just wondering if the West could, say, at least pretend to be ready to negotiate. possibly that would aid avoid war as such, a military solution.
"No, I don't think there's anything in 2021 – whether we're pretending or not – that could have a different result or effect. Besides, I would say president Biden did everything he could to hold a fresh beginning with Russia for the first six months of his presidency. He gave the green light to the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline task between Russia and Germany. He met Putin in Geneva in the summertime of 2021. His rhetoric was, I would say, very, very low erstwhile it came to Russia. He set up strategical working groups to stabilise relations with Russia. What could truly be expected from the American president in the context of that period? Of course, this did not halt Putin from rushing to war, going to war. Looking back, I think that – although it is unlikely, but it is the best thing to prevent war – the most effective would be to recognise not in 2013-2014, but to say in 2011-2012 that Russia has specified territorial and regional ambitions. And due to these territorial and regional ambitions, it is essential to supply Ukraine with lasting and comprehensive military support, to supply the Ukrainian armed forces with resources to defend themselves, or at least to make the invasion very costly for Russia, before any threat was seen on the horizon. This means the usage of deterrence in the language of diplomats and military strategists. It's a classical Cold War concept. This concept has long been utilized in relations with Russia. It is this concept that NATO inactive uses in its relations with Russia, but it should have been taken seriously in the case of Ukraine. If there were a strategy of deterrence from attacking Ukraine between 2011 and 2012, if it were financed, if it were given, you know, a real structure and real content, I think we could prevent specified wars and specified military actions. I think that without this and without this approach there was simply not adequate argument to halt Russia.
To be understood in Europe
Well, Professor, the last question concerns your possible recommendations to Poland, to the Polish government. Of course, I know that it is rather hard to urge or advise the government of a country like ours, in our position and in our, say, geopolitical situation. But would you have any thoughts and ideas about Poland?
Well, I can think of 3 basic things that find the success of Ukraine in this war. I think 1 of them is built into Polish politics, I believe, regardless of whether the government would be centre-left, centre-right or any other. I mean long-term military support for Ukraine. I do not think that specified a advice is necessary, due to the fact that that is the consensus in Poland. I will focus on the another 2 recommendations which are more hard to implement in practice. As far as Europe is concerned, whether we are talking about the European Union or whether we are talking about a broader knowing of Europe, Europe itself is now a complex structure. We have countries like Portugal, which are very distant from the war, and countries like Poland, which are very close to the war. It is crucial that Poland sees its success as the success of Europe, and Europe's success as its success. This is simply a task that must be implemented jointly with different countries, different political cultures of Europe, in order to have a common European imagination, a common European dialogue, a common European consensus on the war in Ukraine. This may mean learning to talk about it in a somewhat little Polish way erstwhile participating in European meetings or erstwhile European ties and cooperation structures are developing. There is no way Poland can handle this war on its own. It can only win in Europe and this must be a political project. However, this does not mean that the European Union is being assisted with no thought. I don't mean anything peculiarly political, but it truly develops political imagination. This may partially trust on persuasion and partially on the rule of political play. But this is truly necessary. I am not saying that Poland is presently doing poorly in this area. I am more afraid with doing so in the long term, as well as in the way we have already discussed, so that transatlantic relations besides function well. What does that mean under president Biden? I think it just means more of the same thing. I think Biden's administration sees Poland as an highly crucial and powerful regional player in Europe. I mean, the population of Poland, I think, is about 30 million.
Trump splits like Putin
Almost $40 million.
– I do not know what Poland's GDP is. It is not at the very summit of the ranking in terms of population and GDP, but whatever these figures mean, the importance of Poland in Europe is greater than they are. I think it is rather useful for Poland. If Biden wins re-election, it's something to trust on. I know that Ukraine's success for Biden's administration is simply a success for Europe, and part of this is success in transatlantic relations. So it's not about changing gears, it's about continuing driving. Greater challenges will arise if Trump is elected president. We've discussed this in part. As I mentioned earlier, I think that Poland could play a peculiarly crucial role, but all that I mentioned earlier will become even more difficult. The challenge will be more hard than easier. Trump intends in his own way, as I have just said about Putin, to effort to divide Europe in any ways into countries he likes and dislikes; countries that aid China, and countries that do not aid China; countries that contribute to the economical success of America in the eyes of Trump, and countries that do not contribute to that success; countries that spend more than 2% of their defence budget, and countries that do not. If that happens, it will be something Poland will gotta deal with. This will, of course, be a challenge. Finally, it will stay to do everything in our power to convince Trump to see the importance of Ukraine, most likely for himself – it will not harm – but to see the importance of Ukraine for the American national interest. It's a question of persuasion again. It won't be easy with Trump, but I think it's feasible. I think that Poland is most likely in the first place among the European countries that can do this work of persuasion.
Mr. Professor, thank you very much for this conversation, and I am counting one more time on a detailed discussion on your book. I think if you have time, we'll discuss this book a small more.
– It would be my pleasure. I'd love to.
Thank you very much. Let us hope that this scenario, which is actually for us, means for Europe as the continent which you described, is rather terrible, is someway avoided. Next time, let us besides talk about how we, here in Europe, could avoid the most tragic scenario, which is besides described in your book.
- Yeah. Well, we are reasoning about these tragic scenarios not to make them inevitable, but on the contrary – above all, to prevent their implementation.
Thank you very much again.
– Thank you very much. Until next time. Goodbye.
Matthew Piskorski spoke
