Polish Navy against the Baltic War

ine.org.pl 11 months ago

Zdjęcie: 729×308

Introduction

At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, the father of the founder of maritime operating art and 1 of the most crucial maritime war theorists – Alfred Mahan – stated that a state with maritime interests must be able to safe them at sea. The existence of the Polish Navy has been the subject of public debate for 100 years. Is this unnecessary megalomania of a country with no vital interest in the seas and oceans? How about an investment to defend valuable supply lines and ports? In the face of an increased threat of war with Russia, the strategical importance of the Baltic Sea and Polish ports is growing. They are the place of supply of supplies and equipment and landings of dense allied forces which cannot be transported by air. In interwar times, the Navy was seen as a manifestation of the megalomaniac of Marshal Józef Piłsudski. This view can be justified by the deficiency of tradition and strong links between Poland and the sea during the time of the partitions. However, even during the 1st Republic of Gdańsk, the port in Gdańsk was held by a crucial Polish economical window on the planet through which food, grain and wood were exported to another European countries. A strong, efficient and well-equipped navy gains importance in the face of threats from Russia. It should be a warrant of Polish interests in the Baltic Sea and the architecture of state security: military, economical and energy.
After 1989 there was no large interest in the Baltic. This trend is likely to change in the coming years due to the intensifying of cooperation with South Korea, which has a wide scope of shipbuilding industries. The Polish economy is increasingly dependent on the Baltic Sea — the pipeline, the gas pipeline and 2 liquid fuel handling bases will be joined by wind farms and a floating liquefied gas regasification terminal in the coming years. (FSRU) [1] The Polish Navy should increase the possible and the ability to task forces in order to be able to defend key elements of the Polish critical infrastructure, so crucial for the functioning of the Polish economy. The arguments against the Polish MW can be divided into 3 categories:

Historical – Poland MW lost the conflict for the coast in September 1939, and disgraced by Operation “Peking”.
Economic – Fregata or corvette cost much more than a tank or cannon.
Operational – Baltic is not crucial for the Polish defence effort and the war with Russia will take place on land.

The author of this work will effort to deal with these misconceptions.

Background

On 28 November 1918, the Polish Navy was first created as a fresh kind of armed force after Poland regained its independence. Poland did not have large maritime traditions, so creating and developing a fresh kind of armed forces from scratch was a challenge. During the interwar times, efforts were repeatedly made to discredit the Polish MW and to turn it into another types of Armed Forces. During the 1939 defensive war, the Polish MW was incapable to establish an equal fight with Germany due to the tremendous asymmetry of forces and dominance of German aviation. Polish maritime aviation had outdated aircraft, which could only conduct exploratory operations.

Despite the controversial operation “Peking” the continuity of the Polish pre-war statehood survived during planet War II: aboard Polish ships (including ORP Lightning, ORP Storm), which penetrated England. ORP Lightning besides took an active part in the celebrated Bismarck hunting. Additionally, Polish sailors in Hel surrendered as 1 of the last: only on October 2, 1939. The Peking plan itself was to retreat the Polish counter-torpedist squadron, which included the destroyers ORP Storm, ORP Lightning and ORP Grom. The primary intent of this operation was to prevent the unproductive demolition of these ships by the Germans during the 1939 defensive war. On the 1 hand, the operation made it possible to proceed fighting these ships alongside the British. Left in ports would undoubtedly be destroyed, as proved by the destiny of another destroyer – ORP Wicher. On the another hand, the departure of Polish ships was badly received by another types of Armed Forces and Polish society. ORP Lightning and ORP Storm survived the war and on board maintained the continuity of the Polish state before 1939.

Potential of the Polish Navy

At this moment, the condition of the Polish Navy is disastrous. Most ships do not meet the requirements of the modern battlefield, and their number and equipment are incapable to supply protection for Polish interests in the Baltic. [2] In the last 20 years, mainly bridge purchases were carried out to supplement the gross needs of the Polish MW. Only that the units acquired in this way are either 5 Ponorweg submarines of the kind Kobben (more than 50 years old) or post-American frigates renamed ORP Gen. K. Pulaski and ORP Gen. T. Kościuszko, which came to the state of MW from 2000 to 2002. Poland does not request large oceanic vessels, but a fleet of tiny modern ships capable of operating in shallow seas and ensuring the safety of our strategical interests. The Baltic is presently poorly secured, which is an incentive for Russian Baltic Fleet activities.

The Polish MW forces form fleets of ships, the MW aviation brigade and shore support and safety units along with school units. Poland MW has:
– 2 Oliver Hazard Perry frigates mentioned above,

– ORP Gen. K. Pulaski and ORP Gen. T. Kościuszko,

– 2 corvettes: ORP Kaszub (a corvette to combat submarines) and ORP Slazak (originally a multitasking corvette, completed as a patrol corvette),

– rocket ships: ORP Grom, ORP Orkan and ORP Piorun,

– destroyers of mines: ORP Albatros, ORP Mewa and ORP Kormoran (former national defence minister Mariusz Błaszczak signed a contract to supply 3 further Kormoran II kind mine destroyers with logistics package; transportation from 2026 to 2027),

– Orp Eagle submarine,

– a fleet of respective trawlers,

– 5 transport-min,

– the command ship of the ORP Rear Admiral Xavery Czernicki,

– tanker ORP Baltic,

– radio-electronic designation ships: ORP Navigator and ORP Hydrograf (for replacement by the requested Delfin ship),

– respective rescue ships,

– hydrographic vessels: ORP Hewelius and ORP Arctowski, and

– training ships.

In the coming years, fresh Swordfish ships will replace old and utilized Oliver Hazard Perry ships. They will take over their tasks of the ZOP (to combat submarines).

Naval Aviation has:
– respective PZL M28B Bryza aircraft (in various versions, which carry out exploratory and patrol tasks, transport and ecological monitoring),

– 4 Mi-2D/R helicopters,

– 8 PZL W-3WARM Anakonda helicopters,

– 4 Kaman SH-2G Super Seasprite helicopters,

– 8 Mi-14PL/R (to be replaced by AW101),

– 4 Leonardo AW101 helicopters delivered in 2023.

The cheapest way to increase the safety of Polish interests in the Baltic would be to have a frigate of air defence and submarines (ork program) built (under the Sword Programme). They will release the air defence squadron, multitasking aircraft and battalions motorized needed at the land theatre operations. [3] The operation of a frigate or submarine can be compared to a military-wide battalion or multi-purpose aviation squadron. [4] but that the battalion itself cannot function logistically due to the fact that it requires the support of the full logistics strategy and functions within the combined weapons. Fregata, on the another hand, can operate at sea for respective months. In addition, Sweden and Finland are developing this kind of weapon: Finland acquires 4 frigates and Sweden expands Visby-class units. Both frigates and submarines let Poland to participate in the NATO 4×30 initiative, i.e. to launch operations within 30 days:

1. 30 military battalions,

2. 30 tactical aviation squadrons,

3. 30 battleships.

Currently, the Polish MW has 3 vessels to join this initiative. However, their age and method condition prevent effective participation. fresh Ork and Swordfish ships will meet NATO criteria and enable Poland to participate in the 4×30 initiative in the cheapest way. [4] Swordships are to be ready by 2033, and submarines of the Orka kind by 2034. It is worth adding that, although the unit cost of these units is high, they will service for respective decades. [5] However, whatever the desire, the process of acquiring marine vessels itself is highly long and costly. Most likely there is no anticipation of buying submarines along with frigates. The acquisition of ships of this size can take up to 15 years: 1-2 years is defining needs, another 1-2 years is selecting a supplier and negotiating a contract, preparation of production takes another year, production about 5 years. Additionally, strategy integration, sea and port tests, launching and equipment, so the next 1-2 years. [6] Then training sailors and commanders, playing them with the ship. Starting orders today, we strengthen the MW in 2035-2039.

Characteristics of the Baltic Coastal War

The Polish Navy will come to operate in an environment where there is no clear difference between war and peace. Its main weapon will be the ability to deter and task forces. An interesting example is the situation from the September campaign. The specified possession of submarines by Poland – abstracting them completely from their usage – caused that Germany did not hazard large ships entering the Gulf of Gdańsk.

Future wind farms in the Polish exclusive economical region can be utilized to make false signals from the AIS strategy and mask their own coastal fleet. For this purpose, turbines must be equipped with the anticipation of generating false signals – passive and active. [7]

Coastal warfare requires a large number of tiny units specified as corvettes and frigates that are capable of operating on shallow water. An interesting argument for the expansion of the coastal fleet of tiny ships is provided by US Navy's problems in influencing the Black Sea. The 1936 Montreux Convention gives Turkey control of the straits leading to the Black Sea. It besides sets the permissible tonnage of warships that affect the Black Sea. The limit is set to a maximum of 30000 tonnes, so it is common for up to 2 U.S. Navy units to influence the waters. The solution is to build a fleet of tiny coastal vessels with a tiny tonnage. They give much more flexible strength on this watershed, which is capable of supporting Ukraine and American allies in the Black Sea. [8] In addition, specified ships may be treated as support vessels and excluded from the Convention.

Strategic objectives of the Polish Navy in the Baltic Sea

The Polish coastline in the Baltic is 770 km and the Polish territorial waters have an area of 8,783 square km – almost as much as the Opole province. Poland's exclusive economical region is 22 595 square km. It allows economical interests, including fishing and deposit operations. In 2023, freight traffic in Polish ports amounted to 135.9 million tonnes (an increase of 14.3% compared to 2022). [9] The largest Polish ports carrying out trade are Gdańsk (58.6% of nationwide turnover in 2023), Gdynia (18.8% of national turnover) and Szczecin-Świnoujście (8.7% and 13.1% of turnover respectively). These ports are besides on the list of the 10 largest ports in the Baltic.

In 2023 458 units with a full gross capacity (GT) of 4937,4 1000 were renovated in Polish shipyards. Energy will be the key manufacture in the coming years. In 2023, the Gdańsk naphthoport of the PERN group overcharged 37 million tonnes of oil and liquid fuels. This means an increase of half compared to 2022. This is related to the ongoing war in Ukraine and the global departure from the usage of ports in Petersburg. Naftoport is already operating at its highest velocity today. There are plans to build another terminal to operate the largest tankers. [10] The evidence besides includes the LNG terminal in Świnoujście. In 2023 62 deliveries of liquefied gas reached him. [11] Most LNG supplies (because as many as 41) came from the United States. Further elements of creating the energy independency of Poland utilizing the Baltic Sea are:

1. offshore wind farms in the Polish economical region (by 2040 are to make more than 10 GW of electricity),

2. Baltic tube gas pipeline (started in 2022 and already in 2023 sent 6339 million cubic meters of gas),

3. For comparison, the coal power plant in Bełchatów generates 5.4 GW, and in the end the Polish atomic power plant is to have a maximum power of 9 GW erstwhile all reactors are launched.

The Baltic tube pipeline connected to the Polish gas strategy – via Denmark – Polish and Norwegian mining platforms located in the North Sea. Gas pipeline capacity is 10 billion cubic metres. The beginning of Baltic Pipe, which coincided temporarily with the sabotage of Nord Stream 1 and 2, ensured energy safety for Poland. [12] In addition to the pipeline, the supply of liquefied gas is besides carried out by sea. The gas-port capacity in Świnoujście is now 6 billion cubic metres, but is expected to emergence to 7.5 billion cubic metres. In total, 17 billion cubic meters of gas, 80% of gas consumption by the Polish economy, is expected to scope Poland. The launch of the floating FSRU terminal in the Gulf of Gdańsk will further increase this percent in favour of the maritime road. [13]

Maintaining the presence of the fleet throughout the Baltic part of the Baltic tube pipeline is impossible. Therefore, it is essential to map the seabed surrounding the gas pipeline and make digital maps. Then periodically repeat the action and capture discrepancies, including based on artificial intelligence tools. The Polish MW does not have adequate strength to carry out this task, but the Kormoran II mine destroyers may be helpful. The reflection systems of these units, the ability to identify mine hazards and the experience of crews make them predestined for this kind of action. [14]

Allies

According to the data presented above, fresh economical opportunities open up before Polish ports and the maritime economy. Due to the war in Ukraine, Polish ports become an crucial transhipment base and supply line. The Baltic becomes a key place for Polish energy independence. Thanks to the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO, the function of combined alliance activities in the Baltic Sea is growing. We should focus on working with strategical partners. First, a long-term global agreement based on the concept of "shore sharing" should be signed. It is about sharing the coast and the free operation of units in allied waters – after prior agreement with the on-call operating service of the country. A akin agreement should be signed with the Baltic States. [15] Poland and the Baltic States should prosecute a common policy of defence of the coast. Defence plans must be agreed on, but they must besides be linked together, and in addition, plans for the modernisation of fleets must be agreed jointly.

Another issue is the link between the Polish and Baltic Sea Commands, following the Dutch-Belgian agreement "Admiral Benelux". [16] In the face of the threat of Russia's invasion, the function of metastatic channels capable of supplying the defending Baltic states, including by the port of Rostock and Gotland, is increasing. In order to make the Baltic an interior sea of alliance, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Finland must be able to defend marine supply routes. The ability of the Russian Baltic fleet to carry out attacks with long-range missiles (Calibrion ships and Ch55/555/101 aircraft and land-based ones) requires NATO fleets to have a solid anti-aircraft defence that has the ability to safe supply routes. [17] The countries of the region noted this gap in defence and switched from investing in tiny water units to ordering multitasking frigates (Sweden and Finland) or air defence vessels (Poland). An additional asset of these units is the ability to destruct the threat from Russian submarines capable of operating on the open sea.

Summary and recommendations

The economical interests of Poland and the capacity of the Polish economy are closely linked to the sea. safety of these interests and the improvement of the fleet are so not unnecessary megalomaniacs, but a strategical necessity. Pipelines, pipelines, fibre optics and shipping routes are not areas that can be fenced and established for them a perimetric defence. They require a critical infrastructure protection model that can be provided by the fleet and shoreline protection. Most of the problems affecting Polish MW are the penance of inter-war reasoning and the deficiency of awareness of the possible of the Baltic Sea. The Polish coastline present is 770 km compared to 71 km before planet War II. present we have any of the largest ports in the Baltic, not to mention pipelines and naphthoports. In the close future, 100% oil demand, 90% gas request and 20% electricity request will be obtained by sea, sea or seashore. [18] The Polish model for protecting critical infrastructure is insufficient to defend what is at sea. Object reasoning is dominant (defence of circumstantial infrastructure elements – carbon from activities on land) alternatively than process (protection of the full supply line or its endangered part). [19] An example is the process of supplying liquefied gas through Baltic Pipe, which begins in the North Sea and runs under the bottom of the Baltic Sea.

Poland is not a country with access to the sea, but a fully-fledged maritime country. Society and decision-makers should see the possible of the Baltic Sea, exploit it and defend Polish interests. We request to see opportunities for cooperation with our allies in the Baltic: Sweden, Finland and the Baltic States. The "shore sharing" agreement and the common defence and modernisation policy of coastal fleets is an crucial aspect.

The usage of unmanned floating devices to carry out mine warfare tasks and combat enemy submarines should besides be increased. Additionally, unmanned air systems (BSPs) that would: (i) increase operational awareness of the Polish MW and (ii) supervise the waters (including a combination with allies of a akin type) to detect Russian hybrid activities (such as the actions of the Russian shadow fleet).

War is simply a system. Without energy and economical security, for which the Baltic is crucial, we will not be able to function in a state of war or effectively deter a possible attacker.

Bibliography