Poland and Japan in 2025 – Populism as a mirror of a collective soul

In Tokyo, on a hot July day, Sohei Kamiya, a politician surrounded by controversy and accused of spreading anti-Semitic rhetoric and conspiracy theories related to the COVID-19 pandemic, climbed the roof of a run car. Megaphone in his hand, shouted to the assembled crowd: “Japan first!”. His gestures were theatrical, and rhetoric – nationalist, anti-immigration, anti-elitarian – went to younger voters, shaking conventional parties. For many observers, it was an impact on the heart of nipponese political stability, a signal that populism can penetrate even the most orderly society.

"Democracies die erstwhile citizens halt defending them," said Timothy Snyder in About tyranny. In July 2025, these words one more time gained for many of us the dimension of terrifying news. The waves of populism, which until a decade ago seemed a distant problem, struck the heart of unchangeable democracy, revealing their weaknesses and tensions hidden under seemingly solid institutions. one more time around the world, we see a akin phenomenon: societies seeking simple answers to the complex challenges of globalisation, economical crises and geopolitical tensions.

Tokyo and Warsaw, cities more than 8,000 kilometres away, have become scenes on which the drama of modern democracy takes place. In Tokyo, on a hot July day, Sohei Kamiya, a politician surrounded by controversy and accused of spreading anti-Semitic rhetoric and conspiracy theories related to the COVID-19 pandemic, climbed the roof of a run car. Megaphone in his hand, shouted to the assembled crowd: “Japan first!”. His gestures were theatrical, and rhetoric – nationalist, anti-immigration, anti-elitarian – went to younger voters, shaking conventional parties. For many observers, it was an impact on the heart of nipponese political stability, a signal that populism can penetrate even the most orderly society.

Until 5 years ago, Sanseito, a organization led by Kamiya, was a marginal group with only 1 mandate. present it has 15 of them, and its YouTube channel is tracking over half a million subscribers. Although this figure is not impressive, it is adequate to rise concern among the nipponese mainstream rightist, fearing the further outflow of voters towards utmost groups.

The emergence in Sanseito's importance is part of a broader trend in which nipponese populists address typical topics specified as vaccines, immigration, diversity, sex issues or nationalism. At the same time, they disagree to any degree from both the far right in another countries and from erstwhile forms of nipponese right-wing extremism, adapting global motives to local social and cultural realities.

The noisy cars with megaphones, reproducing patriotic war songs and carrying young people in quasi-military outfits, which have been present in nipponese cities for decades, have so far been based mainly on nostalgia. They longed for Japan's imperial past and blamed the United States, the nipponese left, and Communist China for “stealing the spirit of fighting” and for the guilt of the nipponese towards the war in Asia, which they considered entirely honorable.

These marginal but noisy extremists, any historical views of whom have penetrated the mainstream conservatives, peculiarly criticized the postwar pacifist constitution, written by the Americans, prohibiting the projection of nipponese military force outside the country. The annexation of respective tiny islands in the West Pacific by the USSR in 1945, which erstwhile belonged to Japan, was frequently reminded by megaphones at busy stations. Kamiya himself refuses to admit that Japan has made any mistakes during planet War II, and the subject that most breathtaking supporters of “Japan first of all” is the increasing presence of foreigners in their country – immigrants and tourists.

Yet, Japan traditionally accepted fewer foreigners compared to most countries. Most of them were Koreans who utilized nipponese on a regular basis and asylum applications almost always refused. Even migrants who arrived in the 1980s. – specified as the Iranians fleeing the Iraqi-Iran War – shortly left the country.

Today the situation is changing. About 3.8 million foreigners live in Japan, and in the first half of 2025 the country visited over 20 million tourists, attracted by a favorable yen course. However, foreigners inactive account for only 3% of the population – much little than in many another countries. For comparison, as many as 29.7% of residents in Germany have so-called. Migrationshintergrund, in the United States immigrants make up 15.4% of the population, in France 10.3%, and in Spain 19.6% were born abroad (of which 14.3% have abroad citizenship). In Poland, the share of foreigners reaches only 1.2%.

The most worrying to the public in Japan is the influx of Chinese tourists and residents. For many Japanese, they are like the “ugly Americans” of the 1950s: rich, confident, insensitive to local customs and demonstrably benefiting from fresh wealth. This abuse is peculiarly affecting those who feel economical pressure. At the same time, China as a increasing power creates strategical concerns – military expansion and hegemonic aspirations in Asia contrast with the historical safety alliance of US dominance.

In conclusion, reflection of global trends shows that one more time the success of populism is based on simple mechanisms: the usage of fear of globalisation, economical uncertainty and social tensions to build clear narratives where liberal democracy requires hard compromises. Kamiya emphasises that its aim is not to fight immigrants, but to build Japan "independent of foreigners". In practice, this translates into harsh rhetoric, controversial statements about women and Koreans and demands for tightening immigration law. At the same time, the fresh elections revealed a deep crisis ruling the Liberal Democratic organization for decades – its leader resigned, and Sanseito's meteoric growth clearly contrasts with the collapse of conventional political forces. Although Takaichi Sanae was elected president of the Liberal Democratic organization on 4 October and thus took the position of Japan's first female prime minister, we are seeing a clear turn towards right-nationalism. This trend may lead to changes in the government of the ruling coalition and to an increase in tensions in relations with neighbours – especially with China and South Korea.

That same summertime Warsaw witnessed another kind of political wave. Karol Nawrocki, so far a peripheral figure, utilized the presidential run to transform national memory into a political tool. As erstwhile president of the Institute of National Memory, Nawrocki made the policy of memory a communicative that spoke of the harm, betrayal and heroism of Poles, while at the same time creating a contrast between “we” – the nation – and “they” – liberal elites and the West. His simple archetypic language, referring to historical symbols, resonated with the emotions of society, which in fresh years experienced accelerated globalisation, economical crises and geopolitical tensions. Populism, which previously appeared to be an episode, became a dominant force in Poland – capable of shaping the communicative of the full country.

The comparison between Poland and Japan reveals universal mechanisms of populism: the request for simple narratives, charismatic leaders and symbols building a sense of community. Historical and cultural differences, however, find its form. Poland, with the memory of partitions, occupations and authoritarianism, uses populism as a tool for affirmation of national identity and defence against “foreign dominance”. Japan, with tradition of harmony and hierarchy, treats it more as a mechanics for balancing tensions between the individual and the community, reacting to the fear of blurring social cohesion and economical stagnation. In Poland, populism confronts Poland with the European Union: disputes over funds, the regulation of law or climate policy become a fuel for the communicative “Europe imposes on us”. In Japan, however, it is geopolitical – it interprets the country's place in the rivalry of China and the US, it strengthens the feeling that Japan must stay "self" against global pressures.

Populism acts like a modern myth: it reduces complex reality to simple symbols and narratives that order fears and frustrations. National and historical symbols dominate Poland, in Japan – geopolitical and cultural. Social media and algorithms reenforce these processes, creating communication networks that mobilise emotions and attract young voters. In both countries, younger generations have become peculiarly susceptible to populist narratives. In Japan, Sanseito uses YouTube and TikTok to mobilize young voters who search meaning and belonging in a planet full of uncertainty. In Poland, the populist campaigns of president Nawrocki mention to school patriotism, the past of "worship and heroism", creating alternate educational narratives that focus on the sense of danger and uniqueness of the nation. Education and the media are thus becoming the arena for the conflict for young minds, where emotions and symbolic rituals replace critical reflection.

Populism besides affects regular communication: both in Japan and in Poland, social media algorithms strengthen polarization, separating audiences according to their fears and prejudices. In both societies, young people learn to interpret the planet through “we versus them”, which in the long word can weaken pluralism and the ability to compromise. This shows that populism not only uses social sentiments, but shapes them – especially among generations that will find the future of democracy.

Thus, both in Warsaw and Tokyo, populism feeds on polarisation alternatively than debate. Hannah Arendt warned that where reflection replaces emotion, and pluralism with one-dimensional narrative, democracy begins to lose its foundation.

Like fascism in the 1930s, modern right-wing populism spreads like a virus, adopting its own variety in each country, shaped by local culture and history. The year 2025 shows that populism is not an episode, but a laboratory where boundaries of democracy, freedom and identity are tested. Poland and Japan – although thousands of kilometres distant and embedded in different traditions – uncover the same truth: populism is simply a global consequence to economic, geopolitical and technological crises. This is simply a philosophical question: how do modern societies cope with uncertainty, reinterpret their past and search meaning in a planet that is getting out of control?

Democracy doesn't fall suddenly. It falls slowly, step by step erstwhile "we versus them" becomes the only communicative of the world, and pluralism – the foundation of freedom – disappears from everyday political practice. erstwhile liberal democracy is silent, authoritarianism comes into its place, dressed in the language of “the protection of the nation” or “the defence of identity”. No democracy is given erstwhile and for all. "The top danger to democracy is the belief that it is indestructible," warned Alexis de Tocqueville. Even the most mature democracies can shake under the force of populist waves. “Freedom dies erstwhile we halt defending it,” wrote Hannah Arendt. The question is whether the planet will learn from this warning, whether it will let the story of populism to become a global ideology of the 21st century.