Deputy Minister of Defence Paweł Zalewski stated on 27 August in Brussels that Poland does not want atomic warheads in its territory. A fewer hours later, the head of MON Władysław Kosiniak-Kamish assured that the government inactive wanted to participate in NATO atomic Sharing. The contradictory message undermines the credibility of Polish deterrence.
Two messages from 1 resort
Paweł Zalewski spoke after gathering with the US Undersecretary of defence for Elbridge Colby's politics at NATO office in Brussels. erstwhile asked if the future permanent presence of US troops in Poland could include atomic capabilities, he replied powerfully that Poland does not want warheads on its territory. At the same time he pointed out that Warsaw wanted to participate in the deterrence of the atomic Alliance.
In the evening, Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz considered it essential to resolve the doubts. The head of the MON wrote that Poland remains curious in participating in the NATO atomic Sharing program and talks about the European atomic umbrella. He called the government's position unequivocal. The problem is that his deputy's earlier message did not show specified clarity.
This isn't a comma dispute in the message. Zalewski's earlier declaration about Poland without heads closed in public 1 of the possible options, while the Vice-Minister stressed his interest in a mechanics associated with allies in the atomic deterrence of NATO. These positions can be formally reconciled, but in safety policy, it besides matters how the opponent reads the communication.
Nuclear Sharing does not mean automatic head decision
Participation in NATO atomic Sharing may include consultations, planning and military contributions to the deterrence policy. Not all forms of participation must lead to the retention of American atomic weapons within the territory of the country. This is an crucial discrimination which the Deputy Minister did not make in a way that secured the Polish area for manoeuvre.
This is why the public and the categorical exclusion of 1 option raises concerns. A state located on the east flank of NATO, bordering the Russian royal circuit and Belarus, should leave the opponent in uncertainty about the full degree of the allied response. Fearlessness works erstwhile the threat of an answer is credible, not erstwhile officials themselves limit their own negotiating capacity.
Marcin Przycz, head of the President's global Policy Bureau, recalled that subsequent Polish governments declared their willingness to be more liable for deterring NATO, besides in the atomic domain. He pointed out that state representatives should be aware of the key policy lines set by the highest authorities. The point is: partners and opponents must hear 1 voice from Warsaw.
Poland needs freedom, not communication chaos
Zalewski's conversation with Colby besides afraid the concept of NATO 3.0, which assumes greater work for the European members of the Alliance for their own defences, and possible places of permanent stationing of US troops in Poland. This is simply a direction consistent with the Polish business. The continued American presence raises the cost of possible aggression and ties the safety of the United States to the safety of the Republic.
The deficiency of discipline in communicating matters of strategical importance is all the more worrying. Poland can yet recognise that a circumstantial model of participation in atomic Sharing is best for it. specified a decision should, however, be based on a military and political account, not on a public message that precedes the negotiations and forces the head of the ministry to nightly straighten the message.
In defence policy, sovereignty means the ability to keep viable options. This besides applies to the backing of the army and the conditions for cooperation with allies, as it reminds us dispute over SAFE and Polish autonomy. Poland cannot be a petent or a hostage of another people's decisions. It must bring its own strength, set clear conditions, and talk a language that strengthens deterrence.
The safety of Poles is at stake
Russia regularly uses atomic threats as a tool of pressure, and its atomic weapons are besides found in Belarus. Under specified conditions, the Polish authorities are obliged to conduct a cold and predictable policy. We must not scare citizens or pretend that atomic weapons are a simple recipe for all problem. Equally unreasonable, however, is the unilateral removal from the table of opportunities that can enhance the safety of the state.
For Poles this dispute means something very specific. The question is whether the aggressor will be convinced that the attack on Poland will meet with the consequence of the full NATO, and whether Warsaw will hold its influence on decisions concerning the defence of its territory. In these matters, chaos costs money. The government should present 1 position and consistently defend it.
