You've been writing us questions about what we think of interview erstwhile Head of SKW, General Peter Pytel for the Electoral Newspaper. So we started reading it and... oh, there's something to comment on. That is why we decided to print the entry, not just a fewer sentences on Twitter and Instagram.
In our opinion, this conversation reflects the deteriorating organization environment of the state, the mediocre quality of public debate and the destructive aggression of the current political discourse. So we will briefly quote what the erstwhile Head of SKW says, and then share with you any reflections on this.
What does Peter Pytel say?
Interview by Piotr Pytel It echoed widely in the media, among commentators, as well as readers of BiS For those who did not read it, we supply a brief summary of General Peter Pytel's statements:
- Russian services effectively penetrated Polish political environments. Especially saturated with coworkers is the current ruling party.
- The political elite of Poland is active in Russian influence operations.
- Counter-intelligence protection of the state is very low.
- The war in Ukraine and its associated actions of the US thwarted plans to form an alliance of the ruling organization with prokremlov environments.
- Services are utilized as part of a political struggle.
- Mail leaks from boxes M. D. and D. Both are operations of Belarusian and Russian peculiar services.
We have omitted any strictly political thesis, due to the fact that it is not our "grant". So we will not be “wise” in this regard. We mention curious parties to full interview. But generally, it's "fat".
The political fight prevents a substantive debate on services
Okay, let's start over. Russian agentura in Poland existed, existed and will exist. In our opinion, however, there are false arguments suggesting to the public that during the period of the X party's regulation it was not a problem, and abruptly in 1 and specified year, after the Y organization had taken over the government, The Russians almost took control of the Polish political scene.
This setting of the case will lie the basic problem concerning the fight against abroad influences in Poland. It is the organization weakness of our services, which results in their mediocre effectiveness. And that doesn't change, no substance which party's in charge.
The activities of the individual companies over fresh years have, of course, been characterised by any differentiation. During the word of 1 boss is simply a small better, and during the word of another, a small worse. This translates into faster approval of reports or greater openness to operational activities.
One organization can besides increase the backing of services and another can reduce them. This in turn affects the comfort of work. 1 can then, among another things, freely travel in delegations, operate on a larger scale, or buy more modern equipment. Bonuses and salaries besides increase, which translates into human resources satisfaction.
However, the fluctuations between the functioning of individual institutions at different times are not significant. For no 1 has undertaken to make the essential organizational changes in the services so far. Thus, during Peter Pytel’s term, they functioned at a akin level as they do today.
Let us besides be aware that, like any professional group, officers besides have their interests. The choice of the head of a given service does not appear to be that the “shortlist” of the best candidates is created, talks are held with them, and then the most competent candidate is selected by careful evaluation.
Nope. In order to lead a given ‘company’, informal links with a given political environment are usually required. And erstwhile that changes, key functions will be entrusted to friends of the fresh boss and their friends. So there are groups that compete.
In the debate on services, let us require specifics
Therefore, from the erstwhile and current heads of service, we should request specifics: what have you done during your word of office? Okay, what precisely are the current problems? We believe that many substantive arguments could be given here, specified as the quality of staff training, or the consequences of SKW's "absorption" of many ABW officers.
And so we have a continued political “flash” alternatively than a debate. In addition, we are frequently fed in it with “bables” arranged to prove a circumstantial political thesis. Mr Pytel argues, for example, that in his time the courts did not "slap" requests for operational control, and now they "conquer" everything. And that's where power abuse comes from.
The fact is that for many years it has been practically the same. And we agree with the erstwhile head of the SKW that this is simply a problem. However, we know that the solution proposed by him (change the governing organization and it will "cut out" the current heads of service) will not change anything at all.
We would so anticipate Mr Pytel to first supply a precise explanation of the problem and then appropriate organization mechanisms to prevent specified situations. And society must begin to require solutions from the ruling non-governments under our “our” organization and any party.
The question to which it should be consensus Moreover, it is political to prevent 1 group of interests from full predominate safety institutions and control bodies. The logic of the interview of Gazeta Wyborcza is as follows – now the bad organization is in charge, and if the power takes over this good, all problems will magically “disappear.”
Oh, no. An example of this is the way we fight the Russian agent, about whom P. Pytel tells extensively.
Fighting Russian agent in Poland = Basic work
We do not think that the thesis contained in the text that the services left the Polish state completely without any protection from the threat from Russia is true. We have a number of officers in Poland who have sincere intentions to fight Moscow's influence.
Nor do we think that the current authorities will consciously "protect" Russian agents. On the contrary, 1 can see the tendency of individual services to effort to prove themselves in the field of combat against the Kremlin. An example of this is, among others, the public cases of detainees suspected of cooperating with interviews of abroad states. Service must so feel that specified expectations “on top” exist.
However, fighting Russian activity in Poland is difficult. And our counterintelligence functions at most on average, possibly even poorly. The origin of this is simply a number of very circumstantial problems related to the activity of the services, which we systematically effort to describe on the blog.
These are, among others, a mediocre way of tasking and supervising them, a flawed recruitment system, training as well as management of officers, or technological backwardness of individual formations. And lots of another things. It is each of these elements that needs to be systematically changed, not "for easy" saying: change the organization this will all be good.
Fighting a advanced Representative
However, if you look at who is presently being detained by counterintelligence in connection with suspicions of activity in favour of Belarusian or Russian intelligence, it will turn out that they are persons of comparatively tiny "caliber". At least those whose detention does not "hit" any institution or environment in Poland.
In the last fewer years, we have never felt that the Polish services have made a real effort to fight high-level agents. We are talking about people possibly placed around politicians and advanced officials, in ministries, at higher levels in the safety sector, in survey centres, or in state-owned companies.
Individual officers and full formations are mostly afraid of the risks associated with "touching" specified topics. There is no appropriate working atmosphere, will and organization independency essential to deal with specified matters. And here it must be admitted that exceptions in this respect came in the days erstwhile P. Pytl led the SKW.
That's erstwhile it was worked out. Lieutenant-Colonel WP, employed in MON, who worked with the Russian GRU. respective another interesting cases were besides conducted, including One that could have possibly massive repercussions for the political environmentwhich presently holds power.
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that anyone in Poland has a reliable and comprehensive cognition of the degree of the Russian agentship's influence in key areas of the state, based on operational information, alternatively than conjecture. This is due to the fact that the services have not been peculiarly curious in performing this kind of activity in the last fewer years.
In our pages we described our time history fan officer of the CBI who found traces of dangerous links between local justice and criminal environments. The effect was that his department “orano” and his own met many unpleasantness. What kind of transmission do you think went to the officers then?
Winning a political dispute means immense economical benefits
And here we come to an highly crucial point, that is, the treatment of any officers by their own state. It besides has not small to do to combat the most valuable abroad intelligence agentship. In order to explain what we are talking about here, you request to give us a minute to explain the wider mechanisms in our country.
Over the last fewer years we have observed the systematic expansion of the public sector in Poland. We think it's excessive. Administration only swellsbut its (not)efficiency remains unchanged. In addition, the immense number of jobs in the ‘mundour’ and, above all, state-owned companies and entities whose existence depends on the ‘cass’ pumped by these companies.
This means that, with political power, each organization gains tremendous economical power. In combination with the organization weakness of the state, the low culture in the management of public sector entities and the mediocre level of meritocracy, this results in an increase in the temperature of political dispute in Poland.
For a large part of society, the decision taken in the elections is not only the choice of a imagination for the improvement of the state, but besides (and possibly even above all) to settle their economical situation for the next fewer years. In the service, this looks like the following: if you take a position from the warden above, then you care that after the election you will most likely lose it.
This can be done in a little (retrieved) or mild (warm jobs in an area considered invalid). As political struggles intensify and formulating increasingly radical, too, any people may anticipate that the change of power will not end with a "soft landing" for them.
This was most likely the case with Peter Pytel and a group of his associates. Thus, with the approval of political superiors, they formed the Counterintelligence Expert Center at the end of their term. It was intended to constitute a kind of “storage” for officers who expected a change of power to mean a margin for them.
SKW vs. power
In our political culture, however, winners take everything. The model in which 1 environment cooperates with the another is completely excluded. B. Misiewicz took over the NATO Counterintelligence investigation Center. A systematic “drive” group of officers centered around P. Pytel began.
The state began utilizing a full scope of instruments to make de facto harass people who spent a 100 years working for him. However, no of the charges which were then formulated against them have yet to be confirmed.. At the same time, the erstwhile Head of SKW had a safety cushion – a decent “em”.
On the another hand, Magdalena Ejsmont, who was then forced to resign from the ministry She's out of work overnight. Moreover, practically the full "branch" in which she has worked so far has been closed for her, as all another "companies" were controlled by the same unfavorable political environment.
The only employment opportunities for a erstwhile SKW officer have thus become institutione controlled by the opposition. In our opinion, specified situations should not take place. The temperature of the political dispute must not force officers to “subscribe” to 1 organization or another.
So, yes, many of the charges Peter Pytel makes are abuses and, at most, half-truths tailored to the preconceived political thesis. But did not the political dispute in our country force the erstwhile Head of the SKW to make specified a case? possibly the same was actual of Paul the Warrior?
The cases of Magdalena Ejsmont and Piotr Pytel should be a “short ball”. Either we are holding back from “adjacent” officers who “do not fit” into a given political thesis, or if the allegations against them do not persist in court, we are liable for the abuse of power.
So if you want the officers not to be seriously afraid to fight corruption at the highest levels, or the influence of abroad services, then society must exert solidarity on politicians to make it look like this.
‘I disagree with you, so you are a Russian agent”
Nor should the situation in the service be judged by individual political sympathy. Certain standards must be respected at all costs.
And they are broken, among others, erstwhile all individual with whom we disagree begins to represent as a “Russian agent”. This applies to both major political environments. M. Dworczyk's revealed emails contain, for example, many elements that would require at least an explanation from the present power.
Therefore, it is not appropriate to disqualify those who ask questions as “coworkers” of the Belarusian and Russian services. Although they are most likely liable for this operation. On the another hand, Peter Pytl's proposition that the ruling organization and the top government officials were “Russian agents” without any evidence is equally harmful.
Moreover, if we would like to take a fair approach to combating the Russian agentry in Poland, it is essential to decision distant from seeking it only in 1 environment, depending on the political preferences of the organization demanding specified action.
It is clear that Moscow is easier to penetrate into the structures of pro-Russian entities. But let us answer this question: if there were pro-Polish environments in Russia, would we like our services to have co-workers in these circles or in the Kremlin itself?
Let us besides remember that 1 of the objectives of Russian influence operations is to bring about a situation in which the fact ceases to play any function in the public debate, and its peculiar services will be seen as "powerful". It is easier to manipulate specified a society.
Epilogue
Let us treat the erstwhile heads of service with due respect, and possibly they won't talk about so many “bables” in interviews. This will give emergence to the quality of public debate. And what is even more crucial – let's argue any accidental "drive-up" of officers, just due to the fact that they "insecure" individual there. Unfortunately, specified situations take place for all power.
They remind the service staff that if individual “on top” has specified a wish, he will usage the institutions under him to take individual revenge on them. But how are we expected to anticipate officers to make the highest sacrifice and take the risk? And how do we get the most talented young people to want to work in specified a “branch”?
If you believe what we do, you can purchase access to weekly columns where we comment on current events or support us through Patronite. all subscription/new patron gives us a immense boost to further development!
