On 21 September 2022, president Vladimir Putin officially announced an immediate mobilisation in the Russian Federation. This changes everything about the war in Ukraine, and unification proves respective also:
- Taking specified a advanced political hazard with considerable opposition from society shows that Vladimir Putin is playing for everything. He's not curious in a tie or a area on favorable terms. The Kremlin authorities are determined and put their authority in the state at stake in order to definitely win the war in Ukraine and accomplish political and strategical objectives.
- The announcement of mobilization is simply a symptom of weakness, the Russian professional army was incapable to cope with a theoretically weaker opponent.
- One of the 2 main political tools of the Kremlin – blackmailing with military power – turned out to be dull and inoperable. This very powerfully affects Russia's global position and the credibility of the Kremlin as an ally.
- Russia is backed against the wall and it is moving out of time. besides due to the fact that the second policy tool (energy blackmail) will shortly become useless (vide The fast independency of Europe from Russia in the supply of energy resources). Therefore, the Kremlin authorities reached for an argument they avoided like fire. Thus, it can be assumed that Putin does not intend to wage a long war to exhaustion, but seeks a swift resolution of the war. To then put force on the West, halt negative processes for themselves, and warrant good conditions for the future.
In the situation in which the Russian Federation finds itself, knowingly deciding on a long-standing and exhausting armed conflict would be suicide by slow cutting up its own body. specified a strategy could end precisely as it did during the war in Afghanistan. By the time the conflict ended, Russia could have even broken up, and Putin would have lost power. So the Russians must search fast settlements.
At the same time, it is clear that the Kremlin authorities will not accept defeat at this phase of the struggle. Until Putin thinks he hasn't done everything he can to defeat Ukraine, then this conviction will push him to rise the stakes. Therefore, as I have stressed many times to safe my future for many years, Ukraine must defeat Russia in a situation where it utilized almost all its conventional potential. Only after his prior mobilization will he be stripped of political possible to later resume war and re-mobilize the army. At the same time specified a triumph would destruct Russia's military possible for years.
The question is, is Ukraine able to defend itself against a fewer 100 1000 Russian army? So far the defenders had a numerical advantage, and inactive the Russians conducted offensives and captured the area. The situation changed after the last counterattacks of the Ukrainian side. However, many experts stressed that 1 of the main problems of the Russian army from the very beginning of the invasion of February 24 was the deficiency of adequate troops. These are missing on each plane. For storms, securing the area gained, defending little crucial sections of the front, supporting logistics, etc. Mobilization can offset (better or worse) this weakness on the Russian side.
In my opinion, the strategical objectives of the war in Ukraine have not changed. Moscow is inactive seeking to take control of Ukraine. To this end, it will be essential to take control of Kiev. I so believe that mobilisation is intended to enable 2 assumptions to be achieved:
- Short-term – saturation of the battlefield with soldiers to keep the front and already acquired territories, as well as endurance until the final phase of “operation”,
- In the longer word – gaining the right mass and possible to carry out another wide-ranging offensive utilizing all possible directions of attack (including Belarus).
While the first presumption seems apparent and undisputable, the second is inactive excluded by many analysts and commentators. Mainly due to the argument relating to the advanced losses in people and equipment on the Russian side, as regards the erstwhile course of military action. In addition, the ability of Russians to manage mobilization efficiently is being undermined. It points to the appointment of people who should never be in the military, as well as the misallocation of the mobilized people. Finally, reservists are mostly directed straight to the front without prior training. Which will surely importantly affect their combat value in relation to Ukrainian soldiers. For all these reasons, it has become popular that the effort to stabilise the front by immediately sending unprepared for draft battles will end in defeat and slaughter on the Russian side. And there is absolutely no chance of getting the initiative back and moving on to the offensive.
Mobilising a deadly threat to Ukraine
Reserves for the slaughter?
However, it should be pointed out that the advanced rate of sending conscripts to the front may be a sign of perfectly logical reasoning. The combat data so far indicate that the casualties of soldiers caused by individual weapons (e.g. a rifle) represent only a fewer percent of all victims. In another words, it is comparatively uncommon to encounter light infantry, in which training, experience, equipment of soldiers and morale play a immense role. The losses are mainly caused by artillery, followed by aviation and dense equipment. Fire support and dense forces are needed to effectively carry out the offensive. For effective defence, artillery and aviation are essential. These request a reconnaissance that will supply information about the position of the targets. For this purpose, both parties usage unmanned aircraft. However, larger drones are expensive, there are not many of them and are susceptible to being shot down. These smaller, cheap, useful and mass-used do not have adequate opto-electronic devices. specified as night vision, thermal vision, etc. Therefore, they are fundamentally blind at night, and their usefulness is limited in hard weather conditions (strong wind, rain, storms). At the same time, to control 24 hours a day the full space occupied requires hundreds of drones controlled by hundreds of operators working on shifts. Furthermore, even if the defenders see the attacker approaching, only aerial observations cannot halt him. In another words, if there is no force on earth, the possible mark for artillery will be rapidly transformed – without resistance. So it might be harder to hit.
What the Russians can effort to do is thicken the front with their own light infantry. Even if it is not best trained and is much weaker in direct combat, it can inactive be very useful. due to the fact that to halt the attacking enemy, you must first announcement it and then give the level information higher. So artillery and aviation can do the rest. Putting even a weak infantry in a place where no 1 has always been stationed will force the attacking organization to stop. In order to storm or summon your own artillery that will breach the defended line. And that's what it's all about, so the attackers gotta slow down the pace of the attack, or halt completely. Just for a moment. Then artillery and aviation can be much more effective.
Bottom line. Sending reservists consecutive to the front (and it should be remembered that if individual is simply a reservist, then he does have military training) can truly seriously thwart Ukrainian plans to conduct offensive actions. That is why the Ukrainian side – which felt the weakness of the opponent – decided to take advantage of the last convenient minute and to inflict as much losses as possible on the opponent, reflecting the previously lost territories. This is where the Russian army is at its highest erstwhile it comes to exhaustion. The reserves scope the front gradually, and at the same time the conscripts are inactive ungunned and mentally ready to fight. Ukrainians can make comparatively low losses at a comparatively low cost and take on crucial points on the map, which with specified difficulty were previously earned by the Russians.
Resumption of the Russian offensive
However, Ukrainians must remember not to overdo it. If the opposition of the Russians threatens to endure crucial losses – then they should let go. This is not the end of war and the minute erstwhile you can go forward chasing a fugitive from the battlefield. After mobilization, the Russian army will again be dangerous and can regain its initiative. surely these are the plans, due to the fact that in order to accomplish the intended goals, the Russians must go back to the offensive. Thus, the Ukrainians should wisely dress up and save them for the next phase of the war.
It is clear that the Russians will not be able to proceed the invasion of recently mobilized reservists. But as far as targets are concerned, that's not the Russian side.
If the Russians could last autumn and winter, then they could train, equip and organize fresh divisions from mobilization over these fewer months. The condition is that this mobilization will indeed lead to the influx of respective 100 1000 soldiers into the army. If this happens, Russia can again gain the possible to carry out a large-scale offensive aimed at becoming Kiev again. erstwhile would specified a large surgery be possible? It's impossible to judge, I'm certain the Kremlin's decision makers are wondering. On the 1 hand, the faster the offensive moves, the worse it will be prepared. And erstwhile it cost the Russians defeat. On the another hand, Russia is moving out of time. The sanctions will become more painful and the treasury of the state will be ravaged. Moscow spends currency reserves at an tremendous rate. At the beginning of the invasion, these reserves were about $640 billion. About $300 billion was frozen by the US. It is estimated that from the remaining 340 billion by early July the Russians spent nearly $70 billion. So for the moment, the reserves could be around US$250 billion and it should be remembered that from December 2022 the EU will reduce Russian oil imports by 90%. At the same time, the army will be much more costly to keep after mobilization. Consequently, it is entirely possible that Russian reserves will run out in late 2023. What do emptiness in Russian money mean? Russia's falling apart. The relation between 1 and the another was written extensively in the book: “Third Decade. planet present and in 10 years” as well as in many blog articles including: “Russia has already lost the question of how much harm it can do?’.
Therefore, in my opinion, everything indicates that we are on the eve of a critical situation for Ukraine, but besides for Poland. The kind where Vladimir Putin will quit everything to defeat Ukraine. The second offensive in Kiev is rather real, the question is only erstwhile will it happen and how many Russians will be prepared for it? I devoted my full survey of 6 July 2022 on: “When and why should we anticipate a second offensive on Kiev?”. I predicted in it that Ukrainians could not agree to a ceasefire or temporary peace, while Russians would not accept a tie or defeat. Therefore, mobilization in Russia (which has already happened) is expected, followed by a reopening of the major offensive on Ukraine, even as early as 2023 (the conviction sustains it). surely the trailer of the upcoming offensive would be a possible mobilisation in the Belarusian army. This time Vladimir Putin will request the usage of all forces and means to accomplish victory. Alexander Lukashenka will either give in to this force or she may lose her power. Of course, the Belarusians will not be prepared to take action against Ukraine. But their troops will surely not take decisive part in key directions. The aim would be to bind as many Ukrainian forces as possible on the north-western part of the Ukrainian-Belarusian border. Nothing more.
Strategic test for Poland
If we consider the above script to be 1 of the most probable options, then we should consider, what can all this mean for the Polish state? Any Ukrainian failure would completely change the safety situation of Poland. On a strategical level, the Russian Federation would make convenient conditions to endanger the aggression of Warsaw. utilizing Ukrainian territory, Russian land forces would gain 2 additional directions of impact (except those from Belarus and Kaliningrad Oblast). At the same time, after the fall of Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic States would be a point of pressure. Which would gotta affect the cost of arms and preparations for war in their own territory. Poland would become even more dependent on NATO safety guarantees, especially the US. We would become a possible front country that does not play its lead outside (as is the case with Ukraine now). Instead, he would gotta search help.
Furthermore, in the case of Russian acquisition of control of Ukraine, the hazard of NATO-Russia war would indeed increase (although I would inactive measure it low). For many reasons, and 1 of the reasons could be that most likely Poland would become a base and a base for Ukrainian insurgent militias. And even if the war did not officially break out, it could be very intense in Poland, only in hybrid form (which in turn would be very probable). For example, we would observe failures or explosions of critical infrastructure facilities. This would be all the more possible, that while the Russian nonsubjective of the war in Ukraine is to take control of this country, in the case of Poland it would be about the demolition of the state and its marginalisation. Therefore, in the war in Ukraine, the Russians at first did not attack critical infrastructure facilities at all, and to this day if they do, it is very limited. If they managed to take over the country in management (occupation), it would be much more costly and more hard in the event of the demolition of Ukraine. Humane disasters, deficiency of electricity or heating for winter, all of which would increase opposition in society. Meanwhile, erstwhile planning a possible war with Poland (whether military or hybrid), Russia would not number on political power in Warsaw. Rather, it would be to get arguments in peace talks with the West, and an additional “bonus” for the Russians would be to destruct Poland in specified a way that for long years it would stay an economically bankrupt state, dependent on Russia, and thus politically inert.
All of this would make immense costs on the part of Poland and at the same time would pose a threat to our security. The vast sums presently spent on armaments could prove to be nothing, with billions lost as a consequence of the demolition of critical and economical infrastructure that has been built for many years. Allowing the state and its army to defend their territory against aggression is simply a sign of failure to accomplish basic national safety priorities. The most crucial of these priorities is to prevent war from beginning in its own territory (defensive war). If specified a script occurs, then the state and the army have not generated adequate deterrent potential. In another words, they failed. The priorities concerning national safety and defence strategy were described in the text: "Great strategy of the Polish State – ARMIA”.
However, achieving the appropriate deterrent possible is just 1 tool to avoid a devastating state of defence war. Another kind of action is preventing a possible opponentcreating conditions convenient to attack our country. It can be done on a political level. If Poland were to separate from Russia a belt independent of Moscow states, then we would not gotta fear a direct attack on Warsaw. The opponent would first gotta take control of Vilnius, Minsk or Kiev. At that time, the overarching strategical nonsubjective would be to cross his plans.
This is all happening in Ukraine now. Although Russia has access to the Polish territory through Belarus and Kaliningrad Oblast, it inactive has a low position to endanger Warsaw. The attack on Poland through Belarus would be risky from a strategical point of view, among others, due to the fact that Ukrainians could make their own territory available to NATO. At the same time, they would effort to recapture the Ukrainian territories occupied by the Russians. So the Russians would hazard widening the war front to include more states, while at the same time from Ukraine or e.g. the Baltic states, a cut-off strike could be carried out from the supply units fighting on the Polish front. I discussed this very widely in the February text: "Army of the fresh Pattern – Assumptions and Reality [ANALIZA]".
Consequently, in order to be able to endanger and act against Poland, the Russian Federation must take control of Ukraine. Only later, the Russians could redirect any force and means to exert force on Warsaw. And after rebuilding military potential, we become a real military threat.
So we are at the minute erstwhile the Polish state – offering a wide stream of assistance to Ukraine – fights de facto for your safety. Maintaining Ukrainian buffer will warrant us peace for the next fewer years. The failure of a Ukrainian neighbour to Russia would be a prelude to serious problems and dilemmas in Poland's national security.
A breakthrough minute in history?
As we appreciate the importance of independency and independency of Ukraine, we should ask ourselves: How much can we do and how far should we go to do everything possible to accomplish the main precedence of the safety strategy? What action should be taken to prevent the outbreak of war (conventional or even "hybrid" only) in Poland?
To the state of October 4, 2022, the question may seem to have been put besides hard. After all, Ukrainians defended themselves against invasion in the first phase of the struggles launched on February 24, survived the second – destructive – phase and moved on to counteroffensive. This is going large so far. Consequently, it could be assumed that the assistance we supply to Ukraine is adequate for Ukrainians to handle the invader themselves. Saving themselves and protecting Poland at the same time.
However, we cannot fall into hurraoptimism. The Russian Federation is definitely a stronger state than Ukraine. The Russian army is inactive more powerful than the Ukrainian army (as a whole, due to the fact that the part separated so far for fighting in Ukraine turns out to be weaker than the Ukrainian armed forces). If the mobilization in Russia reaches the targets, then Ukraine's triumph may not be so certain. And if it turned out that after the period of operational pause, the Russians, together with the Belarusian troops, would again decision to Kiev –What could we then or should we do?
Atomic blackmail
It is worth remembering, in the Kremlin they besides gotta calculate the hazard of greater or even direct engagement of NATO States (including Poland) in Ukraine. Therefore, Moscow may effort to introduce a deterrence origin even before the snap and decisive impact.
One form of intimidation and discouragement of the West to aid Ukraine could be convinced that there is simply a hazard of radioactive contamination. It is doubtful that Putin should usage tactical nuclear, chemical or biological weapons due to the political consequences and that their usage would completely invalidate the anticipation of a mutually beneficial agreement with the West. And let us remind you that this is 1 of Putin's goals.
On the another hand, it is possible to imagine that the Kremlin authorities will organise any kind of “failure” of atomic power plants or, for example, a chemical plant fire. The scale of specified a disaster does not should be great, but it is adequate to make the right impression. The airborne radioactive contamination – even tiny – can effectively discourage the West from introducing its own troops into Ukraine. At the same time, civilian entities and individual volunteers may besides be afraid to transport arms and supplies to Ukraine. This will entail a advanced wellness risk. The intellectual effect caused by even a tiny – but large area of Ukraine – can be paralyzing. And unfortunately, but desperate Putin may be willing to make that kind of mad decision.
Especially since for weeks we have seen the Russian side blackmailing the threat of harm to 1 of the atomic reactors in the occupied dam power plant. And this kind of action would fit modus operandi the Kremlin authorities. The Ukrainian side may be blamed for the harm or failure. It doesn't substance if anyone believes it. It is the very fact that there is simply a anticipation of denying responsibility. Which would let Moscow to hope that it would be possible to settle at the negotiating table and the another side would yet be able to accept the Russian version as its own. If atomic weapons were used, even willing to settle, Western politicians would not be able to take the political hazard of making deal with an atomic criminal.
In the full threat of the situation described, 1 can see any positive. Even the deliberate introduction of contamination in Ukraine could not origin besides serious consequences. Since advanced radiation could smite Russian soldiers as well as citizens of the “antactated” territories (or possibly even the Russians themselves surviving in the Russian Federation). Russia is not about burning Ukraine to the ground but about taking over administrative power in Kiev. The Ukrainian economy is then to work for the Russian economy. Killing a chicken that can inactive lay eggs (Ukrainian manufacture and natural materials, as well as a ‘spichler’) would not make sense.
It seems that if the above script were to be implemented, this could aim to halt Ukrainian offensive activities (if they were inactive ongoing) and to prepare its own offensive after already being mobilised in Russia and Belarus (in this subject we besides observe interesting events to which I referred in interview with Virtual Poland). Terrorizing Ukraine could precede a re-Russian offensive. This time carried out under conditions of numerical advantage over Ukrainians.
Last hotel for Ukraine
It should be remembered that Ukraine's failure becomes an unacceptable option for the United States. While it was inactive calculated in February 2022, the situation changed significantly. Not due to the fact that the Ukrainians were able to defend themselves and showed that they were able to conquer (although in part, too). Mainly due to the fact that the United States has been very heavy active on the Kiev side for six months. Although American soldiers do not fight, there is no uncertainty that Russia's triumph in Ukraine would be a triumph at the same time in a sense over the United States.. And so he will effort to represent Putin. He is already preparing the ground, claiming that Russia is fighting the full West in Ukraine. And if he wins, it will be a triumph against the hegemon, but besides the full NATO. The political hazard in this script is besides advanced for Americans. Weakness of position, showing inability to defend allied states (even informally, i.e. Ukraine) and besides passive attitude could influence Washington's perception as a credible partner and ally. And this credibility cannot be lost by the United States. It is essential to compete with China.
Moreover, in a akin situation as Poland (the threat of becoming a front country and the next target) are Romania and the Baltic States. They can besides become further targets on the Russian list after taking Ukraine. It should besides be pointed out that the UK is very committed. London frequently holds the most firm but even offensive (active) position towards Moscow, selling out not only Washington, but Warsaw.
Undoubtedly Poland is besides weak to save Ukraine on its own and alone if needed. Nevertheless, with the physical support/partition of Hegemon and the British Isles (nuclear powers and air-sea powers) forces: Poland and Romanians could support Ukrainians.
Of course, the point is not to wage war on the Russian Federation. But in the face of e.g. the collapse of the front or threat of the business of Kiev, the aforementioned allies could deploy their troops on the part of Ukrainian territory not occupied by the Russians, taking into account the Ukrainian capital. Faced with specified a reaction, it would be Putin's work to decide: “to shoot NATO soldiers and hazard conflict with at least any of them or not?” Let us remember that it would be adequate for allied forces – at the invitation of Ukraine and without utilizing force – to take defensive positions in its territory. It would be the Russians who would gotta decide whether they attack by continuing to conquer Ukraine and hazard war with the US, or whether they should let go.
This option is entirely possible. Especially since there would be a moral mandate to do so. The slaughter of civilians under Russian business gives grounds for entering the humanitarian mission and securing the cordon as much of Ukraine as possible. Protecting Ukrainian society. However, if Putin utilized the above described atomic blackmail, then the global community would have no opposition to support specified intervention.
Both from a political and military point of view the above-mentioned script should be regarded as completely reasonable and logical. The rescue of Ukraine thus seems real. The goal can be achieved comparatively easily, possibly even without a fight. Even if Putin were crazy adequate to order allied troops to be shot, there would surely be a discord between him and any of the people in power, and especially opposition could happen in the military itself. For the generality knows precisely what is going on on the Ukrainian front, what the Russian army looks like and how it would should be battered if there had been a clash with the western army (with American regulation in the air).
On the Washington side, too, the situation can make a willingness to make the right decisions. The day after the invasion I published a text describing the above variant of events: ‘What should be done to save Ukraine and beat Putin?" quite a few people didn't take him seriously. In the meantime, it should be pointed out that of the 13 points that I thought should be achieved (not at once, but at subsequent stages of escalation), the first 1 is already fulfilled. Finland and Sweden enter NATO.
It is worth pointing out that on October 3, 2022, erstwhile CIA manager General David Petraeus stated in an interview for ABC News that in the event of the usage of an atom in Ukraine, US states and allies should destruct all Russian unit in Ukraine and all Russian ship in the Black Sea. Although this is only a message from a retired military and intelligence agency chief, it is not hard to know that it was any kind of unofficial American signal with a view to being addressed in Moscow.
Critical minute and hard decision of Poland
In a situation in which events on the front would take a negative turn for us and Ukraine would be in danger of defeat, Poland would be faced with a dilemma or a reaction, and if so, how would the Russian march be stopped?
Lack of consequence or support insufficient, can consequently make Poland a front country and it is in its territory that actions (military or hybrid). The awareness of this is crucial. Like the fact that our attitude and willingness to act can besides affect decisions taken in Washington.
In my opinion, the Polish society is inactive unaware that there is simply a hazard that the Polish Armed Forces may be on the Ukrainian battlefield rather soon. It is worth recalling that the “NATO peace mission” in Ukraine Jarosław Kaczyński spoke out loud, erstwhile he visited Kiev on March 15. specified a proposal was repeated by the president besides in April, after a skeptical mention to it by president Zelenski. This thought had to germinate among the Polish authorities from the first days of the invasion of Ukraine. On February 24, 2022, I published a text on this subject: “Stopping Russians in Ukraine is simply a Polish state of affairs”, which was then utilized on 1 March by the president's advisor – Prof. Andrzej Zybertowicz, as an indication of the position to be considered. Well, war in Ukraine creates a unique and historical chance to knock out Russian bear teeth. possibly erstwhile and for all. And we must not commit a sin of omission in this matter, for in the future we may regret it.
Yet, it can inactive be felt that specified a decision could origin immense social opposition. What is different is helping Ukraine, and what is different is taking the hazard of beginning a war with Russia by deploying own troops in the affected territory. Fear of war with Russia, and possibly atomic exchange is mostly due to ignorance. The facts are that at the minute the Russian Federation is incapable to wage any another war than the 1 in Ukraine, which it is losing at the moment. And already a military conflict with NATO countries (with technological and informational advantages) It would gotta end in defeat. Therefore, it is doubtful that the Russians will take specified a suicide step. The script described by General Petraeus could then be fulfilled. And from the territory of Ukraine – writing colloquially – no Russian soldier would come back alive. Therefore, the NATO Peace Mission or the humanitarian action of parts of the allied states would be a cross-border 1 for Putin, which he would not be able to cross. The usage of atomic weapons – even in a tactical dimension – would not be an option if Americans were involved. Thus, readiness to take physical intervention in Ukraine may be a viable option to defend this country. With a reasonably limited hazard of escalation to a full-scale war between NATO and Russia. At the same time, we should ask ourselves, erstwhile will the hazard of war with NATO and Poland be higher? Now that the Russians are fighting Ukraine and have suffered massive losses, possibly a fewer years after the business of Ukraine, erstwhile the military possible will be restored? What we see present as being besides risky can be the only rational undertaking that will defend us from much more serious threats in the future.
So, as a society and a nation, we should prepare ourselves mentally for hard elections, in critical situations for us. To take action erstwhile we have an influence on something. In order to prevent the situation in which we stay passively watching and watching whether the opponent strikes Poland or not. due to the fact that he'll have good conditions.
Krzysztof Wojchal
geopolitics, politics, economy, law, taxes – blog
