It has been 3 months since Donald Trump returned to the White House, and there has been no breakthrough in Ukraine towards peace. Conversations between Washington and Moscow focused almost exclusively on repairing bilateral relations, while attempts to guarantee even a limited ceasefire — whether in the Black Sea or around the energy infrastructure — have failed.
It is actual that Trump did not “give Ukraine to Putin” as many feared after An open divided between Zelenski and the fresh president of the United Stateswhich was broadcast worldwide from the Oval Office on February 28. The White home even talks about "progress" in dialog with Moscow — despite the fact that the number of deaths among civilians in major Ukrainian cities is inactive increasing. Russia, for its part, carefully signals that a real breakthrough on Ukraine is not to be expected and demands far-reaching concessions from Kiev.
So far no 1 has even presented a basic draft of the peace plan that could satisfy the Kremlin and would not mean a complete surrender of Ukraine. In the present situation, the most likely consequence is the continuation of the war. But even if the talks fail, it does not gotta overturn the "new reset" in American-Russian relations.
There are at least 3 reasons why tensions between Washington and Moscow are likely to soften, even if Kiev, Kharkiv, Sumy, Odessa and countless another Ukrainian cities stay under Russian fire.
Ukraine goes to the background
Firstly, for Trump, European policy and the future of Ukraine are not priorities. It consistently signaled both the EU and Ukraine that although the United States would like the war to end, they did not intend to play an active function in reaching a peace agreement. Instead, Trump America moves responsibility for any future agreement and its enforcement on Europeans.
This would let him to limit his commitment to Ukraine and focus on another areas of American politics. Given his plans to annex Greenland, the deportation of 1 million migrants, the conduct of trade wars with most of the planet and the confrontation with China, Ukraine can easy go to the background.
Secondly, Trump does not see Russia as a serious threat in itself. Faced with an unprecedented trade war with China U.S. president wants to avoid Moscow and Beijing.. In order to keep Russia distant from China, Trump must keep a dialog with the Kremlin — which means that it is improbable that he will increase sanctions force on Putin.
Thirdly, Moscow makes it clear to Washington that the bilateral agenda of both countries can go far beyond the war in Ukraine. Although the possible for economical cooperation may be limited, Russia may be useful in regulating crises in Syria, Israel and Iran. It all makes Trump crucial not to escalate tensions with Putin. Even minimal normalization of relations can be portrayed as a major accomplishment for both the White home and the Kremlin.
EPA/GAVRIIL GRIGOROV / SOUTH / CREAMLIN POOL / PAPRussian president Vladimir Putin and U.S. peculiar Envoy to the mediate East Steve Witkoff at a gathering in Saint Petersburg, Russia, 11 April 2025.
That is why both sides will most likely think twice before deciding to escalate the situation. Even if peace talks were unsuccessful, There are respective realistic scenarios for the improvement of relations on the US-Russia line.
Non-binding partnership
Given the current trajectory, the most likely script is to proceed to "reset" without major commitments on both sides. In order to keep Russia's commitment and encourage Moscow to cooperate beyond Ukraine, it would be adequate for the US to signal the withdrawal of military and financial assistance to Kiev and to take steps to reduce its military presence in Europe.
Putin can interpret these movements as a promised U.S. exit from the conflict, which in practice would transform Washington from an opponent into a hard but possibly useful partner — at least in any respects. Full abolition of sanctions would not be essential as Moscow understands that specified a step would be politically hard for Trump. But withdrawing support for Ukraine would be adequate reason for the Kremlin to proceed to call Trump a "genius".
In this scenario, the burden of Ukraine's support would fall straight on the EU. In anticipation of specified a turn of events, Brussels is already working on strengthening their own defence capabilities and expanding aid for Kiev. To be honest, the European Union does indeed have the financial resources to proceed supporting Ukraine in the "active defence" mode.
However, without access to the American defence industry, military aid to Kiev will be increasingly hard to maintain. In Moscow's best scenario, Trump could, following Israel's example, ban the transfer of U.S. arms to Ukraine — even if the EU was willing to cover its costs.
Whether Trump will let the EU to acquisition US weapons for Ukraine will depend not only on its relation with Zelensk, but besides on the wider trajectory of US-EU relations. Given the ongoing trade war and the ambition of Greenland, It is hard to foretell what this transatlantic dynamics will look like in six months.
Relationships limited to the minimum
The most optimistic script for Ukraine is that Trump, trying to alleviate tensions with Western allies and his own political establishment, will blame the unsuccessful talks straight on Putin and then join Europe in punishing Russia for refusing to end the top war in Europe for 80 years.
However, no 1 should anticipate a complete change in Trump’s outlook. Trade conflict and confrontation with China will stay its main priorities in the coming years. At best, Kiev can number on further military support at the current level, provided that the EU takes on most of the financial burden. In this scenario, Trump can agree to impose additional sanctions on Russia and to suspend the bilateral dialog to a large extent. Nevertheless, even in the face of renewed tensions, any efforts to keep minimum contacts with Moscow will likely continue.
Ironically, even with the warmest relations between Washington and Moscow, the biggest threat to Russia could be the escalation of the U.S.-China trade war, which causes oil prices to fall. As a result, Trump can stay Putin's “friend” while doing more harm to the Russian economy than any sanctioning regime.
Friendship in spite
A little likely script assumes that the US will full retreat support for Ukraine, the relation between Washington and Brussels will deteriorate further, and Trump will be willing to importantly grow cooperation with Russia. It is worth pointing out that the possible for specified cooperation remains limited and a dramatic breakthrough is not to be expected. Moscow will not abandon its partnership with China, but can play an active function in the fresh Iran Agreement, show flexibility on Syria and offer limited support to Israel.
JUSTIN TALLIS / Pool / AFP / AFPUkrainian president Volodymyr Zelenski, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer and French president Emmanuel Macron after gathering at the London Summit, 2 March 2025.
To rise greater enthusiasm in the Kremlin, Trump would gotta endure at least any sanctions — possibly those concerning the aviation sector and Russian exports. In return, Moscow could propose major joint projects in the Arctic and, more broadly, a renewed version of the "non-aggression and common knowing pact" that clearly outlines the spheres of influence. Under specified an agreement, Russia could commit itself to limited neutrality in the Asia-Pacific region in exchange for refraining from US interference in European affairs.
The Kremlin surely has ambitions to scope an agreement on specified a scale. For Putin, this would mean almost putting an equality mark between the 2 powers.
Which script is most likely?
The first script — reducing tension with limited cooperation — inactive seems to be the most realistic. However, we should not forget that Trump's approach over the last 3 months has been very chaotic, unpredictable and frequently contrary to conventional US interests. His aggressive economical moves are pushing the global economy towards a slowdown that will inevitably besides affect the United States. Half-elections are planned in November 2026, and Democrats are likely to regain the majority in legislature – and this would make Trump's presidency even more complicated and distract him from abroad policy.
So far, the ‘reset’ with Russia has not taken any clear shape. Both sides proceed to discuss only how to reopen embassies. And it is rather possible that if any advancement is actually made, Trump will meet with criticism from both national opponents and US allies.
Even for the recently elected president, trying to fight the full planet — but Russia — will not be easy. Despite its untapped energy, Trump is improbable to make a revolution in abroad policy overnight. As we have seen earlier, it seldom focuses on 1 issue for a long time. Under these circumstances, the thought that he could supply a deep and lasting partnership with Putin seems unlikely.
Partial withdrawal from Europe appears more likely to be possible and support for Kiev is reduced. This in turn brings us back to the question of Europe's function in the future of Ukraine. Whatever happens in the negotiations between the US and Russia, 1 thing is certain: Kiev will not accept surrender, and the European Union does not quit supporting Ukraine's rights of defence.
