In the first part of the text We stressed that peculiar forces should be utilized as they were intended, otherwise the command hazard losing hard to recreate, limited and valuable resources. We besides presented a brief description of the most crucial Russian peculiar units.
We then went on to effort to recreate the ideas of those who were active in planning the invasion of Ukraine and the function that the “Specnasians” would play in this operation. In the second part we will decision on to what the Russian peculiar forces actually looked like in the first phase of the war.
We take off right distant where we left off. In the following part of the article, we will tell you about the observations and thoughts that came to people from our “pack” erstwhile we analysed the materials that we were able to gather. We besides talked to any of the guys who are as close to the subject as possible. Well, boom.
Role of Russian peculiar forces in the first invasion phase
The very beginning of the invasion seemed to follow Moscow's plan. The Russians managed to effectively disrupt enemy radar close Kiev. Ukrainians initially thought they would endure a full defeat in the spectrum Radio-electronic combat. Aggressor besides made successful attempts to attack anti-aircraft defence positions.
The beginning impact with guided missiles was besides effective adequate to let the landing VDV to Hostomelu airport (which does not mean that they were sufficient to accomplish all the objectives of the invasion). This facility was to constitute a ‘gate’ for further storming in Kiev, as control of the port would let the deployment of further forces by air.
Russian peculiar forces were already waiting in the capital, which were probably:
- Planning assaults on critical infrastructure facilities.
- Training mercenaries and people to become participants in pro-Russian protests. These forces were most likely organized utilizing the act of the Russian peculiar Forces.
- Security of the work of GRU, FSB and SWR operating officers.
- They will defend Ukrainian collaborators of these peculiar services.
- Recognition of Ukrainian positions before and during the operation.
At the start of the war, peculiar forces were to initiate the takeover of key facilities in Kiev. In view of the limited number of these formations, and the limited opportunities for secretive movement of operators to the capital, they needed support by pro-Russian local forces. The second is besides much easier to operate in a acquainted environment.
In the months before the invasion, GRU co-workers were so tasked with developing private military companies. At the time of the outbreak of Russian aggression, they were to aid Specnazu. Following the example of erstwhile operations in Crimea and Donbasa, there was most likely another group of co-workers of Russian services – civilian provokers.
Their function was, in turn, to provoke protests that would exacerbate chaos in the capital of Ukraine. If the crowd were to accumulate further close the facilities occupied by Specnaz, it would make it hard for local services to respond as they would gotta face Russian soldiers mixed with Ukrainian civilians.
In countries that aspire to the name "democratic" to shoot a crowd of citizens, even if they are acting in the interests of a abroad aggressor, it could prove controversial. Without doubt, it would besides be "problematic" from the position of information struggle. In addition, this method of operation allowed the Russians to claim that the planned change of power would take place “on request” of the local population.
Someone evidently had to be there to make certain that the full diversion mechanics worked. The mercenaries must be assembled, trained in advance, and at the right time besides be able to command them. The Kremlin most likely entrusted the task with peculiar forces.
Due to the very large function of the FSB in planning the attack on Kiev, in addition to Specnaz and SSO (most elite, Special Operations Forces straight subordinate to KSSO) peculiar safety units, or Alpha and Wympieł, could besides play a major function in this element.
Already during the erstwhile years' conflict on Donbasa ‘Specialists’ provided Pro-Russian separatists appropriate ‘motivation’ (also forceful) erstwhile the second refused to follow Moscow's will. It may besides be that Specnaz operators or FSB units were tasked with pushing the crowd into aggressive behaviour and initiating provocations.
Diversification, protests, or the acquisition of critical infrastructure facilities were only meant to be means of taking power in Ukraine. For this purpose, the peculiar services had to recruit co-workers who would in due time lead political processes in the affected country.
In Russian realities, the work of forces and peculiar services is so closely linked. On February 24, both men and others were waiting in the capital to join with the strike forces to land in Hostomell. And then the problem started...
Change the task of peculiar forces as a consequence of an unsuccessful landing in Hostomel
In view of the previously exposed plans of the Russian invasion by U.S. intelligence, the massive assistance in the SIGINT area that he gave Washington Kiev, as well as the breach of Moscow's safety rules of communication just before the attack on the capital, Ukrainians most likely learned the plans to attack Hostomell in advance.
They may not have been certain about the peculiar day, they may not have believed... but they knew the main assumptions of the Kremlin's operation and made appropriate preparations for the "W". So the invading Air Force lost the component of surprise. To their surprise, at the airport “welcome” their artillery fire and counterattacks of Ukrainian troops.
They yet managed to take over the object, but it was besides late, and the runway was so damaged that it was not usable. Another problem was that the main attack from Belarus besides encountered crucial problems. any of these troops reached the outskirts of Kiev after 48 hours, but the remainder were inactive far behind.
Russian forces were so dismembered, including through effective ambushes organised by defenders. The groups that were separated from the Kremlin's main troops were ‘killed’ by Ukrainian artillery. With each passing day, Moscow lost its initiative and military capabilities to take Kiev.
The Kremlin besides believed in the weakness of its opponent and did not anticipate specified strong opposition from the Ukrainian army, political class and society.
The presence of elite interior formations among the Russian forces shows that they assumed opposition in occupied areas. However, it was expected to have the character of a guerrilla war and limited military fighting.
Meanwhile, Ukrainian opposition was fierced, organized and based primarily on armed forces, decimating enemy convoys. alternatively of the expected apathy of society, the Ukrainian population showed the will to fight. There have even been cases in which "normal" residents went out unarmed in front of Russian troops and politely told them...
The peculiar forces located in Kiev were so incapable to connect with the landing from Hostomela region, which forced the change of their first tasks. As a result, Specnaz had only to a tiny degree conducted diversionary activities. But he was increasingly active in regular fighting in urbanised areas, for which specified formations are not prepared.
The commanders leading the peculiar forces were most likely aware that the landing on Hostomel had failed, and the main forces did not appear in the designated locations. As a result, only a tiny number of critical infrastructure facilities were abandoned or stormed.
It is besides probable that it was decided to focus on tasks related to the liquidation of individuals, especially members of Ukrainian authorities. The implementation of the most delicate actions was entrusted to SSO.
It is worth noting that the creation of the KSSO (Special Operations Force Command) most likely affected the increased flexibility of the operation of all Russian peculiar Forces. It can be assumed that it was SSO operators who were tasked with coordinating the operation of another “specials” formations, local collaborators and mercenaries' branches.
On the example of the function to be played by Russian peculiar forces in the first phase of the invasion of Ukraine, we see the fundamental difference between these formations and their NATO counterparts. The second are primarily trained for 3 types of tasks:
- ‘D-ezek’ (Direct Action, or ‘door blasting’ to stop/dismant the target).
- "M-ezek" (Military Assistance, or training of local forces).
- Special designation (surveillance/patrols behind enemy lines).
The specificity of the Russian peculiar forces is that they are besides intended to be utilized as part of wider political operations, especially as part of a concept frequently referred to as "hybrid war".
For example, frequent cooperation and close links between Specnaz and peculiar services. The ‘Military Assistance’ performed by the Russian ‘specials’ can so come down not only to training the army of ‘separatists’, but besides to ‘wars’ paramilitary or civilian. The "D"s could simply be killing political opponents.
Specnaz, you mean from the commando to the infantry?
When the first convoys with Russian troops became the mark of the attacks, any of our Ukrainian “colleagues by profession” were amazed not only that these convoys were a comparatively easy mark to destroy. They were besides amazed that Moscow had decided to send valuable peculiar units to the first line of fighting. And then the guys connected the dots.
The Russian Army is inactive struggling with a mediocre level of training and equipping individual soldiers, low morale and insufficient number of contract soldiers. The exception is, among others, peculiar units for which more funds are allocated, gathering their equipment, training and recruitment needs to a much greater extent.
So these are any of the fewer forces that can do precise work, and their level of professionalism does not fall below a certain level. At the same time, the number of Russian infantry troops was far insufficient in the first phase of the invasion. This caused that alternatively of acting in a typical way, Russian “specialists” were frequently forced to replace “persons”.
That's why we were able to observe in the first days of the fight. Specnaz soldiers trying to take over the area in the suburbs of Kiev. In addition, peculiar forces have besides encountered many applicable obstacles that hinder their operation in the rear of their opponent. Let us, for example, look at transport of operators.
“Specs” were frequently met on tanks, BWPs, BTRs... They barely always utilized "soft" (unarmed vehicles) which are use at least sometimes Ukrainian peculiar forces. Why? due to the fact that if Russian “specialists” had given up providing better protection for armored vehicles, they would have had the following choice:
- Go to low-profile (civil) activities and decision cars with Ukrainian registration plates across designated liability zones.
- Stay in the high-profile expression (in full ‘storage’), utilizing civilian vehicles only as mobile means of communication on short sections.
Both solutions, however, are at advanced hazard of getting under fire from your own forces or your opponent. Formula actions low-profile let them to “melt” into the crowd, but must be preceded by careful preparations preventing the opponent from detecting masked/recommended soldiers.
The Russians were able to do so effectively in the first days of the war, but the worse the offensive in Kiev developed for them, the more they most likely had to improvise, and the time for careful planning of peculiar operations was little and less. The Ukrainians besides increased their safety measures, making it hard for the enemy to penetrate their backs in secret.
Soldiers operating in the expression low-profile they must besides coordinate their position with the another military components (to avoid falling under the fire of their own forces). A with Russian side communications were experiencing many problems, not to mention the hazard of interception of communications in the delicate position of ‘specials’ by Ukrainian services.
In turn, the suspension of communication would entail an increased probability of getting into ticks alleged "friendly-fire’ while moving around Ukraine. The Russians besides realize that their troops do not have much opposition to the sharpening of civilian vehicles.
In turn, the usage by peculiar forces of a civilian vehicle aggressor in the expression high-profile could only work on short sections and would require a frequent change of vehicles. Moving the same car over a long period increases the hazard of the Ukrainian military or territorial defence identifying Russian forces.
When planning operations, operators must besides take into account the anticipation of fuel stocks or vehicle failure being exhausted, which automatically ground the combat team. In view of the many problems of the Russian army, the chaos created by the failure of the first plan and the obstacles encountered by peculiar forces for these reasons, we are not amazed by the comparatively low rate of their operations in the first phase of the conflict.
Minor Changes in the Art of Combat Activities.
Russian peculiar forces are effective. The Ukrainian colleagues with whom we spoke mentioned that they encountered Russian combat teams, which were well equipped, acted according to a pre-established plan and were a very dangerous opponent on the battlefield.
However, it seems that the “Specnasians” request any time to adopt their procedures for the current conflict in Ukraine. The fact is that the scale of the attack is simply a challenge that virtually no army of the planet has faced in fresh years. The Russian peculiar units must so be in a very different function than the 1 that they have been active in, for example, Syria.
The effectiveness of peculiar forces is due, among others, to their ability to adapt procedures to changing challenges. Therefore, the most effective units of this kind are those that have the most combat experience. A major concern of the commanders in the Polish peculiar Forces are, for example, the limited possibilities of "shooting up" in fresh years.
Note, for example, that in the past American “specialists” stormed virtually all object in which the mark was hiding to capture or destruct him. However, they concluded that specified a maneuver resulted in a advanced hazard of loss. So they now use, among others, the alleged "call-out": they call for "bad guys" to leave the object and go to storm only if it does not work.
The problem of the Russian peculiar forces is that their methods have not changed much in fresh years. They besides did not have a “experience course” comparable to the current conflict. It makes them modus operandi is comparatively easy to decipher for Ukrainians.
Many people forget that the armed forces unions of Russia and Ukraine were rather close by 2014. The “Old Guard” of the peculiar forces of both countries knows each other. After all, they frequently exchanged experiences during meetings and exercises. Even during the invasion of Crimea, there were unexpected situations.
Russian “Specnasers” sometimes called their Ukrainian counterparts and informed them that they could, for example, take valuable items from the object they had just taken. They provided safety guarantees. They did so in the name of “old acquaintance” and common respect for certain unwritten rules.
So both Russians and Ukrainians know how the another side works. However, the second are supported by intelligence and tactical solutions that Western instructors gave them. This gives them any advantage in the fight against Russian "specialists".
No means of transport, easy targets and low morale of Russian peculiar forces
Due to the comparatively warm winter this year, a large part of Ukraine's territory was impassable for dense vehicles on routes another than asphalt roads. And remember, the roads in Ukraine are even worse than ours. The most crucial arteries are maintained in good condition.
The weather, the very advanced requirements regarding the pace of operations, and the belief in the tiny opposition of the Ukrainian people contributed to the Russian troops' decision to decision in convoys on major transport routes.
Moscow units, including peculiar forces, became the same easy mark for unmanned flying vehicles and tiny mobile Ukrainian ambush groups. This is how they died, for example, above 40 SOBR officers who from the territory of Belarus headed for Kiev.
In turn, helicopters were allocated in the first phase of the invasion to VDV landing operations and their support, as well as to more hard areas in the east of Ukraine, where wheel transport was hampered. Moreover, Russian Mi helicopters, which are most frequently transported by soldiers to the landing, are de facto slow and unreturned.
This makes these machines an urbanized easy mark for shooters who can hide in multi-storey buildings and wait for the convenient minute to attack. Moscow besides did not accomplish dominance in the air and was afraid of losses in air-space forces. For this reason, the spread of peculiar troops by air, just as the land was hampered.
If we put all of this together, i.e. changing the first assumptions of the invasion, the failure of the Hostomell landing and the general impression that "something is no yes" (as our colleague erstwhile explained to the American army that "something is wrong" with Humvee;), as well as moving in convoys that are easy targets for the opponent, we presume that frustration has begun among the Russian "specials".
It led to systematic erosion of morale, even among elite units. The situation was aggravated by the fact that, as we wrote earlier, peculiar formations sent to Ukraine frequently received tasks inadequate for their purpose, or did not have the appropriate support to execute the tasks assigned to them.
Moreover, the Russians observed in their circles branches that “go to the farmazon” while performing small actual “robots”. An perfect example of this is at least any of the forces of the “cadivers” who publish, for example, films on which they “fight” in already acquired cities or shoot at trees and bushes, with no rules of tactics.
In specified circumstances, there was, among others, a revolt. special unit from Pskow. The formation commander – Col. Bushujew – went into conflict with the command of the 20th Army and the West Military District, which resulted in his suspension in duty.
After fighting in the Kharkiv area and having suffered crucial losses in equipment and people (more than 30 dead, 26 wounded and 50 missing soldiers of this brigade), Colonel Bushujev refused to follow orders and send his men one more time into the fighting zone.
In summary, the first phase of the invasion of Ukraine is for Russian peculiar forces a phase full of reasons for disappointment and frustration. After months of preparation for another operation, in which the “specialists” were to play a leading function and to win unimaginable, they had to ride the BWP together with the infantry.
However, this will undoubtedly be the experience from which the Russians will draw appropriate conclusions. So we are curious in how their concept of "hybrid war" and the function of peculiar forces in specified operations will evolve.
Ps: Thank you very much Vlad Dut of Ukrainian peculiar forces, Karol Golowski, Darius Materniak, as well as a fewer another boys who helped gather information for analysis but did not necessarily want us to publically mention them in the text
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