One year on: July protests return to Ukraine

A year ago, thousands of people took to the streets of all major Ukrainian city to protest against moves to restrict the independency and capacity of the country’s anti-corruption institutions. The position quo was restored reasonably quickly, helped by simultaneous force from Ukraine’s western partners. I analysed last year’s protests in item in an earlier article, “Street protests in Ukraine: causes, features and consequences”.

A year has passed, and one more time the “people with cardboard signs”, as they call themselves, have taken to the streets of Ukraine’s major cities. What does all this mean? What are the causes and what might be the consequences?

Background

Prime Minister Yuliia Svyrydenko resigned at the initiative of president Volodymyr Zelenskyy, which meant the resignation of the full government. Various reasons were suggested for the move, but it shortly became clear that the main nonsubjective was neither to appoint a stronger manager, Serhii Koretskyi, to the country’s top executive post, nor to separate ministries that had previously been mistakenly merged. Rather, it was to remove Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov.

Political commentators point to 3 possible reasons for Fedorov’s dismissal. First, there was his conflict with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrskyi. president Zelenskyy himself cited this reason, and although Syrskyi denied it, all available sources confirm that specified a conflict existed. We will return to its substance below. Second, there are claims that the defence minister introduced a procurement strategy that was more transparent and based on performance data, thereby moving counter to the interests of influential arms manufacturers. Third, the young and energetic defence minister had become remarkably popular with the public, which greatly irritated president Zelenskyy, who inactive harbours hopes of winning post-war elections, whenever they may yet take place. It is hard to say which of these explanations is correct, or whether all 3 are actual to any degree.

Many people in Ukraine dislike Fedorov. After all, he was 1 of the key architects of Zelenskyy’s successful presidential election campaign, something the president’s opponents have not forgiven him for. Others point to allegations of corruption among people around the minister, his insufficient attention to cybersecurity and individual data protection, and many another concerns. Yet despite all this, Mykhailo Fedorov became remarkably popular, primarily for reforms made at his erstwhile position of a Minister of Digital Transformation of Ukraine, but not only for that.

His peculiar popularity among young people cannot be explained by youth alone. The age difference between him and Prime Minister Svyrydenko, for example, is not peculiarly large. Yet she is far little popular, despite what was, overall, a reasonably successful year in terms of resilience, as well as populist cash handouts to various sections of the population.

The reasons for Mykhailo Fedorov’s popularity are so connected little with his personality than with the situation that triggered the protests. Let us examine them in greater detail.

The nature of the protests

The immediate trigger for the street protests was the news that the president did not intend to nominate Fedorov to the fresh government and alternatively proposed that the much little popular Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko should head the defence ministry. The explanation offered was simple: Fedorov had failed to deliver the urgently needed improvement of mobilization, whereas Klymenko would succeed.

Government reshuffles in Ukraine are usually regular affairs that attract small public interest. This time, however, the trigger worked. The question is why.

Most of those taking part in the protests are young people below mobilization age, but there are besides many veterans, any of them seriously wounded. The protests emerged spontaneously from youth networks created last year to defend the independency of the anti-corruption institutions. They were subsequently joined by influential bloggers and volunteers sympathetic to minister Fedorov.

The current protests are based on 2 key ideas.

First, in the eyes of the active part of Ukrainian society, Fedorov has become associated with the thought of asymmetric, innovative, high-tech warfare and horizontal, network-based management. In the public imagination, he came to be seen as the antithesis of Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi, unquestionably a hero of the war, but besides a proponent of a more conventional russian school of military thought. At precisely the same time, Ukrainian society was shaken by reports of highly brutal treatment of soldiers in 1 regiment associated with the old russian military culture.

The thought of asymmetric warfare has been embodied in the successes of the Ukrainian Defence Forces in striking Russia’s oil-refining industry, its shadow fleet and logistics; in attacks on heavy protected Moscow and targets as far distant as Siberia; and in creating a logistical crisis for the Russian business forces in Crimea. Preparations for these attacks began long before Fedorov took office, but it was over the past six months that they acquired specified scale and visibility. Fedorov was appointed in January.

In another words, Fedorov became associated with the hope that Ukraine could win through asymmetric methods. For a democratic country that is considerably smaller than Russia, preserving the life of all soldier is enormously important.

The first fundamental origin of the protests is so a conflict between 2 approaches to warfare. On 1 side stands the conventional russian school, focused on discipline, hierarchy and strict execution of orders. On the another is simply a modern, high-tech school focused on networks, innovation and asymmetric warfare.

These 2 approaches have come to be personified by 2 prominent figures representing different generations, although in reality this personalization is clearly an oversimplification. Moreover, Ukrainian government does not separate sufficiently clearly between the functions of the civilian defence minister and those of the military commander-in-chief. This creates an awkward duality of authority that works well only erstwhile the 2 men share the same vision.

The dismissal of the defence minister so created the impression that the old school had prevailed and that the hope placed in asymmetric warfare was being lost.

Thus, although many of the slogans displayed in the squares of Ukrainian cities focused on circumstantial individuals, it is crucial to emphasize that this is not fundamentally about names. It is about a conflict between 2 approaches and 2 systems.

The second crucial thought behind the protests concerns politics in conditions where a average political process is effectively absent. Elections cannot be held until the war is over, and nobody knows erstwhile that will be. Yet the request for political participation is enormous, while the opportunities to satisfy it are virtually non-existent.

The only way to accommodate this request is through a broader distribution of power. Society wants people in government who have views of their own and who can balance and restrain personalized rule. It wants less loyalists and more competent professionals; checks and balances; genuine discussion; the ability to say, “No, Mr President, this is simply a bad idea”; and public explanations of why decisions are taken.

This request will only grow. Politicians can gain political capital by responding to it, or lose it by attempting to defy it. Ukrainian society opposes an excessive concentration of power and wants to see elder state officials who have independent judgement and positions of their own.

President Zelenskyy offered no explanation for his personnel reshuffle. A crucial part of society interpreted this behaviour as a sign of authoritarianism — and, by extension, as a failure of hope for a better future. On questions of war and peace, society demands openness, accountability and reasoned justification.

Parliament, 1 of the central institutions of democracy, failed to act as a safeguard. Ukrainian society so one more time demonstrated its inclination towards the street democracy of the “viche”, or popular assembly — a tradition with a thousand-year history. The people are sovereign. If they cannot express their will through elections, they will express it in the public square.

It can be argued that, with his decision, president Zelenskyy one more time violated Ukraine’s wartime social contract. Society agrees to respect its politicians as legitimate and to refrain from criticizing them, while politicians are expected in return to respond to the public request for fairness and decently justified decisions.

A country cannot be governed and ministers cannot be appointed through street democracy. But erstwhile democratic mechanisms cease to function, street democracy sends a powerful signal that certain methods of governance are unacceptable. It is an utmost means of getting a message through to politicians who have closed off their channels of feedback from society at a time erstwhile the average political process has necessarily been suspended.

Thus, the unpopular, old-school commander-in-chief, despite his considerable achievements and merits, yet became a lightning rod for the president himself.

A July tradition

Despite many political scandals over the year since last July, there had been no street protests in Ukraine during that time. This was not due to the fact that Ukrainians protest only in summertime — the country’s 2 largest revolutions both took place in winter, amid bitter cold.

Rather, protests in Ukraine cannot be triggered simply by personalities or political scandals. What can bring people into the streets is the failure of hope for a better future — a sharp rupture of the social contract with a sense of crucial injustice.

Although many of the protesters’ slogans are personalized, the essence of the protests is so not about individuals but about principles. This becomes clear erstwhile 1 analyses the messages written on their cardboard signs and speaks to the participants. The first rule is asymmetric warfare, technology alternatively of the russian approach, and the request to defend the lives of soldiers. The second is transparency, openness and appropriate justification of government decisions. The 3rd is Russia’s reaction as a yardstick for judging the quality of those decisions. If Russians are pleased, the reasoning goes, then the decision is improbable to strengthen Ukraine’s defence capability. In addition, many slogans stressed the request to resolve the situation rapidly and the impossibility of dragging matters out during wartime.

Last year’s street protests in defence of the anti-corruption institutions received strong support from Ukraine’s western partners. The current protests concern matters on which outside stakeholders cannot decently take a position, leaving the protesters face to face with the authorities.

Public support for the protests, however, has been much higher this time. According to a survey by Active Group, 85 per cent of citizens had heard about the president’s decision, while 74 per cent did not support it. A level of disapproval this advanced cannot simply be ignored.

Conclusion

As I compose these lines, events are inactive unfolding. Nevertheless, the problems have already begun to be addressed.

First, president Zelenskyy heard the message from the streets and began consultations with key military commanders, keeping society informed regularly and in considerable detail. There were dozens of meetings in an almost continuous stream.

Second, the president dismissed Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi and appointed Mykhailo Drapatyi in his place.

Drapatyi belongs to a different generation: officers who entered the war in 2014 in comparatively junior positions and, over the following 12 years, accumulated an strength of combat experience unmatched anywhere in the world. He is described as a proponent of innovation, horizontal connections and trust-based delegation. elder generals have frequently been accused of tying the hands of this cohort of officers and preventing their advancement.

Thus, in the confrontation between the old and fresh schools, it was the fresh school of warfare that prevailed — prompting exuberant reactions among Ukrainian commentators and deep gloom among their Russian counterparts.

The temporary acting defence minister, Yevhenii Khmara, is besides a supporter of these fresh approaches. He built his military career in the peculiar Operations Centre “A” of the safety Service of Ukraine, besides known as “Alpha”.

The eventual future of the defence minister’s post, and the individual political future of Mykhailo Fedorov, remained unresolved as this article went to press.

Ukraine is inactive a long way from being a perfect democracy. But Ukrainian society is simply a surviving political community, firmly committed to democratic improvement and membership in the European Union. And the Ukrainian authorities are capable of proceeding signals from society and correcting their own mistakes.

A strategy is defined not by whether it makes mistakes, but by how it responds to them.

From this perspective, despite a hard period of anxiety and confrontation, this communicative is yet more optimistic than not.

Valerii Pekar is simply a president of the board of the Decolonization NGO, the author of 4 books, an adjunct prof. at the Kyiv-Mohyla Business School and Business School of the Ukrainian Catholic University, and a erstwhile associate of the National improvement Council.

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