In public space, there is simply a reasonably common belief that from the point of view of the assumptions concerning the alleged reset in the relations between the United States and the Russian Federation (2009), the decision to carry out specified a movement should be regarded as wrong. If the goal of Barack Obama's reset was to make a constructive partnership that included Moscow, it was surely not successful. Consequently, the Americans besides failed to win in dragging Russia to their side, in the context of the upcoming rivalry with China.
The Washington administration projects were ruined for a simple reason. Vladimir Putin was not a reliable partner who kept his promises. And he besides failed to comply with the reset arrangements, which became clear to everyone as early as mid-2012.
Thus, from the point of view of the above-mentioned assumptions of the reset, as well as taking into account the fact that Vladimir Putin one more time turned out to be an unreliable partner (which could have been predicted in 2009), Barack's policy Obama led against Russia through Secretary of State Hillary Clinton must surely be judged negatively. And if so, only 1 thing can be learned for the future. Vladimir Putin must not be any partner in terms of arrangements and contracts which would depend solely on his goodwill. In another words,if you've already signed with the Kremlin any deal These are only the ones where the West could enforce from Russia the fulfilment of the Treaty provisions. For this reason – as I wrote in earlier texts – from the position of the West, there must be a devastating defeat of Russia in Ukraine. 1 after which the West could dictate the conditions of peace and the continued functioning of Russia in the global system.
So just this kind of negative assessment of Barack's policy Obama towards Russia allows us to draw correct conclusions for the future and thus avoid repeating the 2009 error.
However, as has frequently been the case in history, not only do the right decisions lead to affirmative effects. Sometimes it is simply a coincidence, a mistake, or even a mistake that yet results in affirmative effects. If only to adopt a methodology for assessing a policy decision on the basis of its later effects only – which is preferred by the alleged ‘realists’ – is Barack’s ‘reset’ Obama would should be considered the most crucial and best political decision of the 21st century.. For this decision could even save the planet from planet War III. But about that in a moment, J
Event sequence
Still dust after the Russian-Georgian War did not settle well (7-16 VIII.2008), and as early as March 6, 2009, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton presented the thought of reset relations with Russia to the world. In September of the same year, president Barack Obama stated that the US had resigned from building a rocket shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. Conversations on the Washington-Russia line had to bring results, as in 2011, Americans suspended the activities of the Second Fleet US Navy. The 1 in which competence lay, among others, the protection of the northern Atlantic and besides the Norwegian Sea, which came down de facto to defender the Russian North Fleet. These were powerful concessions to the Russians. The decision to liquidate the Second Fleet coincided with the G8 summit in France from the end of May 2011. As a result, the alleged Deauville Declaration was signed, in which members of the G8 assured: "We, members of the G8, powerfully support the aspirations of the arabian Spring and the Iranian peopleIt’s okay. ” It should be remembered that the arabian spring was already at its best, and that not only Tunisia, Libya or Egypt, but besides Syria (since March 2011). Thus, the 2011 G8 summit in Deauville concerned, among others, the destiny of Russia's friends: Libya, Syria and even Iran. It can so be assumed that Putin has agreed to any kind of “refurbishment” of North Africa and the mediate East. Among another things, Russia did not veto subsequent UN resolutions against Iran.
Also in 2011, there were public words about the construction of Eurosia from Lisbon to Vladivostok and Hillary Clinton's words about the alleged American beer on the Pacific. The series of events thus draws the following conclusions on the objectives and effects of the reset:
- The US agreed to tolerate the construction of the Eurosia task (Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis), accepted Europe's dependence on Russian natural materials, and agreed to transfer western technology to Russia, which Moscow technology acquired for the proceeds of the sale of hydrocarbons,
- The U.S. has resigned its rocket shield to keep a balance of power at the level of atomic weapons potential,
- The U.S. has eliminated de facto 2nd U.S. Navy fleet giving Russians freedom on delicate sea routes for it (exit from Murmansk and Archangelsk ports – via the Norwegian Sea – to the Atlantic),
- Finally, the Eurosia block was to support the US in its rivalry with China and Russia was to become part of the West,
- Russia has agreed to "refurbish" North Africa and the mediate East (Libya, Syria, Iran), as well as to support the US in Afghanistan (as next).
As a consequence of the agreement, Americans gained peace on the Old Continent and the anticipation of making a beer on the Pacific against China. The issue of the mediate East played an crucial function here due to the fact that the Americans knew that China could be controlled through gas and oil. Oil that flowed to China mostly from the Gulf. So Iran – as a possible ally and supplier of China – became a precedence of American abroad policy. In order to weaken Tehran's position, however, an alliance on the Iran-Syria line had to be broken up. The overthrow of Assad and the disengagement of Syria from the alliance with Iran would later facilitate force on Tehran. It didn't work, as we know. The Syrian government survived, resulting in a change in the US strategy and an offer to Iran the alleged "nuclear agreement" in 2015. But back to reset.
Why would Putin agree to the fall of an ally in the form of Bashar Al-Assad and exposure Iran to the grace of the United States? Writing briefly (to this I dedicated the full large chapter in the book), Iran and Syria were building a oil pipeline from Iran to the Mediterranean. A oil train to let Iranian and Syrian oil exports to Europe. It was a large threat to Russian interests. So Putin decided to teach his partners from Damascus and Tehran a lesson. With American hands.
When the reset conditions were set and the Americans had already made a series of concessions for Russia (resignation of the 2009 rocket shield and the liquidation of the 2011 II Fleet), Vladimir Putin felt that there was a good time to start a game against Washington. In February 2012, Russia vetoed a UN resolution condemning the Assad regime. As a result, negotiations on Syria have been launched. The consequence was Koffi Annan's peace plan, supported by all parties active in the conflict in the United Nations (including Russia but besides China's interest in the mediate East). It all seemed to be settled. Unfortunately, the plan failed due to the failure of the fighting parties (rebels and government troops). In June 2012, the Scots stopped a ship off their coasts landed with Russian combat helicopters sailing to Syria. The masks are down. After this event, the Russians had no further opposition to formally confess to supporting Damascus and in May 2013, to sale S-300 anti-aircraft systems to Assad. Then, in June, Edward Snowden arrived in Moscow wanted by American services, and Putin refused to extradite him.
Therefore, it became clear that the agreements with Deauville as well as those concerning reset were no longer valid. With Russian help, the Assad government survived, and Barack Obama had to search another solution on Iran. Most importantly, however, the United States has never done de facto The announced beer on the Pacific. They had to proceed to engage in rivalry with Russia.
A waste of time, or is he on time?
The fact that due to the reset the Americans wasted respective years (at least 2009-2013) alternatively of focusing on rivalry with China was written and said a lot. Failed by the Kremlin of the elite of Washington, D.C. for years, they surrendered to the Russians only to see that Moscow was not on the US side at all. However, this is only 1 point of view that does not necessarily correspond to the full image of the situation in 2008-2009. It should be remembered that at the time the United States was very seriously engaged militarily in respective places in the planet simultaneously.
Hot Afghanistan
Although six years have passed since the 2001 invasion, the war continued at its best in Afghanistan in 2007. It was the year of many military operations against the Taliban carried out by ISAF (military coalition). However, the strength of the action did not produce results. As a result, in 2008, it was the Taliban that regained their initiative by making frequent and bold attacks throughout Afghanistan. The situation became so serious that in the first 5 months of 2008, the Americans increased the contingent of troops from 26.6 1000 soldiers (January) to as much as 48,000 (May). Then in September, 8,000 more people were moved from Iraq. Overall, the number of US forces in Afghanistan increased by 80% throughout 2008. It was the most bloody year for the US and all NATO in the war against the Taliban. The second specialized in attacking coalition convoys with supplies, causing serious problems. Therefore, Barack Obama – at the beginning of his presidency – He negotiated with Putin the anticipation of moving supplies to American forces in Afghanistan through the Russian Federation. In July 2009, the Russians opened airspace for American aircraft. As a consequence of expanding supplies of supplies (and forces), the coalition went into the offensive against the Taliban, regaining its operational initiative and conducting a number of military operations. dense fighting in Afghanistan lasted fundamentally until 2011, erstwhile Osama bin Laden was captured and killed. It was only at the end of 2012 – besides as a consequence of the exhaustion of the intense war – that measures were launched to stabilise the situation, and in 2013 Afghan forces took full control of the state and its security. Which did not mean that US forces could leave Afghanistan. On the contrary, the Americans remained there until 2021, although of course the quota volume and the cost of maintaining it decreased.
Iraq
The situation in Iraq – for the period 2008-2009 – has besides not yet been resolved. Although the 2003 invasion was a military success, Iraq's business continued until 2011. Besides, after a three-year break, the Americans returned to this country in 2014. The most hard minute during the business most likely came to the time of the Mahdi uprising (2004), which was presided over by Muktada as-Sadr. The situation was under control, but in 2006, an interior war in Iraq broke out between the Shiite and Sunni. It was successfully put out in 2008. It was only then that the Iraqis were given control of the largest American bases. Since then, Americans have been able to restrict their presence in Iraq. However, in order to have an image of American engagement in this country, it is worth giving figures. January 2009 In Iraq, it was stationed in 357 bases as many as 144,000 American soldiers (this is more than the full Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland count). This required 3.4 million pieces of military equipment for them. precisely 1 year later (January 2010) the U.S. presence in Iraq was 112 000 soldiers, followed by a massive simplification to 50,000 in June 2010 (121 bases). Even after specified a large reduction, the American contingent required about 1.2 million pieces of various kinds of equipment to operate. Which shows how immense a logistics task the business of already stabilized Iraq was.
Thus, in January 2009, the Americans held a full of about 180 000 soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan (approximately 140 000 Iraq and 40,000 Afghanistan). For the next 2 years, the contingent in Iraq declined and in Afghanistan it increased. By August 2010, there were only 50,000 soldiers in Iraq, but the American army in Afghanistan grew to nearly 100,000 soldiers! While supplying the Iraqi contingent was easy (directly by sea, via the Persian Gulf, to Iraqi ports, or yet via allied Turkey or Saudi Arabia) the troops in Afghanistan had to trust on 3rd country supplies. I.e. Pakistan (south) or countries of Central Asia (north) as well as Russia.
North Korea and Japan
Although Iraq and Afghanistan caught the attention of the full world, it should be remembered that these are not the only directions operated by the American armed forces. The U.S. contingent in North Korea counted nearly 30,000 soldiers from 2009 to 2014, making up the largest part of the staff of the full 8th United States Army. American forces deployed in Japan can be counted on another 50,000 soldiers. The Americans – as they did present – were present in various parts of the planet (RFN, Japan, Italy, Kosovo, Kuwait and many others), but it was mainly the actions in Iraq and Afghanistan that were most crucial for geopolitical decisions taken at that time.
Was Reset a necessity?
They bear this in head should not surprise that the Barack Obama administration – facing a powerful fighting strength in Afghanistan in 2009 – did not search another front against the strong opponent Russia was. And not just due to American military commitment. besides due to the finances. It is estimated that the full war period in Afghanistan (2001-2022) cost $2.3 trillion. The 2009-2010 Nlata had to be among the most expensive. In turn, Iraq's war and business Could have cost Even another $2.2 trillion.
The expenses associated with conducting war activities take on additional weight if we remind you that 2008-2009 was a global financial crisis. In 2008, the Icelandic economy fundamentally collapsed, and in 2009 Greece's finances broke out. With the financial crisis in the US, it has hit the European economies and the euro area itself. From this perspective, the fresh American president – who took office on January 20, 2009 – had to put out not 1 fire (war in Afghanistan), but at least 2 (financial crisis). And on different levels. At the same time, during the financial crisis, Barack Obama could not be certain of 100% geopolitical support from European partners. It was a very hard time for the full West.
Bottom line. The Americans knew about the coming Chinese challenge, and they began to think about it seriously since 2008. They started the first preparations for return in abroad policy (vide announcement that at least 50% of fresh submarines will service in the Pacific). However, at the time of attempting to make major geopolitical changes to the US strategy, the situation in Afghanistan became heated and at the same time a massive financial crisis broke out. Barack Obama – at the time of taking office – had respective fires to extinguish at once. First things first – As the Anglo-Saxons say. Washington could not afford to lose the war with the Taliban and at the same time had to deal with the economical crisis. The agreement with Russia – with which there have been very bad relations since the invasion of Georgia – seemed to be an option not so much optimal, but actually necessary. First, we had to solve interior problems (crisis), and win wars that were already ongoing (Afghanistan, engagement in Iraq). By the way, however, the Russian Federation could be acquired for American plans to subdue the increasing Chinese giant. That's why the offer to Moscow was so generous.
It is crucial that as shortly as the economical crisis had passed and the situation in Afghanistan was contained (+ killing bin Laden), Hillary Clinton immediately announced a beer on the Pacific (2011). Thus, the chronology of events shows that the assumptions of reset relations with Russia were not only related to the current consequence to events, but besides related to a long-term strategical goal (contemplation of China).
It is actual that 1 can accuse the American administration of those years of naivety, given her belief that Vladimir Putin will prove to be a loyal partner. In this context long-term strategy reset (the acquisition of Russia for the West and the joint dictate of China's conditions) could not stand the trial of time. On the another hand, the economical and geopolitical situation of the United States in 2009-2010 forced the settlement of the dispute with the Russian Federation. In this respect, reset He actually did his job.
Putin besides believed in reset
Most studies on reset Barack Obama is described and judged from the position of the West or the United States itself. In view of this, there are frequently no consequences reset for the Russian Federation. And its impact on the global arena.
Octopus gas-supply tentacles
In the meantime, it should be pointed out that the Kremlin elites – after 2009 – became very powerfully active in the task to build a strategical partnership on the Berlin-Moscow line and the wider EU-Russia line. In February 2010, the Russians obtained final approvals for Nord Stream. Work began in April on the construction of the gas pipeline, which was completed in 2011. Nord Stream had a capacity of 55 billion ml of gas/year, precisely the same as the planned Nord Stream II (total capacity of 110 billion ml of gas/year).
In parallel, efforts continued to build the South Stream pipeline across the Black Sea. There the formalities lasted until 2014, due to the amount active in the investment of the states. At the end of 2012, the first investments were officially launched, but the pipeline itself began to be laid only in 2014, and yet as a full the task was not created until present (due to the blocking of land-based investments in a number of countries due to the first invasion of Ukraine from 2014).
At the same time, it should be remembered that both investments were emanating from the political engagement of the Russian Federation in the Eurosia task from Lisbon to Vladivostok. A emanation that translated into financial matters in a reasonably concrete way. The combined costs of Nord Stream are estimated at 15.7 billion UAH. Second thread – Nord Stream II – active expenditure in the order Okay. 17 billion UAH. Finally, the estimated cost of building South Stream – which was created only partially – is 25 billion UAH. Interestingly, many experts pointed out that the value of all these investments is so advanced that, in the context of the expected profits from gas sales, there were large reservations about the profitability of the projects. In another words, it is rather likely that Nord Streamy (but besides South Stream) were a purely political task from Russia's perspective.
Strategic partnership with medicine on the US and Mitteleuropa
If the Kremlin authorities were investing live cash in a political project, why? The Northern gas pipeline was to shut down Poland as an intermediary in the sale of gas from Russia to Germany. The implementation of the Nord Streams allowed to blackmail Warsaw in the field of energy. The aim was to be able to turn off the gas tap on the Jamal pipeline (cut off Poland from deliveries) without consequences for Germany. The exact same reasons for the confederate Gas pipeline project. This in turn was to let Ukraine to be bypassed through the Black Sea. So yet Russia intended to make Western and Central Europe, as well as the Balkans dependent on Russian gas, and to get at the same time powerful lions for states that could pose a problem for Moscow (Poland/Ukraine).
This was part of the concept of building Eurosia and if specified a task had succeeded, Warsaw and Kiev would have been neutralized. In another words, even if the Americans decided to teardrop apart the Berlin-Moscow axis then, they would have a very hard task. How can we persuade Warsaw to assert itself towards Berlin and Moscow erstwhile Poland could be blackmailed by the threat of cutting off gas supply (let us remember that there was no Baltic tube or LNG terminal at the time)?
So, Energy projects were crucial from the position of Germany and Russia as regards the intention to neutralise American influences on the Old Continent and to build an independent and competitive political centre in Europe. The anticipation of energy blackmail utilized by Moscow was to be a kind of sword of Demokles, which fell on the heads of any U.S. allies if they tried to act assertively towards Berlin and Moscow.
The strategical partnership on the axis of Berlin-Moscow besides had a second objective, which was to subdue Central and east Europe to the duo: Russia/Germany. The German sphere of influence was to end at the border of the European Union, and Moscow would extend immediately behind it. Energy infrastructure was besides key to the pacification of the unruly countries of the region. So, Germany wanted to implement the task Mitteleurops Vladimir Putin, however, played the USSR within the limits of which Belarus and Ukraine, among others, were located.
In this arrangement, the Germans on 1 hand may have affected Mitteleuropa through its economical and economic-political advantages (EU tools) and, on the another hand, to usage Russia as a kind of scare. It was about creating an alternate situation for e.g. Poland. The anticipation of communicating Warsaw: “Or you will do what we anticipate you to do, or the Russians will come and you will have a problem.” In addition, a very circumstantial left hand was expected to be the chance to spin Polish gas taps.
Germany would besides profit on a purely economical basis. Cheaper gas pumped straight from Russia – via Nord Stream – gave the German economy an advantage and greater competitiveness in the global market. On the another hand, after the conversion to renewable energy, Germany could sale Russian gas as a major intermediary to almost all EU countries (through the EU's pipeline network).
In summary, the US's consent to reset opened the anticipation of implementing infrastructure and energy projects. The completion of the investment in question was to give political lions to possible allies of the United States. As a result, the United States was to be expelled from Europe, regardless of its own will. Germany and Russia combined with Paris could then build Eurosia as the 3rd (next to the US and China) centre of geopolitical force in the world. From Russia's perspective, this political task was to warrant Moscow a advanced position in the global power arrangement for long decades. For Russia could import Western technologies from the sale of energy resources to the West, as well as from another types of gross resulting from the strategical partnership with Berlin. These were essential to keep the scale of gas and oil extraction from Russia. Since most of the Russian deposits are in the Arctic region and the Russians themselves do not have the technology to extract natural materials under specified hard conditions. Thus, the acquisition of French and German technologies was a condition for the Kremlin to last economically and keep Moscow's position as a global exporter of gas and oil.
In addition, the acquisition of Western technology was essential to keep itself in the technology race. In both military and space. Meanwhile, it should be remembered that the safety of the Russian Federation depends only on its atomic arsenal. Imagine a script where, given the fresh technologies, obsolete Russian atomic missiles could be completely neutralized... The Russians would then feel very uncomfortable in the neighbourhood, e.g. China.
With this in mind, the strategical partnership was seen in Moscow as a strategical geopolitical nonsubjective determining Russia's endurance and its further development/strengthening of its global position.
Third Force Centre – Eurosia
However, the benefits of building a political task from Lisbon to Vladivostok were to extend beyond the interests of Germany and Russia, as well as their relations with the US. In addition, the French added their own assets (impacts in Africa) to the project, hoping to settle issues with Russia in Africa and the mediate East (distribution of revenues). At the same time, France – as I wrote in my survey on the subject. Germany: "Bancrue German geopolitical strategy" – it was intended to become a window for the German economy in the Atlantic (and wider into the planet ocean). But on the highest plane, Eurosia was to become an equal partner for China.
Russian silk trail
Through cooperation with the European Union, the Russians were able to offer their territory to the Chinese as a band for land trade transfers (New Silk Road). At the same time, while besides calculating the issue of global warming and melting of the ice layer in the Arctic region, the Russians invested in a fleet of icebreakers, which were intended to make the alleged Northern Maritime Road possible. In another words, in the far future Moscow intended to become a safety warrant besides for maritime transport between China and Europe. Taking place in the Arctic waters, where the Russians have an advantage over the US.
The plans were truly ambitious and far-reaching. Russia beginning the gateway to Europe to China would become an crucial player who could offer Beijing a supply of gas and oil in the long term. And on my own terms. Especially if it were found that the United States would begin to exert strong force on the People's Republic of China. And remember, the Chinese economy is dependent on the supply of gas and oil by sea. In another words, the Russians yet intended to tame the Chinese by making them, like the EU, dependent on their own energy resources. It could work if the U.S. believed in reset with Russia and pressed China hard. These could not then trust on supplies of oil from the Gulf (due to the control of sea routes by US Navy) and would possibly be more submissive to Russian natural materials. Although it should be remembered that Beijing was doing everything to not become addicted to Russia and would effort to drag oil trains to land from Iran. However, this is simply a very hard and risky investment which has not been implemented to this day.
European Empire of the German Nation
From the position of Europeans, France and Germany hoped to make large profits from their expansion opportunities on a large and ever-increasing Chinese market. Germany and the French – thanks to the Russian offer of merging Europe with the Far East – would have arguments to bargain with the US. Having alternatives to export their own goods would give Europeans negotiating options in talks with Moscow and Washington.
It should be remembered that Germany planned to reduce its dependence on Russian gas (Energywende) and oil (the automotive revolution – electricity). So, Berlin's game was set for 2 stages of unchaining political shackles. First precedence was independency from the US, thanks to cooperation with Russia (gas pipelines as jackers, Russia as an alternate way to China for German exports). In the long term, however, Germany besides wanted to break its energy dependency on Russia. As a result, they wanted the fullest possible ability to conduct an independent abroad and economical policy. Return to the geopolitical state before planet War I (WWI) and correct the errors of Kaiser and Hitler. Through cooperation with France (the Atlantic window) and Russia (the Far East window), the German economy could grow unfetteredly and benefit from globalisation. The difference between this state and this current state would be that it is now the US that imposes conditions on Germany to usage the global safety order. Meanwhile, in relations with France and even Russia, Germany could become the stronger partner. Berlin saw itself in the function of future Rome in the EuRussia project.
French colonial power
Paris had its own plans in all of this. Of course, the French hoped for economical gains from cooperation with China, but the more crucial issue was the establishment of spheres of influence in Africa and the mediate East. Both Russia and China, which began expansion in East Africa. France intended to take control of North Africa (including Libya), and possibly even gain influence in the mediate East. European agreements with Iran (vide The atomic agreement) indicated that Germany and France intended to build an alternate to Russian oil supplies. The French were to become masters of the Mediterranean. So while Germany intended to oversee the east direction (Russia/China), the French were to take care of the south. At the same time, Paris feared that the growth of Germany's economical power and Berlin's break from the American chain could translate into the expansion of Germany's military power. Therefore, Paris pressed for the creation of a European army that would not pose a threat to France.
Overestimation of possibilities
From Russia's position reset It was fatal. He hoped that the gateway to the EuRussia task was open. The Kremlin authorities have invested not only money in this task but besides time. Counting on the creation of the Moscow-Berlin axis insensitive to the dictatorship of Washington, the Russians wanted to act methodically. EuRussia first. Only later, erstwhile the U.S. forces China against the wall, could Beijing be subject to conditions for gas and oil supply. On its own Russia was besides weak to negociate with Beijing, as evidenced by the fact that the Chinese had just completed the construction of the first strand of the gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to China (the Central Asian-China project). They besides rejected the Russian proposal to build a gas pipeline to China through Kazakhstan.
Moscow authorities believed that they could usage reset and take the Germans distant from American influence, make a task of EuRussia, then shift military and capital resources to Central Asia. To torpedo the Chinese expansion in this region and then scope China erstwhile these will depend on the sea supplies (and thus the US). At the same time, the Russians countered any projects in the mediate East that aimed at expanding oil supply to the Old Continent (vide Syria, but besides playing in Libya for a civilian war, in which the Russians are inactive active). Putin believed that he could dictate the conditions in the future to both Germany and the wider EU and the Chinese. Being an equal partner for the US, which would lose influence in Europe.
In 2012, Vladimir Putin was convinced that he had all the assets in his hands. Nord Stream was created (2011), Nord Stream II was planned, construction of South Stream was about to begin, and the task to build a gas pipeline from Iran through Syria to Europe was in ruins (Explosion in March 2011 of the Syrian civilian War). Poland is at the Russian energy grace (gas)And at the same time the Americans announced a beer on the Pacific (2011 Clinton speech). Which announced force on China.
Putin believed that the Russian-German partnership was stronger than the American influences in Europe and Berlin itself. He felt it was the right time to start a game against the US in order to detach Eurosia from American influence and make a competitive block. Moscow besides decided to regain control of Syria. In the face of the civilian war, Asad needed help, and while at Putin's mercy he was ready to completely submit to the Kremlin's will.
When, in consequence to support for Assad, the Americans began to finance Ukrainian efforts to independency from Moscow, Vladimir Putin did not hesitate to usage force. He occupied Crimea and started a war on Donbas. After peaceful talks in Minsk, Angela Merkel gave the green light to the construction of Nord Stream II (2014), which resulted in the signing of a gas pipeline contract in 2015.
No doubt. Angela Merkel and Germany's attitude after the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine convinced Vladimir Putin that Americans were powerless. And Russia can go as far in east Europe as it wants. However, the first EU sanctions on Russia were a alternatively worrying trailer of problems with the German partner. However, they did not have much effect on Putin. After all, strategical interests (Nord Stream II) were moving forward as planned.
Shale Revolution
One of the black swans for Russian calculations turned out to be... a slate revolution in the United States. In 2009, the production of shale oil, for example, was somewhat higher than in 2005. However, in 2011, “something” began to happen, and between 2012 and 2014, the volume of American shale gas and oil production grew geometrically.
This resulted in the congress's approval for oil exports from the US in 2015, as well as the simplification of LNG export procedures in subsequent years. The United States entered the European energy marketplace more powerfully each year, frequently at the expense of Russia's interests. At the time, it turned out that it was not mediate Eastern, but that American natural materials could be an alternate to supplies from Russia to the EU. As if that were not enough, erstwhile the Russians played truly hard on the gas marketplace in late 2021, it was dozens of U.S. gas carriers that transported LNG to Europe. The Americans thus neutralized Russian possible for energy blackmail.
American gambit – gas is not enough
When Barack Obama's administration realized (2014) that due to reset The United States pushed de facto Germany's embrace of Moscow, a violent turn in European politics. In mid-2014, a wiretap scandal broke out in Poland. As a result, then Prime Minister Donald Tusk resigned. He was given a soft landing by Germany, with the support of which he took the position of president of the European Council (1.12.2014). The governing coalition of PO-PSL – after losing a number of leaders including the head of the organization – was incapable to make adequate trust among Poles. In 2015, a real political breakthrough came, and the pro-American political faction (PiS) took full swing in the election. The President's office and the majority in parliament and senate. Americans cast a political anchor in the heart of Europe, right between Germany and Russia.
In 2015 the LNG terminal in Świnoujście was commissioned (decision on the construction of 2006-PiS, implementation of 2010-2015 – PO-PSL, completion of investment of PiS – 2015). It was almost immediately decided to grow the terminal, as well as to build the Baltic tube pipeline. This was completed by the end of 2022. Thanks to the above mentioned infrastructure, Poland became at first a small susceptible (after completing the LNG terminal) and then completely insensitive (after finishing the Baltic Pipe) for possible Moscow gas blackmail. Moreover, thanks to another investments in the gas pipeline network Poland has gained the chance to transfer gas from and to the Baltic States. The gas pipeline to the south to Croatia is inactive under construction (connecting Poland with the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Croatia), and it was further decided to make a connection with Ukraine.
Fear of the military threat on the part of Russia has caused not only Poland, but besides the Baltic States and Romania to become aware of abroad policy in the US alternatively than Berlin. Especially as Germany proved to be powerless, on the 1 hand, in the face of aggression against Ukraine, and on the another hand their attitude demonstrated the unwillingness to argue Moscow. As a result, the full political task broke down for Germany Mitteleurops What I wrote in my last analysis. The Berlin authorities were inactive trying to fight to regain control of Warsaw, but it failed (break 2016/2017). However, Germany continued to effort to build Nord Stream II with Russia.
In January 2017, U.S. president Donald Trump took office and from that minute on, any insubordination Germany was broken in a demonstrative way and very clear. All you request to do is remind the US duties on steel and aluminium (2018) which hit Germany mainly. Donald Trump acted controversially, but 1 thing should be said. He could origin panic in Germans who did not anticipate specified extremist actions. The deficiency of calculation of the Washington administration, as well as the demonstration and humiliatingness of Angela Merkel Trump's attitude caused light fear to the Germans. Especially since the German economy inactive mostly depended on the Americans (the largest importer from Germany) and their control of the maritime routes. So Donald Trump fulfilled his function perfectly. Both Putin and I had concrete arguments to blackmail the Berlin administration, but for that time Donald Trump seemed more mad. Capable of carrying out their threats: breaking NATO and globalisation, which served German interests so much.
The German pacification did not last long and in December 2019 the United States imposed sanctions on the construction of Nord Stream II, which was fundamentally already completed in 90%. Thus Trump blocked the last minute implementation of the German-Russian project. Faced with sanctions, the Russians were forced to complete the gas pipeline on their own, which extended the process until IX 2021.
In conclusion, The strategical German-Russian partnership placed, among another things, on the pillar of Berlin's energy dependency from Moscow did not withstand force from the US. The United States – despite its German dependence on Russian gas – forced Berlin to follow its lead in relations with Russia. A sign of this was, for example, the imposition of further EU sanctions on Russia, as well as the expulsion by Berlin of Russian diplomats after an effort to kill Skripal (2018). yet blocking Nord Stream II.
Simultaneously The US did not have the slightest problem with anchoring its interests in Warsaw and building a pro-American coalition blocking the Berlin-Moscow axis.
Desperation and head injury
The eventual symptom of Germany being powerless against American force and incapable to support Russia was the deficiency of gas flow activation by the completed Nord Stream II gas pipeline. Of course, it should be mentioned here that Poland has tried for years to block the construction and operation of Nord Streams, utilizing EU tools. Thus, this investment bore immense legal and procedural problems. However, in Putin's eyes, the inability of the Germans to break these issues was just another proof that Berlin could no longer be counted on. Nothing in this respect changed the position of president of the United States. Although Joe Biden removed the sanction from NS II just before tightening the last screw (which had no meaning), the sanctioning force on Russia continued to increase. And the gas through NS II didn't flow.
Furthermore, in Moscow, it was realized that by the end of 2022 the “Geopolitan window” was passing convenient for Russia. For completion of Baltic tube meant that the most so far dependent on Russian gas Central Europe was gaining an alternate in the form of supplies from Norway. In addition, a number of another investments were made which undermined Russia's position on the energy market. This is described in item in the 2019 article: "Russia will start a war in Europe or the mediate East by 2022." In another words, the Russians were losing the anticipation of energy blackmailing Europe. It would be impossible to recover Ukraine without specified blackmail and without neutralising the EU as an ally of the US.
Therefore, Vladimir Putin issued an order on 24 February 2022 to launch a “special operation” in Ukraine. What? de facto can be compared to the authoritative announcement of the bankruptcy of his existing abroad policy and EuRussia project. That Russia had already lost the war in Ukraine (regardless of the result of the military clash) I wrote a separate analysis: "The Russian Federation has already lost. The question of how much harm he can do?It’s okay. ”
Release of hands
At the same time, the American ability to cope on respective fronts should be appreciated. At a time erstwhile Washington had to engage in Central Europe and struggled with Moscow's offensive attitude, the Americans did not quit the subject of rivalry with China. Donald Trump introduced further duties on Chinese products starting a trade war with the mediate State. At the same time, there were ongoing struggles against Kim Jong Un, who threatened American allies with an atom by 2018. In addition, Trump broke the deal with Iran by noticing his weaknesses (Iran despite the agreement inactive played against the US, especially in Iraq and Syria). Finally, in the mediate East, the war with ISIS continued continuously since 2013, which was not erased from the map until 2019. During this period, Americans had to engage in this region both militarily and politically.
The American administration, individual expert cells separated for analysis of circumstantial geopolitical theatres, as well as individual politicians and military had their hands full. And on all front.
And you gotta admit, the Americans made it. They managed to retreat military forces from Iraq and Afghanistan (2021). They thus freed their hands and importantly reduced the cost of maintaining the expeditionary forces. respective years of peace were played on the Korean Peninsula (2018-2022, only now did Kim start scaring again). Germans were pacified, and at the same time NATO's unity was restored to the Russian threat (at Putin's request). The economical and technological war with China is inactive ongoing, and it is not seen by the Americans to lose it.
As a consequence of reducing engagement in little crucial regions (near East/Central Asia), in the face of the second invasion of Ukraine, the United States could increase military presence on the alleged east flank of NATO and at the same time afford to send immense amounts of ammunition and supplies to Ukraine. Which possibly would not be so simple if the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan were inactive ongoing.
In 2023, there seems to be no uncertainty that the Russian Federation is in a very hard position. And it may shortly turn out that the Americans – without putting quite a few effort into it – will come out of the confrontation with Russia with a defensive hand.
But we already know all this “after the fact”. Therefore, it is besides worth considering – in the context of the evaluation Obama reset and cognition already acquired – what if...
What if... alternate version of events
Reflecting on hypothetical geopolitical scenarios always involves large risks, or alternatively certainty that the imaginary series of events does not take into account a number of factors that have had an impact on reality. However, ‘if’ is of large value in the context of individual decisions assessments. Both in individual life and in matters of interstate nature. After all, the imagination – and of course experience – tells us what can happen after specified a choice, not another choice. It is so an essential origin in decision-making and evaluation. However, in order to be as nonsubjective as possible, an alternate must be developed and justified as best as possible. The presentation of a false image of alternate developments will lead to misjudged, and worse, false conclusions for the future.
Therefore, this sub-section of the analysis – which is the core of it – was preceded by an extended presentation of the situation context with which we had faced in the years 2009-2022. For without cognition of the realities prevailing at the moment, it is impossible to verify the decision honestly. At the same time, it is surely easier to do so erstwhile considering its effects. Here, however, many traps await the researchers of alternate visions. For the effects of action are divided into short-term but besides long-term ones. The difference can be diametric. For example, 1 of the crown arguments of the “realists” in the context of the Polish 1939 decisions is the fact that the Czech Republic – which capitulated before Hitler – came out after the war without major human losses as was the case with Poland. However, we remember that the II of Poland had about 35 million citizens, of whom nearly 24 million (68%) were Polish nationals. It is estimated that during planet War II the Polish Republic lost about 6 million citizens including little than 3 million Poles. In 1945, little than 21 million Poles lived in the Polish Republic. So if you reject issues of moral nature and leave only a statistical argument, the data for the years 1939-1945 are adverse to the choice of a defensive war. However, if we survey a longer period e.g. 1939-2022 it turns out that the Czech population increased in this period (80 years) somewhat over 20%, while Poles are already (without migrants) 38 million, which gives 158% increase. This, of course, consisted of a number of different factors, but demographers – on the basis of circumstantial data – indicate that the war had a major impact on the later demographic surplus in Poland. Natural growth in Poland in 1946 was 16%, in 1955 it was 19.5% and in 1960 – 15.1%. It was a period of the alleged war failure compensation phase. For comparison, in 2006 we dropped in this ratio to the line (-0,04%). Thus, if we justice Beck's decision only and only on the basis of dry statistic from 1939-2022, it can be concluded that the war of 1939-1945 has been highly affirmative (as it sounds, but these are the facts!) erstwhile it comes to natural growth in Poland. Does this mean that the lost defence wars are beneficial to the state? Of course not. due to the fact that there are many planes, and Poland has lost its political importance in: territory, assets (de facto business of the USSR). You could trade it a long time. However, that does not mean that Beck's decision was incorrect and the worst possible. On the contrary, she was the only 1 that could be taken under those conditions, as I showed years ago in the article: “PAKT with III RZESZA – alternative, or worst dream of Poles?”.
Therefore, the assessment of the effects themselves should be regarded as a catastrophic evaluation method. It is crucial to remember that cognition of the effects of a given action comes after its adoption. no of us take into account the consequences that we do not know erstwhile making any decisions. It can only recognise, on the basis of experience gained, that specified a alternatively than another consequences of action are most likely. And the probability is assessed on the basis of the circumstances that be at the minute of the decision – which we know – and we may not know about everything.
After so long, but possibly necessary, philosophical introduction should be returned to reset Barack Obama and get on with it.
U.S. minute of weakness
There is simply a explanation according to which Vladimir Putin besides decided to hit Ukraine due to the fact that he considered Joe Biden to be a weak president. He could besides be convinced that NATO unity does not exist. If we accept this thesis as correct, it is worth noting that the United States active in the costly war in Afghanistan and under the weight of the global economical crisis seemed even weaker in 2009 than today. Furthermore, NATO's cohesion and trust in the US were marginal. The 2004 invasion of Iraq was not supported by anyone but London and Warsaw. Not much, in 2007 there was a scandal erstwhile it came out that there were no reports of Saddam Hussein's chemical weapons, which were to be the basis for the war. This information swept from Prime Minister Tony Blair's seat.
In the following years, the U.S. reputation did not gain anything. In 2010, WikiLeaks published hundreds of thousands of papers on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as diplomatic papers from the American embassies. In 2011, the portal published data on Guantanamo prisoners, as well as from another secret CIA prisons (including Poland) where torture was applied. In 2013, Edward Snowden revealed an American service surveillance program for U.S. citizens. besides in 2013, another scandal ensued with the American surveillance of the full German government, including the wiretaps of Chancellor Angela Merkel. To compose that the credibility of the US was compromised in 2009-2013 is not to compose anything. The image of the hegemon was fundamentally devastated at the time. If Vladimir Putin were looking for the "weak" minute of the US and the North Atlantic Pact, he came much earlier than in 2021. It should besides be remembered that during the 2008 Georgia War, the Russians themselves seriously challenged the U.S. position. The Russian strike was made 1 period after NATO-Wese troops, mostly American, were practicing in Georgia ("Immediate Response-2008"). Furthermore, the Russian invasion was in effect a consequence to declarations about Ukraine and Georgia's future NATO membership, which fell at the Bucharest summit in April 2008. Russia won militarily against Georgia and in order to halt the business of the capital Tbilisi, a delegation led by French president Nicolas Sarkozy went to Moscow. Putin's strong position was very visible here. After peace was made, the Russians felt highly assured at the turn of 2008/2009. They won the war with Georgia, and the US – engaged elsewhere – did not lift a finger.
The feeling of having the advantage of the Kremlin grew. Especially since Ukraine's "lost" as a consequence of the Orange Revolution (2004), support for pro-western president Viktor Yushchenko was... only 5.5% in 2009. The governments of the “revolutionaries” were finished and the Russians were almost certain of the triumph of their candidate in the 2010 election. What besides happened (president of Viktor Yanukovych).
Obama's hard Line
Imagine that under specified conditions the Barack Obama administration does not scope out to Vladimir Putin. Thus, Washington decision-makers would decide to deal with the economical crisis, the war in Afghanistan, the business of Iraq, and at the same time effort to pacify the Russian Federation. Then the war in Georgia could service as a basis for imposing sanctions on the Russian Federation. The question is, would the European Union join Russia's sanctioning action? Without it, specified action would have no effect in principle.
And the issue would be highly problematic. Although there were no Nord Stream threads yet, there was besides no Baltic tube or LNG terminals in Świnoujście or Lithuanian Klaipeda. There were no specified terminals in Germany. Furthermore, as I pointed out above, in 2009 the Americans were inactive ahead of a crucial increase in shale gas and oil extraction. In another words, the Russians could cut off gas supply to Poland, Germany, Ukraine, Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and many another EU countries. And there would be no alternate to Russian natural material. Kremlin blackmail would be 100% effective in this case. In fact, imposing sanctions on Russia in 2009 would mean energy game over for Europe. Consequently, it appears justified that 2009-2010 The Russians could break the alleged unity of the West with large ease. Americans would then have a powerful problem to convince Europe to act against Moscow. possibly that's the main reason why it happened. reset?
This constitution seems to fundamentally close the subject of ‘if’. Americans – even if they themselves had the possible to act against Russia – could not gain support among their allies. And if specified a step were taken (sanctions), then the West could lose already in pre-runs. Europe, without energy in a global economical crisis, would not have recovered.
Ukrainian Chess
However, let us presume that the United States itself, or together with the EU, would, without respect to economical and energy effects, start exerting force on Russia. Trying to isolate her politically, technologically and economically. How would Vladimir Putin react? 1 can presume with a large deal of certainty that it would work like today. In another words, the precedence would be to regain Ukraine. Under reset conditions, the Russians decided to wait until 2010 to regain influence in Kiev as a consequence of elections. However, in 2009, the support of the Ukrainians for the pro-Western government was so low that in fact Putin could be tempted to make a coup. Ukraine from 2009 is not the same as from 2022. The Ukrainian army and services of 2022 are not the same as in 2009. We saw what happened in 2014, erstwhile due to the inertia, betrayal and incompetence of Crimea he was given without a fight, as was the lion's part of Donbas. It can be assumed that if the political coup had failed in 2009, Putin could have carried out a “special operation” which would not have occupied Crimea and Donbas, but immediately Kiev (as tried in 2022). The Ukrainian service and army, which are in large part at various stages of decomposition, would not defy much. Especially since in 2009 a large part of the staff came from the times of the USSR...
If Vladimir Putin continued his aggressive abroad policy in 2009-2010, it is possible to bet dollars against nuts that he would push Belarus on integration and Ukraine would return to the Russian sphere of influence very quickly. And so, a real script would be that in 2010 the full Russian Federation army – which would not be scratched while taking control of Ukraine – She'd stand at NATO borders. Starting from Kaliningrad Oblast, through Belarus to Ukraine. Let us remind you that around 150 000 American soldiers were in Iraq and Afghanistan at the time. By absorbing immense amounts of resources, equipment and supplies.
From the point of view of military potential, only atomic guarantees could then give the Natovian side any sense of security. And it's perfectly real that the Russians would start a hybrid war. But not in Ukraine, but in Estonia and Latvia, where there are Russian minorities. This – left unresponsive – would hit NATO's credibility even more.
Strategic partnership with ... China
Further attention should be paid to the Far East. If gas pipeline projects to Europe had not been created, the Russians would have sought partnership with China in 2009. alternatively of betting on EuRussia, Vladimir Putin would start building Russia. fresh pipelines and pipelines to China (which is not present today, but for the tiny crucial Siberian force) would possibly be created in 2014. Which would make Russia independent of capital from the West and build a more durable relation on the Moscow-Pekin line.
At the same time, it should be remembered that if the EU were frightened of energy blackmail (highly probable), then the Americans could face the Berlin-Moscow-Pekin block. At the same time, India was pro-Russian and at the same time peaceful coexistence with China was seen. The geopolitical situation of the United States would be fatal. For good, with specified a variant of events We would talk about the end of American hegemony in 2009. And this would be the real end, not the imaginary 1 – as it seems to any today. The above presents a number of crucial arguments that argue that Americans in 2009 might not be able to halt Russians from destroying the constructivist global order. In fact, in 2022 Vladimir Putin decided to test the U.S. hegemony and we already know that he failed the test. In another words, the resumption of the Russian-Ukrainian War of 2022 was unprofitable, and the cost of challenging the United States exceeds the possible benefits, if any. The effects of Russia's actions did not prove a breach of hegemony, on the contrary, they most likely discouraged Chinese from taking more decisive action. Beijing prefers to wait out the "storm" if possible unless the US decides to increase the force on the People's Republic of China itself.
A planet without a hegemon
The situation in which the planet would find itself in the event of the failure of a hegemonic arrangement was described in the book, so let me describe only the selected aspects related to this hypothetical script (no reset). This is crucial, for the question should be raised here: “Well, well, but would the fall of U.S. hegemony in 2009 be so tragic? possibly a Euro-Asian construct would be better.”
This question can be answered twice. Yeah. The establishment of a Euro-Asian geopolitical block would be better. For Russia. Perhaps, but not necessarily, besides for China. On the another hand, the position of the European Union and Germany itself would be marginalised. In turn Poland would find itself in a tragic, completely inert geopolitical situation. All these thesis can be rather easy justified.
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Ambitions and opportunities – EU as a milk cow
The scratched large Plan on the axis of Paris-Berlin-Moscow (and more broadly Beijing) looks awesome if you draw it on a card. However, it should be remembered that in 2009 the individual capitals had a somewhat different thought of their own function in the full project. China invested in Central Asia and sought land connections to the mediate East that could control themselves. At the same time, they have fundamentally become an economical predator who has entered a reasonably liberal European marketplace and started taking over full production facilities along with technologies. In addition, the Beijing authorities did not hesitate to usage regulatory blackmail for abroad operators producing and selling in China. Beijing decision-makers acted and acted as if everyone around them were not only competitors but opponents. Enemies that should be yet demolished and vassalised. This is precisely the same political-business doctrine as the Kremlin elite.
No wonder, therefore, that by 2014 both the French and Germany began to wonder about the form of partnership with China. For the effects of the brutal economical expansion of the mediate State were already seen at the time. slow it turned out that the Chinese were not, like the Americans, attitude toward relationships win-win. Where they could, they brutally exploited the weaknesses of the capitalist and democratic system. They not only bought full factories or companies, which were then transferred to China after the technology was sucked out. They took over strategical infrastructure (vide Port of Piraeus) and dictated even cultural conditions (vide blackmailing the NBA federation after criticism of China expressed by 1 of the basketball players or exerting force on Norway after awarding the Nobel Peace Prize for Liu Xiaobo). The Chinese, like the Russians, intended to tie a rich Europe with shackles to the radiator and milk Europeans to the ground. They never meant to build 1 large global strategy in which everyone has a chance to make (as the Americans did). The Chinese never sought partners, they built vassal relations. The tool of disciplining the remainder of the planet – who would be guilty of being "conquered" by the Chinese – was to become money. The West's bounty on capital seemed completely politically submissive to Beijing's elite.
With the increasing power of China and Russia (due to the geographical and militaristic importance), Berlin and Paris would lose de facto in the long term. For example, the political findings made in 2010 would be kept up to date. As the EU's dependence on east partners increases, The second would force further concessions and lead to aggressive expansion at the expense of the interests of France and Germany. There is no doubt, however, that authoritarian regimes would be much more effective in this respect than democratic European elites, which would argue further among themselves. How easy it has been to play individual EU countries we see even today. The Russians did and did effectively (e.g. in Hungary, but besides Germany).
Energy Slave
It is besides crucial to bear in head how much agentural influence the Russians had throughout Europe. And at the highest levels. The corrupting of German or Austrian chancellors clearly indicates that far-reaching policy (Energywende) is 1 thing, but Russian interests are the other. Strong and recapitalisation Russia would increase its influence in the European elite, which could have a very negative impact on the long-term plans of the EU and individual countries. It should besides be remembered that Energywende would not give 100% independency from gas. On the contrary. The extinction of the atom, the increase in electricity demand, as well as the instability of energy production from RES (variable atmospheric conditions) caused the German dependence on Russian gas to grow in 2010-2020 at a very advanced rate (hence investment in NS II). Just look at the data. In 2019, Germany imported twice as much gas as in 2009.
Still in 2021, the Russians supplied until 35% of demand for gas throughout the EU. And this rate was close to 40% in erstwhile years. If Putin had not acted aggressively, this dependence could have continued to increase.
Also after the fact that Germany could and intended to gain greater energy independency in 2009, but on the condition of 2020 it looked worse than a decade earlier. Moreover, force on the extinction of the atom, which was besides exerted on France, indicates that Paris, if it had not resisted this madness, could have been more dependent on Russian gas... If there were no 2009 reset, no additional infrastructure would most likely be created in Central Europe to let gas to be drawn from a different direction than Russia. Not only due to the fact that Moscow would play hard-core energy blackmail, but it would most likely have large abilities in terms of softpower (although through agentship and corruption of the highest politicians). Consequently, the EU would become Putin's energy hostage with no hope of breaking free from this dependency.
In addition, the example in which Putin was ready to "show" Assad in Deauville to torpedo the construction of the Iranian-Syrian oil pipeline to the Mediterranean (the mark of deliveries to Europe) shows that the French ambitions in the mediate East were illusions. The Russians would have played this region their own way, and if the Chinese had entered there (and the construction of the military base in Djibouti shows that they intended to) Europe would again become completely dependent on external powers to supply strategical natural materials, including oil from the mediate East. We could talk about the situation: "changed his uncle's axe to stick", due to the fact that Berlin would possibly be free of influence from the US, but would become a hostage to ruthless and unbelievable regimes from Beijing and Moscow. The second would dictate political and economical conditions utilizing force arguments.
Thus, it should be pointed out that Berlin and Paris have pushed the European Union to a certain point to embrace aggressive geopolitical predators. And in a situation where the existing American strategy allowed itself to develop, and Washington did not require much more than loyalty.
Furthermore, the issue of French-German relations, in which there were many conflicting interests, has not yet been described. Which could besides disrupt or destruct EuRussia's large plans. This task was besides dangerous, even for this reason, that there was no clear leader-hegemon in it. This would lead to a continuous and intensifying competition between ‘partners’. And since no 1 would feel weaker in this system, tensions could easy escalate.
Polish territory or Polish territory?
In a situation where Americans would lose influence in Europe and Berlin would become a slave to Moscow, Warsaw's position would be reduced to the admin of Polish territory within the German-Russian-Chinese interests. It is adequate to mention the conditions under which energy resources were sent from Russia to Germany by Poland until recently. In practice, we did it for free. Also, the fresh Silk Road would not bring us much benefit. For there would be no reason why Germany, the Russians and the Chinese would share the proceeds of the transfers with us. German-Russian political influences in Poland would be large adequate for Poland to cease to be a comparatively independent political entity, and became only a geographical name of the country through which roads, railway tracks and pipelines would run. Nord Streamy would have been born anyway, but no 1 would have blown them up in 2022. However, specified a destiny could happen at worst to the LNG terminal in Świnoujście (if it was completed or later used). There wouldn't be a word about the Baltic tube uprising. The full region of Central Europe would be subject to the dictatorship of the German-Russian strategical partnership. What would be even worse is that the Germans themselves would be very dependent on the Russians, and thus susceptible to their suggestions for administering Poland...
On the illusion of the explanation of vacarism, whether the possible Polish political independency and partnership within the Weimar Triangle I wrote in the text entitled: "Which hegemon would be best for Poland? How about a multipolar world?’ These mirages would have no right to come actual in the context of:
- 100% energy dependence on Russia,
- demilitarization of Poland – that is, the actual disarming of the Polish Armed Forces, as we have observed for many years,
- a vassal economy towards Germany,
- Legal and organization dependence on the EU.
Such a “realism” – in modern Polish conditions – was the most detached concept that could be proposed.
RESET Saves the World? – alternate geopolitical scenario
In view of the above considerations, the consensus is that it would be possible to break the unity of the West if the United States were tough. As a result, the EuRussia block co-operating with China could be created. How fatal this would be for Europe – which in specified a arrangement would be the weakest link and milk cattle – has been described above.
However, there is another option in which the EU, despite the energy force from Russia, would yet take the US side. Germany could shortly build LNG terminals, as they did in 2022 erstwhile they built 2 floating terminal LNG in little than a year. Poland would deal with its own terminal in Świnoujście, Lithuanians would carry out a gas-port in Klaipeda and the situation would be managed to any extent.
In specified a scenario, we would have a duplicate situation to the reality. Only that would be 2010 or 2011. Ukraine would have been in Putin's hands, and even if there had been an accelerated mahdan, the revolution in Kiev would have resulted in a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. Assuming at the time the Ukrainians were incapable to defy the attack, the Russian Federation would stand at NATO gates extending its armies and military installations along the full border on the alleged east flank of NATO.
Not beaten and ready to act, the Russian army could besides exert large force on Finland. It is doubtful that Helsinki, in specified a situation, would hazard attempting to officially enter NATO. Especially if the Finns were aware of the scale of American engagement in Afghanistan.
A hybrid war in the Baltic states could give Putin an excuse to enter Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia with troops. Let us remember that at the time NATO might not have sent even traces of troops in this area. The situation could be very dynamic and change from week to week. In the end, it would at least lead to a situation akin to that of the Cuban crisis.
However, it is not said that Putin would act abruptly and violently immediately from 2010 to 2011. possibly he would have gone far adequate not to hazard atomic conflict. Destabilizing Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, or even Poland – but not sending troops to the borders of these countries. Vladimir Putin could wait because, as described above, Russia-China's strategical partnership would give him a sense of control of the situation. The construction of energy infrastructure for China could be completed around 2014-2015. Then Russia and China – mostly independent of the West – could carry out war effort simultaneously in 2 places of the world. If we add the force (or possible attack) of North Korea to South Korea, it could turn out that the planet would burn. This would be all the more likely as US rivals would be convinced that Washington is incapable to halt the storm. And he will be inclined to leave the throne of Hegemon, turning towards the politics of "Americana First".
Such a decision by the Americans would have been possible, as with a choice: the failure of hegemony or atomic war in defence of the West and the American sphere of influence in Europe and the Far East, Washington could have chosen to wait out the storm.
If the war in Europe had not begun by then, 1 thing is certain. After the Americans withdrew, Vladimir Putin would effort to revise Russia's position in Europe with threats and even force. This could lead to a complete EU submission to Moscow, or to war. From the point of view of Poland's geographical location, there is no request to explain what all this could affect for us.
A utopian imagination of a compatible multipolar world
In addition to these options, there is of course another. Namely 1 in which the deficiency of reset contributes to a peaceful transition from hegemony to the multipolar world. The Americans, alternatively of reset, would decide to lose, declare "America First", retreat from engagement worldwide and observe the situation from a safe distance. At the same time, Russia and China would recognise Europe's position and, on a partnership basis, make a block of Euroasia which would jointly and jointly lead the continent to prosperity. The imagination in which everyone gives up setting their own interests as priorities is very beautiful. It's just a fake and nothing to do with realism. It is idealism and utopia in pure form. Besides, it was Obama's reset that proposed specified a world, at least to the Russians. Although the Chinese would surely receive a favorable proposal if they agreed to reduce their arms and let Taiwan go (something for something). It was Barack Obama who proposed globalisation and improvement within a single common safety system. Taking into account the spheres of influence and the common definition of policies and positions in relation to circumstantial problems or regions (vide Deauville findings in the arabian Spring). Paradoxically, Barack Obama's policy was a symptom of cold calculation and full realism in the assessment of the geopolitical situation. Calculation, which did not take into account the fact that Vladimir Putin – by killing the interests of life – would want to violate the provisions against common sense reset and strive to face the US.
Constructivism and Realism
Finally, a fewer paragraphs are worth sacrificing. It must be noted that Barack Obama's reset is frequently presented as surviving proof that constructivism in global relations does not work. But it's the opposite. The failure of reset is besides a failure of realism. Why? Barack Obama offered Vladimir Putin a constructive order in which Russia would become an crucial part of the widely understood West. However, this offer was based, in fact, on assumptions that stem straight from the attitude of realists. For the American side assumed that if abroad policy in the execution of Russia is only and only a game of business, then Moscow is adequate to propose a good deal. Indeed, Putin received on a platter all of Russia's strategical interests at political (Eurosia), economical (gas and oil), technological and safety levels. In 2011, Vladimir Putin should get political Oscar, due to the fact that he achieved everything he intended (and what he is trying to regain today). However, he destroyed his work due to the fact that he decided to bid even higher and challenge the United States. Russia could patiently build its position on the global stage, modernise the state and economy, and make technological conversion. To do precisely what Germany and China did. However, Vladimir Putin preferred to send weapons to Syria, and erstwhile the Majdan broke out, he decided to make an armed invasion of Ukraine (2014). It is fair to admit that in this case realism – understood as a tool for translating geopolitical reality – failed on the full line. It turned out that people who were referred to as “romantics” somewhat despised as “romantics” who recognized Russia as an erratic threat – contrary to purely business logic – were those whose view of the planet turned out to be the most sober. How could this happen?
At this point, it is crucial to say that the perception of global policy only and exclusively as forms of beating up interests with unincorporated countries with no character and emotion is simply a completely unrealistic look. Although supporters of specified reasoning like to talk of themselves as “realists”. For even on a purely business level between economical operators, credibility is important. If a individual who runs a company has the image of a fraud, it is not worth cooperating with, even if it looks like a business of life on paper. Anyone who runs their own business knows precisely how crucial it is to have a subjective perception of a possible counterparty and to have relationships between people. Even in the private sector, people are frequently hired by command or household (for example due to trust). Why? due to the fact that there are pathological units in society that, even if they can make a better deal honestly, like to benefit through fraud or extortion. For instance, from the misconception that in order to guarantee one's affairs, 1 should scare the another so that fear – not only good will – motivates it to carry out concrete actions.
However, countries are not data-based decision-makers, they are entities directed by people of a peculiar cognition and character, originating from circumstantial cultures with a precise way of thinking. Politics is besides psychology, and the Cuban crisis has more to do with the tense game and the effort to guess intent and determination of the another side, alternatively than a realistic calculation including who has more heads. Russians – due to cultural and intrasocial conditions – like to force concessions for themselves due to the fact that they do not believe that another mechanisms are able to halt the another side from breaking the contract. At the same time, if they see weakness, they put force to get even more. This kind of mechanics has been observed throughout centuries of history, so it is not an abuse to formulate specified general principles towards the full nation. It is worth remembering that the Asians, especially the Chinese, perceive "doing business" rather similarly. Only they're smarter than the Russians, and they hide with their intentions to take advantage of the another side.
Western Latin civilization is based on the Roman rule pacta sunt servanda (Contracts must be kept). due to the fact that our European experience shows that it is beneficial for the long term. Thanks to reliability, you can make business and get fresh contacts. We learned to live in a planet where word and credibility build Prosperity. Meanwhile, in the east, they follow the rule rebus sic stantibus, according to which the change of conditions entitles to review the provisions of the contract already concluded (I thank Przemek for this highly good reflection which I took the liberty of pointing out above).
In another words, if Putin agreed to any conditions between 2009 and 2010, and later considered that he underestimated the strength of his own negotiating position, he did not hesitate to act in a way aiming to revise the reset in his favour in 2012. The Chinese work precisely the same, only they effort to make a appearance. Dirt called Realism Not only does he ignore the sphere of human nature, but he besides completely fails to see cultural differences, closing himself only in the definition of doing business outlined by Western culture (the pursuit of a win-win situation).
Meanwhile, the effect of the so-called. Realism is that all Western concession in the name of a peculiar agreement is simply giving the field to the people of the east. They are not striving to accomplish a win-win situation, but little (Russia) or more patient (China) decision forward, pushing the interests of their rival (not their partner) as much as he will allow. The last time he understood it, even Henry Kissinger, who yet admittedThat Ukraine, however, must be included in NATO.
Summary
With all this in mind, 1 should be aware that reset the relation with Russia made by Barack Obama was a consequence to the US's utmost global situation (Afghanistan, a deficiency of credibility in the West) and the financial situation (crisis). In this context, this action has fulfilled its role. It allowed Americans to deal with their problems and return to rivalry with Russia after their hands were released. Of course, the match with Moscow was not planned. The Washington administration intended to make a beer against China, as announced in 2012. However, Vladimir Putin's attitude ordered a change of plans. In this respect, a long-term policy aimed at acquiring Russia for the West as an ally – reset He failed. However, judging post factum The course of events cannot be affected by the fact that from the position of the USA, the West and even Poland a reasonably affirmative script has been achieved. Hoping to pacify Russia and subdue China. Thus maintaining – for a time – a single-polar order that guarantees peace and Prosperity. For where there are more interests, there is simply a conflict between them to show who is stronger and gain more influence. And that usually ended in war in history. Meanwhile, the strong position of Hegemon discourages all from taking aggressive action. The weakness of hegemon (although only presumed), encourages specified actions. Hitting Russia on Ukraine was the consequence of Putin's conviction of U.S. weakness. However, the disastrous consequences for Moscow for this act against appearances strengthened the position of the United States and reversed the process of spreading in the seams of Western unity. Americans have the chance to prove that challenging them simply doesn't pay off. Which is and will be a informing to the Chinese, for example.
Krzysztof Wojchal
Geopolitics, politics, economy, law, taxes – blog
