Foreign policy is complicated. It is said that in diplomacy, 1 must be able to play many pianos, that is to leave as many opportunities as possible to act, to effort to be a possibly valuable ally he seeks. Being skeptical of the reality of the alleged Polexit, however, I effort to set any conditions without which there is nothing to throw specified a slogan. I received any suggestions in a description of the policy of Stressemann in the interwar 20th anniversary and its criticism at the time in the German press. I will begin by giving the level to “Cat”.
The German press not only criticizes the stressemann policy system, but does so on request Stressful something far more useful to your homeland. Apart from criticism of the political system, thesis of another political strategy is stated. He does not only say: Stressmann does wrong, but he besides writes Stressmann does wrong, due to the fact that he does Locarno, and you gotta do something else. possibly it is “what is different” – what the opposition German press puts forward is the dumbest; possibly that it could never be realized, possibly that it would harm you most. But despite this, it is highly beneficial for the authoritative German politics to bring out even the stupidest of others. due to the fact that policy change can be very negative for the country that changes this policy, while being detrimental to its partners – opponents. For example, the change in German's Locarne policy to the Filobolshevik policy may be a negative change for Germany, but that does not mean that England and France want for specified a change and that its ghost cannot be blackmailed by these powers. If Stresemann had a single press behind him that would be a frog choir, she would repeat: “There is no another policy to be done, like Locarna’s politics”, then Stresemann would feel in the League Council like a man who has no retreat, like a man pressed against a wall, like a chief surrounded by a wheel and no exit, i.e. as an army chief who, following the classical examples of Kann or Sedan, is at the head of an army that has already lost.
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(More quote available Here.) In this alternatively short quote, I announcement something I would not have thought of without reading this passage. On the 1 hand, I was convinced that in order to have policy options, these options must be in social awareness. However, I did not think that aid could come from an unexpected side, from a political opponent. I have translated this text of Mackiewicz into a question of our position in the European Union and the anticipation of leaving it within the framework of the alleged Polexit. And I have come to the sad conclusion that the Polish government has no area for manoeuvre in the issue of the EU, and for this reason it will never be able to set conditions for the French or the Germans. Our “polexit” seems to be at first glance unfavourable due to the facilitation in the common market, as well as, wrongly, but more clearly affecting the mass recipient, the grant programme. However, our exit from the European Union would surely be to any degree unfavourable for Germany, which have strong trade/economic relationships with us, so it is frequently said that the money that goes to Poland from the EU's cash registry returns to Germany to a large extent. Thus, if Poland were able to blackmail Germany with the imagination of leaving the EU, it would have the chance to play something for itself or to make it clear about federalisation alternatively than just doing theatre for interior use. That would be an interesting prospect. But how do we accomplish that?
Of course, propaganda would be needed. Earlier, I thought that people who are simply able to calculate the benefit/loss balance of the grant programme and to present how the EU is becoming a superstate should frequently be on tv and conveying a fair cognition of this to the public, which, by knowing the situation, will be able to support the government in its policy of putting matters in the EU on the edge of a knife and genuinely threatening another associate States Polexit. Now, of course, the government can present specified threats, but this will not be taken seriously, as both the recipient of government tv and its opponents consider Poland's presence in the EU to be at least economically advantageous, or even to value the recipient as European. This is well known in the EU. This compatibility of the recipients, so different in interior issues, takes the area for Polish diplomacy in negotiations with the remainder of the Union. And as a substance of principle, not unlike the “frog choir” message, in this respect it fulfils this unfavorable role. However, if a larger private station began to give viewers both the substantive as described above and the (and even more effective) emotional message against the presence in the EU, the situation could change in favour of the government, which could endanger Germany or France with a solution that might even be unfavourable to Poland, but by the fact that the negative besides for Germany and France, would should be taken seriously and Poland itself would should be taken more seriously, or at least subtle. It should be pointed out that specified a fresh propaganda line could completely sink its broadcaster, who would gotta abandon it due to the deficiency of a receiver who is already besides profoundly convinced of the EU's wonders.
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There is inactive an option with thicker threads. I mean, the media favouring the government (maybe outside the public media themselves) could start to thin towards the option of Polexit. This could make a niche and trigger a "social debate" on this subject, expanding the participation of supporters of leaving the EU in society and thus the anticipation of the government playing specified a card. My thesis is simple. Without a real exit option from the EU, we are incapable to play anything in it, and we will only be able to play verbal pushes. The more we are condemned to be in these structures, the more façade there will be the difference in the choice of government between specified a "patriotic" (maybe even without quotes) and 1 openly "pro-European" which, on the another hand, would even receive more subsidies for maintaining a common propaganda line. As if not to see the government actually threatening Polexit must have the support of a large number of voters in case specified a bluff is essential to lead far or even actually the Union to leave. In order to have specified support, voters must consider that leaving the EU can be beneficial even if they think so under the influence of emotional propaganda alternatively of sound arguments. Without this, we have an eternal relationship in the EU, that is, in the position of being a fresh European state.
Amadeus Putzlacher
