Facts
W The Spanish consumer concluded a contract for a consumer credit of a renewable nature with a real yearly interest rate (RRSO) of 23,14%, with which the credit card was issued. The consumer then brought an action for annulment of the contract, inter alia, due to the deficiency of transparency and information erstwhile concluding the contract, in so far as it sets the RRSO at 23,14%, and due to the fact that that interest rate should be considered to be loan. The Bank denied the deficiency of transparency as well as the usury nature of the debt agreement under consideration. For this purpose, he referred in peculiar to the case law of the Spanish ultimate Court. It follows from the judgement that the interest rate provided for in the credit agreement in question cannot be considered to be of a debt nature. In order to find whether the interest rate is such, mention should be made to the average interest rate applicable to the category to which the contract belongs, as published in the authoritative statistic of the National Bank of Spain. In the present case, the RRSO of 23,14%, mentioned in the debt agreement at issue, was below the average interest rate commonly utilized for this category of contracts, i.e. revolving credit agreements. The referring court had doubts as to the compatibility of this case with EU law. He so suspended the proceedings and requested a preliminary ruling from the Court.
The Bank then informed the Court by providing the applicable papers that the Court of First Instance had been granted designation of the claims to which the Bank had taken all the claims of the plaintiff into account. In addition, the Bank explained that the parties to the main proceedings had reached a deal in which the plaintiff waived all of its claims in exchange for payment of the requested amount by the Bank. According to this agreement, the credit agreement is terminated and each organization declares that there are no claims against the another party.
However, the referring court argued that, despite the designation of claims in the main proceedings, the application for a preliminary ruling should be maintained, since it is of apparent public interest. Furthermore, the Court of First Instance decided that the application for approval of the settlement could not be accepted until the proceedings were suspended pending a preliminary ruling by the Court.
TEU position
According to the Court of Justice of the European Union, questions concerning the explanation of Union law raised by the Court of Justice the national court on the basis of the legal and factual situation for which it is responsibleWhereas the accuracy of these arrangements is not subject to the Court’s assessment, they benefit from the presumption that they are applicable to the case (judgment of the TEU of 26.3.2020, City of Lowicz and lawyer General, C-558/18 and C-563/18, Legalis, paragraph 43, Joined Cases). However, the CJEU has already ruled that the procedure provided for in Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ C 2016, 21.11.2016, p. No 202, p. 47; hereinafter: TFEU) is an instrument for cooperation between The Court and the national courts by which the Court provides national courts with the elements of explanation of Community law which are essential to resolve disputes submitted to them (provision City of Lowicz and lawyer General, point 44). In addition, in accordance with regulation 100(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice (OJ L 268, 29.9.2012, p. No. 265, p. 1) The TEU can at any time conclude that the conditions of its properties are no longer fulfilled.
In the present case, the parties to the main proceedings entered into an agreement in which the plaintiff, in return for the payment of the amount by the Bank, waived any claims against that bank resulting from the credit agreement in question. On the another hand, the referring court has indicated that it intends to keep its mention for a preliminary ruling on the grounds that its questions concern matters of general interest. In his view, the replies may put an end to the legal uncertainty arising from the case law of the Spanish SN and may be applicable to the resolution of many akin disputes pending, inter alia. On the basis of the provisional caselaw of the Court of Justice, the Court of Justice stressed that The mention for a preliminary ruling is not intended to give advice on general and hypothetical questions, but is to be dictated by the request to resolve the dispute effectively. Therefore, if it is found that the question asked clearly is no longer applicable to the result of the dispute, The Court should consider that there is no request for judgement in the case — judgement of the Court of Justice of 19.11.2019, A.K. and Others (Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the ultimate Court), C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, Legalis, paragraph 70, Joined Cases. In particular, since it is clear from both the content and the strategy of Article 267 TFEU that a mention for a preliminary ruling is required actual hanging in the main proceedingsin which that court will gotta issue a decision taking into account a preliminary ruling, The Court should dismiss the proceedings erstwhile the main proceedings have become irrelevant – the decision of the TEU of 1.10.2019, YX (Transfer of judgement to the associate State of which the sentenced individual is simply a national), C-495/18, Legalis, paragraphs 19, 24 to 26.
In the view of the TEU in the present case, even if the dispute in the main proceedings is inactive formally pending before the referring court, since it has decided to suspend the dispute for the purposes of this mention for a preliminary ruling, it follows from the information available to the Court that the parties to the main proceedings have entered into an agreement which has been reached and that they have requested the referring court to approve that settlement ending their dispute. It follows from the above that the Court’s answer to the questions raised by the referring court would in no way be useful for it to resolve this dispute, which has become irrelevant. Under the circumstances The Court of Justice dismissed the application for a preliminary ruling.
In connection with the submission of many preliminary rulings by the Polish courts, not only in Frank cases, it is worth noting the position consistently presented by the Court that the mention for a preliminary ruling is not intended to give advice on general and hypothetical questions. Thus, in the event of an agreement between the parties to the contract, even if the Court of Justice would have a clear public interest in resolving the legal question set out in the mention for a preliminary ruling, the Court of Justice will discontinue proceedings. The above position, of course, is not only relevant, as in the present case, to consumer credit agreements in the event that the parties to the home dispute agree, but is of a universal nature.
It should besides be noted that, on the basis of its position in the present case, the TEU referred to judgments in ‘Polish cases’ which deserve peculiar attention from Polish courts.