Long live youth! Demography of Central Asia countries

Since the dissolution of the USSR, Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) has had a advanced fertility rate and a crucial population increase of nearly 30 million in the last 35 years. Today, the region's full population of more than 80 million is rather young, with a median age of 26.6 years. This distinguishes them from most neighbourhoods and makes Central Asia a origin of labour migration. By the time of full-scale aggression against Ukraine in 2022, the people of the region mostly left for Russia, and then their function gradually began to take over, among others, the EU and Turkey. With population growth, Central Asia is besides undergoing social changes related to urbanization – in cities there is already 1 in 2 inhabitants of the region, which corresponds to the planet average.

A favourable demography gives the region an chance to strengthen its political and economical position. At the same time, however, population growth is becoming increasingly challenging for the stableness of the countries that face insufficient infrastructure and organization resources.

Central Asian baby boom

Central Asia is in a phase of dynamic demographic development. In the year of the region's acquisition (total area of 4 million km)²) their population of independency from the russian Union was 52.9 million, and present it reaches nearly 81 million, accounting for about 1% of the world's population. In terms of population, Uzbekistan is leading (35.7 million) and Kazakhstan (2.3 million). In Tajikistan, Turkmenistan^[1] and Kyrgyzstan lives 10.4 million, 7.4 million and 7.1 million people respectively. After 1991, Uzbekistan (by more than 15 million) and Tajikistan, whose population almost doubled, reported the biggest increase in this area.^[2]. The only exceptions to the trend were Kazakhstan from 1993 to 1999 and Kyrgyzstan between 1993 and 1994, resulting from the outflow of Slavic population (see below). In 2024, the highest population growth was recorded in Uzbekistan (+2%), and the lowest population in Kazakhstan (+1.3%).^[3].

Figure 1. Number of Central Asian residents after 1991 and UN demographic projections

Source: World Population Prospects: The 2024 Revision, United Nations, Department of economical and Social Affairs, Population Division, population.un.org.

There is simply a fertility rate in the countries of the region that guarantees the replacement of generations, above 2.1 births per woman. Since 1991, it has fallen below this threshold only in Kazakhstan from 1996 to 2003 following an economical collapse. In 2024, the highest – 3.5 – was registered in Uzbekistan and the lowest – 2.69 in Turkmenistan. It is gradually decreasing in all countries outside Uzbekistan.^[4].

Figure 2. Growth rate in Central Asia and UN demographic projections

Source: World Population Prospects: The 2024 Revision, United Nations, Department of economical and Social Affairs, Population Division, population.un.org.

As has already been mentioned, the median age for the full region is only 26.6 years, making it 1 of the younger in the world. In 2024 the youngest was the society of Tajikistan (22.1 years), and the oldest of Kazakhstan (29.6). In 2025, children up to the age of 15 will represent 31.4% of the full population of Central Asia, people between 15 and 64 (i.e. working age) – 62.2%, and older people – 6.4%. The highest percent of children up to 15 years of age occurs in Tajikistan (35.9%), while the most seniors over 65 years of age live in Kazakhstan (9%), making the population the only “older” in the region^[5]. The UN demographic projections foretell that the median age in all the countries afraid will grow: in 2050, the highest will be in Turkmenistan (32.8) and the lowest in Tajikistan (27.9).^[6].

Figure 3. Median Age in Central Asia

Source: World Population Prospects: The 2024 Revision, United Nations, Department of economical and Social Affairs, Population Division, population.un.org.

Rapid population growth is simply a consequence not only of advanced natural growth, but besides of the fact that the inhabitants of the region live longer and longer. In 2024, the longest average life expectancy was recorded in Kazakhstan (74.5 years), and the shortest in Turkmenistan (70.3). By 2025, these values are expected to emergence to 78.3 and 73.6 respectively. This means a decisive leap towards 1991, erstwhile Uzbek lived on average the longest (65.5 years) and Tajik (61.7).^[7].

Figure 4. Life expectancy in Central Asia

Source: World Population Prospects: The 2024 Revision, United Nations, Department of economical and Social Affairs, Population Division, population.un.org.

Change in cultural structure

Since the country's independence, their cultural structure has undergone transformation. The most crucial change in this area brought a drain on the Russian population in the 1990s. In that decade, Tajikistan could have left as much as 80% of Russians (270 000 people), Turkmenistan – 2 thirds (180.000), Uzbekistan – half (800 thousand), and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan – 1 3rd (1.5 million and 300,000 respectively). The mass trips besides included Ukrainian, German and Polish minorities^[8]. The exodus was mainly driven by economical collapse, but its reasons include the fear of expanding nationalism and losing status, and in the case of non-Russian minorities repatriation. The 1992–1997 civilian war forced many people to decision to Tajikistan.

The percent of the Russian population besides declined due to the weaker reproduction of this group and its higher mortality, frequently resulting in unhealthy lifestyles, including alcohol abuse^[9]. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan besides implemented their own repatriation programs. Between 1991 and 2020, 1.2 million Kazakhs arrived in the first of these countries, mainly China and Uzbekistan.^[10], and the second by the end of 2024 adopted more than 70,000 cultural Kyrgyz, including from Tajikistan and Afghanistan^[11].

The transformation of the cultural structure can be traced to the example of Kazakhstan, both at the time of independency and now the most diverse state in the region. This state of affairs is the consequence of a conscious policy of the USSR: artificially induced hunger in the 1930s, multi-thousand deportations and intensive settlement action. In Kazakh SRR, the Russians were outnumbered. According to the 1939–1989 censuses The Kazakhs placed second. In 1959, they did not even form a 3rd part of the population of the republic, and in 1989 – even half. Before the collapse of the USSR, this area inhabited 39.7% of Kazakhs and 37.8% of Russians, and besides large minorities – German (5.8%) and Ukrainian (5.4%)^[12]. By early 2025, 36 years later, Kazakh participation was 71.3%. The largest number – 14.6% – were inactive Russians, with 3.3% of the population being Uzbek. The erstwhile mainly live in the north and east of the country – in the East Kazakh and North Kazakh circuits their share of the population in general is over 40%. Uzbecs are mainly located in the south, in the border of Uzbek-Kazakh. They represent more than 15% of the inhabitants of the town of Szymkent and the Turkic region^[13].

Urbanisation and interior migration

Central Asia has a diverse level of urbanisation. In this regard, the region is led by Kazakhstan, with 58.4% of its population surviving in cities in 2024. Next are Turkmenistan (54.5%), Uzbekistan (50.6%) and Kyrgyzstan (38.2%). The lowest citizens live in the cities of Tajikistan – 28.5%. Since its independence, the level of urbanisation has increased most in Turkmenistan – 9pp – and in Uzbekistan – by 8.7pp. In the 1990s, all countries of the region outside Uzbekistan recorded a decrease in the percent of urban population caused by the abandonment of the population by those surviving in urbanized Russian-speaking areas^[14]. In Tajikistan, the de-urbanisation tendencies strengthened the civilian war, while in Uzbekistan, migration to cities slowed down the restrictive reporting strategy in force by 2020, which would not let the free taking of work and housing outside the check-in place.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the level of urbanisation of Central Asia has steadily increased. In 2025, the largest cities of the region were: Tashkent (3 million inhabitants), Almaty (2.3 million), Astana (1.6 million), Szymkent (1.2 million) and Bishkek (1.2 million). Since 1991, the population of the first 2 has grown by about a million people and the last 2 more than twice. Astana's population, after moving the capital there in 1997, increased 5 times^[15]. Between 2009 and 2021, the permanent residence changed as much as 13.4% of Kazakhstan's citizens. The most popular destinations were the 3 largest centres: Astana, Almaty and Szymkent^[16]. The Kazakhs accounted for 76% of interior migrants^[17]. The surge in the population of the metropolis caused them to face infrastructure problems specified as overcrowding, air pollution, underdeveloped public transport, deficiency of spatial planning or mediocre management of municipal waste.

Individual countries in Central Asia besides disagree in population density. Minimum population (8 persons/km²) is Kazakhstan, which is at the same time the largest country in terms of surface area of the region and most densely - Uzbekistan (85 people/km²). The areas with the top population accumulation include the Fergan Basin (a cross-border area between Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan), confederate Kazakhstan and confederate Tajikistan. These regions are besides frequently the mark of interior migration, while others are ravaged. An example of specified a process is northern Kazakhstan: in 2009–2021 despite advanced natural growth across the country, the population of 3 northern circuits decreased by 3%.^[18]and government settlement support programmes on these lands have not yielded the expected results^[19].

Migratory movements in Central Asia are besides affected by climate and, above all, restrictions on access to water. advanced temperatures and droughts are peculiarly reflected in agrarian and agricultural areas. There are besides utmost weather phenomena, specified as floods and hurricanes. The planet Bank foresees that by 2050, for climate-related reasons, the place of residence will change 1.7–2.4 million people in the region^[20].

Migration – not only to Russia

The permanent part of Central Asia's social scenery is economical emigration. Departures, frequently seasonal, are caused by a mediocre economical situation, including advanced unemployment and low wages. abroad transfers account for 47.9% of Tajikistan's GDP, 18.8% of Kyrgyzstan's GDP and 14.4% of Uzbekistan's GDP (for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan their share of GDP is close to zero)^[21]. According to the UN data, 6.3 million citizens of the countries of the region continued to reside abroad in mid-2024. This group included the Kazakhs – 2.8 million – and Uzbekistan – 2.1 million, followed by Kyrgyzstans – 0.5 million, Tajiks – 0.5 million – and Turkmens – 0.4 million. A full of about 8% of the population of the countries concerned^[22].

Expatriations were most frequently targeted by Russia, which inactive had socio-economic ties with the countries of the region. In fresh years, her attractiveness has fallen. This was affected by Russian aggression on Ukraine in 2022, which worsened the economical situation there and caused a decrease in ruble value, making trips little profitable. In addition, there is simply a negative atmosphere around visitors, e.g. Tajik deportations after a terrorist attack on Crocus City Hall^[23] whether repeated cases of forced entry of Central Asian economical migrants into the military^[24].

As the situation in Russia deteriorated, another directions specified as the European Union, Turkey, China and South Korea gained importance. In 2023, the EU issued a evidence number of 196 000 first residence permits for Central Asian citizens, of which 78 000 in connection with employment. The Kazakhs (84.9 thousand) and Uzbekistan (53.5 thousand) received the most permits.^[25]. In 2024, 250,000 citizens of the countries of the region, especially the Turkmens and Uzbeks, were residing in Turkey on the basis of a residence permit.^[26].

However, Central Asia must not be viewed as a origin of migration. Although on a limited scale for now, it is increasingly a destination for foreigners. any of the arrivals are repatriates from neighbouring countries, especially in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (see chapter Change in cultural structure). Others come to the region for educational purposes. From this point of view, Kyrgyzstan is leading the primary – in 2024 50,000 foreigners were educated in its universities, among which the most widely represented nations were Uzbek, Indian and Pakistani. Medical studies were peculiarly popular^[27].

Education immigration sometimes creates social tensions. In the spring of 2024 in Bishkek, over 700 people attacked a hostel inhabited by abroad students, primarily Pakistanis and Indians. The origin of the riot was to be a fight that occurred a fewer days earlier. After the incident, up to 4,000 Pakistanis would leave Kyrgyzstan^[28].

Russia's full-scale aggression into Ukraine caused a wave of migration from Russia. 1 of the destinations of the alleged relocations was the countries of Central Asia. Visa-free movement, low maintenance costs and common Russian cognition contributed to their popularity. According to uncertain estimates, after the outbreak of the war, about 265,000 Russians arrived in the countries of the region, but it is not clear what part of them remained there.^[29].

Chance or challenge?

Central Asia benefits from a demographic dividend. The low median age and advanced natural growth separate the region from its surroundings (outside Afghanistan) and increase its political and economical potential. However, the dynamic improvement of societies is simply a challenge for the authoritarian regimes there. Government institutions frequently neglect to respond to the increasing needs of citizens, reflecting, for example, the level of teaching in overcrowded schools^[30].

Unemployment is besides an crucial problem (4 to 11.6%).^[31]) and the absence of high-paid jobs. It was partially resolved by mass emigration, not seen by the authorities in terms of threat. However, it leads to the alleged brain drain and importantly weakens the human capital of the full region, hindering its development^[32]. It besides makes local economies and societies (in peculiar Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) dependent on remittances of money on commercial migrants. The breakdown of this model can lead to deep shocks (vide limitation of entry to Russia after 2022). However, current trends indicate that the directions specified as EU countries, including Poland, will gain in importance.

There is besides a deficiency of developed household and elder policies in Central Asia. advanced reproduction has long been seen as an adverse phenomenon. Uzbekistan has until late lowered it through a policy of forced sterilization^[33]. In the region, social benefits for children are frequently limited to a single benefit after the birth of a child^[34], and the caring functions inactive mostly execute conventional family. Given the low number of seniors in the countries concerned, there is no debate on care for the elderly.

The UN demographic projections confirm population growth. According to them, in 2050 Central Asia will have a population of 113 million people. In the 4th of the century, the population of Uzbekistan will increase to 52.2 million, Kazakhstan to 26.5 million, Tajikistan to 15.6 million and Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan to 9.6 million.^[35]. In the long term, there will besides be an ageing population. The fertility rate continues to decline, which can besides be contributed by increasing urbanisation. A decline in birth rates may happen more rapidly than previously indicated by the UN forecasts. Earlier than expected demographic downturn affects Turkey, among others^[36]Tunisia and Latin American countries^[37]. The countries of the region are in no way prepared for specified a scenario.