A summit in NATO, Vilnius, is scheduled to take place on 11-12 July. The event will be symbolic, and there are at the same time considerable expectations of NATO communications towards Russia and Ukraine.
The site of the summit itself is not accidental, as Vilnius is the capital of the NATO associate State, which lies just over 20 km from the border with Belarus and about 170 km from Minsk. At the same time, Lithuania borders the Russian Federation through the Kaliningrad Oblast and is 1 of the Baltic States, which has so far been considered NATO's weak point. Additionally, via Lithuania, after the alleged Suwałski Pass, the remaining Baltic NATO members, Latvia and Estonia, can be reached by land.
Finally, the Vilnius summit will be the first with at least 1 fresh NATO member. Finland has already joined the alliance, and it is not excluded that Sweden will besides join the North Atlantic Pact by July.
But that's not all. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg announced – during his visit to Kiev on 20 April 2023 – that Ukraine's future participation in NATO would be 1 of the main topics of the Vilnius meeting. The meeting, to which the president of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenski was invited.
The July summit can become even more crucial and symbolic, as interstate negotiations on NATO decisions related to the ongoing war in Ukraine are inactive ongoing. A lot can happen.
However, it is worth considering how the members of the North Atlantic Pact should go, what common azimuth must they set themselves, and how should they meet their targets? What form should NATO take during the war in Ukraine, but above all for the period after it ended?
This issue was the subject of a strategical debate organised by the National safety Bureau, held on 20 April at the Belvedere Palace in Warsaw. The analysis underlying this text has been developed for the intent of this event.
It should be noted here that the survey was based on public information and the author is aware of the limitations of his deficiency of cognition regarding classified arrangements or backroom talks. Thus, it is not possible to measure in which part of the concept presented below is realistic. In particular, taking into account Poland's real capacity to negociate individual points and cognition of the real position of NATO partners.
Has NATO defined strategical objectives in the context of the war in Ukraine?
The geopolitical situation in the planet is changing, forcing various global organisations to adapt to fresh conditions. Without flexible approach and modification of assumptions, obsolete structures crumble until they collapse completely.
Clearly, NATO must respond and evolve. Set fresh or modify existing targets. In the context of the interests of NATO as a whole, respective levels appear here, including:
- NATO's strategical interests and objectives among modern challenges and global situations.
- strategic interests and NATO objectives linked to the rivalry with the Russian Federation,
- strategic interests and NATO objectives related to the ongoing war in Ukraine.
Within the first issue, the question of the emergence in the function and power of the People's Republic of China cannot be disregarded. Should the North Atlantic Pact extend its interests and impacts beyond the alleged Atlantic world? The deficiency of a signal on this subject should be considered a serious failure, but it will not be the basis for any further consideration in this article.
In addressing the subject as briefly as possible, NATO's format did not foresee specified far-reaching ambitions, as evidenced by Article 6 of the Washington Treaties on the territorial scope of the alliance. And in view of the differences in interests, the geographical position of the associate States and many another factors should stay so at this moment. Although it should be remembered that NATO has already operated militarily outside the North Atlantic region during the stabilisation mission in Afghanistan.
However, it seems that safety issues in the Far East should lie primarily (although not exclusively) within the competence of the countries of that region and the United States. Of course, NATO states must calculate the impact of the global agreement of forces and individual events in another regions of the planet on the strategical situation of the Pact and its individual members. NATO should influence and influence the places and events on which safety depends for the members of the alliance. The limits of NATO's impact should surely not be categorically outlined, but the limits of any military action and of expanding the alliance – that is. Are NATO military missions in the Far East needed to defend the United States and their territory from China's invasion? The question seems rhetorical. Another is the situation where Chinese ships would sail off the coasts of the United States, and another situation is that US Navy operates on the coast of the People's Republic of China. It would be hard to admit that Taiwan, separated from the US by the vastness of the Pacific, acts as a buffer region for Americans, as did Ukraine in the context of Europe's security. And even if we believe that NATO should grow and operate in another parts of the world, surely not all members of the alliance share this view. The subject so comes down to a purely theoretical issue.
It is clear that the European part of the alliance must be aware of American challenges in another parts of the world. Europeans should therefore, to a large extent, guarantee the safety of their surroundings. And specified expectations are formulated by the Washington administrations, which was demonstrated by president Donald Trump.
Strategic interests and NATO objectives
We are at a historical minute for the North Atlantic Pact, due to the fact that we are observing the redefining of NATO's interests, objectives and tasks. The pact was created to halt the USSR in a peculiar area and became a shield of Western states against the Warsaw Pact. The collapses of the USSR and the UW orphaned NATO, which began to act as a stabilizing and protective function for members of the alliance. Further strategical concepts of the alliance of years: 1991, 1999 assumed cooperation with Russia. In practice, there was a widespread belief in the cessation of the threat to NATO.
The situation changed after September 11, 2001, erstwhile NATO first launched procedures related to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty as a consequence of terrorist attacks in the US. It was an impulse to redefine the objectives of an alliance that took on the task of combating global terrorism. specified a vague focus on NATO's precedence later resulted in a military operation in Afghanistan, which clearly went beyond NATO's previously defined geographical limits. It was besides a consequence of recognising that the enemy of the alliance ("terrorism") could attack its members by organizing anywhere in the world. In order to combat the threat, the Alliance members agreed to take action where deemed necessary.
At the time, Russia became a partner for NATO, not an opponent. This period is commonly referred to as the reset of Western relations with Moscow. This lasted about until 2013, and ended definitively at the time of the first Russian invasion of Ukraine from 2014. This does not change the fact that Russia's position as a Western partner was reflected in papers until 2022, erstwhile a fresh strategy was approved at the Madrid Summit replacing the NATO strategical Concept of 2010, which was adopted at the Lisbon Summit. So only after the second invasion of Ukraine, the Alliance officially declared Russia's policy the top threat.
The Spanish summit last year besides pointed out, among others, the dangers posed by the policy of the People's Republic of China. It was found that the Beijing centre of power uses tools on various levels (from political to economical and military) to increase its influence, which is simply a challenge for NATO.
Consequently, it was considered that the most crucial tasks for the Alliance were deterrence and possible defence erstwhile this deterrence failed. It besides indicated the request to take action to prevent and manage crises. There is no uncertainty that the Madrid summit and the fresh strategical concept were groundbreaking. The safety architecture framework in which NATO would like to operate has been outlined, the risks for NATO have been identified and the method for neutralising these threats has been identified in general. It can so be concluded that NATO's strategical interests and objectives in the context of the global situation are rather clear. It is about preventing the threat to the Alliance, and if it does, then it should be managed, deterred and yet defended. Among others (i.e. terrorism or the situation in the mediate East) 2 main sources of problems were identified: Russia and China. specified arrangements cannot be disputed. However, they do not seem to have exhausted the issues in which NATO should specify its strategical interests.
It is inactive unclear what solution to the war in Ukraine your alliance should seek. The definition of NATO-acceptable peace conditions raises the question of what are NATO's strategical objectives in the context of relations with Russia? How should it look, what conditions should it be imposed so that it no longer poses a threat to its neighbours?
What is Russia beneficial to NATO?
Since the NATO strategical Concept has imposed on the Alliance and its members an work to think about future threats and to present an active attitude to avoid specified threats, the overriding question seems to be what kind of NATO Russia would want in the future? If the Moscow centre is designated as the most dangerous to the safety of the Alliance, the question must be answered, what can be done to change this state?
There is no uncertainty that any of the North Atlantic Pact countries would like to return to the state from the reset of relations with Russia. The decision-makers from any capitals may imagine that specified a script is inactive possible and would be beneficial. But are you sure?
History proves that the Kremlin stopped being a threat to the West erstwhile it faced immense interior problems. all consolidation of power in Moscow and the increase in strength and importance of the full country subsequently spawned an increasingly demanding, aggressive and expansionary abroad policy pursued by the Russians. This leads to a consensus that whenever the West lets the Kremlin go, and Moscow has the conditions to build its power, it ends in disaster. In another words, The next reset with Russia – even after her military defeat in Ukraine – would give Moscow a chance to prepare for another start with the West. The Russians – declaring relationship and cooperation – would again wait for the Western minute of weakness to usage it. And increase your sphere of influence. If this were done peacefully (through Western concessions) then the Russians would increase their expectations and demands. Forever. For Every concession to Russia increases its power. And the increase in power increases the request for Moscow decision-makers to redefine the existing arrangements. Since the proportion of forces changes – in favour of the Kremlin – the current arrangement of forces should besides be changed for the benefit of Russia. It's a self-winding escalation spiral..
Trials of time have besides not survived the thesis that Russia's strength should be safeguarded so that it can balance China's power and at the same time support Western interests towards Beijing. specified a view of the geopolitical situation proved naive.
Experience in fresh decades shows that strong Russia does not get into fierce competition with China. On the contrary, it only challenges the West, even if it was friendly before. Why? due to the fact that there is fundamentally no buffer region between China and Russia. Mongolia could be regarded as such, but for various reasons – including geography – the Russians can easy pacify Ulan Bator. From Moscow's perspective, the border with China and the sphere of influence within it is rather clear. The existing division is easy to preserve for both sides and hard to change (also due to atomic deterrence). At the same time, Russia is besides weak in the Far East, where it lacks infrastructure, population, manufacture and many another things. Writing briefly – power. In turn, all of this is available to the Chinese.
In Central Asia, too, the Kremlin authorities have an undeniable advantage. All major gas and oil deposits are within Caspian Lake. Russian aviation and fleet dominate indistinguishably. So the Russians could easy blow up gas installations from which the Chinese draw blue fuel. This shows that Beijing is located – on a gas plane – between the hammer and the hardwood. On the 1 hand, China is dependent on offshore LNG supplies, on the another hand, are strategical deposits from Central Asia, whose supplies are dependent on Moscow's goodwill on safety issues. In another words, the Russian-Chinese rivalry for Central Asia does not affect large hazard for the Kremlin. In the end – if there were a knife fight – the Russians could cut the Chinese off from gas. Even if these others would take full political and economical control over Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan or even Turkmenistan.
The regions where the Russians can lose the most – but besides the most – are the Caucasus (and further mediate East and even Africa) and Europe. That is why whenever Moscow grows stronger, it directs its unsuspected appetite in those directions. This is the origin of the structural conflict of interest between the Russian Federation and NATO or the wider Western. At the same time, the mediate East of Europe and the Caucasus are buffer zones where smaller and weaker countries exist. any of them are not covered by any large alliance providing safety guarantees, including atomic ones.
For these reasons, The strategy of weakening Russia – and even strengthening it – does not work for the benefit of the West and does not make problems for China. It's precisely the opposite. Whenever the Kremlin is convinced of its power and predominance, Russia becomes a major problem for the West – to the delight of the Beijing authorities.
This leads to a reasonably simple constatation. It is in the strategical interest of NATO (and the West) to keep the Russian Federation in permanent weakness. Weakness gives emergence to concerns in Moscow by China and at the same time does not let for expansion to the West. Russia's weakness encourages China to hit the interests of the former, and thus creates conditions for disputes on the Moscow – Beijing line. Which in turn puts the Kremlin into the embrace of the West. So it is precisely the other of what many experts and analysts have presented for decades, and what was 1 of the pillars of reset and normalization of relations with Russia. Of course, as I wrote in the text entitled “Obama's reset saved the planet and Poland?“, Barack Obama's reset was essential and at the same time allowed the minute to keep Vladimir Putin in the gutters. Just erstwhile the Americans were engulfed in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and did not have the strength to compete with Moscow. However, the justification for this reset is rather different from that according to which Russia had to be acquired against China. This last thesis proved to be incorrect and pointless. It can be disastrous to draw incorrect conclusions from rational actions. Giving up Russia (and thus strengthening it) not only does not service the interests of Poland, it is besides not beneficial for all NATO and the West.
Of course, at this point, may the question arise as to whether maintaining Russia's weakness leads to a downward slope? Which may manifest itself with desperation and determination. However, it should be stressed that it is much easier to control and manage weak Russia – aware of its shortcomings – than Russia convinced of its own power, which is only waiting for a good minute (difficult for the West) to challenge and request adjustments to erstwhile arrangements.
Knowing all of this, we request to consider how to translate these rules into the current and future situations. What are NATO's objectives and priorities for the war on Ukraine, and what conditions would we like to impose on the Russian Federation in peace talks?
What will be the Western triumph in Ukraine?
On the basis of the above arguments, the strategical concept associated with the war in Ukraine seems to be simple. The Russian Federation must appear from this war weakened. He cannot gain much (or nothing at all). Simultaneously The decline in Kremlin possible should not be temporary (short-term). Moscow must end the conflict as a geopolitical, economical and military dwarf, with no chance of recovery quickly. Only specified a script will allow, in a sufficiently long period of time, to neutralize the anticipation of another threat from the Russian Federation. It will then be considered that NATO has dealt with the most crucial opponent as defined in the strategical Concept of 2022.
The question is, will NATO thus strengthen the People's Republic of China? This is only a seemingly legitimate question. The Russians like to convince the West that we request them against the Chinese. On the another hand, they have never (and nothing) offered to subdue Beijing (for the reasons described above). The fact is, however, that the Chinese would benefit small from weakening the Russian Federation (unless this 1 would break up). The atomic arsenal and the military dominance of the Russians in the Caspian Sea would safeguard Russia's interests by China. However, the Russians have virtually no function in cooperating with the US, Japan or South Korea and Taiwan to limit Chinese expansion off their coasts. So the failure of force by the Russians would have a zero impact on the safety of United States allies in the Far East.
But the Americans would benefit from different directions. Moscow's short hands would have led the Indians to gain support from Washington to balance China. So far, India has powerfully placed on Moscow and at the same time has been distanced to the US. Without strong Russia, that would gotta change. The situation of Iran or Syria would besides deteriorate in the variant of Russian sadness, and so the next 2 regimes with which the West has a problem. In Africa, the French would have little to worry about. In the mediate East and the Caucasus, Turkey would strengthen its position. The Russians would besides gotta retreat from the conflict in Libya. The Scandinavians and Finns would be relieved, and the Baltics, Romania, Slovaks and Poles would feel much safer.
Buffer maintenance
Certainly, a Russian triumph in Ukraine would make many problems from the position of all NATO. I have justified this many times, although it seems obvious. Consequently, It is in the interests of the Alliance that Russia should not win in Ukraine and Kiev should stay independent of Moscow after the war. However, and This presumption must be permanent. In another words, the situation in which Russia, after regaining its strength, attacks Ukraine for the 3rd time is unacceptable. From the position of the Ukrainians as well as NATO itself. This is the time and the minute at which the future threat (Russia) should be actively neutralised.
However, no substance how large a defeat the Russian army will endure in Ukraine, 1 cannot presume a priorithat Moscow will halt rebuilding military capacity and will not be ready for further aggression in a fewer years. The West has only limited options for affecting Russian capabilities in this respect (e.g. maintaining sanctions).
What depends on NATO's decision and action is the resilience of the states surrounding Russia to its possible aggression. Ukraine is an highly crucial buffer for the Alliance. Without its control, the Russians do not have the strategically convenient conditions to endanger NATO states.
So, The Alliance's post-war precedence should be to prevent Moscow from carrying out a 3rd invasion of Ukraine.
NATO enlargement
It seems appropriate to affect Ukraine in NATO and to supply safety guarantees under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Ukraine will after the war be a devastated, weak and incapable to stand up a large modern army to participate in another prolonged conflict.
Even financial and hardware aid from the West, which would give the Ukrainian armed forces the chance to keep a large military potential, could not be adequate to discourage the Kremlin from attacking. At the same time, the provision of safety guarantees to Ukraine only by selected NATO countries could even encourage Moscow to test their promises in the future. And possibly devastating their image internationally. Written declarations may not be adequate to scare the Russians away. In the context of guarantees from selected states and NATO as a whole.
When comparing both warrant options, the risks arising from the "bridge" solution (not to compose half-way) should be seen. The granting of a warrant for Ukraine from respective countries (with the US at the head, but besides Poland – a key country) could prolong or completely torpedo Ukraine's accession to NATO. Taking on the work of the selected members of the Alliance to keep Ukraine safe would discourage others from joining a costly and risky initiative. A popular argument would become that since half-way solutions work (of course until Russia attacks), why change the format and grow NATO? Therefore, the decision to safe Ukraine should be a decision of the full Alliance, which would set clear procedures, conditions and deadlines for Ukraine's accession to NATO. NATO's goal and at the same time the Polish strategy towards Ukraine should be the accession of the second to the North Atlantic Pact.. This would definitely solve the safety problem in the Alliance buffer zone.
It should besides be remembered that Poland's participation in a dedicated and detached warrant mechanics for Ukraine de facto It would give the Americans the decision whether Poland enters the war with Russia in defence of Ukraine or not. Let us not fool ourselves, in a tiny coalition of states, the United States would have a far more dominant position than in NATO, which could in fact translate into any kind of automation in terms of the war decision. It is besides worth imagining a situation in which the USA and Poland which are part of the mini-coalition enter the war with Russia in Ukraine, and for example Germany does not do so... This would make considerable political, logistical and supply problems on many levels. These are issues that should be taken into account, which definitely does not put an end to this kind of solution as mostly beneficial to Poland.
Of course, unanimity on the admission of Ukraine to NATO and its inclusion in the guarantees of the full Alliance may be hard to accomplish under current geopolitical conditions (mainly due to Hungary). possibly it would be appropriate to release any kind of rumor or communicative that It is better to have an experienced Ukrainian army in NATO than to block the strategical initiatives of the Hungarian Alliance. This kind of communicative released unofficially into space would possibly give thought to Victor Orban. It is clear that as long as the conflict continues in Ukraine, the image of NATO's unity should not be destroyed. However, this is where we discuss negotiations with Russia after the military conflict has been resolved. At that time, the pacification or punishment of unruly allies becomes more real, and possibly this is the position to be indicated now.
Peace Mission
There is besides a problem of the time gap between the conclusion of a possible peace and the formal admission of Ukraine to the Alliance. Russia can effort to usage this time to carry out its purposes. 1 way or another. To prevent NATO enlargement, the Kremlin may repeat the 2014 script next time. Enter the selected section of Ukrainian territory and halt to frost the conflict (as in Donbasa). For specified a limited area action, the Russian army could prepare quickly. Especially since the directions for 1 strong impact are Multum, and Ukrainians would find it hard to safe them all (all the dimension of borders with Belarus and Russia).
To regulation out specified a variant of events, the thought of introducing NATO peacekeeping forces to Ukraine is already being discussed. specified an thought – only that in the context of preventing Russians from conducting further offensives in Ukraine – I presented the second day of the ongoing war. At the time, it seemed abstract, but it may prove to be the only right 1 to accomplish NATO's strategical goal of securing Ukraine.
It should be pointed out that the sending of a peace and stableness mission is part of preventive and dissuasive actions that prevent the emergence of a fresh threat to the North Atlantic Pact members. If the impact of the alliance on areas outside the territories of NATO states could prevent future threats to the members of the Pact, it should not only be an option, but an obligation.
Polish diplomacy should lobby for this solution or its variants before the July summit in Vilnius. Although it can be highly hard to scope a consensus in NATO. An alternate could be the deployment of selected NATO states in Ukraine (including the US) to guarantee Kiev's peaceful membership of NATO members.
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Victory of Ukraine for NATO
With circumstantial strategical interests of NATO, including those concerning the rivalry with Russia, 1 can be tempted to specify what war script in Ukraine is in the interests of the Alliance. It is not that this business is identical to the Ukrainian business. The Kiev authorities are announcing a fight until all Russian-occupied territories have been taken back – including Crimea and Donbas. Of course, specified a variant of events would be beneficial for the Alliance, the problem is that the war is besides at the expense of the associate States of the North Atlantic Pact. It is not only the value of the aid provided (including military equipment), but besides indirect costs specified as economical losses, the burden of maintaining humanitarian support (including for refugees) or geopolitical costs (the engagement on the front against Russia, in a situation of expanding power of China).
Furthermore, it should be noted that there are differences in the assessment of the impact of the conflict on national interests. It would be beneficial for Ukraine, but even Poland, to resolve the conflict in a very decisive way. Destroying for the Russian army. A akin opinion about the dimension of the war (but not necessarily the result) surely has the French, Germany or another Western European states. Meanwhile, the Americans seem to be having a discussion. Both the duration of the conflict and its optimal outcome. Would it not be better for a long war to finish Russia (but besides Ukraine) than to end the conflict quickly? Is Russia’s severe defeat truly necessary, or is it worth giving Moscow another chance, but on Washington conditions?
As you can see, it is hard to find 1 common interest for the full Alliance, due to the fact that individual states have different optics of the situation. On the another hand, 1 can look for ways to accomplish the interests of all, or the decisive (in the sense of decision-making) part of NATO.
In view of the above-mentioned thesis, it must be concluded that it is absolutely in the interests of the majority that Russia should be permanently weakened (maybe only Hungarians and Germany would argue with it). This sustainability can be achieved by prolonging the exhausting war. However, it is not the only way. If the conflict were resolved rapidly and negatively for the Kremlin, the effect of permanent weakening of Russia could be achieved through mechanisms utilized by the West during peace. What will be developed further in the analysis. This should convince the US to look at Poland and Europe, and so the optics of the countries most affected by the war in Ukraine.
It seems so possible to make specified a common NATO position, according to which the Alliance should support Ukraine's swift and decisive triumph and then take care of Russia's permanent weakness.
At this point, it should be clarified what the "winner of Ukraine" means for NATO. Is the reflection of all the territories occupied by the Russians after 2013 essential for this victory? Is there a limit to the costs and time-limits for exceeding which it would be unprofitable to reconstruct Ukraine's borders before 2014?
Donbas lost?
Given the military resources that would be needed to reflect all of Donbas with Donetsk and Lugansk inclusive, the presumption that Ukrainians could do this without bloody, costly and long-term fighting would be rather risky. Donbask surgery would most likely require a immense amount of resources, human resources, as well as time. And still, there's no warrant that she'd succeed. For example, winning an agglomeration of 900,000 inhabitants would require a lap and a siege. Cut off the Russians defending themselves from the back and resources. Forced to surrender, which would not be so certain and easy. Especially since the Russian army can afford to defend selected areas (like Crimea/Donbas) without the request to keep large forces along the border with Ukraine. In the other situation there are Ukrainians who, leading the offensive in selected directions, must take care to defend the full dimension of borders with Belarus and Russia. Consequently, the Russians can concentrate their forces, while the Ukrainians must stay in greater or little dispersal, and have the appropriate means of devising them.
For these reasons, batting Donbas would be an highly hard task, and in the context of establishing fast war settlements – most likely impossible to implement. The conclusion is one. If the Ukrainians had failed in any spectacular way to recapture the area in a comparatively short time, but at the same time the Russian army would have been beaten elsewhere, NATO should have joined the peace talks with Russia. Irrespective of the geopolitical and interior situation of Russia, in Moscow they will not accept the surrender of territories where Russian troops would inactive be present. usually – not always – military decisions decide on territorial transfers established during peace negotiations.
It is worth noting at this point that part of the Donbaski area (this 1 inactive occupied in 2014) could be a bullet at the feet of post-war Ukraine. The loyalty of the locals would be controversial, which could make problems for the future. At the same time, it should be remembered that Russia, even in hard circumstances, may not accept one-dimensional peace conditions that do not take into account any territorial advantages for Moscow. The Kremlin authorities – whatever they may be – cannot afford to be "capitulated" due to the fact that on the second day they could lose their authority in Russia. And this historically ended differently in terms of individual consequences for rulers. From the position of the Ukrainians, the task of the Russians of a severe defeat and subsequent acceptance of the failure of Donbas seems to be the price they should pay for the lasting peace. The fight to recover all metro of Ukraine will not be justified if there are no Ukrainians who could benefit from this military "success" after peace was made. Kiev must declare present a fight for everything due to the fact that it fears that the deficiency of determination will prompt the West to enter into a rotten truce. On the another hand, if Ukrainians were given iron guarantees of safety during peace, then they would be inclined to leave the uncompromising position.
Crimea retrieved
The military indicates that there are real chances of carrying out a military operation to reconstruct Crimea. The peninsula can be physically cut off from supplies from Russia, and then it can be capitulated. possibly even without the request for a risky storm. However, with the usage of appropriate forces and means (already existing), there is simply a chance to do so in comparatively short time.
The recovery of Crimea for Ukraine would be beneficial for many NATO members. Controlling the peninsula facilitates dominance in the Black Sea and the anticipation of blocking Ukrainian ports including Odessa. Crimea in Russia's hands is simply a threat to Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine, which should in rule become a NATO member. The United States and the United Kingdom besides have an interest in weakening the Russians on this watershed. Anglo-Saxon naval powers would surely benefit from options to usage the port in Sevastopol. These countries surely have the political will and interests to deprive the Russians of control of Crimea.
At the same time, the recovery of the peninsula is crucial for Ukraine in terms of maritime safety on the Turkish Strait way and further to the Mediterranean Sea. It is worth that the future NATO ally should rapidly gain independency in this context and not depend on the aid of others. Until then, fleets US Navy or Royal Navy could usage Sevastopol as a base for neutralising the Black Sea Fleet.
Thus, the recovery of Crimea is beneficial on many levels not only for Ukraine, but besides for NATO as a whole. At the same time, it seems to lie in the capabilities of the Ukrainians themselves. Consequently, it can be concluded that Ukraine little Donbas, but with the restored Crimean Peninsula is an optimal peace option from those real to be achieved in a comparatively short period of time and without requiring expanding the hecatomb required for an uncompromising victory.
The setting of conditions for triumph (target) in Ukraine for NATO so allows to answer the question of what should the Alliance do to accomplish specified a victory? Since Russia's time and costs are crucial, politically unlimited support for supplies of military equipment to Ukraine seems necessary. Ukrainians should receive as shortly as possible the resources allowing them to carry out the mission of the Russian army of devastating defeat.
Moreover, 1 can begin to wonder whether NATO should not be prepared to act if the course of events required it. This may not happen, but we request to prepare for the worst scenarios, specified as the 1 I described in the analysis: "Intervention in Ukraine – how to halt Putin?“
A fresh model of the NATO army?
Western and NATO forces are the weakness of Russia (relationship). In addition to the weakening of Moscow – including the mention to triumph in Ukraine – action should be taken to strengthen the North Atlantic Pact. And indeed, the Alliance discusses a fresh concept of expanding military potential. It assumes having land forces that, within 10 days of the decision, would be able to put up a fight about 30 brigades (100 1000 soldiers). Within a period these forces should increase twice, and six months after the decision of NATO's commanders, they should have a 500 thousandth army. specified a direction – which takes account of the increase in weight and besides assumes a long-term conflict – seems to be as correct as possible. It is besides crucial that now the US and NATO troops are reviewing their erstwhile assumptions that tiny forces would be able to settle the conflict in favour of the West in a very short time. As you can see, Poland has chosen the right way for the improvement of the Polish Armed Forces in this regard, which shows that the unreflective duplication of what the “Americans say” does not always work. It should be remembered that due to their position and situation, Americans can make mistakes even at strategical level. In turn, Poland's position is besides hard and does not leave much area for even operational or tactical errors about strategical issues. Therefore, we cannot afford to abandon our own way based on our conditions and historical experience. 1 of them is the awareness that “East” usually leads wars in a full way, and thus destructive and deadly for civilians.
In addition to expanding the number of NATO units ready for consequence and war, the discussion raises the request to depart from the 1997 agreement with Russia (NRFA) according to which NATO cannot deploy "significant combat forces" in the east flank states. This step seems natural after Russia has become a real military threat in east Europe. At the same time, experience from Ukraine shows that the enemy cannot be allowed into his own territory due to his willingness to commit war crimes on the civilian population. For these reasons NATO must defend all metre of its territory (as president Joe Biden clearly stated during Warsaw visits).
This defensive concept supports the plan of permanent military bases in NATO border states. This would be essential not only in the context of readiness for possible defence, but besides in the position of acquiring capabilities, to carry out expeditionary activities outside NATO borders (e.g. peace mission in Ukraine). It should be stressed that the current U.S. presence in Poland is rotational in rule only by name. Individuals US Army perform the rotation, however, there has been a full logistics town under Rzeszów for a year, which is de facto besides a military base. Not rotational. It has besides been decided to establish a permanent command of the 5th U.S. Army Corps in Poland.
It besides seems essential to deploy NATO fleets to safeguard and dominate the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. The accomplishment of a decisive advantage on these waters should be permanent. Especially in the Baltic, due to the many and key energy infrastructure of strategical importance belonging to individual members of the Alliance.
The function of Poland and its armed forces in NATO
Poland's diplomacy should, of course, support all the above mentioned initiatives to make the military Alliance. However, there is no uncertainty that due to its location and so the scale of the threat, Poland must grow its army. Which will be highly expensive. Consequently, the question of how many of the planned 30 and yet 150 NATO brigades will belong to Poland? Will the Armed Forces of Poland participate in an alliance effort in the same dimension as the Bundeswehr or armies of Spain, Italy or Portugal? Or will many of these ready to operate 30 brigades be exhibited by Warsaw?
Given our geopolitical situation, it seems that Poland must even be the leading country in Europe as regards the possible of the armed forces and their readiness to act. If so, possibly it is worth putting on the NATO agenda the thought of expanding the common budget in NATO. This budget would then be spent on infrastructure expansion and logistics facilities that would service everyone.
It is crucial to remember that front states – i.e. like Poland – must not only put up adequate own forces, but besides be prepared to accept hundreds of thousands of soldiers from all over the Alliance. The shift of troops and their deployment – even during peace as a deterrent – is simply a serious organizational and logistical operation. For example, a large number of railway rolling stock, a large number of trucks, aircraft, ships, transhipment bases, warehouses, ports, airports, and yet a barracks for soldiers as well as training grounds are needed. In order for NATO to be ready to act, adequate infrastructure must be available at the site of this action. Building it is simply a immense cost. Poland may and should even show its readiness to self-fulfill in the expansion of the Polish Armed Forces. However, part of the essential expenditure will be linked to the common interest. The creation of a fund for these purposes does not seem unfounded. The amount of contributions to specified a budget could depend on the proportion of the country's commitment to the joint effort to increase military capacity (e.g. how many brigades ready for action would put the country under the above-mentioned concept of 30 brigs in 10 days and 150 brigs in 180 days).
It is not about putting yourself in the function of a petent who wants to gain safety at the expense of others. On the contrary, Poland must show its willingness to become an crucial partner of NATO, which not only is not a parasite, but, to any extent, wants to be a safety donor for the countries of the region. On the another hand, it is worth fighting for additional resources for infrastructure serving the full NATO, which must be created in Poland. There utilized to be quite a few controversy about which organization – USA or Poland – would possibly finance "Fort Trump". possibly it is time to think of a solution in which all members of the alliance would participate in this kind of cost?
Maintain determination after the war
In conclusion, the considerations to date are that it is in NATO's interest to bring Russia to a permanent state of weakness. To this end, her disastrous defeat in Ukraine must be achieved and the peace conditions of the Alliance imposed. The precedence is to accomplish lasting safety for the North Atlantic Pact countries, which involves the permanent securing of the buffer in the form of Ukraine. The best way to accomplish this is to bring Ukraine into NATO, but before that happens, we must take care of the iron guarantees. specified may be due to the deployment of the Alliance's troops in Ukraine. specified awareness must be present and discussed in the NATO committee.
It is besides clear that the Russian defeat in Ukraine cannot mean the end of NATO and the improvement of the military power of the Alliance. The rivals of the North Atlantic Pact cannot be forgiven, as was done after 1991. Peace is simply a period between wars. What needs to be done is to maximise the time of peace that allows you to make and cooperate. The best way to safe the future is to act in Roman maximism: si vis pacem, para bellum. Failure to invest in safety would weaken the Alliance, and this could lead to a fresh crisis, including war. It is so crucial to think about legal and political mechanisms as well as financial mechanisms that would guarantee that the Alliance members stay determined to invest in common security.
At the same time, in view of the above-mentioned view of the request to keep Russia in permanent weakness, NATO states in cooperation with the EU should keep a policy of independency from the Russian Federation and its natural materials (or possibly China and their market). Sanctions on Russia should besides be maintained. Perhaps not all, but surely those in terms of the transfer of modern technologies. For Kremlin authorities usage a technological leap based on Western support to make and grow the military sphere. So helping Russia with technological improvement is nothing but feeding the cember. Russia must stay weak for years after the war. If this kind of condition persists, we can look forward to a situation in which Moscow will beg for Western safety guarantees from China. Wouldn't that be a dream script for us?
Krzysztof Wojchal
geopolitics, politics, economy, taxes – blog
