Meat storms are more complicated than they seem. A Pole Fighting in Ukraine explains Russian tactics

Did Trump's temporary cut-off of Ukraine's weapons affect your situation?

This deficiency of weapons is what we could truly feel in August erstwhile the Russians do the offensive.

Why in August?

August is the perfect minute for offensives. Most of the erstwhile ones were held just then. On the 1 hand, weather conditions are favourable, which means it is dry, and on the another hand, erstwhile you finish your offensive, you do not give your opponent time to counteroffensive, due to the fact that autumn rains and mud are about to begin.

What about cutting intelligence, including satellite data?

We on our front long have a very good surveillance from the drones, so it didn't affect us. However, in a broader sense, the cut-off of data causes problems with counter-battery, i.e. in a fire consequence to artillery strikes of the opponent. He's besides cutting us off from information about the movement of enemy troops and techniques in the back. There is besides a problem with the usage of long-range drones — the discovery of targets and the correction of flight by these drones trust mostly on intelligence.

You're inactive utilizing Starlink's American communications systems. What would happen if the Americans cut you off from them? A acquainted Ukrainian officer who deals with technology told me that then the front could break in weeks.

That could happen. I'll follow our example. Although we have replacement communication, its transfer rate does not let to send a good image quality. You can send messages or sound with it, but the image is much worse.

What does this mean in practice?

It's about the velocity of communication. I will explain this utilizing artillery fire. Currently, artillerymen usage a live image from the reflection drone, so after each impact they can immediately apply corrections so that the next impact is more accurate. After Starlink is cut, the reflection drone operator will inactive have the image, but will not be able to transmit it in real time to artillerymen. He can only call them and effort to describe to them how to correct the fire.

This will make the precision of the strokes worse, but besides the velocity of response. Today, artillery needsThree minutes to hit a fresh target. Without the Starlinks, we will return to the time erstwhile the invasion began in 2022, where it needed about 7 minutes. It's a immense difference in the reality in which the equipment keeps moving.

What about the FPV drones that dominate the battlefield today?

Their usefulness would besides be reduced by the deficiency of Starlins. Operators FPV drones they will no longer be able to receive coordinates from the command, which present has a full field review, due to the fact that there will simply be no communication between them and the staff. They're going to gotta work at the same positions with the surveillance drone operators and get along with them as to what mark to hit. The deficiency of Starlins will disrupt the overall order of the battlefield. In short, Starlink is part of the combat and reflection system.

The flexibility of the Russians. “Polish army is not prepared”

At this point, the Russians are attacking respective major directions. They push Ukrainians out of the Kursk circuit, but besides storm in the directions of the Jaru and Pokrowska Times. At the beginning of the Russian invasion in 2022, quite a few people heard about the alleged Russian meat storms, that is, sending soldiers to any death to “soften” the position of the opponent, as well as top-down combat management, regardless of the current situation on the front. Are we inactive dealing with this?

First of all, the Russians changed their tactics very powerfully compared to 2022. At the time, it was the advanced command, not the officers in the field. It was an outdated strategy that didn't work on the modern front.

Even in 2023 under Bachmut, Ukrainian officers explained to me that the ability of commanding officers in the battlefield gave them the advantage over Russians who followed the orders of commanding officers in the troops in the far back.

Today it is no longer an advantage, due to the fact that the Russians have become much more flexible. erstwhile we talk, I have a Russian manual in my hand for the commanders of the assault company. I will quote the main motto from this manual: “Experience shows that all unit of any kind commanded by a reasonable, motivating, determined, persistent commander adapts to all situation and acting bravely and more confidently gains advantage over the enemy.” So erstwhile it comes to the situation on the battlefield, they're the ones who moved the decisions from advanced commanders to commanding officers in the field.

So they took on good patterns from the Ukrainians, eliminating their advantage.

When you read this manual, it is besides worrying due to the fact that if I think about the Polish army, it is not prepared for most of these points.

Like what?

Take, for example, this: "The full usage of electronic combat". For Russians, gaining the area is besides electronic control.

Electronic combat, drones. The battlefield is changing rapidly

What is specified a rule?

As we know, there is besides an electronic conflict on the front, which is mostly about interfering with enemy drones, GPS signals, GSM signals and radio stations. If we can control any area electronically, it means that no enemy drones will come. And drones present origin about 70 percent of all losses on the front. So they treat electronic combat as a basic action in the field of combat, and the Polish army is powerfully behind in this respect.

You say drones origin about 70 percent of all losses on the front. What about the artillery that caused most of these losses a year ago?

Here the battlefield changes very dynamically. Just look at the data the Ukrainians themselves give. I read, for example, that on the last day about 5,000 artillery missiles and about 3,000 drones flew into their positions. There's more bullets at first glance. but drones hit with much more efficiency. If we are trying to hit an object with artillery, then at this phase of the war, where many barrels of haubic are simply made and does not hold precision, specified a blow can have a shot of respective 100 meters. The drone, if not disturbed or shot down, hits the point.

What is the scale of the participation of drone operators in combat units?

According to the same manual on all Russian assault unit that has 150 men, 12 are drones. That's almost 10 percent. And the Polish army is just starting drone troops.

How did drones change soldiers' actions straight on the battlefield?

In 2023, Russian recommendations were to decision in this field with threes, due to the fact that it was optimal – you could observe the environment at 360 degrees, and if 1 of the soldiers was injured, the another 2 could evacuate it.

It's out of date today. The drones are so much and have become so inexpensive that 3 soldiers are already a valuable mark for them. That's why soldiers now mostly work in twos and decision by frog. This is due to the fact that 1 runs to the nearest hiding place, stops there, and another comes to it. Even these 2 work in distraction.

How the Meat Storm Goes

What about the alleged meat storms? Are they inactive being implemented?

At first, it must be said that there is small direct shooting at the current front. Assault groups frequently enter positions that were previously broken by drones and artillery. However, specified storms inactive happen. But they are more complex than the media.

What do they look like?

Such assaults are planned precisely, usually for 24 hours, of which the combat condition counts 2 to 3 hours. They attack at dawn most often, preferably erstwhile there is fog, due to the fact that then reflection drones, which hang over our positions, can see less. The assault unit consists of 4 assault groups and 2 support groups – 1 utilized to deliver ammunition and the another utilized to evacuate wounded.

These are the least experienced, frequently the alleged fresh mobilisation. That's why they're called meat attacks, due to the fact that they're massively wiped out. However, each group makes it possible to decision further and further. As a rule, the last, 4th group is composed of professionals, frequently peculiar forces soldiers.

How do they work?

Each group has 15 to 25 people. There are shooters, bomb squad, device weapon operators and RPG grenade operators in each one. First goes the bomb squad to see if the area is mined. The shooters are following him. There's besides a separate shooter covering the group while retreating. The task of each group is to get as far distant as possible and safe positions for the next group.

What is the endurance of this first group?

The first group is improbable to survive. They're moving for fire positions to get. These first twelve people usually go to the shootout. If the next group manages to take forward positions before being struck, she tries to dig in there, which takes about 30 minutes by hand. Then another wave comes. And then another one.

Are there any signals that let defenders to foretell specified an attack?

Yes, and very clear. Even before the attack, the Russians usually effort to soften the positions of artillery defenders and assault drones. So if the Russian artillery and drones start to hit hard just before dawn, you can be certain there will be a storm. That is why in any situations the Russians quit artillery to get the component of surprise.

What is the most complicated thing about resisting specified a assault?

Difficult moments arise erstwhile the enemy approaches the position of defenders. Then it strikes artillery and drones again. erstwhile the Ukrainians hide, the attackers have the chance to throw grenades inside.

“The first time in this war I feel that the strategy cares about my life”

What does a meat attack look like from your perspective? Is it hard to defy him?

I work in an elite reconnaissance battalion. It's an highly efficient and well organized battalion. For the first time in this war, I feel the strategy cares about my life. There are plenty of safety procedures and quite a few emphasis on communication and situational knowing by a soldier. The last Russian storm did not even scope our positions, was destroyed 500 m from us, utilizing FPV drones and artillery. The endurance of armored vehicles on the null is 15 minutes. To gain a village of 4 houses, the Russians gotta sacrifice quite a few equipment and people. Besides, I feel like we're always 1 step ahead of the enemy. We're always prepared. Unfortunately, another sections of the front can be worse.

What do your assaults look like?

The basic difference is that the Russians presume that many people will die in the attack. Therefore, they send on the first fire a simple infantry without experience. We only have experienced soldiers from assault groups and intelligence. There aren't that many of these soldiers, which is why we work in tiny groups. There was much delight in the effectiveness of these tiny groups. Yeah, but if you work in a group of 15-20 people, you besides score little – possibly 100 meters of land, 1 trench and that's all. Last time we stormed the position. The Russians tracked us down and shot us with artillery and FPV drones. Plus, individual stepped on a mine or something. The storm, before it started, is over. Fortunately, no 1 was killed, but they were injured.

So the Russians just take the area with more weight?

It's not just about mass, it's besides about forcing people into this kind of attack. You can make a man sit in a gap and watch over her, but it's harder to force him into fundamentally a suicide attack. It's not that easy for us.

And yet the Russians manage to force their people into a meat storm.

Perhaps this is simply a substance of another Ukrainian and Russian mentality. In the Russians, power and power are the most important, which is why they unconditionally submit to it. For us, freedom is the most crucial thing.