If Mao Zedong and Jarosław Kaczyński are replaced with 1 breath, the first association will lead us to the area of shroud-liberal talks about the dictator Duck. But I'm curious in something completely different. Namely the answer to the question of what and how they should do to be effective, today's "right populists". Where are they going for support: the political center or the economical periphery?
I believe that modern defenders and representatives of weaker layers, classes, communities and regions, although they usually come from the right, are increasingly taking over the function reserved for the Native Left over the long decades. Therefore, they should lead to a logical end to the “option for the people”.
Instead of trying to gain the support of any classes holding and the planet of privilege, it is even more crucial to focus on the weak and emphasize the offer for them.
What does that gotta do with maoism? virtually nothing. However, erstwhile we think of real democracy, or non-liberal democracy, which is the power of the people, the verdict of the majority, not the power of money and plutacracy, we can draw inspiration from any designation by maoists, rejecting their methods and systemic solutions.
The village besiegs the city
It is simply a substance of identifying which has placed the most susceptible and at the same time crucial areas of interest. This is not, of course, an undiscovery consensus on the basis of all left-wing thinking, which opposes the unification of many weak – fewer strong. However, Maoism rightly stated that the planet should be taken as it is. Western left-wing thought in its mature form referred to proletariat as a possible force for political change. There were many workers in developed, industrialized Western countries, and in addition they were a key origin for the full economy. However, this was doubtful already with respect to Tsar's Russia. It was a country that was not industrialised, not developed, not urbanised, and thus, in which the proletariat in general, and especially the large industrial one, constituted a number of the population.
In China, the agricultural country, rural, peasant, semi-feudal – this was even more visible. The western version of Marxism matched the reality of that country like an ox to an ambulance. Maoists rapidly learned from this, opposing local circumstantial universal theory. In their doctrine and tactics, the agrarian people were to be subject to political change. The village was opposed to the city. Mao in the text About a fresh democracy from 1940 he emphasized that the Chinese revolution is based on the aspirations and needs of peasants – it is simply a peasant revolution. In this vision, fewer cities have been viewed as a habitat of prosperity and privilege. All the more so, they were usually non-industrial, based on trade and focusing non-productive layers. Hence the thought doctrine, the political strategy and the tactics of the armed movement, which was expressed as "the village besiegs the city".
In time, this designation was raised to a level higher, creating a imagination whereby Lin Biao, a very close associate of Mao, pointed out as a key global contradiction the conflict between the "world village" (undeveloped countries, mostly postcolonial) and the "world city" (rich states and their imperialism). akin intuitions were preached earlier by our compatriot, close to the Polish Socialist organization literary critic Jan Nepomucen Miller, who departed from social democratic orthodoxy and synthesized it with syndicalism and with Stanisław Brzozowski's “proletarian nationalism”, pointing to the existence of “retirement states” and those which are the objects of their exploitation. Hence, only a step to, mostly Latin American, the explanation of dependence, which combined left-wing concern for exploited folk masses with "right-wing" or "nationalistic" concern for exploited countries and nations, opposing the states of the periphery to the capitalist areas of the center-core world.
On the side of the people
Let's go back to today's populists. Triumphs of specified environments in fresh years have been straight linked to the acquisition of a large part of the folk electorate, and in most cases – although there are populisms more or little "Corvinian" – besides with emphasis on social offer in the transmission of "antisystemic" groups.
In addition, the Liberal Left has concluded with large bourgeoisy a circumstantial informal alliance concerning the cultural sphere. Modern business is an antithesis of classes possessing from the Puritan Victorian era. Today's billionaires are "morally liberated", and on escapist hyperconsumer masses gain more billions. It is in the interests of today's large capital to break down all traditions and existing life forms. This process is reinforced by structural changes, e.g. labour migrations, pulling people out of their home community. The folk class responds to these phenomena ambivalently. It is not as conservative as before, but at the same time in many spheres it stiffens attitudes and views, treating it as self-defense from the chaotic planet of hypercapitalism. Or, more frequently than not, in the world, it does not keep up with another fashions that have been set up by the cultural liberal avant-garde. Also, they are completely out of contact with her needs or even being treated as a threat. specified a state of affairs results in the perception and image of the folk class as backward, as a "dark-garden" environment, not sufficiently modern, yes or otherwise "phobic". This coincides with the narratives of the left, which departed from the "classic" position for "cultural". What further separates people from liberal-left environments – increasingly seen as oppressive cultural overseers. The paradox of past is that erstwhile the erstwhile left took the people in defence against moralism of conservative classes having or clergy, present the right hand defends this people against worldly progressive priests looking in conscience, virtual likeness, bed, refrigerators, etc.
Big crack
Analysts point to a "big crack" between the reality of the satiated and the realities of the hungry and besides stigmatized for "inappropriate" views. French investigator Christophe Guilluy points out that this phenomenon is not only strictly class, financial, and cultural, but besides increasingly territorial. As part of it, wealthy metropolises become even more privileged habitats than they utilized to be, any kind of rich citadel. In an interview with “New Citizen”, he said: “It is about geographical secession. [...] The difference between today's bourgeoisie, the “cool” bourgeoisie and the conventional bourgeoisie is that today's bourgeoisie does not occupy a class position. It rejects a imagination in which it could be considered bourgeois. erstwhile communicating, the higher classes usage discourse referring to openness, Inclusion, etc. If you pay attention to how the marketing department of Paris communicates, we have many specified references: Paris – an open city, etc. At the same time, the price of a square metre of flat exceeded 10 1000 euros. It is impossible for the city to be open, having to offer a square metre of housing for EUR 10,000. [...] Most people don't live in large metropolises like Paris or Lyon. They frequently live in villages, tiny and medium-sized cities. These are the spaces I call peripheral France. Life there doesn't look the same as in the large metropolises. There is no specified mobility, but there is something that can be called cultural autonomy towards mainstream politics or what the media promote."
The same investigator points to another aspect of fresh divisions and inequality. The catchy liberal-left thesis that the planet is divided into 1% of hyperriches and 99% of the others opposes another diagnosis: “The neoliberal model creates quite a few wealth. If we look at general indicators specified as GDP, the value of this indicator has only been expanding in France for 40 years. Objectively, the country is increasingly rich. And yet we are dealing with the key problem of hyperconcentration of this wealth. And I'm not talking about concentration of wealth among the richest 1 percent. I'm talking about about about 20 percent of the population. For these 20 percent everything works and everything goes in the right direction. If we look at unemployment rates broken down by categories of workers, we will see that unemployment does not actually apply to executives. For people with a university degree, this indicator besides has a tiny scale. Objectively, these people are doing well. The emerging crises do not affect them, and they mainly affect the worst people. [...] We are so dealing with the consistency of the transmission of modern bourgeoisie, i.e. the coherence of its economical interests and the media-university power.” From specified environments, from the top 20% serving interests of narrow-numbered hyperburge, the current left is recruited. From large-town technological backgrounds, the cultural sector, the media commentaries, from large NGOs (which with real civilian society, or bottom-up activity, have nothing in common, alternatively like corporations, only non-productive, due to the fact that held by rich people or liberal governments) etc.
Today, populist groups, frequently from the right, are popular parties. In addition, they are besides parties to class struggles as they accentuate antagonism between the hyper-elita of privilege and wealth and the poorness that has been taken distant from everything.
Even those groups and populist leaders who have small emphasis on social and non-social issues present have a crucial advantage in the plebeic communities over liberals and liberal left. In the U.S., where Trump, a rich man and a man far from rhetoric, and much little from social activities, have already developed very insightful and interesting analyses – the best known among many are Elegia for bidets is Aliens in their own country – about why the people's class from the mediocre province, including the post-industrial rust belt, chooses populism. Even erstwhile it does not offer its social offer, it offers a deficiency of cultural contempt.
That's how the unprofitable vote
The phenomenon concerns the full planet as so developed. Not excluding our part of Europe. respective fresh national elections, as well as fresh elections to the European Parliament, show ever-increasing support, and frequently populist victories, hard to imagine a decade and a half ago in a country specified as France. This usually applies to right-wing populists, but it is besides worth paying attention to strong populist-left formations – SMER and HLAS ruling in Slovakia or marking the revival of any left in the Czech Republic a good consequence in elections to the EP obtained by the coalition Stačilo!, or national neo-communists. They indicate that it is not indigenous left-wingness that is repulsive for the people today, but that it is only left-wingness that is married to cultural liberalism and co-operating with the planet of large capital.
The populist triumphs are straight linked to the support of the folk electorate. Whether it will be France, where the workers, the province, the poor, etc., or the United Kingdom, where Brexit have been mostly voiced by people of the working class and subdued post-industrial regions, or the triumph of the AfD in almost all poorer East Germany in the elections to the EP or countries of our part of Europe. In the post-communist states, this is seen as if we are following support for populists in income, class and territorial terms.
The liberals' visions of the populists being voted only by ‘backward villagers’ are ridiculous, for example, erstwhile the Czech Republic is mentioned. There, populists win in poor, devastated and full of social problems, but heavy urbanized and inactive full of manufacture in northern areas of the country. Conversely, liberals and/or liberal lefts in different countries have exceedingly much support in capitals, large and prosperous agglomerations, but besides in tiny but rich towns, among managers, prestigious professions, in the business world, in "creative" professions, well educated people, etc.
Let us look at Poland, although the available exit poll analyses deficiency specified an crucial origin as income or the anticipation of combining respective features (e.g. income and the size of the locality). However, we know that in the fresh local elections, the village of PiS gained 43%, more than twice as much as the PO. In the largest cities it was the opposite: 48% for PO and 20% for PiS. Among the workers – PiS is 44.5% and PO little than 20%, while the left... only 4.3%. Unemployed – 42% for PiS, little than 22% for PO. Farmers – PiS is about 57% of support, the 3rd Road with PSL in the composition of 15%, and the PO just under 10%. For a change, the group of directors/directors/specialists is 39% for PO, 21% for PiS, but abruptly the left is increasing to over 9%, or 1 3rd more than the overall consequence of this group. Nearly 40% of the company's owners vote for PO while on PiS little than 23%. Poorer and at the same time stereotypically considered "culturally backward" regions are even more than 2 times the advantage of the Law and Justice Office over the PO. likewise with education: people with primary, professional and secondary voting for populists much more frequently than liberals, and this trend is reversed in higher education.
Of course, specified factors will be an asumpt for unwise commentators to argue that the populist electorate is blunt, dark and easy to manipulate, and the liberal electorate – educated and pervasive. However, these data – for at least a decade now almost identical in the case of subsequent elections to the EP, parliament or presidential elections – show above all the location on the ladder of income, prestige, opportunities, standard of living, etc. It's a class conflict in almost pure condition. Yes, with an crucial addition to the cultural war, it is for the previously mentioned reason that the planet of money and good social standing is usually besides a planet of world-view liberalism today.
Downtown or periphery?
This class-cultural division is becoming increasingly clear. However, it does not warrant the victories of populists, and much little their political and cultural hegemony. The opponent is powerful, with large private media (so-called free), millions of Soros' fortunes and akin technocratic EU-type institutions and its financial resources, "public opinion", the planet of discipline and "civil society" sitting in the pocket of these forces, etc., etc.
We see this now, for example, in Poland. Liberals now besides regulation thanks to the voices of many weaker. Not to mention what Tusk and the company were massively destroying (destroyed railway and bus connections, closed schools and post offices, etc.) and what they were designing as part of the "polarisation-diffusion development", or planned collapse of the province. And even what they are doing present and how they are doing erstwhile they are demolishing home budgets by eliminating energy shields or zero (because of reduced inflation) increases in the minimum wage, and the CPK task depletes the most needed railway lines, i.e. leading to poorer and excluded regions, leaving routes between habitats of prosperity and development.
The reaction of populists to specified a situation is not always reasonable. any of them effort to appeal to the centre electorate. What is different is that populists effort to de-demonise their image, created by liberal forces. However, erstwhile they effort to coquet groups of voters distant from the passwords and priorities of the current electorate of anti-system groups. This threatens to lose any of the popular voices, and does not warrant the conviction of fresh environments. We see this in Poland now, erstwhile the Law and Justice are trying to bid with liberals, among others, on postulates aimed at business, the large-town mediate class, etc., specified as “ZUS holidays” or inductive housing prices credit programs, which will benefit the better placed. This is simply a questionable measurement not only due to the hazard of losing the votes of weaker groups, but besides due to the fact that the more affluent groups do not request to search a copy erstwhile they have the choice of liberal originals (and in large numbers). In addition, we are dealing with the pursuit of the voices of groups for which populists or right-wing populists are multifaceted "objections" on cultural and aspiration grounds.
It seems to me a much better way to admit its actual political and social role, not necessarily in line with the authoritative names and auto-identifications of populist groups. This function is akin to that of the expressive left. The voice of the weak and excluded. Political mobilisation of groups without influence. The movement of the majority. Although any of the plebeic communities inactive do not trust populists or gain the propaganda of the liberal establishment, it seems that specified groups will be easier to get than the electorate from the mediate class, large cities, etc.
Option for the weaker
Hence the Maoism mentioned at the outset. The populists of Western countries, and even more of our poorer part of the world, should work to make the village “besieg the city.” Of course, not literally, due to the fact that in Poland the 1920s we are at a different level of improvement than China from decades ago.
Of course, even 20 or 30% of support in cities the size of Warsaw or Budapest is simply quite a few votes. However, we must halt looking for visions of truly good results in specified places, halt looking for "acceptable" candidates for the large city electorate, halt wasting time and energy on specified an highly hostile environment. This cultural distance works both ways and continues to grow – just as the people collectively reject liberal elites, so even average populist candidates will not be acceptable to "modern" voters. This can be seen very well today, erstwhile the elite and large fashion for "social sensitivity" collided with the real, wide-ranging and first major social moves in the 3rd Republic of Poland in PiS. This organization is nevertheless for the “modern” circles, and at the same time declaratively “sensitive” precisely as “cursed” as it was in the era of liberal politics symbolized by Zyta Gilowska. Let's just talk about liberals, for whom the set is even more repudiating, speaking their language, with the content of "republication + mohers + Duck-dictator".
The population should so have not less, but more, an offer for the weaker. It should be an offer for workers and workers, with any bows besides towards tiny business (JDG, but erstwhile distinguishing a small-town repair point for computers from well-earned specialists from large cities), the unemployed, rencists, poorer groups of pensioners, farmers (again distinguishing between agribusinessmen and tiny farms), the inhabitants of the state (because here even a good wealth position does small to the overall collapse of the area) etc. This is not only a substance of financial benefits, but besides of improving and enforcing the labour code, supporting the improvement of trade unions and another labour representations, investment activities (e.g. preferences for the placement of plants in poorer regions), infrastructure improvement and social surviving facilities (communal construction primarily in smaller cities, but besides ensuring efficient public transport between them and larger centres, due to the fact that the combination of low-cost housing with the anticipation of efficient transport to work will aid to combat the depopulation of specified areas), care for public services and state interventions in places where the marketplace is not curious or expects rates not suitable to the local earnings of most residents. This is, of course, just an outline of possible directions of action. These actions not only improve the pits of individuals or families, but besides rebuild the individualized spirit of the community.
The imagination in which “the village is besieged by the city” is not just a recipe for election successes. This is besides taking care of the country's overall better condition. Its weaker inhabitants and little developed regions. For social, economical and civic equality, it is simply a unusual paradox of history, that present the "popular right" cares more than the liberal-elitist left. I hope she'll take even more care of you.
