In fresh weeks, Ukrainians have continued to win and free further towns from Russian occupation. After Balakija and Iziuma came the time for the liberation of Lyman. Ukrainians are not only successful in the north of the country. In the past week, they've pushed the Russians distant about 30 km under Cherson. Russian command is counting on this negative trend to be reversed by announced mobilisation. However, each day brings further humiliating defeats to the Russians – if not under Lyman and Cherson, then in Crimea, where on October 8, the Crimean bridge, symbolizing the Russian business of the peninsula, was damaged.
The liberation of Lyman. Another stop, Swatowo.
The Russians are inactive incapable to stabilise the front after the defeat they suffered under Kharkiv in early September erstwhile Ukrainian troops occupied Balakia, Izium and Kupansk in just a fewer days.
Plans to make a fresh defensive line on the Oskil River line failed, and Russian troops were forced to retreat further east.
The Russians besides failed to defend their positions along the river Donet. At the minute erstwhile at the beginning of September 1 Ukrainian group invaded Kupańsk, the another group began to make aheads on the another bank of Donetsk, in forests close Lyman (before the war a city inhabited by about 20,000 people).
While under Kharkiv Russian opposition was minimal, and their units rapidly allowed the Ukrainians to go out into their rears, but in the forests under Lyman, the Russians put fierce resistance, respective times attempting to counterattack and dismiss the Ukrainians on the another side of Donca.
Eventually, however, the Ukrainians won the battle. After 4 weeks of fighting, the Ukrainians liberated Lyman on 1 October.
In the relations of Russian soldiers fighting under Lyman, there is 1 main motive – complete chaos and deficiency of coordination between the various troops. While any units fought very well, others panicked and went into a mess.
Special Military Reserve (BARS). BARSy are Russian troops that were created a fewer years ago. They were recruited from reservists who had already had military training. BARS soldiers worked “in civilians” and were to be mobilized in situations specified as war. The Russians began to mobilize BARSy and send them to Ukraine in the summertime before Putin announced his mobilization.
It was the BARS troops that defended Lyman erstwhile Ukrainians began to cross Donet and storm the city. Against the background of another Russian units, BARSy presented themselves very positively, as troops well motivated and ready to fight to the end. BARSy defended Lyman even erstwhile the city got into the lap. Only erstwhile it became clear that the support would not be there, BARSy – through a narrow corridor and under constant fire – withdrew from the city.
However, holding their positions to the end of BARSy suffered very large losses and will likely gotta undergo a thorough reorganization to regain at least part of their combat force.
The Ukrainians are now continuing to invade the region and the Russians are retreating to the fresh Swatowo-Kreminn defensive line (below the map). If the Russians don't halt the Ukrainians here, in a fewer weeks, the battles for Rubizhne and Siewierodonieck will begin, and the Russians will gotta consider the evacuation of Lisicchansk.
After the defeat at Lyman, Russian morale fell even more than after the fall of Kupansk and Izium. Even the BARSoks are very bitter about the deficiency of support and rotation (these problems are to be solved by mobilization, which is later).
New Russian defence line Swatwe-Kreminn. The map will somewhat distort the situation on the front, due to the fact that Ukrainians are most likely closer to Swatov than you can see on the map. Source: liveuamap.comFailure under Cherson
Losing Lyman is not the only problem with the Russians. Last week, the Ukrainians besides amazed the Russians at the Kherson wharf. The Ukrainian group fell here on the Russian right flank (on the side of the Leaning Horn). The script from Kharkov was repeated here – mobile Ukrainian troops, coming out the rear of the enemy and forcing him to retreat.
Over the past week, Ukrainians have forced Russians – on any front sections – to retreat by up to 30 km (below the map).
The Russians are complaining about the deficiency of people to fill the full front. Russian troops are stationed mainly in the Kherson villages, which have turned into tiny fortresses. Communication between individual villages-instruments is difficult, and as a consequence any attempts at counterattacks are not effective.
The Russians besides study on a large number of Ukrainian diversions who operate on their backs in Khersonszczyń. Ukrainian vehicles, with the capital letters ‘Z’, are reportedly a plague. The Russians, without electronic recognition systems, cannot most frequently admit whether a vehicle belongs to them or to Ukrainians. At the same time, the Russians claim that the Ukrainians received specified systems from NATO, but it seems that this is an effort to shed work for defeats under Cherson.
The situation in Kherson region is hard for the Russians. There is inactive a war on destruction, and the main goal of the Ukrainians is to spread Russian logistics on the shoulders. Although this war of demolition has continued since July, erstwhile the first Ukrainian rockets began falling on the Antonian bridge, the Russians have inactive not taken adequate countermeasures to prevent them from creeping defeat in this sector. As time passes, the Russian situation in the Kherson region will deteriorate.
Interesting information besides comes from Zaporozh. The Russians study a large number of diversions crossing the front line. Ukrainians may be preparing for the offensive here. As in another sections of the front, the Russians are besides powerfully stretched in Zaporozh, and reports of Ukrainian concentration on this front section have been appearing for respective weeks now.
Crimean bridge
Speaking about bridges and logistics – on Saturday 8 October the Crimean bridge connecting occupied Crimea and Russia was severely damaged. 3 bays of the road bridge fell from the pillars on which they were placed – 2 bays fell into the water, and one, somewhat tilted, hangs in the air. The neighbouring railway bridge was besides damaged – the tanks standing on it were in flames, possibly damaging part of the bridge structure.
We don't know 100% what caused the detonation on the bridge. The Russians claim it was a detonation of a truck that was passing a bridge. On the another hand, any experts claim that the origin of the detonation was under the bridge—explosive charges at the pillars that led to the discharge of the bays up.
Whatever the origin of the detonation on the Crimean bridge, the harm is rather serious – but not adequate to shut the bridge out of use. On the same day the detonation occurred, the Russians resumed traffic and railways. On the road bridge, traffic is driven by a neighboring bay that survived. Thanks to this pass, the bridge, so far only passenger cars can pass – trucks are to be transported by ferry until the bridge stableness assessment is completed.
Traffic on the railway bridge has besides resumed. However, tankers that had previously stood on fire inactive block 1 of the tracks. Here, too, the question of the stableness of the bridge structure remains open.
The attack on the Crimean Bridge is simply a major success of PR Ukraine, which one more time showed that the targets in Crimea are within its reach.
From a military point of view, however, it is essential to wait. The bridge's capacity was limited, but the bridge itself is inactive functioning. The key will be the impact of the attack on rail traffic, which is of paramount importance to the military. It may turn out that the harm to the structure as a consequence of the tank fire is serious adequate that railway traffic will should be completely stopped – but we will find out only in the following days/weeks.
Destruction of the road and railway bridge connecting occupied Crimea and RussiaMoobilization and months ahead
Russian command seems to consider the current problems to be temporary, and their solution is to be the emergence of now-mobilized reserveists on the front.
In that approach, he's right. erstwhile we look at, for example, the failures of Russians close Balakija and Izium, it turns out that the main problem of Russians was the deficiency of adequate people to fill the full dimension of the front. The Russians did not lose the fight for Balakia or Izium in a "direct fight", alternatively they were bound in a "maneuvering war" – Ukrainians, breaking the front in 1 episode and going to the Russian rear, forced the full Russian groups to retreat.
Of course, recordings showing how in any cases mobilization takes place are comical. No uniforms, rusty weapons, no training officers. These are all real problems. However, these are not unique problems only for the Russian army. Similarly, in organizational terms, there was a process of mobilization in Ukraine during the first months of the war.
Of course, in no way is this an effort on my part to "whiteen" the Russians. From the organization's point of view, the invasion of Ukraine was completely unthinkable. besides fewer people and besides late announced mobilization. To what degree the invasion was imprudent, it is best to show that many officers who were to be liable for recruiting fresh units on the Russian rear, were pushed to replenish losses in Ukraine in spring and summertime – as a result, there are now no officers to form units from recently mobilized soldiers. Ridiculous is chasing absurdity.
I mean, the complete mocking of Russian mobilization is unjustified. Never underestimate your opponent. Almost surely mobilization will stabilize the front (maybe outside of Cherson, due to the fact that there the Russians have immense logistical problems) and will make it hard for Ukrainians to further effort to reflect further areas.
The most interesting thing, however, will be what happens after the front has stabilised. In winter we will see a "great conflict for a strategical initiative". This will mostly be a conflict for exhaustion, in which Russia and its armed manufacture will, on the 1 hand, stand (limitedly supported only by any countries specified as Iran) and Ukraine, with wide NATO support.
