The end of the year is simply a time of summary, but the end of this year is besides a perfect chance to conclude 8 years of regulation of law and justice, which ended precisely as... they had to end.
However, in order to do this, efforts should be made to systematise the multidimensional imagination of the Polish statehood in the thought and practice of actions Jarosław Kaczyński and the host of his faithful (though besides mediocre) acolytes. It was a imagination different from the 1 of the “main-nortourt”, but only partially, which was at the root of the failure of Polish neoconservativeism (because in fact it is possible to find the direction taken by the Law and Justice).
Polish Concept according to the Law and Justice
The rulers of 2015-2023, distinguished themselves from mainstream, among others, a critical assessment of changes after 1989, but in a way different from national formations (defining Euroatlantic integration as simply a failure of independence) or socialist (approaching change as a counter-revolution and implementation on Polish grounds of harmful economical system). The SS cut both of these threads out of “extreme” and merged. He advocated integration into the widely understood West, but he rhetorically insisted on making it a sovereign state. PiS did not negate the request for restitution of the capitalist system, but at the same time – drawing on e.g. Catholic Social discipline – he opted for the organized redistribution of produced goods in order to neutralise emerging social inequalities.
The neoconservative position on national property was not rather clear. If we follow the PiSu communicative regarding the possible settlement of pathologies that grew after 1989, it is alternatively dominated by individual and organization themes over economical ones. Kaczyński's people sought to retaliate on people associated with the PRL apparatus (retirement and salaries) or to revise the unfair division of the "tort" between the forces of the anti-communist opposition (foundations, media, culture, etc.), but there was no opposition to the phenomenon of privatisation itself. While in 2015-2023 we will see any attempts to build Polish property in various areas, it was inactive just shifting the means of gravity within the limits of global capitalism, not, for example, the state monopolization of strategical sectors of the Polish economy, which is what we are asking if we want to talk about any sovereignty.
Finally, possibly most crucial in terms of the sphere of intangible assets – the Law and Justice set itself at any point on the grounds of defence of Polish culture, traditions and customs, although – precisely – while remaining under the omnipotent influence of the machina of the Western mass media (taking this concept more than only through conventional media), interpreting harmful, according to the Law and Justice, the influence as a temporary trend resulting from the force of competitive political centres in the West itself, but not being able to permanently change the form of something that functions as a "Christian heritage of Europe", and to which Polish neoconservatives loved to appeal. So their social conservatism was not even so much Polish, it was expected to be a variant of Europeanism, temporarily only destroyed by "left".
Poland in salons?
For 8 years, the United Right has devoted quite a few time and resources to building a political camp that is competitive against neoliberals, supported by national, Polish capital. State resources to build oligarchy were not spared. So fortunes arose Daniel Obietka Or about. Tadeusz Rydzyk. Not only to “make money”, but besides to have a structure that will make the political strength of Poland in the West.
Although PiS built and built its image on anti-germanism, it does not deny Poland's belonging to the "collective West", in which the national Republic of Germany plays a leading role. However, in order to make a counterweight against German influences, the Kaczyński Formation tried – both in communicative and in practice – to base position III of the Polish Republic on a strategical alliance with the United States of America. In this concept Poland had more independency for Germany, as a player supported by the US. That's why the President's skills Andrzej Duda au Donald TrumpThat's why it's an earball for huffing from the U.S. embassy, hence this primitive propaganda in the form of "America Is Likeable". Servilism towards Washington was covered by a uncommon (even over Vistula) rhetoric of rivalry directed against the Russian Federation. Hunting “spy”, destroying the achievements of a common history, intended diplomatic faux pas towards Moscow – this was expected to make a image of a fearless, patriotic government that “will yet show these Russians.”
While this worked to a large degree for interior use, it caused considerable confusion in the West itself. In fact, it was not known what this Poland wanted. In Nowogrodzka, ambition exceeded possibilities. This was not even a “contrary with the West over Poland” which was alternatively a “contrary with the West, that we are more of the West”. The Europarlamentary ECR Group (European Conservatives and Reformists), in which the Law and Justice played a leading role, became the brake on the full block. However, while this was logical in the case of the British (because, in the end, London simply left the European Union) the remaining ECR representatives in the European Parliament no longer had a coherent concept and, above all, the strength to push their visions in Brussels. At the same time, possibly even more important, this abroad policy in the implementation of the Law and Justice, whose goal can be described as "achieving a better position at a large table", has completely neglected another directions in the world. Although there was a bit of sinophilia around Andrzej Duda (or possibly just a glimpse of reality in the form of China's increasing power), the clear anti-Russian dimension of its policy of the Law and Justice was deprived of real opportunities for Poland to enter into relations with countries outside the Western world.
Why didn't it work?
It didn't work due to the fact that it couldn't. As many billions would not drown in Płock or Toruń, the Polish government, due to Poland's handicap in the "free world", would be impenetrable to the wealth of the globalist elite and its influence over the Vistula. The Polish Comprador class at most generated a small more cost, but it is not a scale that would scare the world's powerful. Well, it's due to the fact that Orlen bought the Polish Press, since the U.S. TVN operated in full steam. Since the subliminal transmission was sipping Netflix. Another thing is that PiS truly lacked intellectual resources to usage its tools. The popularity of TVP Info advanced to the function of an online meme, the sense of national pride evolved in the same direction erstwhile Jarosław Kaczyński photographed himself in a white-red raincoat, and all ideas for "national social media" ended with the establishment by trolls of a 1000 mocking accounts of the kind "Jan Paul II".
Kaczyński, by neoliberal propaganda, was compared to the Turkish president, Recep Tayyipa Edroğana whether the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. The problem of PiSu, however, was that he was far from Budapest or Ankara. Hungary and Turkey differed from Poland in the good days of the regulation of the Law and Justice that – yes – they remained in Western structures, but at all occasion they besides tried to build networks of links with institutions outside the "free world". In the case of emerging contradictions with the West, Erdoğan and Orbán are able to say, "Well, we are different, but we must take care of our national interests," erstwhile Kaczyński says, "we know better than you what we should do here in the West." It's not a subtle difference. Hungary, Turkey, and late Slovakia, do not condemn themselves to Euro-Atlantism erstwhile it comes to achieving their political objectives. Unlike the United Right did.
This inconsistent and pointless attitude of the Law and Justice has yet become a burden for the West, and to make it more ridiculous for this "better" part of it. Ostential appearance of the US Ambassador Marek Brzeziński in the company of the neoliberal opposition and the position of the State Department threatening with a finger for "breaking democratic standards" were clear signals that this demonstration independency of PiSu was not needed for anything. Accused of political genius, Jarosław Kaczyński, could not even read it. Government Answer under managementMateusz Morawiecki there was an increase in military and kiss-ass orders towards America spots on television, but no 1 in the United States appreciated that. Why should the West have any unruly middleman in the form of a jumping appendix, if it is possible to reconstruct to power a more comfortable and obedient Comprador formation? I don't think anyone from PiSu can answer that question.
Tomasz Jankowski
