Witold Jurasz is known for his activity in Oneta, he plays a “objective” role, and sometimes he does have a appropriate analysis, but only due to the fact that he wants to get back at the current MFA, where he thinks they are stupid.
Hieronim Grala, however, is simply a historian who deals with Russia in the 16th and 18th centuries, has large cognition and worked in diplomacy in Russia. I inactive know him from college in the early 1980s at the University of Warsaw, erstwhile he was a PhD student or doctor.
The 2 gentlemen decided to talk about modern Russia, or alternatively about its politicians. What's the large deal? This is somewhat akin to the “Alphabet...” convention referring to George Urban's celebrated “Alphabet”. The title itself, frivolous for serious authors – shows that the book has a clearly commercial intent and is to enter into a full mass of akin titles. There's any information, any gossip, and any innuendo. It is aimed at Juras, who against the background of the Grail is sometimes embarrassing. all now and then, he provokes the Grail to compare the elite of present Russia with the elite of the 3rd Reich. And is that the equivalent of a jury? Joachima von RibbentropaAnd individual else is Himmler or Schacht. It is already a primitive and intellectually embarrassing procedure, although Juras most likely thinks it's very original. The grail is laversing, and he's not very comfortable with it, but he's not opposed.
Both gentlemen know well that in Poland there is no cognition of Russia, that primitive rusophobia (cacapophobia) dominates, which prevents rational thinking, but they do not talk about it, although Głala has no evidence of it, even now, after 24 February 2022 – valuable texts, specified as an excellent review of a propaganda and simple book Prof. Andrzej Nowak "Poland and Russia. vicinity of freedom and despotism of the X-XXI century” in which he demonstrated, though very gently, the incompetence of the author in knowing Russia's past until the 18th century. Interestingly, during the conversation with Jurasz he did not undertake this subject by talking about the relations of the Russian state with the Orthodox Church, which – contrary to what is widely believed in Poland – were not so simple.
In my opinion, both interviewors have lost the chance to give a broader position erstwhile discussing Russian power elites. It is not possible to analyse Russia's politics only in terms of who with whom, who truly is, who is simply a thief, an ex-gangster and who is an "ubek". After this conversation, rather, we will not realize Russian politics, but the conviction, which has been widely promoted for years by Western media, that Russia is ruled by a criminal gang.
Mr Jurash and Graila say nothing about how Western politics influenced the behaviour of the Russian elite, the influence of the constant expansion of NATO, the organization of colorful revolutions by the West, and yet the US-funded coup in Kiev in 2014. There is no point – There is, however, the thesis that Russia's policy derives from its nature, alternatively grim, which is, of course, untruth or residual truth. This subject does not be for them, just as they do not analyse, for example, the evident chauvinist extremes in the politics of Ukraine, and in the area so close to Jerome Grail. It is unusual that he did not mention to the Ukrainians' rewriting of past at all, even though it may besides have negative consequences for him as a historian dealing with Russia. While he is very keen on commenting on the "inflections" in Russian historiography, he does not mention the "inflections" of Ukrainians, where the Russian ones are alleged small Pikuś.
What is most astonishing is faith, mainly Jurassic, in the communicative of Ukrainian propaganda. Although the war in Ukraine only rewinds respective times in this conversation, it is like a point of mention to any conclusions. To illustrate this uncritical approach of Juras to Ukrainian war propaganda, it is adequate to quote what he has to say about Bucza. In my opinion, this is simply a compromising assessment and delight pay attention to the reaction of Jerome Grail, who clearly makes it clear that he does not believe in this version, but promotes his version, in my opinion besides curiosical, that possibly Russian soldiers "were high". no of you doubted whether sometimes this event in Buczy had a completely different course. Here's the passage:
‘Witold Juras: We have described these different characters and we come up with a image of technocrats, cynics, people who either believe in nothing, or if they believe in something, it is only in the state and this belief in the state that replaces their views. We come up with a picture, strangely, of people alternatively civilized, educated, mostly with the past in the service, but nothing like Jeżov, not Berries, Beeria, Abakumov or Mirkulov. And that makes me not realize 1 thing. Mianowice follows Buczami, follows Irpenie, and then Mariupol. The Russian army not only invades Ukraine, but commits regular crimes against civilians. There are many indications that these are not, I mean, accidental crimes, they are not “on the spot”, i.e. those that, nevertheless bad it sounds, happen during wars. It's besides the Americans who have My Lai on their conscience. The problem is, it looks like it was on order.
Jerome Gral: This is 1 interpretation.
WJ: According to this interpretation, the aim was to force the Ukrainian army to change tactics, and the maneuver was to retreat from towns that were militaryly unwarranted. After Bucz, this becomes difficult, even impossible."
The Grail, however, is mostly narrated and believes that any things – as president Kaczyński said – are obvious, which as a perceptive historian should avoid and keep abstinence. For example, on what basis did both gentlemen consider Bucza a large Russian crime? Based on communications from the Ukrainian prosecution? Let's not joke, all institutions of the Ukrainian state after 24 February 2022 work for Ukrainian propaganda and are so not credible.
The game sympathizes with the Russian liberals, it is apparent that it looks at Russia through the prism of their views, which is sometimes fatal due to the fact that this option has almost no public support in Russia. Besides, if we're talking about Russian intelligence, which, contrary to Western expectations, did not rebel, it would gotta ask a question – why? And the answer is simple – due to the fact that the West and Ukraine, with Poland in the first line, does not wage war with Putin's “regime”, but with all Russia, its identity, culture and historical memory. If the average Russian intelligent learns that concerts are canceled Piotr Tchaikovsky, closes the Bulhakov Museum in Kiev, rugs Russian, etc. – this cannot be an enthusiast of the “free world” and pushed to the avant-garde of this “free world” of Ukraine, whose everything is now getting distant with, including all the baggage of flagism and chauvinism. Both interlocutors spoke much about the Orthodox Church in Russia, alternatively in a mocking speech and disrespectful. In the meantime, behind the city, the “free” Ukrainian Church is created by force and with the aid of the “free” force, and the old Ukrainian Orthodox Church, linked canonically to Patriarchate Moscow, is brutally persecuted in the Bolshevik style. And not a word about that. It is all a substance that this book does not service to realize what is happening now, as in Russia, as around it. besides bad.
Jan Engelgard
Witold Juras, Jerome Grail, “Wataha Putin. Whether Kremlin is simply a average place of power or a laboratory of evil”, Red and Black, Warsaw 2023, p. 351.
