Iran – a advanced price of endurance in the 12-day war
On June 24, the ceasefire imposed by president Donald Trump in the Iranian-Israeli War, in which the United States militarily engaged. The twelve-day conflict was the biggest defeat the muslim Republic of Iran has suffered in its history: it exposed its military weaknesses and undermined the bulk of its strategical political assumptions. At the same time, however, Iran did not let Israel to carry out its intent – to complete the decommissioning of the atomic program and to bring the government down – and to hold its ability to attack enemy targets. The current ceasefire does not prejudge the permanent completion of the armed and political settlement of the conflict. Further developments will depend primarily on the U.S. attitude, i.e. their ability to enforce ceasefire, the imagination of conflict resolution and Iran's flexibility.
War, its military and political effects and the scale of demolition will be a catalyst for deep overestimation and interior tensions in Iran. They will undoubtedly affect the ruling elites and will influence the political system. The economical and social consequences of the conflict will be a major challenge. Tensions will be fueled by Israel. Although the Israeli government change programme is unrealistic, the possible for interior destabilisation of Iran in the coming weeks and months seems high.
Israeli-Iran War involving the United States
The Israeli attacks on Iran launched on 13 June were a fresh phase of the strategical conflict between the 2 countries that has lasted for 4 decades. From Israel's point of view, Iran is the most serious rival and threat to, among another things, the global atomic programme (Israel accuses Iran of its advanced military application), the creation and support of anti-Israeli terrorist forces in the region (mainly Hezbollah) and, more broadly, the ambitions of regional dominance at the expense of Israel, among others.
Israel's undetected goal remains the permanent neutralisation of Iran's regional influences, and optimally, the demolition of its political strategy and Israel's promotion to a dominant player's safety position in the region. The attacks resulted in a crucial improvement in Israel's strategical position due, inter alia, to the weakening or liquidation of Iran's influence in Lebanon and Syria, which contributed to the simplification of asymmetric Iranian repression, and to the breach of Iran's air defence systems in raids in October 2024. The decision to attack was besides influenced by concerns about the United States-Iran bilateral negotiations that have been under force from Trump's administration since March, which could bring about normalisation of their relations.
Israeli attacks were highly wide scope and intense. Within 12 days of the conflict, utilizing air force, rocket strikes and diversion, Israel eliminated Iran's air defense, destroyed aviation and much of the logistical facilities of the armed forces and a large part of arsenals, means of production and rocket launchers. The targets related to Iran's atomic programme have been repeatedly attacked, and it cannot be predicted that they have been successful. An crucial aspect of the strike was the elimination of at least a twelve key figures of Iran's atomic program and respective twelve commanders of the muslim Revolutionary defender Corps (KSRI) and the army.
In addition, Israel has made a series of attacks on economical infrastructure, including gas deposits, refineries, fuel retention and industrial plants. Institutions related to interior safety were bombarded (local units and command centres of KSRI and forces liable for suppressing protests; the prison of Ewin in Tehran – a symbol of strategy repressivity). Moreover, actions were deliberately carried out to make panic in society, specified as attacks on state tv and radio and water and electricity infrastructure.
The full image of Iranian losses is hard to estimate. Information provided by the parties is part of the information war (no independent sources here). The number of killed is estimated to be around 800 (including over 200 military). It should be assumed that Iran's offensive military possible has been importantly reduced, but not eliminated, as evidenced by permanent rocket attacks on Israel. The stated nonsubjective remains to break down the current state structures and make grassroots protests leading to the implosion of the state and government changes (including the activation of emigration opposition environments).
The Iranian consequence to the attacks was limited to regular rocket and drone strikes at targets in Israel. Regardless of the effective strategy of its air defence, they have brought – due to censorship to a precise estimation – losses in economical infrastructure (including a refinery in Haifa), military and among civilians (about 30 people killed). From a military point of view, the Israeli military possible has not been breached, although it is limited by the expanding costs of operations.
An crucial component of the conflict was the US air and rocket attacks on Iran's atomic infrastructure in Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan on 22 June – their effects, although no uncertainty significant, were not legally verified. Iran's consequence was a rocket strike on the U.S. Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar. The Iranians warned of the attack by informal channels, and its military effects were limited. A fewer hours later, president Trump announced a ceasefire without giving details.
Israeli attacks exposed the weakness of Iran's defence strategy (actual failure of control of its own airspace) and its inability to symmetrical military consequence to this aggression, and all the more possible full-scale clashes with the US. In the current conflict Iran remains in applicable global isolation. Many, in particular, from the countries of the mediate East region and the Global South, words of condemnation of Israeli (and American) aggression do not translate into real support (including military) for Iran.
The twelve-day war exposed restrictions on Iranian deterrence mechanisms. Above all, the debate proved to be tremendous expenditures on the atomic programme, which was to warrant Iran a safeguard against external aggression. At this stage, the asymmetric arsenal of deterrence of Iran has besides proved ineffective. The threat of the activation of Iran's non-state customers in the region or attacks on American interests there (bases, critical infrastructure of allies in the Persian Gulf and trade routes in the Armenian Strait) and the media debated, but the untrue anticipation of terrorist acts did not prevent the attack.
Iran's interior resilience and stableness of its political strategy stay major problems. In spite of Israel's declarations and actions and media speculations in the West, Iran has maintained its in-steerability, effectively complements human resources losses at the highest levels and (taking an amendment to the information blockade) seems to enjoy unprecedented unity of power and society affected by external aggression in fresh decades. However, the current conflict is taking place in a situation of deep interior crisis in this country and is importantly deepening it. Iran is simply a country facing a number of economical problems, primarily through multiannual sanctions and inefficient management.
Iran's chronic pains have been a steady decline in GDP growth in fresh years (estimated at 1% in 2025), inflation and underinvestment in the economy. The challenge is increasing public discontent with the continuing deterioration of surviving conditions and the anticipation of liberalisation of the system. There are besides tensions in the elites, including the correction of the state's strategy and policy and the progressive issue ( Iran's leader Ali Chamenei, ruling since 1989, is 86 years old). The war with Israel, among others, strengthened questions about the costs and effectiveness of the policy so far, undermined assurance in the resilience of the strategy (e.g. against the scale of infiltration of safety structures by Israeli services) and most likely exacerbated tensions on the occasion of forced (or expected) staff changes.
At present, it is hard to measure the failure of central and local national safety structures and the resilience of society to the continuation of the conflict and its economical costs. Israel's ability to make effective usage of centrifugal or anti-systemic forces in Iran to destabilise the state (e.g. Kurdish groups with which Israel cooperates, and, potentially, beludzian or Azerbaijani forces and, on the another hand, extremist political opposition, e.g. the People's Mujahedin Organisation – MKO/MEK) remains an open issue.
Forecast
Iran is – and will likely stay – reactive towards Israel and the US, which were attacking parties and despite ad hoc successes have not achieved a full victory, including, above all, the warrant of the decommissioning of the Iranian atomic programme. It should be assumed that in the close future Tehran will effort to proceed its policy, i.e. responding to Israel's attacks if essential and avoiding confrontation with the United States and the countries of the region. Political solstice in relations with the US depends on a atomic agreement, and Iran should guarantee safety (i.e., credible detention of Israel) and the abolition of sanctions. The script of the escalation of Tehran's aggressive actions in the United States base and the region seems to be possible almost exclusively in the event of an existential threat to Iran's political strategy or, little likely, in the event of violent clashes in its ruling elite.
With the war, Iran may have entered a decisive period of resounding for at least a decade. In the power camp, the burning issue is to adapt safety and interior policy strategies to fresh realities, and in a broader plan – to organise the succession process covering both individual and systemic issues. Any successor to Chamenei will be weaker than he is, which will force the shuffle in the organization back, and the nationalist legitimacy will most likely prevail over the spiritual one. The clearing process and the rift in the elite can be stormy and susceptible to external developments and socio-economic pressures. At the moment, it cannot be prejudged whether it will be dominated by supporters of the consolidation of the apparatus and the rigidity of the course, or whether attempts at point-to-point liberalisation of the strategy will be made.
The key issue for Iran is to keep interior stability. The government change programme advocated by Israel and any American communities was unrealistic. Organised political opposition in the country does not exist, and this emigration gives the impression of alienated and devoid of real political instruments (the environment centered around the exiled successor of the throne in 1979) or highly unpopular among citizens (districts linked to the MKO/MEK). The opposition groups with a strong cultural lynx (e.g. Kurdish) may have local influence only.
However, Iran's constant problem remains the advanced possible for social and political protests. In a situation where there is no hope of improving the situation, exacerbating tensions in the elite and the intentions and instruments confirmed by Israel during the war to penetrate and destabilise the country, the hazard of shocks threatening the strategy is increasing.
ANNEX
Positions of selected countries against US strikes on Iran
United Kingdom supported the US's efforts to address the threat from Iran's atomic programme. At the same time, London, calling for deescalation and negotiations, highlighted its deficiency of participation in the US operations and earlier Israeli strikes (although the US aviation increased the usage of air force bases in the UK in the days preceding the attack on 22 June).
Germany: Chancellor Friedrich Merz supported US action against Iran's atomic programme, but stressed the request to resolve the conflict on a diplomatic basis. The Berlin authorities are dissatisfied with the deficiency of influence of European countries on developments around Iran. The government is primarily afraid about the consequences of the escalation of the conflict for the West Germany, including possible attacks on Israeli facilities located in Germany and a fresh wave of refugees from the mediate East.
France: President Emmanuel Macron described the U.S. attack on Iran as incompatible with global law, although he acknowledged that France was supporting the nonsubjective of preventing Iran from entering possession of atomic weapons. Paris advocates a diplomatic solution to the conflict and is skeptical about the thought of changing the government in Iran through aerial attacks. Like Germany, France is afraid about the marginalisation of Europe, fundamentally without any influence on developments in the mediate East.
Turkey: The Ministry of abroad Affairs of Turkey issued a message on 22 June expressing its deep concern about the American attacks on Iran's atomic facilities, recognising them as actions leading to further destabilisation of the mediate East. Ankara called for an immediate halt to military action and a resumption of dialogue, and is ready to support specified initiatives.
PRC She powerfully condemned American raids, calling them "a serious violation of global law". At the same time, Beijing offered mediation and on 22 June, along with Russia and Pakistan, proposed a UN safety Council resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire to prevent further escalation. With limited opportunities for action, China will focus on creating the impression that they are the voice of reason and advocate a diplomatic solution to both the current crisis and the Iranian atomic programme. Above all, however, they will focus on providing political support to Iran, utilizing their position among the countries of the Global South.
