Rszard Kulczyński
The continued execution of Iran's leaders is ineffective in the face of the existing defence doctrine.
Iran is not doing a suicide mission. He's on autopilot. No 1 in Tehran can take control.
In 2003, Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari watched the United States cut the centralised command structure of Saddam Hussein in 3 weeks. He spent the next 4 years at the IRGC strategical Studies Center, designing military architecture that could never be cut down.
In September 2007, he was appointed commander of the IRGC and immediately restructured the full Iran military in 31 autonomous provincial headquarters, 1 per province, each with independent headquarters, command and control, arsenals of missiles and drones, fleets of fast attack boats, integrated Basij militias, a pre-delegated launch body, stored ammunition and sealed emergency orders.
The doctrine was built for 1 scenario: the death of the ultimate leader.
This script was activated on February 28, 2026. Doctrine was implemented within hours. It's been working always since.
The question nobody asked is, can anyone in the muslim Republic turn it off? Nope. The reason is constitutional.
Article 110 of the 1979 Iran Constitution grants exclusive command over all armed forces to the ultimate Leader. Only he is the commander-in-chief, appoints himself and cancels military leadership. No another institution, neither the President, nor the Parliament, nor the Council of Guardians, nor the judiciary, has constitutional powers to give military orders or to nullify directives of the ultimate leader.
Ali Chamenei gave orders. Ali Chamenei is dead. Mojtaba Chamenei was appointed successor on 8 March 2026. He hasn't spoken. He didn't show up. He didn't give any verifiable orders. He was wounded in the raid and never turned to his people. The only constitutional body that could replace 31 autonomous orders exists in an office occupied by a man who may not be able to execute it.
Ghalibaf (an advocate of the Iranian parliament) may reject the ceasefire. He can't order the IRGC to stop. Pezeshkian may issue statements, but he cannot counter the Bushehr provincial commander firing anti-ship missiles on a tanker. The guardian board may verify the legislation, but may not revoke the mandate to fire issued by the deceased commander-in-chief, whose orders stay legally binding until the surviving ultimate Leader has explicitly annulled them. The ultimate Leader is dead.
31 autonomous command centres are not insubordinate. They're following orders. The last orders said, "Fight independently, whatever you have at your disposal, as long as it takes, without waiting for instructions that may never come."
These orders were to last the death of the man who issued them. This was the full intent of the 20-year Jafari project.
CONSECTIONS
• For insurers: no counterparty can warrant that 31 independent entities cease their activities.
• For diplomats: no signatory may issue orders he does not control.
• For military planners: Iran has no office whose demolition would end the campaign.
• For the Gulf States: each faces local harassment from fast attacking boats, drones and coastal missiles of the neighboring Iranian state without any central coordination that could be intercepted or negotiated.
• For markets: 7 P & I clubs ruled out the probability that all 31 autonomous command centres would respect any contract at the same time and this assessed the probability as close to zero. These calculations have not changed due to the fact that the constitutional mechanics that could force compliance does not be functionally.
The doctrine was not intended to win. It was designed to prevent losing. Jafari was investigating the deaths of centralised armies. He built a doctrine that rules it out.
The device works without a distant control. The pilot's dead. And the constitution says only the pilot can shut it down.
