Chinese investments in Brazil from 2023 to 2025

In fresh years, we can see a clear deepening of economical cooperation between China and Brazil. Both commercial relations and investments are increasing rapidly, which is besides affected by the current geopolitical situation. China's investment activity in the energy and infrastructure sectors is peculiarly visible, which benefits both economies. Since 2023, investments have seen crucial growth, reflecting both strategical economical interests and diplomatic cooperation. China is Brazil's largest trading partner and Brazil is China's key partner in Latin America. Renewable energy, infrastructure and financial markets activities accelerate the economical growth of both countries. Agricultural products, mineral natural materials, industrial products and advanced technology products dominate common trade. This activity reflects China's long-term objectives of safeguarding natural resources and exploiting Brazil's potential, with a strategical position in South America. However, the exchange at a advanced level between Beijing and Brasilia in addition to increased investment activity besides raised questions about regulatory oversight and environmental safeguards.

Brazil, as the leading power of Latin America and a associate of BRICS, is actively cooperating with China and the investment prospects are enormous. The country established diplomatic relations with China in 1974 and in 1993 became the first developing country to enter into a strategical partnership with the mediate State. In 2012, Brazil was again the first of Latin American countries to rise relations with China to the rank of a comprehensive strategical partnership[1].

China has been Brazil's main trading partner since 2009, erstwhile it overtakes the United States[2]. As the largest soy importer in the world, the Central State draws most of its supplies from Brazil. In 2024, 28% of Brazilian exports went to China. In 2023 Brazil was the main supplier of soya, beef, cellulose, maize, sugar and poultry to China. The trade balance was historically beneficial for Brazil, although China has importantly increased its exports in fresh years[3].

Brazil is of large importance to China as a supplier of key minerals, including uncommon earth metals, lithium and nickel, due to its immense resources, amounting to about 23% of the world's reserves, which ranks it second in the world, just behind China[4]. In the first half of 2025, more than 60% of exports of uncommon earth metals from Brazil went to China. This strengthens Brazil's strategical importance for the Chinese supply chain of technologies specified as electrical vehicles and clean energy[5]. The mining manufacture and Brazil in the field of uncommon earth metals is inactive rather underdeveloped, but with specified large resources this country can become an alternate origin of these natural materials[6].

Beijing is peculiarly curious in investing in industries that supply supplies of natural materials specified as food (with peculiar emphasis on soya), mining or infrastructure essential for the transport of these goods. Brazil ranked second in terms of the number of direct investments in the first half of 2025, just behind Indonesia. Chinese investment activity in this country is partially a consequence to customs duties on Brazilian imports of 50% imposed by Donald Trump[7]. In the last 2 decades, Brazil has been ranked 4th among destinations hosting direct investments by the mediate State. However, the trade war with the US has increased China's interest in emerging markets, and Brazil is 1 of the leading markets[8].

China and Brazil strengthen their financial ties to facilitate trade and investment. A bilateral abroad exchange swap agreement signed in 2013, covering 50% of the yearly volume of trade, ensured trade efficiency[9]. The establishment of a settlement agreement in Chinese yuan in 2023 further improved transactions between countries, which is crucial in the face of the deepening economical cooperation of countries. At the same time, Brazil has a large open capital market, which facilitates marketplace access and benefits investors[10].

The Brazilian improvement Bank (BNDES) and the Chinese Export-Import Bank (Cexim) formalised an agreement on the creation of a breakthrough joint investment fund worth $1 billion to fund strategical sectors supporting economical improvement and innovation. The fund, to start operations in 2026, will invest in energy transformation, infrastructure, mining, agriculture and artificial intelligence, reflecting the common priorities of both countries to advance sustainable growth and technological competitiveness[11].

Brazil presently produces more than 80% of energy from renewable sources[12]. Moreover, exports of photovoltaic modules from China are besides crucial in this respect, as Brazil is simply a country with a advanced sun exposure[13]. These factors make China and Brazil have considerable possible for cooperation in the field of energy and electrical vehicles. Thanks to renewable energy, these vehicles can be manufactured in Brazil in line with sustainable improvement objectives. At the same time, China needs outlets for manufactured cars, while Brazil has an interest in electrification of transport. In addition, Brazil provides you with the minerals essential for the production of electrical vehicles, wind turbines and solar panels, specified as iron, copper and nickel, utilized for the production of batteries for electrical vehicles, engines and renewable energy infrastructure. Another key mineral, boxite is utilized to produce aluminum. However, manganese plays an crucial function in both vehicle and battery production. This complementarity between the mineral resources mined in Brazil and China's industrial possible so offers a unique chance to establish strategical partnerships on the improvement of clean energy and electrical vehicles, placing both countries at the forefront of the global energy transition[14].

Following a decrease in China's investment activity in 2022, there was a rebound and even an increase in investment between 2024 and 2025. Chinese companies were peculiarly active in the mining, energy and infrastructure sectors. The investment value increased by 64% in 2024 year to year, although the number of investment contracts decreased. This suggests a return towards larger, crucial investment impacts[15]. The investment in 2023 amounted to $1.73 billion, an increase of 22% compared to 2022.[16]. The investment in 2024 amounted to $4.8 billion and the number of projects amounted to 39, most of which afraid the energy sector.[17]. According to Brazil-China Enterprise Coalition, Brazil was in 2024 the main mark of Chinese capital among emerging countries[18].

The increase in the value of the investment in 2025 was mainly due to the acquisition of 70% stake in Vast Infrastructure, an operator of the land-based oil handling terminal in Rio de Janeiro by the Chinese port operator China Merchants Port Holdings for an amount of up to $1.07 billion. The second largest investment in 2025 was the acquisition by Geely Holding Group of 26.4% of the shares in the local company of the Renault car maker for an amount of $655.2 million. The 3rd transaction is the joint acquisition of the Luiz Gonzaga solar complex in northeastern Brazil by a local subsidiary of the Chinese State Power Investment Corp and Recurrent Energy, a subsidiary of Canadian Solar[19].

The year 2025 brought crucial changes. In July Brazil hosted the 17th BRICS Summit, where advanced level meetings took place, thus improving the conditions for Chinese investments in Brazil[20]. Chinese car maker BYD besides marketed the first electrical car entirely produced in Brazil, at its fresh mill in Camaçari, Bahia. It was besides the first car produced outside Asia. A symbol of the developing bond is besides the fact that the Brazilian diplomatic mission in Beijing seeks a new, larger office and increases employment. For the first time, the embassy in Beijing will have an army general and a Rear Admiral – only the Brazilian embassy in Washington has specified military rank[21].

The increase in investment activity was besides influenced by the visit by president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva to Beijing in May that year. This gathering was identified as an chance to attract investment and increase Brazilian exports, which is peculiarly crucial in the context of the unstable customs policy of US president Donald Trump[22]. Chinese companies announced their willingness to invest around $5 billion in Brazil. 1 of the main investors is Envision, which announced that it would invest $873 million in the production of sustainable aviation fuel from sugar cane in Brazil. CGN announced an investment of $535 million in renewable energy in the state of Piauí[23]. It is besides worth mentioning the earlier gathering of Lula and Xi, held in Brazil in November 2024, during which leaders signed more than 40 agreements on many sectors, including infrastructure, energy and agriculture[24]. The investment is besides intended to cover education, as extended training will be needed[25].

The following summary is based on data from the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) China Global Investment Tracker, 1 of the most comprehensive global sources monitoring abroad investments of Chinese companies. The AEI base includes projects worth more than USD 100 million and is regularly updated, allowing reliable monitoring of the scale, dynamics and sectoral structure of Chinese investments worldwide, including Brazil[26]. The data from 2023 to 2025 are so a solid benchmark for analysing trends and the increasing presence of Chinese capital in key sectors of the Brazilian economy.

Table 1 Chinese investments in Brazil according to China Global Investment Tracker from 2023 to 2025

Source: American Enterprise Institute and Heritage Foundation, China Global Investment Tracker, https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/ (accessed: 29.11.2025).

According to the report, the full value of Chinese investments in Brazil between 2023 and 2025 amounted to around $7.8 billion. The data show that investments have grown dynamically, in peculiar in the energy sector, to which more than 50% of the funds invested have gone. The largest investor is State Grid, as well as another crucial state companies specified as State Power Investment, China General atomic and PowerChina. The second most crucial sector is transport, where companies specified as Geely and BYD were peculiarly active. Another manufacture with a unchangeable investment growth is metallurgy, where companies specified as Baiyin Nonferrous, China Nonferrous and Minmetals were active. The overall trend indicates a shift in investment towards green energy, electromobility and a crucial presence in the infrastructure sector. State-owned companies are peculiarly active and the investment strategy assumes a win-win situation, where Brazil gains abroad capital in key sectors for its economy and China can usage its activity for its own global supply chains, including the extraction of metals essential for energy transformation.

With strong government support, Chinese state-owned companies advance extensive, long-term projects, frequently focusing on infrastructure specified as railways and ports. This reduces transport costs for the Chinese side while improving Brazil's infrastructure, which faces fiscal and planning constraints. State-owned companies besides have crucial resources of capital, technology and expertise. The engagement of state-owned companies besides strengthens bilateral relations and cooperation, supporting unchangeable trade agreements and ensuring financial resilience. Private companies are in turn more marketplace oriented and profit oriented. With little political support, they avoid large purchases of land, focusing in return on joint ventures or number interests. Their smaller scale and flexibility let easier integration into local supply chains[27].

The energy sector is crucial for investment activity. These are in peculiar solar and wind projects, which in 2024 received 34% of the full value (about $1.43 billion) of Chinese investments in Brazil, while the oil and gas sector attracted 25% (1 billion dollars). This approach reflects the pragmatic trends of China's energy transition, which make the production capacity of renewable energy sources while maintaining access to fossil fuels. As the largest energy consumer in the world, Beijing seeks to diversify supply sources and reduce vulnerability to marketplace fluctuations and geopolitical tensions. Investments are aimed at achieving a number of strategical objectives, specified as securing long-term access to Brazilian offshore oil reserves, access to key minerals specified as lithium, niobium and uncommon earth elements, and the building of influences[28].

The Chinese energy company SPIC announced in 2024 an investment worth about 147 million dollars in the construction of 2 fresh wind farms in north-eastern Brazil. The company intends to become 1 of the 3 largest energy producers in Brazil, Construction started in early 2025 and production is expected to start in 2026. The power plant's power output is 105.4 MW. The company besides engaged in Brazil with solar power projects, launching 2 solar parks with a full power of 738 MW[29].

In addition to investments in energy, Chinese companies are besides active in the extractive sector, focusing on materials essential for energy transformation. At the end of 2024, China Nonferrous metallic Mining Group (CNMC) took over Brazilian company Mineração Taboca, the country's largest maker of refined tin, for 340 million dollars. This provided China with access to tin, used, among others, in the manufacture of solar panels, niobium, key in the production of advanced strength steel and tantalum, necessary, among others, in electronics[30].

Brazil has become a strategical marketplace for investment in electrical vehicles. According to the global Energy Agency (IEA), in 2024 the volume of the electrical vehicle marketplace in Latin America doubled, reaching nearly 4% of all vehicles. fresh data indicates evidence results. In Brazil, 9.4% of fresh cars registered in August 2024 were electrical vehicles[31]. In consequence to the improvement possible of this market, BYD began installation of electrical vehicles in the erstwhile Ford mill in Bahia in October 2024, and large Wall Motors started production at the renewed Mercedes-Benz factory. Brazil is besides a crucial importer of specified vehicles. In early 2025, the world's largest vehicle transport ship docked in Itajaí with 22,000 Chinese vehicles. However, it is worth noting that the expanding marketplace share of the mediate State is not without criticism. Brazilian industrial and trade union groups criticise China for utilizing temporary low customs barriers to export electrical vehicles without generating adequate jobs on the local market. In response, the Brazilian government plans to impose duties on Chinese electrical vehicles, which are expected to scope 35% in July 2026.[32].

To guarantee food safety, China imports large quantities of soya which is mainly utilized as feed for pigs. As much as 45% are from Brazil. Among the Chinese projects completed in fresh months is simply a terminal built in the port of Santos by the state-owned agricultural company Cofco. The investment is complemented by a 1000 trains, which the company will deliver to the transportation of grain from inland to the coast[33]. Although only around 5% of Chinese investment goes to the agricultural sector[34], investments specified as the construction of infrastructure for the transport of agricultural products are worth paying attention to the function Brazilian agricultural products play for China.

Chinese investments in Brazil are increasingly targeted at the service sector. An example of this is Meituan’s investment in food delivery. The investment is expected to amount to over $1 billion.[35] The company started operations on October 30 under the name Keeta, which is the first entry of this company into the Latin American market[36]. Another investment announced is an investment plan worth about $595 million, which assumes the beginning of shops in Brazil through a network of ice cream and tea shops Mixue[37]. Mixue signed an agreement with the Brazilian Agency for Trade and Investment Promotion (also known as ApexBrasil) on the acquisition of Brazilian agricultural products. Mixue intends to employment about 25,000 people as part of its expansion[38]. Didi Chuxing, a transport company, is developing its food supply business in Brazil. By next year, he intends to invest 374.8 million dollars in this country.

Chinese investments are besides not without controversy and problems. An example is the investment of the BYD car manufacturer, who reported the release of the Jinjiang Construction subcontractor active in the construction of an electrical vehicle mill in Brazil. The reason was to inform local officials about the rescue of 163 workers from slave conditions. According to information provided by officials, workers experienced highly degrading housing conditions on construction site[39]. Consequently, the Brazilian government suspended the issuance of temporary worker visas for BYD staff and launched a legal investigation and inspection of labour inspectors[40]. The usage of Chinese workers to build a BYD plant is akin to the way Chinese global corporations operate in Africa and another Latin American countries. This practice brings small benefit to the countries receiving the investment. There have been voices that it would be more beneficial for Brazil if workers came from local communities, due to the income they would make for themselves and their families, the affirmative impact on their communities and the vocational training they would have. Moreover, it would be easier to monitor their working conditions.[41].

Some Brazilian citizens expressed concerns about the increasing competitive force on local businesses. erstwhile cross-border e-commerce platforms specified as Temu and Shein entered the market, Brazilian companies called on the government to take action to defend local companies. Brazil charged a fee on tiny packages worth little than $50, which were previously exempt from customs duties[42].

Another example of controversial investments is any of the infrastructure projects supported by China, peculiarly in Amazonia and another protected areas. These projects met with a negative consequence from environmentalists and social activists. An example is simply a railway corridor linking the production zones of goods to export ports, which according to activists can accelerate deforestation, land acquisition and environmental degradation in Amazon rainforest areas.[43]. Moreover, extended infrastructure and mining agreements endanger not only ecosystems but besides social cohesion and local livelihoods – which raises questions about trade-offs between economical growth and sustainable development[44].

Another example is the activity of the Chinese company Baiyin Nonferrous Group, operating within the mining sector. In March 2025, the company took over Brazilian company Mineração Vale Verde, a copper and gold mine operator Serrote in Alagoas. Local residents reported demolition of homes, wellness problems, livestock deaths and crop losses, which they attribute to explosions and mining dust. Despite the court order of 2023 ordering the installation of environmental monitoring, the company did not comply with it, which delays the environmental impact study. The case highlights tensions between abroad mining investments and local social and environmental impacts, as well as gaps in law enforcement and accounting[45].

The criticism of Chinese investments in Brazil besides concerns the fact that despite encouraging investment due to improvement and fresh jobs, insufficient attention is paid to the risks associated with Beijing's over-control. It is stressed that a crucial part of advanced technologies and value added production stay under Chinese control. Many jobs fall into assembly and logistics, while higher-value activities and key decisions are made in Beijing. The increasing dependence of Brazil on Chinese capital and markets makes the country susceptible to political and economical force from your measure. Furthermore, many of the companies investing are state-owned companies that follow the guidelines of the Communist organization of China and can usage their control of critical infrastructure and resources to influence Brazil's policy. Trade patterns reenforce this imbalance: Brazil exports mainly natural materials to China while importing higher-value industrial goods, which may endanger to accelerate the deindustrialisation of Brazil and weaken its economical complexity[46].

In conclusion, Chinese investments in Brazil since 2023 indicate strategical activity of Beijing beyond conventional exports of natural materials. The mining sector and the extraction of strategical minerals specified as copper and lithium are inactive of large importance for Beijing, peculiarly in the context of China's industrial priorities for energy transformation. Without these natural materials, electrical vehicles and batteries could not be produced. At the same time, it is clear that you are active in energy projects, peculiarly renewable energy, which indicates a broader approach and long-term commitment. Diplomatic cooperation and participation in BRICS have undoubtedly influenced the recovery of investment, which shows a close link between policy and the economy. However, investments face challenges in the form of regulatory controls, environmental and social concerns, which could affect the direction of investment in the future. A full of 2023 – 2025 is simply a period of clear indication of the presence in Brazil by the Central State, which is increasingly moving from tiny projects and trade-based relationships to deeper investment strategies. Monitoring the implementation of projects, backing structures and social responses will be crucial to knowing the changing economical and political dynamics between the 2 countries.

[1] Wang, Fei. (2020). China-Brazil Cooperation in Infrastructure Construction Progress, Challenges and Approaches. The Chinese diary of global Politics.

[2] https://english.elpais.com/economy-and-business/2025-08-28/china-accelerates-investment-in-brazil-while-the-us-punishes-it-with-tariffs.html (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[3] https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/brazil-deepens-bond-china/ (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[4] https://news.mongabay.com/2025/09/rare-earth-rush-endangers-rural-communities-and-conservation-areas-in-brazil/ (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[5] https://fundacionandresbello.org/en/news/brazil-%F0%9F%87%A7%F0%9F%87%B7/brazil-reports-a-48-increase-in-rare-earth-exports-to-china-during-the-first-half-of-2025/ (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[6] https://restofworld.org/2025/china-rare-earth-export-curb-brazil/ (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[7] https://edition.cnn.com/2025/07/30/politics/brazil-tariff-trump-executive-order (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[8] https://english.elpais.com/economy-and-business/2025-08-28/china-accelerates-investment-in-brazil-while-the-us-punishes-it-with-tariffs.html (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[9] http://www.pbc.gov.cn/en/3688110/3688172/3713600/index.html (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[10] http://english.scio.gov.cn/international exchanges/2023-03/31/content 85203377.htm (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[11] http://theexchangeasia.com/brazil-china-launch-joint-investment-fund/ (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[12] https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/05/04/brazil-can-be-both-richer-and-greener-world-bank-group-outlines-opportunities-for-climate-action-and-growth (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[13] https://www.efunds.com.cn/en/upload/resources/file/2025/02/10/ANewEraofGrowthandOpportunity.pdf (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[14] Ibid.

[15] https://www.alvarezandmarsal.com/thought-leadership/china-s-strategic-investment-surge-in-brazil-m-a-activity-hits-eight-year-high (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[16] https://www.cebc.org.br/2024/09/03/investimentos-chines-crescem-33-no-brasil-em-2023-com-foco-em-energias-verdes-e-carros-eletricos/ (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[17] https://discoveryalert.com.au/china-investment-brazil-energy-2025-impact-resources/ (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[18] https://www.cebc.org.br/2025/09/04/brasil-foi-a-economia-emergente-que-mais-recebeu-investimentos-chines-em-2024/ (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[19] https://ionanalytics.com/insights/mergermarket/chinese-ma-deal-volume-in-brazil-hits-eight-year-high-for-first-semester-dealspeak-latin-america/ (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[20] https://brics.br/en/news/brics-summit-signs-historic-commitment-in-rio-for-more-inclusive-and-sustainable-governance (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[21] https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/brazil-deepens-bond-china/ (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[22] https://www.reuters.com/world/brazil-seeks-china-trade-boost-amide-trump-tariff-chaos-lula-meets-xi-2025-05-12/ (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[23] https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/internacional/en/business/2025/05/chinese-company-to-invest-5-bilion-in-brazil-to-production-everything-from-jet-fuel-to-cars.html (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[24] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-visits-brasilia-cap-tour-flexing-diplomatic-cloud-2024-11-20/ (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[25] https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/politica/noticia/2025-05/china-boost-investments-brazil-27b-lula-says (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[26] Scissors, D. (2024). China’s Global Activity: Building Grabs the Spotlight from Owning. American Enterprise Institute. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep61696 (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[27] https://discoveryalert.com.au/china-investment-brazil-energy-2025-impact-resources/ (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[28] Ibid.

[29] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/chinas-spic-invests-147-million-brazil-wind-farms-launches-solar-parks-2024-06-05/ (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[30] https://discoveryalert.com.au/china-investment-brazil-energy-2025-impact-resources/ (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[31] https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2024/trends-in-electric-cars (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[32] https://noticiasambientales.com/sustainability/sales-of-chinese-electric-cars-growth-in-south-america-investments-in-peru-and-brazil-consolidated-them-in-the-region/ (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[33] https://english.elpais.com/economy-and-business/2025-08-28/china-accelerates-investment-in-brazil-while-the-us-punishes-it-with-tariffs.html (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[34] https://www.tridge.com/news/agro-accounts-for-only-5-of-chinese-investme-ysnwnc (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[35] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/economy/article/2025/08/06/chinese-service-company-are-targeting-brazil 6744105 19.html (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[36] https://www.caixinglobal.com/2025-10-31/meituans-expansion-into-brazil-sets-up-showdown-with-local-food-delivery-services-102377974.html (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[37] https://www.forumchinaplp.org.mo/en/economic trade/view/8848 (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[38] https://asia.nikkei.com/business/business-trends/from-mixue-to-byd-chinese-brands-move-into-brazil (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[39] https://www.ft.com/content/972b4547-391b-4110-b781-317e3f6ced3 (accessed 29.11.2025).

[40] https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/byd-brought-hundreds-chinese-workers-brazil-irregular-visas-inspector-2025-01-08/ (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[41] https://www.dw.com/en/byd-brazil-scandal-exposes-flaws-in-chinese-investment/a-71249057 (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[42] Ibid.

[43] https://news.mongabay.com/2025/06/brazil-china-megarailway-raises-deforestation-warnings-in-the-amazon/ (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[44] https://agenciacenarium.com.br/the-amazon-china-connection/?lang=en (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[45] https://entornodiario.com/en GB/articles/gc4/features/2025/05/21/feature-01 (accessed: 29.11.2025).

[46]https://riotimesonline.com/brazils-dangerous-dependence-lula-turns-nation-into-chinas-strategic-hub/ (accessed: 29.11.2025).