Interview with Zbigniew Parishovich: Political spheres of relations between Poland and Ukraine and their impact on current challenges in Central and east Europe – And part

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Agata Krygier: We know what Andrzej Duda's relation with Volodymyr Zelenski looked like before and during the war. What about the accounts for the presidency of Alexander Kwasniewski? And what part did the representatives of the Polish government (including Radosław Sikorski) have in the democratisation of Ukraine and its about Western structures (EU, NATO)? What about the controversy surrounding the Yanukovych-Yushchenko presidential election?

Zbigniew Parishovich: Aleksander Kwasniewski built semi-private relations in order to be able to usage them in a critical situation. The Orange Revolution was not the first 1 to appeal to them. Kwasniewski had previously favoured Kuczma in the incidental with spikes, i.e. during Ukraine's accusations of arms exports to Saddam Hussein. This was at the tallness of the war on terrorism. For Ukraine, specified accusations were politically lethal. Then there was the orange revolution. It was not Kwasniewski who led to the repetition of the second round. This was done by the Ukrainian justice system, which made a political decision. On the another hand, Kwasniewski played a very crucial function in building an atmosphere around the request to repeat the second tour, which Janukowych manipulated. This was helped by the semi-private relations with Kuczma and the awareness of the Polish president that the crisis must be resolved politically, not forcefully, as the Yanukovych environment wanted. A large part of the oligarchy planet besides did not want bloodshed. They did business abroad. In the West. They wanted to keep doing it, not be isolated. Kuczma's son-in-law was Wiktor Pinczuk, or oligarch recognized as a typical of a business oriented towards the West. To this day, the Russians reiterate the thesis that Kwasniewski then brought an American informing to Ukraine for Yanukovych and his surroundings. This informing was meant to be concrete cognition of their abroad accounts and investments. They'd lose them if they were to escalate.

Ukraine did not follow the way of Belarus. Putin failed to build a kruku couple With Yanukovych. Yanukovych failed to dress or – referring to fieni – clothes’ a crime so that no 1 in the West can shake hands with him. This script was only fulfilled in 2014, during the Revolution of Dignity.

In 2004, Putin in Ukraine lost and never forgot this to Kwasniewski. Yanukovych left as a compromise. He was not met by dintojra from orange politicians. He returned to politics in 2007 as Prime Minister. Later in 2010 he won the Ukrainian presidential election democratically and without forgery. At the time, a compromise was reached. Besides, even before the Orange Revolution, the first major effort was made to clothe Ukrainian elites in blood. It was an effort to poison Yushchenko during the 2004 campaign. It didn't work.

Eventually, Yushchenko won, but over time, disappointment with orange mayane led to Yanukovych's return, which went towards authoritarianism. And so we scope Sikorski, which is erstwhile he and Carl Bildt lobbied behind the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. NATO was closed. EU integration was not frozen. Until the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest, Sikorski remained a keen supporter of Ukraine's rapprochement to the Alliance. After closing the window of opportunity, he focused on the procedures for rapprochement to the EU. Yanukovych enters these conversations. Negotiates, but at the same time avenges against political opponents: he puts erstwhile head of the MMA Yuri Łucenka and erstwhile Prime Minister Julia Tymoshenko in jail. Kwasniewski then returns to the game, which forms the mission of the European Parliament together with Pat Cox. They go to talk about freeing political prisoners. So, on the 1 hand, negotiations of the association agreement are underway, and on the another hand, the conversation between Kwasniewski and Cox on the release of political prisoners.

Agata Krygier: Prior to the EU-Ukraine Summit in November 2013, Viktor Yanukovych suspended the preparation process for signing an association agreement with the European Union. He argued that it was due to deteriorating trade relations with Russia.

Zbigniew Parishovich: This summit was 2 days old and was intended to negociate any controversial issues. Yanukovych came to Vilnius under Russian blackmail. It's about a gathering in Sochi that happened just before Vilnius. Another Bohoslovska, erstwhile Yanukovych co-worker and MP of the organization of Regions, reported this gathering of Putin with Yanukovych. According to her, he got out and looked like he died. Most likely then Putin threatened Yanukovych with annexing Crimea. The president of Ukraine so refuses to sign an agreement with the EU. People go to Majdan. There's a bloodbath. Yanukovych is compromised and Ukraine on the edge. The president lacks the psyche to stay and search compromise. He's scared. He's getting away. And Putin anekts Crimea and causes separatistism on Donbas.

Agata Krygier: Berkut was liquidated. The decision to disband the formation was made by Arsen Awakov – acting head of the MMA. Berkut was celebrated for his bloody pacification of protests in Kiev's Maidan. Records have been documented in which officers shoot demonstrators with sharp ammunition.

Zbigniew Parafianovich: Berkut's gone. Majdan elites take over. Ukraine's heading west. An association agreement has been signed. I was in Kiev on Majdan. I was besides in the first days after Majdan's triumph and during the annexation of Crimea. It was the only minute Putin could have conquered Ukraine at least to the left bank of Dnieper. The country had no army or armed forces at the time. Everything was stolen. The annexation of Crimea is, among another things, the consequence of the complete disintegration of the army. Army deployment and Russian infiltration of peculiar services. The full SBU delegation in Symferopol advocated Russia. She joined the FSB. Everyone, no exception. And that's erstwhile Putin hesitated.He didn't take the hazard of a full invasion. He wasn't ready for her. Separatism, however, was established. Donetsk, Lugansk were taken, and for a minute the Russians even had Slavic and Kramatorsk. Porezhice managed to recapture these areas, which besides shows that despite all this, the Russians were not as strong as it seemed. Mariupol was maintained despite repeated artillery and land attacks. The city has managed to hold. But all this shows us a certain continuity of Putin's escalation ladder.

Agata Krygier: Let's halt at Petro Peroshence, please. Was he connected to Leszek Balcerowicz? This is about political cooperation. Could you explain the proposal that Petro Poroshenko made to Leszek Balcerowicz?

Zbigniew Parishovich: Poroshenko offered him the position of Prime Minister. Leszek Balcerowicz confirmed it in a conversation with me. In a alternatively cynical calculation Poroshenko Balcerowicz was to be a shield in talks with the IMF. For many years the Ukrainian budget has been on the credit lines of the global Monetary Fund. The point is that the state faces constant problems: security, corruption or public finances. Balcerowicz was so to guarantee that Ukraine carries out reforms in line with the will of the IMF. Balcerovich refused. Good, 'cause he'd most likely be a figurehead. Traditionally, the government in Ukraine is just a flower for a goat. A centre that administers, not sets policy directions. The same is actual now: Szmyhal is simply a figurehead of Zelenski. He's not alone. Balcerowicz so refuses, but even earlier there was a question of the introduction of ministers to the Ukrainian government. And it was already negotiated on the Duda-Poroschenko line, with the participation of Krzysztof Szczerski. In the end, Poroshenko cheated on Duda. He played for the opposition. To this day, there is simply a belief on the right that Poroshenko treated the PiS from the beginning as a seasonal party. The Polish side no longer trusted Poroszka. She had her reasons.

Agata Krygier: As we know, the countries of Central Europe, specified as Slovakia, Hungary and Romania, likewise as Poland protested in 2023 against Ukraine's agricultural or transport policy. Farmers and carriers besides opposed the solutions adopted by the EU to defend the environment and protested against the force on the marketplace caused by imports of Ukrainian agricultural products.

Zbigniew Parafianovich: Ukraine wants access to the single marketplace as wide as possible. But I have the impression that Polish elites – regardless of their colours – realize the consequences of this access.

Agata Krygier: "A fruitful gathering with Prime Minister Donald Tuski. We talked about the free movement of goods across borders, the improvement of border infrastructure and energy cooperation. We agreed to resume intergovernmental consultations. Grateful for supporting Ukraine's intentions to become an EU and NATO associate as shortly as possible. That's what Denys Szmyhal wrote about relations with the fresh government.

Zbigniew Parishovich: possibly from Szmyhal's point of view Donald Tusk's visit to Kiev was a reset. From the point of view of Poland, not necessarily. In politics towards Kiev there is continuity. The communicative doesn't change and it won't change. Conflicting economical interests will make tensions. 1 cannot scope for the argument that Poland is making Ukraine a hostage. Or the argument that protests at the border block transports with help. Last time I came back from east Ukraine, I saw myself how on the border with Poland life of NGOs was hindered, which carried medical assistance to the front. But the side causing problem was Ukrainians, not Poles. This painting is gray, not black white.

Poland helps Ukraine and actively supports it in safety policy. But we have our interests. Recently, 1 politician from the Ukrainian government spoke about the request to renew humanitarian aid for Ukraine, specifically for Kharkivszczyzna. It was just after the Russian offensive opened at Kharkov. I think this aid could start an hr after unlocking the exhumation of Polish victims in Ukraine. I am convinced that Poland is ready for this.

Agata Krygier: Should we take the position Erdogan presents in Turkey at the time of the reset? He supported Sweden's accession to European structures, but it turned out that Turkey would receive a twelve F16 in return. Can he do as Prime Minister Viktor Orban did in Hungary? powerfully negotiates with the European Union and in exchange for supporting financial assistance Ukraine will receive a large injection of EU money.

Zbigniew Parafianovich: Each of these cases is different. Erdogan has indeed gained a large deal, due to the fact that not only aircraft, but besides a change in Swedish legislation, which concerns very delicate issues of freedom of assembly. The situation of Poland and Turkey is incomparable. Turkey is another player in NATO. It seems that simple transactions in Poland would not should be successful.

Agata Krygier: How do the United States see Germany's function internationally, especially now that they are active in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

Zbigniew Parishovich: This is due to Germany's potential. From the position of Germany and the function that the United States has attributed to Germany since the late 1980s. It is the celebrated concept of “partnership in leadership” which was formulated by George Bush elder in Mainz in 1989. He meant to give Germany management of the transformation process in Central Europe after the fall of communism. The same is actual of Ukraine now. That's what Sullivan wrote in his programming texts about politics towards Ukraine and Germany.

The United States see Germany as this neopartner in leadership, which will administer the peace and transformation process in Ukraine. Believing that Poland may be number 1 is magical thinking. Rammstein syndrome causes the United States to proceed from Germany. They won't quit due to the fact that they're calculating profits and losses. It's a pragmatic approach. The PiS team's mistake was to be completely abstract from this aspect. And surviving in the belief that something can be achieved by isolation from Germany. Of course, the responsibility was not only on the Polish side. In many cases Germany has frozen relations with Poland. Whether it's about building a Weimar tank or about Weimar as such.

Agata Krygier: Let us return to the reset issue mentioned by the Prime Minister of Ukraine, Denys Szmyhal during Donald Tusk's visit to Kiev. What strategy should the Polish government take to halt being – as you put it – “Poland in War” – “Texas of the United States”.

Zbigniew Parafianovich: Let's start with the reset gone. The evidence was that the grain was dumped on the Polish-Ukrainian border and that Minister Hetman supported the farmers protesting. Denys Szmyhal did rhetoric. Of course, we must always appreciate the willingness of political elites to cooperate on both sides. The content of this conflict, namely trade, agriculture and services, has not been altered in any way. There are nonsubjective contradictions between interests we can't jump.

Ukrainians like to resolve disputes with Poland through the European Commission, which is more favorable to Ukraine than the Polish government. How can Poland respond to specified situations? 1 way is to introduce unilateral protectionist solutions, specified as the embargo on Ukrainian cereals. In general, the problem of Ukrainian grain in the second edition of the trade conflict between Poland and Ukraine has a much broader and deeper context. This is no longer just a question of Ukrainian grain itself, but mostly general trends in the prices of cereals in the world.

The Russians have mastered a large deal of markets in the mediate East and Africa. They utilized the closure of the Black Sea Trails. They pushed the Ukrainians out of these markets. In the spring, the wheat price fell at times below $200 per tonne. However, there is simply a narrower context. The fact that Polish farmers have the impression that Ukrainians enter the single European marketplace in a brutal way. And without transitional periods that were natural for Central European countries erstwhile they integrated into the European Union.


Agata Krygier: president Zelenski said in 2023 that "only 5% of our agricultural exports pass through the Polish border, so it is not about grain, it is about politics".

Zbigniew Parafianovich: Zelenski uses half-truths. It did not supply data on the quantities of cereals that enter the marketplace and how it affects the price of agricultural products. He didn't mention agricultural products like sugar, eggs, poultry. The liberalisation of EU markets for Ukraine surely created fresh conditions for Polish agriculture – and this is little beneficial. The Polish State has a work to defend Polish farmers and to apply protectionist methods. There's most likely no painless exit here. This dispute can be resolved in 1 day if either organization resigns and simply suffers losses. It better not be the Polish side.


Agata Krygier: During Donald Tusk's visit to Kiev in early 2024, talks were started on the defence package. I mean, crediting military aid. Work on joint production of weapons and ammunition. Will Poland participate in military aid to Ukraine so as to at the same time leave funds in our arms industry?
Zbigniew Parafianovich: It's a large creation erstwhile it comes to facts. Everyone has plans to make ammunition. But no 1 effectively or effectively implemented it. The Tusk Package is the will to sale military equipment on loan. Americans are pushing Poland to find any more russian equipment that can be handed over to Ukrainians for free. And here we are talking about 2 T-72 tank battalions from the Saigon. They're in terrible shape, but they can be renovated. Poland has 12 Mi-24, which are besides in bad condition, but can be a origin of spare parts for Ukrainian assault helicopters. The speech was besides about KUB anti-aircraft kits to be equipped with NATO-made missiles. And this is the military contribution that we could inactive make to aid Ukraine.



Agata Krygier: The German authorities inactive do not want to hand over Taurus long-range missiles. Is this due to fear of escalation? Military experts are of the opinion that the Germans have limited the supply of missiles to 100-150 units due to inadequate storage.

Zbigniew Parafianovich: In the first batch of ATCMS missiles, those with a scope of up to 165 kilometres, the Americans passed them around 20. besides in the mediocre version, which is shorter range. The situation of Ukraine on the front could now improve long-range missiles. That could change the situation on the front. We're talking about the failure of Awdijika and the march to Pokrowsk. About losing 40 square kilometers towards Kupansk. About moving Russians towards Robotny or towards the Jaru Times. But on the another hand, we are one more time in the second utmost of reasoning about war, as is the counteroffensive. There was talk that the Ukrainians would get everything. From the point of view of Ukraine, any political trends in the planet are unfavourable. And it's not just Trump himself who questions Article 5. It's besides about the temper among Republicans in Congress. It besides applies to the globalisation of the alleged Global South which Putin is seeking.

Agata Krygier: Apart from the EU support programme "Facility Programme", can we number on the financial support of Ukraine for military purposes from another countries?

What about the freezing of Russian assets in the West? At what phase and will it come to pass?

Zbigniew Parafianovich: The European Union has adopted 51 billion aid. They'll feed Ukraine's budget. The Pillar of EU military aid raises controversy and resistance, including Hungary. If we look at the amounts of bilateral warrant agreements, then they are much smaller than what the Americans give. Britain predicted £2.5 billion for this year. France around EUR 3 billion. So did Germany. This totals about EUR 10 billion, 1 sixth of Biden's package. His program is $61 billion. It allows you to hold an IV war, but it does not let you to make breakthroughs.

As far as Russian assets are concerned, it is realistic to usage profits from money that are frozen. The West will most likely not go to the maximum option, i.e. the transfer of all frozen assets to Ukraine. Fears of confiscating western property in Russia will win. On the 1 hand, of course, we have narratives against Putin and Proukrain, but on the another hand, we besides have a calculation of profits and losses. Last time we had an example of Ecuador. The country was expected to be active in a global weapons collection program for Ukraine. At the last minute, he withdrew from it after blackmail with restrictions on exports to Russia.


Agata Krygier: Is the equipment for equipping the Polish army adequate to effectively deter Russia from escalation? Should we, like the Baltic States or Scandinavia, take care of civilian defence? Demographer Ariel Drabiński verified evacuation plans in major cities in Poland. The conclusions are alarming: 4 cities, including Warsaw, do not have a 3rd degree evacuation plan.

Zbigniew Parishovich: Saying brutally effective defence against Russia is proving to it that we are ready to stand up for the fight massively. Then we can actually talk about effective deterrence. This is an example of the Scandinavian countries that are now going into this model. On the 1 hand, they have professional armed forces and, on the another hand, the anticipation of mobilising a immense number of citizens. And this resistance, in addition to the modernisation of the armed forces, is simply a deterrent.

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