To full explain what Systems-Worlds are, Immanuel Wallerstein had to discuss repeatedly what they are not. First of all, he argued that the planet Systems were not identical to the planet System.[and].
Concept World-Systems This is due to the fact that it assumes the existence of a separate, single being in which the strategy and the planet are one, alternatively than any form of the existence of the first on another or within another. Therefore, it cannot be confused with ‘economic worlds’Fernanda Braudela[ii], these can coexist several, not necessarily within the same system. First of all, World-Systems are not in any way the same as the empire, even the Empire-World, for which a homogeneous political component is key, while The system-World is primarily the Economy-World, characterized by ‘axis division’, i.e. economical relations between a clear centre and processes / peripheral areasand[iii]. In practice, this means that, first of all, not only ours, but the only reality of the System-World is capitalism, which is its immanent part, the creator, the material and the effect simultaneously. Secondly, that System-World capitalism is more than just the sum of the capitalisms of its individual components[iv].
1. Accumulation, hierarchy, exploitation, polarisation and uneven exchange
Wallerstein did not hide his Marxist inspiration, but at the same time began to argue with any views of the author Capital, e.g. on the occurrence and meaning of "progress". In fact, I. Wallerstein's thought remains Marxist on 2 key issues: first, the perception of accumulation as the main and infinite origin forming and supporting Systems- Worlds[v]. Secondly, regarding the designation as key class relationships[vi], even by accepting specified categorisation between countries within the planet Systems[vii]. Yes, full countries can besides exploit – or be exploited. This is 1 of I. Wallerstein's first highly crucial conclusions for Poland. In fact, he expressed it plainly, writing about the transformation after 1989: “In a given time, only a fewer countries with a immense number of aspiring appear space to improve their position within the global economy. In east Europe in the 1990s, especially Poles, Hungarians and Czechs hoped to be among those chosen. They were wrong.’[viii].
Other characteristics of alleged capitalism include those taken from Arghiri Emmanuel “unequal exchange’[ix], despite the passage of 5 centuries inactive well hidden under slogans o "rational elections" is "Common benefits" all participants in capitalist relations (not only commercial). Capitalism is besides characterized by features besides found in another systems, specified as triad-based ‘hierarchy-exploitation-polarisation’, however, which are strategical and functional elements in the present planet System, not in another cases, by-products of politics.
One of the more frequently discussed assumptions of the Systems-World explanation – is the date of the formation of capitalism indicated by I. Wallerstein for the 16th century, in borrowed from Giovanni Arrighi concept ‘extended duration’[x]. The author has repeatedly defended the chronology adopted, of course besides introducing complementary periodicalization, both related to its expansion and interior organization. Generally, the System-World expanded through the incorporation of zones previously outside its perimeter. The reorganisations were related to the phenomena described and calculated by Nikolai Kondratieva as part of his long wave theory[xi]. As part of the 3 waves described by the author himself, based on statistical data, the changing stages of growth A and end B, each lasting about 30 years, are observed. According to I. Wallerstein, these processes continue, and in order to complete the image they should be applied to the hegemonic cycle, allowing to separate between periods of Dutch dominance in the 17th century, British domination in the 19th century and American domination in the 20th century.
1.1. “...let what bloody Hegemon?”
As we know, according to G. Arrighi, this list should be extended to include proto-capitalistic genealogy at the turn of the 13th / 14th century. It was besides G. Arrighi who best described the differences between successive hegemons and their methods of implementation[xii]. This is due to the fact that the Genueans, thanks to their spread diaspora, built a powerful network of capital, which in effect had to be treated as an equal partner even by the then strongest states (especially the Iberian ones), successfully utilizing their own competition for financial assets for their own expansion, and also, in a way, hiring to carry out tasks more forceful, specified as achieving political goals, or financial goals through wars. The Dutch improved this strategy by combining elements of the earlier cities/trade republics with their own territorial authority, allowing them to decision distant from the necessity of buying state protection. British supremacy in turn consisted in the anticipation of relying on its own production capacity, and thus the financial origin was supplemented by industrial. Finally, the United States has already gone beyond the national framework and, as G. Arrighi writes, has internalised not only financial costs (like Genoa), protective costs (like the United Provinces), production costs (like the UK), but besides transaction costs, in the form of global marketplace control. Author The Long 20th Century At the same time, he noted that each successive hegemon was gaining an advantage, utilizing not so much the strategy of a declassed predecessor as alternatively his predicament last time. The Dutch strategy was so a improvement of Venetian, The British referred back to the Genuese patterns, while the Americans referred to the Dutch. So are we now facing a review of the imperiality of the global financial-commercial-production power for the British prayer? We will return to this at the end of our deliberations.
The presumption of accumulation, cyclicality, processes of formation and replacement of hegemony and the incorporated nature of expansion formed 1 of the most crucial distinctions of the capitalist System-World, the axial nature of work. Expresses it solid as a regulation core-semi-peripheries-peripheries, where the division of labour is carried out, followed by flow of additional value, always towards countries and products of a central nature[xiii]. The rule itself did not change even the existence of Declaratively non-systemic states, especially communist states, which, in fact, remained interdependent with the axial division of labour and in commercial relations with the capitalist system-world, could not only make a real alternate for it, but actually functioned within it.[xiv].
1.2. Poland, Russia and the planet System
So – we could recognise – the peripheral position of Poland turns out to be an inevitability, since historically we did not have a chance to be outside the planet System? Well, the problem is that specified corporations did not happen simultaneously, or in the same way, even in our part of the world. To these various Wallerstein devoted quite a few space in the first volume of his opus magnum, The Modern World-System:Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century[xv]. From our point of view, it seems most crucial to compare the incorporate processes of the Polish Republic and the Moscow State. The key and most crucial difference was that The Polish-Lithuanian dominant classes themselves demanded the inclusion of the system-world (i.e. the European planet economy at the time) in the most utmost form, the economy which was open to the maximum. The large financial crisis of 1557, which in the West brought simply the replacement of any bankers' powers with others – in the Republic of Poland it permanently overtook the position of proto-burge, and an increasingly powerful magnate saw her own interest in the adoption by the Republic of Poland of a consistently peripheral position. This evidently had known consequences in terms of both the class structure and the established political system. Also, which is little frequently analysed in Poland – it had an impact on the state of consciousness, especially spiritual Poles. Unlike Max Weber, who believes that capitalist states have become such, among others, thanks to Protestant ethics – I. Wallerstein and G. Arrighi points to the exact opposite: the core countries adopted Protestantism due to the fact that they were or were just becoming capitalist (with the crucial exception of France). This peripherality has thus established Catholicism in Poland, among others. Note bene This was geopolitically linked to the submission of Polish abroad activity not only to the Church, but frequently besides to the Habsburg cooperating with it. Indeed, as an economically peripheral state, we were in subjection not even to the current hegemon, but to the local power aspiring with the centre in Germany. Doesn't that sound familiar?
At the same time, i.e. in the 16th century, Moscow remained in practice outside the European planet economy, despite maintaining trade relations with core countries, especially with England. Unlike in the Republic of Poland, there has been no dependence on the export of 1 product (cereals) and 1 trade way (wisled). The Grand Duchy of Moscow already had imperial features at the time, and economically it was primarily an interior market, protected by Tsar's signs from uncontrolled external interference. At the same time, magnates and nobles continued their efforts to strengthen the position of abroad trade at the expense of Polish-Lithuanian bourgeoisie and manufacturers. Apart from another negative effects, this effectively dried the Republic of Poland out of the capital brought to the West, and the deficiency of active monetary policy paralyzed any political or military capabilities of the country.
Meanwhile, the Russians (especially after the business of Kazan and Astrachania) benefited from trade, but importantly larger from the exchange on the Asian section. More specifically, the state and the state, namely the car-self-employed make a fresh participating class (courtian) and a fresh safety device (pripicin). Paradoxically, however, the biggest success of Moscow's day Ivan the Terrible There was not even the very strengthening of the state, but... failure. precisely the failure in the Inflantic Wars, which further delayed Moscow's inclusion in the system, without allowing the expected beginning of the Baltic Gates for Western trade and finance. erstwhile again, the Russians saved comparative isolation. As a consequence of this almost age-old slip even erstwhile the corp yet arrived – Russia immediately took a semi-peripheral position within the System-World, giving it a clear handicap to the neighbors. In fact, Moscow was already Western Eurazia alternatively than east Europe at the time – I. Wallerstein agreed with Giegij Wiernadski[xvi].
Wallerstein, himself from the household of tiny Polish Jews (immigrants to America) never lost sight of Polish affairs, analyzing both the debt trap in which the Grykowski PRL fell in the 1970s, Solidarity and its consequences and yet the return of the Republic to its favourite peripheral position within the capitalist system-world. Of course, all these events, however, were not even the causes of his further analysis.
1.3. Change without change?
Continuing its presentation, it is worth noting here that the concept of Systems-Worlds is not a closed theory, as evidenced by its gradual addition to non-economic factors, including those referring to Antonio Gramsci concept geoculture, within the meaning of I. Wallerstein as a product of capitalism, and as a reaction to attempts to disrupt it[xvii]. This origin is not only applicable for the current strategy management (e.g. through racism and sexism), but may besides be an indicator of its change or breakdown, which I. Wallerstein considered possible (despite his pessimism)[xviii]. The catalysts of the crisis of capitalism are its interior contradictions, the exhaustion of the directions of continued accumulation and the questioning of paradigm, namely the undermining of the legitimacy of the planet strategy on the ground of geoculture[xx]. The alternative, on the another hand, is the "di Lampedusa option", a strategy change that allows it to stay unchanged in its essence. How? Among another things, thanks to controlled changes in the global commodity chain.
2. Cuffed by a global chain
Definition of global commodity chains (global community chainsWe owe T. K. Hopkins and I. Wallerstein[xxx], but the phenomenon is of course much older and, as the explanation of Systems-Worlds teaches, has already been observed in the 16th century. It was then known from ancient times that trade over border barriers began to transform into a network in which both labour and manufacturing processes were linked in order to accomplish a complete good. The essence of the process is so its networking, i.e. spatial link, complementarity and interdependence of production processes, alternatively than interstate or commercial relations. essential condition global community chains it was so the emergence of capitalist forms of production, and this besides means the capital itself and the marketplace in the Marxist meaning adopted by Immanuel Wallerstein.
2.1. Always towards the core
Capital and its pursuit of infinite accumulation are realised in a space where value meets (Wert), exchange value (Tauschwert) and useful value (Gebrauchswert) goods. Thus, the question of location and competition in space has become an crucial component of the production and exchange processes, which, as a consequence of the capitalist system, is unequal, i.e. peripheral products are replaced by core products, as described by A. Emmanuel[xxi]. specified additional value transfer shall always be made to the core regardless of the nature of the goods exchanged, which has changed over time, including in fresh decades.
The historically well-known classical work-sharing cycle, described inactive by Adam Smith and David Ricardo as part of their comparative advantage theory, recommended the specialization of production according to its cost at a given location. It was so natural to consider the process in which the exchange took place according to the pattern of industrial goods / highly processed from core to periphery – natural materials and agricultural products from periphery to core. The shift of production from industrial core countries to developing countries observed since the 1960s was so considered by any researchers to be a disturbance or disruption of the system, prompting a search for New global Division of Labour Theory[xxii]. Indeed, as David Harvey rightly pointed out, the changes recorded fall within the Marxist logic of competition law, including in terms of location and space. What is important, contrary to the tendency to recognise stableness in any prominent places as an component of competitive advantage – rather, the mobility of capital is an immanent feature, and so there is simply a constant tendency to multiply additional value, both through technological changes and relocations.[xxiii]. This link of technology and location is besides essential to realize the current reversal, while maintaining the same direction of accumulation. This is due, inter alia, to the change in capital needs for certain types and quantities of labour.
2.2. Competition for Unwanted Residues
Wallerstein described the stages of the gradual exhaustion of quasi-monopoly capitalists and the resulting shift of core processes on the periphery[xxiv]. His attention was drawn in this passage especially by the attitude of the semi-peripheral states, which compete with each another for specified end-to-end production processes, which could lead to a trap of average development[xxx]. In fact, the competition of semi-periphery itself is mostly regulated by core countries, which clearly prefers the transfer of production processes to controlled countries managed in a composting manner. Known examples of this are, of course, the pseudo-reindustrialisation of Central Europe and the exudation by Poland, Slovakia and Romania, among others, of the honour of hosting assembly plants which are pushed out of core countries.
In fact, a akin mechanics exists within the periphery, which has undergone industrialisation in many cases over the past decades, without achieving any erstwhile development. On the another hand, there is simply a crucial social cost associated with the change, which any researchers associate with the Dutch "anemia"[xxx]. Taking over by the periphery of production tasks that have been abandoned in the core increases uncertainty and inconsistencies with the fresh reality. Contrary to the hopes of analysts to decision on to the "over-organized solidarity" phase, in many places of the globalised world, the fresh paradigm coexists with the remains of the old, as well as elements of the erstwhile division of labour[xxvii]. The “creative destruction” announced by Joseph Schumpeter within the periphery and semi-periphery is mainly successful in destruction. And it was as predictable as possible at the beginning of the process[xxxiii]. Also, somewhat akin at this phase from the simulator of the "liberal democracy", utilized as a bait – liberalism itself remains, despite its propaganda of the "freedom" of the relay, in a version closer to totalizm.
The situation of the core is besides classly differentiated in this respect. The real effect of changing global supply chains in core countries is deindustrialisation. According to any researchers, its causes were exogenous, as the change in qualitative and quantitative request for work in core countries was secondary to liberalisation and export orientation of trade[xxx]. This, on the another hand, was subject to acceptance of the globalisation of free movement of capital. Whether it was the first intention or not, it besides resulted in a change of a political and so social nature, i.e. a weakening of the position of work towards capital, not only within the core[xxx].
2.3. Is there a fresh core?
The change described, although striking especially for workers and consumers, does not so contradict the logic of capitalism, but is its consequence. They predicted it precisely Marx and Engels announcing replacing old industries with fresh ones, creating fresh needs and gathering them by controlling global community chains[xxxi]. Time has indeed destroyed space, with no reason to presume that this process has already been completed. On the contrary, as I. Wallerstein predicted, after moving to semi-peripheral sectors specified as automotive, chemistry and electronics, further relocation of e.g. the computer or space manufacture will be possible.[xxxii]. Researchers disagree whether specified processes constitute a recovery strategy or alternatively a symptom of the end phase of the current system-world cycle. However, it is noted that the advance of the semi-periphery to the core will not change the essence of the process, but the fact is that in the pursuit of further accumulation, the capital itself can besides be relocated, creating its fresh centre. A situation where fresh centres of capital, production and return work can be located in the same centre, i.e. as expected in China, can so mark the beginning of a fresh cycle, the threat of a breakdown and destabilization, or a complete change in direction and scope which is presently hard to predict[xxxiii].
As a result, any of the main threats present are seen as a consequence of the further increase in income inequality, both within and between the countries of the planet strategy and among them, while the countermeasures see global migration.
3. Inequality in poverty. Liberal Utopia Branko Milanović
It would be hard to analyse the state and perspectives of capitalism without noticing and trying to measurement its most apparent contemporary effect: the expanding inequality. John Kenneth Galbraith, distinguishing equality from inequality, noted that “The first is the ideal, while the second is the reality”[xxxiv]. Everyday to be studied Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus, Karl Marx, John Meynard Keynes, Joseph Schumpeter and Simon Kuznets – of course, mainly in terms of economical interest, i.e. in terms of wages, income and assets. Of course, the large economists differed, in peculiar as regards the assessment and prediction of the effects of inequality and its continuation. In fact, only Branko Milanović proposed to organise views on inequality in the 3 main groups. The first is to focus on the inequality between nations. The second takes into account the population factor. Finally, the 3rd concept is to survey global inequality, taking into account the full global population understood as a collection of individuals whose level of income, earnings and wealth is studied both in terms of time, historically and spatially[xxxv].
B. Milanović himself clearly advocates the 3rd option, which (as he points out) in simplification can be expressed as aggregate inequalities between nations and within them, and so both class and geographically determined inequalities.[xxxi]. In fact, of these 2 factors, class and location – the former, however, confers mainly historical significance, as he sees the growth of gaps between labour revenues in individual countries. Thus, their proletarians did not unite but clearly differentiated[xxxvii]. It was so essential to introduce an additional set of factors to better track the global distribution of inequalities. There was even a separate term: the inequality of possibilities, which is the 1 affected by someone's race, gender, household origin, different from the inequality modified by individual effort or even... happiness[xxxviii].
3.1. poorness Against Inequality
To find the level of inequality, economists usage indicators specified as Lorenzo curve, i.e. the graphical expression of the population's income divided as a consequence of surveys into the corresponding quantums on the x-axis comparative to the share of income for each quantum on the y-axis. Ginnie Index is in turn a geometrical expression of this graph, written in the form of a expression [A/(A + B)] * 100, where A is the area between the Lorenzo curve and the line under the 45 degree account, and B the area between this curve and the axes[xxx]. As well as statistical Theila indexThese tools, of course, hold their illustrative usefulness, but B. Milanović and his supporters propose to supplement them with another indicator: income origin cooperative, to diversify income from labour and capital and thus to further research the interior complexity of inequality[xl]. Of course, it is besides more crucial to examine the real purchasing power of income[xli] than e.g. analysis of GDP per capita[xlii]. All the more so, due to the fact that the weak point of typical meters of inequality is the difficulty of utilizing them in relation to the past, due to the deficiency of adequate survey data, and based primarily on extrapolation of the list referred to as ‘social tables’. B. Milanović, however, believes that despite the differences in the environment – changes in inequality in the pre-modern era can be analysed in the same context as today. To this end, the author developed the Kuznetsian hypothesis of the "turned U" into his own concept of the "Kuznets wave". This is crucial not only historically, but besides explains the comparative optimism of the author assuming that we can anticipate not so much a future decline in inequality measured e.g. by Gini's indicator, but besides that global income convergence will increase.[xliii]. It is this prognostic component of B. Milanović's explanation that raises peculiar criticisms as a subjective explanation alternatively than an economical model. The concept of inequality itself is considered secondary to the basic category simply poverty[xliv]. It is this old, acquainted categorization that is inactive more cognitive than the otherwise relative, although awesome graph of inequality. This level of poorness in the planet should inactive be a centre of interest, alternatively of seemingly motivated by social engineering statistics.
3.2 Who benefits from inequality?
This is not the only interior contradiction between B. Milanović's assumptions. The examination of the level of inequality is traditionally related to the analysis of its correlation with growth, where Nicholas Kaldor It is frequently considered that "an inequality is not only affirmative for growth but besides necessary". Roy van der Weidemann and Branko Milanović for the 1960-2010 period agreed that significant inequality inhibits the emergence in incomes of the poor, while affirmative increases in incomes of the highest earners[xlv]. Since it is this group that has a greater influence on political decisions (in any case in the United States surveyed) than most – this means that it is likely to like the kind of growth that will keep this negative coupling. Milanović faced this problem by examining the situation after the 2008 crisis, pointing out that his celebrated ivory illustration of income inequality distribution "He lost his trumpet“[xlvi]. It means that post-crisis income growth ‘top 1%” is little than the increase in mediate class income, more specifically in its part located in Asia. More detailed investigation is to confirm the slowdown in the wealthiest income growth while maintaining the growth rate for the lower quantum[xlvii]. However, even researchers mostly agree with Milanović's ideas are willing to accept this forecast only if a global policy is adopted to reduce inequalities at least on a European basis (and preferably Scandinavian from the 1990s) alternatively than, in contrast, American[xlviii].
3.3. Invalid optimism of social intelligence
Milanović's views besides seem to evolve in this respect. Furthermore, its basic recipe for global inequality, namely free migration, has always been complemented by the request for complementary improvement of poorer countries[xlix]. In time, however, there has come to appreciate elements specified as redistributive policy, resulting in a noticeable simplification of inequality in Latin America or Scandinavian "emeryan capitalism", which, with a change in the age structure of societies, besides shifts income from the sphere of work to the sphere of capital, without actually changing the social structure, although maintaining their clear classiness[l].
On the basis of these fresh observations, however, it is hard to find whether the basic assumptions of Milanović's concept will be changed, based inactive on the 1952-2011 studies[li]. It is becoming increasingly hard to exclude China and India from the survey of global inequality; it is besides actual that the gap between rich and mediocre countries is comparatively constant erstwhile identifying the failure and gaining on global growth in the form of this ivory chart. What is increasingly controversial is the prognostic and proposed solutions[sighs]. Milanović continues to represent scepticism as to the prospects of even global redistribution, specified as universal basic income (UBI), praises liberal finance of further sectors, finds a warm word even for the precarriage and holds hopes of further automation of work[whispers]. It so remains an incorrect liberal optimist, and in a philosophical dimension, despite the large methodological achievements in sociology and economics. A imagination of breaking the "location premium" (i.e. the place of birth) by migration until the change of place of work and residence will be motivated only, for example, by the desire to live in a country with little rainfall, while deficiency of class awareness – so far it seems to be something between utopia and... conspiracy theory[liv]. However, he perfectly explains the stubborn promotion of migration processes by centres curious in sustaining and globalisation, and capitalism, and so the present planet System. However, this raises opposition and so far chaotic and mostly manipulated attempts at resistance.
4. Populism – incomplete answer to the right questions?
Population, like many another political phenomena, is easier to describe than define[lv]. First of all, due to the fact that it is simply a form of politics alternatively than ideological content. Its left and right variations frequently disagree in priorities and passwords, but not necessarily in sources and motives[lvi]. All these currents combine the self-identification of the "people" as a real and subjective entity, peculiarly within the democratic system. Secondly, the sense of betrayal of this people by decision-makers, elites or even the strategy itself[Lvii]. The common denominations so stay the victim's complex, alienation and recruited opposition caused by a captivating sense of falsehood. “If you are already deceiving us – at least do it decently and consistently!” – others seem to be discouraged from libdemocratic formalism[lviii]. The causes of this dissonance in the context of globalisation were explored Dani Rodrigo pointing out in its celebrated "trilemate" the impossibility of co-existing maximum globalisation, democracy and the national state, in peculiar implementing an effective redistributive policy[lix]. Modern populism is so a reaction to the second and 3rd values – from the first or even against it.
4.1. Globalisation as the highest phase of capitalism
The observed symptoms of the crisis of liberal typical democracy are the level of electoral abstinence, the expanding convergence of political parties and the fluidity of electoral flows between them, the reduced direct engagement of citizens in any form of politically associated activity. Democratic policy appears abroad and external to its theoretical entities, namely voters[lx]. Not only globalisation itself is simply a causal origin in the eyes of opponents, but it is besides primary capitalism, which is in rule not only opposed, but simply destructive to specified social constructs as “freedom” and “democracy”, traditionally utilized to popularise the liberal paradigm and, consequently, to implement capitalism. This is due to its immanent characteristics, specified as the reversal of the control and influence mechanism, so that it takes place from capital – in the face of the public sphere, greater political participation, the precedence of inequality as the essence of capitalism and naturally dictatorial governance structure of capitalist entities[lxi]. Globalisation is so only an intensified phase of capitalism. However, contrary to apparent facts, especially in social circles, the other view is highly popular, with the "clearly affirmative impact of globalisation on democratisation". Contrary to appearances, this is not specified a contradiction. On the contrary, globalization processes can both advance "democratic content" and weaken authoritarian attitudes in non-democratic countries, expanding their vulnerability to full openness, besides economic; and, at the same time, transferring decision-making into a transnational and corporate sphere – catalyze the erosion of alleged old democracies[lxii].
4.2. Degeneration of the left and the fall of the right
Globalisation would have a destructive effect on democracy, and a stimulating effect on populism through associated changes in 2 spheres. Firstly, due to a disturbance in the comparative balance of labour and capital in Western communities prior to the 1980s. economical intensive financialisation, privatization and triumph of the liberal paradigm accelerated the emergence of income inequality, while politically deprived the natural socialist / social democratic left base[lxiii]. The second component was the violation of the integrity and the present state of cultural homogeneity of globalised societies, both through promoted isomorphism and migration[lxiv], which weakened the foundations of the traditionalist worldview associated with the classical right. Focusing on the first vector is so characterized by left-wing populism, especially in Latin America; on the second – the 1 called right-wing, known from Western Europe and the USA[lxv]. In both cases, it is considered the elite and the ruling, but right-wing cultural populism is usually supplemented by ethnic, xenophobic and anti-immigrant factors.[lxvi]. This is besides the consequence of another consequences of globalisation – the failure of class identification, resulting in increased cultural and cultural identification[lxvii].
Of course, the division of the left-right with respect to populism itself is at least controversial, as this attitude is alternatively oriented towards the “up / down” axis. The detailed catalysts of populist movements besides vary. For the United States, this is simply a general opposition to deindustrialisation and a fall in the standard of surviving understood as consequences of globalised free trade, coupled with an unwillingness to immigration competition in the labour market. In the UK, for example, the populist attitude expressed by Brexit combines akin aversion to the globally open labour marketplace with the general support for an idealised imagination of global free trade, limited by the Brussels elites[lxviii]. In both cases, however, globalisation has been a spring of reaction that has not been stimulated by national policies for a long time. Especially erstwhile alternate programs responding to escalated social needs were no longer able to present chief post-left and post-right formations. besides the left-wing Latin American populism has its origin in the globalisation processes, being mostly opposed to imposing a neoliberal paradigm, expanding inequality between and within countries or exploitation by moving industries on the periphery. Despite seemingly different motivations, all these currents are a kind of reaction to the asymmetricity of the influences and benefits of globalisation, including the deficiency of effective redistribution[lxix].
4.3. What if globalisation is reversible?
As a result, various alliances are proposed in this trilem of D. Rodrigo. Both "cleaning democracy by globalisation", in practice at the expense of the national state[lxx]; as well as the withdrawal of globalisation as a consequence of the combination of "democratic" efforts, and in any case outside the dominant of globalism, organised nations, in view of the utopian anticipation of a "democratic planet government" that would defend global society against monopolies and their real power[lxxi]. The circumstantial example of the populist movement is besides alterglobalism, which combines the characteristics of many populist movements, and is already focused unequivocally and straight on criticism of the current form of globalisation, although globalized about its essence.
In fact, it can besides be justified that globalization processes are inactive alternatively superficial, providing an alibi for increased accumulation and threatening their expected irreversibility and inevitability[lxxii]. Thus, in no way are they another “end of history”. Further investigation should show whether this besides means the transientity of contemporary populist tendencies, which lose the right of existence in the event of weakening and stopping globalisation. Or, on the contrary, its reversibility may be an argument for expanding populist activity. However, these questions are inactive based on 1 increasingly debated presumption – the state's (even globalised) basis of subjectivity. What if fresh (?) The Empire no longer comes from the planet of territorial states? If – returning to the Arrighi imagination of the dominant cycles (see Part I) – we have circled to the Neo-Genuean variant, the capital of the country's landlord only to any force tasks, and with time completely giving up their services?
5. fresh (?) Empire
The survey of the common relations of globalisation and imperialism is 1 of the main issues of disputes between contemporary researchers. The discussion even concerns whether the end of American hegemony has been ongoing since the 1970s[lxxiii]or on the contrary, it was a period of strengthening it, including in military and financial terms[lxxiv], including through globalisation mechanisms. Researchers argue whether globalisation, escalated with neoliberal paradigm, was only meant to be a tool of traditionally understood American state imperialism[lxxxv], or in fresh global realities, American leadership can only be considered formal and titular[lxxvi]. Finally, there is no agreement on the future in which visions of peaceful replacement of American hegemony by neo-concert powers cross, somewhat like u Karl Kautsky[lxxvii], dual dominance between the US and China[lxxxviii], or even the end of capitalism as we know it, transformed whether into an even more hierarchical, polarized and exploitive form, or in a democratic and egalitarian direction, but in both cases within a globalized system[lxxx].
Much of these differences stem from the fundamental disagreement regarding the definition of globalisation itself – as simply the observed state of the geoeconomic relationships of labour and capital, or as a clearly isolated process of a higher phase of imperialism. In another words, It seems crucial to identify globalisation actors: whether they are inactive countries, especially the United States, or whether global organisations have already taken over this role[lxxx]the capital marketplace institutions. The determination of who is the sovereign is crucial to determining the strength he uses to organize his order and to describe the form of government exercised and their real constitution[lxxxi].
5.1. Hegemonia – ‘who’ besides designates ‘how’
Some, like M. Mann, inactive powerfully criticise the globalisation of the features of a distinct phenomenon alternatively than the process[lxxxii]. In their opinion, erstwhile we talk about globalisation, we should only mean the degree to which conventional ideological, economic, military and political forces are held. However, he notes David Harvey, this scope in time and space is both a separate force and an interior engine of globalisation[lxxxiii]. Indeed, modern imperialism is guided by both capitalist and territorial logic. Only in this way can 1 capture the dialectics of breaking through subsequent crises of superaccumulation through geographical expansion, up to the global level. In turn, by Ulrich Beck and akin social, average global optimists, specified assumptions are dangerously close to confusion of concepts, due to the fact that in their sense, “globalisation” should be distinguished as a process of denationalisation of global interaction spaces by transnational actors, from “globality”, i.e. a naturally developing planet society and from “globalism”, or the current form of expansion of neoliberalism[lxxxiv]. This discrimination so implies a difference of opinion from both Michael Mann and its national state as a "container" and thus as a carrier of social and political phenomena, including globalisation[lxxxv], as well as I. Wallerstein, focusing unequivocally on the logic of capitalism determined by the pursuit of infinite and unlimited accumulation[lxxxvi].
Indeed, the dilemma whether a state is inactive a essential origin in the application of force is not the only uncertainty affecting researchers of globalisation. Now. Murray Low and Clive Barnett They asked: whether globalisation is alternatively a "history", or simply a more or little determined hegemonic cycle of states, or a more "geography", or a spatial change of modernity into postmodernity[lxxxvii]. However, on a akin rule 1 could besides examine whether this transition is of a nature stricte economic, e.g. in the field of productivity or cultural – and to this rule of multiplicity and interdependency of various forms of social power yet came behind Gramscim besides I. Wallerstein[lxxxviii]. Just as a akin synthesis, he saw his observations of G. Arrighi, explaining the logic of the dominant cycles as a scope of changes each time identifying not only a fresh hegemonic entity, but besides implemented mainly through it the main method of accumulation[lxxxix]. In this sense, American dominance, aiming at the planet State at the same time carried out natural capitalist tasks, according to the rule that even globalised capitalism operates through states. By agreeing to that Chris Chase-Dunn and Anthony Roberts they wrote straight about the transition of cycles into the current planet System, with globalisation being not only a fresh cycle, but besides a long, very long trend[xc].
5.2. Who's guarding a global cop?
With this approach, the interests of capital understood as a separate entity and the hegemonic interest of the United States, having (so far) an absolute, global "police authority" seem complementary and convergent. Let us remember that we are describing the situation before the current Ukrainian crisis, which may be a caesura and a denial just for American omnipolitics, without, however, questioning the very assumptions of globalisation. So far, the American Empire and the Empire as seen by M. Hardt and A. Negri – seemed to co-exist mutually beneficially and jointly. And yet the fact is that this is the view Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri with the gradual elimination of global capitalism from the reality of national states seems to be the most intellectually inspiring imagination of the present and further globalisation. alternatively of investigating whether the fresh centre of global capital will be Japan, as G. Arrighi and I. Wallerstein considered half a century ago whether China (as both recognized in the early 21st century) – M. Hardt and A. Negri asked if countries were inactive a essential component not only for globalisation but besides for global hegemony[xci]. Coming from the Marxist establishment of the states as "capitalistic supervisory councils" and recognizing their long-term function as filters for global flows – the authors noted that modern globalisation is characterized by an increasingly hybrid strategy of governments and ideologies, and thus, the actually exercised ruling functions. It is actual that by recognising the 3 basic tools of power: violence, the economy and the media – states are inactive useful at least erstwhile applying the first. However, to a lesser degree – as demonstrated by examples of wars/interests in Iraq and Syria, in which more corporate forces than state forces on the 1 hand and amorphous and besides unorganized state grassroots movements periodically participated – on the other. In the past, at least countries were needed for raids and rocket attacks – but today, is the electronic war and drones not limiting this marketplace attractiveness of countries in general, with peculiar mention to the US position to date? The Ukrainian experience seemingly different in this respect, including the absorption by the state apparatus of the Russian ЧВК "Вагнер" is inactive waiting for its complete analysis[xcii].
5.3. What end is the hardest thing we can imagine?
So what awaits us – a fresh hegemonic cycle with a fresh leader selected after the period of dissipation already seen today? The end of the state era, direct and public dominance of corporations like erstwhile merchants and bankers? Intermediate and mixed solutions? The end of capitalism or its transformation, which will supply it with an indefinite temporary stasis, occupied by almost zero growth, a collapse of consumption and a build-up of social reproduction and virtual financial trade? What is yet hardest to imagine: the end of the world, the end of capitalism or the end of globalisation?
It is only an apparent paradox that China and its focus around them, wanting not to, the countries of possible multipolarity to any degree at least adopt a reactionary attitude. They find themselves better in realistic inter-power relations, better or worse for decades, trying to advance from the periphery to the semi-perphyry, and from there to the core position – and they would now observe the idleness of how this full World-System rolls and transforms into something completely new? For China as a possible fresh center it would inactive be possible, but what about the rest? Is it amazing that he is at least considering staying outside? And yet You can't be outside the planet strategy due to the fact that it's either the planet or not the System..
Assuming that the first forces determining human activity were described by Hobbes, pointing to fear, lust and pleasure, we agree that the ruling of us – govern and globalization. In its present form, the next phase of evolution, even though of obscure details, seems much easier to guess than an alternate effective for it. active in globalization processes, whether they are the Empire of capital, or the associated state actors, or yet creators and products of geoculture – they lead us 1 way: a totalitarian global market, not just capitalism, nor simply globalisation, but another planet System, a eventual hybrid, at least in the sense of its constituent forces and processes.
Immanuel Wallerstein described this dichotomy in his late writings as a clash ‘spirit Davos’ au ‘spirit of Porto Alegre’[xciii], that is:
– or the evolution of capitalism in any more or little seemingly non-capitalism (Great Reset? green capitalism / climate order? zero growth / simplification of inequality?), but inactive based on triad hierarchy-exploitation-polarisation, according to the ‘priority di Lampedusa’;
– or something new, previously unusual, of a character "more democratic and comparatively egalitarian" and decentralized.
Supporters (not necessarily aware) of both solutions share further in terms of the preferred method of change – force or evolution. However, it is clear to everyone that a compromise between these positions is not possible in the long run. No intermediate states will be permanent in the long term.
Wallerstein himself, before his death, bet on completing the transformation over the next 3 decades, but he made any interesting reservations. "Of course, a affirmative change of the World-System is not expected until 2050 unless 1 of the 3 catastrophes occurs earlier: – irreversible climate change, – common pandemic, – atomic war“[xciv]. Looks like he hit at least 2 out of 3, or even more than ever. hattricka. And anyway, we're most likely the generation that's gonna falsify all of these scenarios.
Konrad Hand
Title What about capitalism? What globalisation? Whose hegemony? At the threshold of system-world change The text (with slight differences) was first published in issue 86/2022 "Pro Fide, Rege et Lege".
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