When Chancellor Olaf Scholz first utilized the word “Zeitenwende’, everyone wondered what the German geopolitical strategy would look like after this breakthrough (dated at 24.II.2022). The quoted phrase became the German word of 2022, but did the German course change in a diametric way?
Last year proved disastrous for the German political strategy implemented for at least the last 2 decades. The Berlin authorities were defeated in 3 precedence directions, as I described extensively in the December 2022 survey on: "Bancrue German geopolitical strategy". The Russian invasion of Ukraine devastated the plan of the axis construction on the Paris-Berlin-Moscow line. She torpedoed German attempts to regain political control of Mitteleuropa. It blew up the image of the Germans as leaders of Europe, who always "know better" and who should be followed. The national Republic of Germany, to be, together with France, the typical of the remainder of Europe in the Federalised Union. The politics of Olaf Scholz conducted in the first year of full-scale war in Ukraine burned the German image to the rest.
In the face of specified a tailored disaster – which was the consequence of the German strategy as well as the Russian action – the German authorities had to make decisions about taking a fresh road. And indeed, it did. A way has been chosen to lead in precisely the same direction, that is, towards the realization of the erstwhile ambitions. As if the Germans did not realize that if the destination of the hike is the abyss, then each way will lead down.
Zeitenwende
We had to wait until a year after the war began. At the same time, there is no uncertainty that the German car did not turn back at all. The Chancellor's driver made only a certain correction. The government in Berlin felt that the federalisation of the Union under German-French leadership should inactive be a precedence for German diplomacy. Like taking over political sovereignty Mitteleuropa. It was understood that this could not be done without repairing Germany's image and changing the basis of German abroad policy.
Therefore, it was decided to control the checker over to Ukraine's assistance. Olaf Scholz – who was celebrated for his delays and torpedoes of German support for Kiev – launched a communicative run under the motto by default: "Germany is Ukraine's second largest ally after the United States". Intensification in the advertising of the RFN has begun as an EU leader in supporting Ukraine. On all level: financial, humanitarian, material and military. At the same time, German defence minister Boris Pistorius has not missed to remind you that Germany is the largest NATO ground level in Europe. The proclamation of this kind of thesis should be read as a deficiency of German certainty as to whether the NATO partners inactive believe that. Germany is clearly aiming to dispel specified doubts.
In addition to attempts to repair the image and regain credibility, a geopolitical return was made simultaneously. The administration in Berlin realized that Putin might not win the war. In that case, Russia could stay in isolation for years. Even if Moscow had regained area for manoeuvre in talks with the Europeans, its political importance would have been slim after the military defeat in Ukraine. In another words, the return to the strategical partnership on the Berlin-Moscow line became unlikely, or even impossible in the foreseeable future. And even if he could exist, he wouldn't be doing his part anymore. This cooperation with Russia has made it easier for Germany to pacify Central-European assertiveness, especially in the case of Poland. Meanwhile, the deficiency of a military triumph of Russia in Ukraine, as well as the independency of the EU, including Poland, from Russian energy resources, would make Moscow lose its ability to influence Central and east Europe. Poland, the Baltic States and Ukraine would become immune to threats and blackmails from the east. Thus, Berlin would not have a partner in the joint management of Mitteleuropa.
In another words, the political plan to regain control of Central Europe based on a Russian partner has become obsolete. Berlin – acting only alone – saw its limited affidavit in the substance described, especially due to Polish-American cooperation.
In addition, Western European partners are not de facto curious in strengthening their position in the EU. Therefore, no of the countries i.e. France, Spain or Italy are specifically active in supporting Berlin's ambitions linked to Mitteleurope.
In specified a situation, the German government sees the request to break the American-Polish ties. The method for this seems to be to effort to re-enter Germany in close relations with the United States and marginalise Poland's role. That is why we are slow witnessing any kind of bidding. Germany can aim to prove to the Americans that Berlin can be more, faster and more than Poland. Whatever is on the agenda.
This kind of tactics is not new, but there is simply a crucial difference between the erstwhile and current German offer to the US. It concerns the request to categorically break political and economical relations with the Russian Federation. The Germans are ready to halt pretending and actually stand by Washington in competition against Moscow. However, what is crucial is that specified a clear position has not been expressed in the context of the American conflict with China.
Consequently, the Berlin authorities enter – again – a rival way with Poland for who will become the most crucial American partner in Ukraine after the war. And not just that.
Mitteleuropa
After the defeat of the erstwhile political strategy The Germans had 2 options. admit Poland as – inactive weaker but inactive – a partner or treat Warsaw as an unnecessary decision-making centre, which must be neutralised and subjected to. So as to be able to ignore it erstwhile making the most crucial decisions on Central Europe.
At this point, it should be noted that the presentation of this kind of alternate is justified, as Poland's function in the European Union and in NATO has increased significantly. After 24.II.2022, our country became the most crucial European associate of NATO in terms of providing support by the alliance for Ukraine. This is not only about the scale of the assistance provided by Warsaw, but besides about the fact that the process of transferring Ukrainian resources from another countries takes place with or through Poland. Especially in the field of logistics management and backroom organisation. Poland plays a leading function here.
Moreover, political elites from Warsaw have decently recognized the importance of the historical minute and have stood in the avant-garde as regards the search for solutions to increase Western support for Ukraine. Poland has proved to be a loyal and reliable partner in the region. A partner that can be counted on even in the most hard moments, and which provides assistance immediately and without undue delay.
At the same time, ambitious plans for the expansion of the armed forces announce that Poland intends to take work in the future for the safety of the east flank of NATO and the European Union. The Polish Armed Forces are so to become a political tool that will let for deeper regional cooperation on political and economical levels. This would strengthen the political strength of Poland on the global stage, including in the European Union itself.
All this made the previously reluctant government in Warsaw administration of the president of the United States Joe Bidena returned to closer relations with Poland. This resulted in 2 visits by Joe Biden in Warsaw, and this in 12 months. specified a signal could not be ignored by the Germans. And he didn't.
Marginalize, but not minimized
Germany's diplomatic communicative has for respective weeks been focused on highlighting Berlin's crucial function in helping Ukraine. Of course, this is simply a natural action, which is besides taken by the Polish authorities. These besides emphasize the peculiar position and actions of Poland in the context of the ongoing war. The problem is that the German accession to any kind of bidding is not suspended in vacuum. For this bidding takes place against the background of competition for a European palm of precedence in relations with the United States. This again sets Poland and Germany on a collision course. In Berlin, it was clearly realized what resulted in a alternatively peculiar behaviour of the German side. For example, in January of this year Olaf Scholz, after deciding to send Leopard tanks to Ukraine, stated: "Now it can be said that in Europe we and the UK are delivering most of the weapons to Ukraine". The omission of Poland on this subject was not accidental. They besides appeared data manipulation concerning German aid to Ukraine.
Fortunately for us, Germany cannot act openly, due to the fact that the diplomacy of diminishing the Polish function in the context of the war in Ukraine is doomed to failure. So alternatively of open attacks, the Berlin authorities effort to ignore and ignore Warsaw's commitment. However, it is hard due to the fact that the Polish authorities are doing everything to keep the image of the most active in helping Kiev. The fresh proposals in this respect are inactive beyond the next – it would seem red – lines. We were the first to hand over tanks, we were the first to address the subject of the transfer of fighters, we were the first to rise the subject of the transfer of western tanks, and we were the first to deliver our organization Leopards 2 A4 to Ukraine. That's enough. We've pushed through the thought of delivering German launchers. Patriot, and we besides initiated the transfer of MiGów-29 for Ukrainian aviation. In fact, part of the German commitment besides goes to our account (although the Leopard issue is mentioned). We have become a Ukrainian spokesperson in the European Union and NATO. It is besides hard to imagine that the process of rearranging Ukraine could proceed without us. Support reaches Kiev through Poland, so fresh ideas in this area must be consulted with us. This gives the chance to join third-country initiatives and to presume joint work for subsequent deliveries.
Moreover, we can no longer take distant what we have accomplished. Poland will always have an argument in the form of a statement: "Maybe your support will be greater, but if it wasn't for our fast response, you wouldn't have anyone to help".
Shy attempts to hit the image of Poland from another side, besides seem to be ineffective. Like this one, erstwhile the German ambassador to Warsaw equals Polish and German work for Putin's war:
https://twitter.com/Amb_German/status/1630866404210626561
Such argument is easy to neutralise, as the attitudes of both countries after the first Russian attack on Ukraine from 2014 were highly different. At a time erstwhile Poland was building Baltic tube to become independent of Russian gas, Angela Merkel began building Nord Stream II, which was meant to let for doubling of volumes of transfer of blue fuel from Russia to Germany.
However, the twitter consequence of the German ambassador was crucial erstwhile it came to revealing the real German perception of reality. The German authorities – who have argued for years that they know better what to do in the name of the general good and wanted to make decisions for smaller and weaker partners – are incapable to accept the fact that Poles were right, among others. And even worse, they're pointing out German mistakes now. In addition to hitting German: image and credibility. The above-quoted tweet has, of course, achieved the other effect. He sparked quite a few controversy, and besides gave the Polish side a signal that Germany would not be caying forever and are ready to decision on to the communicative offensive. This should definitely light red informing lights for us, indicating that the German marketing game for image restoration and promoting Berlin as the biggest donor and friend Ukraine is simply a simultaneous effort to marginalise the importance of Poland.
An interesting subject in this context is the subject of the transfer of 29 MiGs by Poland to Ukraine. The fact that the machines supplied could be the ones that Poland had previously bought from Germany caused concern on the German side. Olaf Scholz did not want to comment unequivocally, and the German MON simply stated that Poland did not make any authoritative request for specified a transaction. Finally, Chancellor made you understandThat he does not support the transfer of aircraft to the fighting Ukrainians. Yet, in the name of the case, he could declare that he did not see any objection to this kind of action. But that did not happen. Which raises the question of how much this German return on aid Ukraine is sincere and did Germany not want to play the MiG issue in specified a way that the glory for their transportation to Kiev would fall on Berlin?
Of course, everything that is written above can be read as a subjective assessment, which does not gotta correspond at all to real relations on the Warsaw-Berlin line. Only that so far, the German side has not made absolutely any motion to announce the thaw and the desire to decision to the level of partnership. However, the work for these relationships is always more on the side of the stronger.
We're happy to accept help, but we're not planning to cooperate.
It is worth noting that Poles have already demonstrated their willingness to cooperate with Germany. It is about oil transfer to Germany through Naftoport in Gdańsk. Polish infrastructure uses only half its possible to meet the home market. Thus, we could usage the possibilities of Naftoport, as well as existing and previously utilized oil trains to Germany. The problem for the Polish side is that the “Friendship” pipeline goes to Schwedt refinery on the German side, which is half owned by Russian Rosnieft. Warsaw agreed to transfer oil to Germany, but subject to the expropriation of Russians. In this context, Poland besides expressed an interest in taking ownership of the refinery. It would be beneficial. deal for both sides. Poland would pump oil into Brandenburg and in return would gain shares in the refinery. However, the German side not only did not offer this option to Poles, but did not even expropriate Rosnieft (it introduced only the trustee board). At this point it is worth noting that Schwedt is only the 5th largest refinery in the national Republic of Germany, so deal with Poland would not be risky. On the another hand, it could open a completely fresh chapter in the relations between the 2 countries.
Development of Poland Unwelcome
So we did not see a breakthrough in German-Polish relations – which could be hoped for in December 2022 – but we inactive feel the effects of German pressure. For example, the German side continues to protest the construction of the Polish container terminal in Świnoujście. This is simply a strategical investment for Poland.
The German-Polish dispute connected with the regulation of river roads, especially Oder, continues. The Polish side would like to usage the largest rivers in precisely the same way as Germans, French or British do. It's the reconstruction of river transport, which was actually held in Oder erstwhile it was a river stricte German. In July 2022 Brandenburg objected to the environmental decision on the work in Oder and its authorities intervened in the European Commission. And that despite Angela Merkel's existing agreement.
Germany besides protestes the Polish plans for the construction of atomic power plants. 4 German trade union countries request that these critical investments be stopped. On the another hand, due to the adopted EU regulations, Poland is required to leave coal. The German side besides looks at the plan of the Central Communication Port, but there is no area for manoeuvre in this case. akin examples could be multiplied, especially if a fewer years back.
It is so easy to announcement that on the level of infrastructure investments there is no Polish initiative that would not give emergence to opposition or discontent on the western bank of Oder (except for the construction of east-west motorways). The fact that it is the individual lands – not the central authority – that effort to hinder the implementation of Polish projects is of no importance here. The activities of individual states are in the hands of the Berlin authorities.
All these examples show that Germany has quite a few area for manoeuvre erstwhile it comes to showing intention to enter into partnership relations with Poland. Resigning force on these subjects would not cost the German side a single euro.
Electoral Perspective
It is not without importance that 2023 is an election year in Poland. The past of relations on the Warsaw-Berlin line after 2015 has not yet looked very good. It is possible that the Scholz administration is waiting for a fresh opening, but not its own, and this is on the Polish side. You can't afford a small malice in this place. Since considering the last 30 years of the neighbourhood, it is hard to imagine that due to a possible change of power in Poland, Germans abruptly gave up their influence on our country and began to take into account our interests (which was not done yet, for example, in the construction of the first Nord Stream thread). Rather, the expectations in Berlin are that the German position will stay unchanged, while the fresh – weaker politically – authorities from Warsaw will again politely perceive to suggestions from Western partners.
This kind of position is evidently very real. At the moment, the coalition of the United Right has the seat of president and Prime Minister with a majority parliament. Which has so far allowed for political, multifaceted war within the country, but besides in abroad policy. After the election, however, it may turn out that the Polish political centre can importantly weaken. The United Right may not get the rightful majority in the Sejm, which would require the search for a coalitionist. If he didn't find one, the government might be minority. In another case, the opposition can take over. Then a very broad coalition would should be formed, taking into account everyone's interests, which would again weaken the decision-making centre in our country. In any case, it may turn out that the future Polish government will be besides weak internally to hold many diplomatic disputes. Even if it were the will.
Germany could then regain control of the situation in Central Europe and become NATO leader in the European Union. Which would strengthen their position in talks with Washington. As a result, it can be concluded with large certainty that no breakthrough in Polish-German relations will happen until the autumn elections. In Berlin, they are waiting for a fresh hand of cards.
Written by: Buy a book or ebook: “Third DEKADA. The planet present and in 10 years’ time” and find out what may be waiting for us in the coming years. In addition to the war in Ukraine, which was described in the forecast chapters.
Three DEKADA. planet present and in 10 years
The Berlin-Kiy axis?
In a politically beneficial option for the Berlin administration, Germany would number on Poland to voluntarily renounce its ambition to become a regional leader. Then – after the issue of Warsaw's concessions has been put out – the political centre of gravity in the European Union would return to its place. Berlin. This would mean that Germany would become the United States' most crucial safety partner in the European Union. That's not all. Polish-Ukrainian relations would besides drift westward. Presidents from Kiev would start going to Berlin to agree and coordinate assistance to Ukraine. Warsaw/Rzeszow would only become insignificant stations, serving for courteous visits “in the passage”.
The sentiment and gratitude of the Ukrainian side towards Poland is 1 thing. However, in a situation where Poland itself had given the safety and improvement of the region into the hands of the Germans, the Ukrainians would have no another choice. In order to survive, they would besides request to know about Berlin and have doubtful hope that there would be no more wars, or the 3rd time Germany would yet emergence to the occasion. It would be so naive to think that we cannot draw a reasonably crucial conclusion here. Ukrainians pray that Poland will bear the burden of work for the safety of the region and deal with the challenges ahead. No wonder that president Zelenski sends so many affirmative messages to Warsaw. Not only due to current dependence on Polish aid, but besides in the hope that Poles will not get off the road. For The destiny of Ukraine will depend on us.. Poland was the only 1 who could respond so rapidly to the Russian invasion of February 24, 2022 and did so. Ukrainians hope that in the future we will besides be willing and – most importantly – prepared. due to geography, we can respond quickly. due to the possible of the state, we are the strongest in the region. From the point of view of the experience so far, among the EU countries with real opportunities, we alone have proved to be reliable. It is simply a immense political capital in relation to Kiev. It would be foolish to give it up. Therefore, it is vital that our political elite realize all this regardless of organization affiliation. Poland cannot let go in this respect. Politicians of all groups request to realize that Poland has become a completely different country with a different weight over the 19 years in the Union. If we do not realize this ourselves, no 1 else will accept Poland's fresh function in the European political and economical system. We must think ambitiously and prosecute ambitious assumptions. Lithuanians, Latvians, Romania, and especially Ukrainians, will aid us to do so due to the fact that their safety will depend on it. However, they must see the will, determination and consistency on our side.
Be aware that If Poland does not quit building its position in the region, in cooperation with the Warsaw-Kijów line, then Germany – regardless of who will regulation with us – will put force on our country.
At the same time, as I wrote in the article "Ukraine will be a burden for Poland – east strategy of Poland after the war” “Germans will want to get jacks on Kiev by making Ukraine dependent on German financial assistance as well as political position in the EU. The administration from Berlin can conclude that in order to neutralise the assertive and ambitious attitude of Warsaw, a closer relation with Ukraine should be established. And promise the Ukrainians that cooperation with Germany will pay the most.
This should be made aware, to support the reconstruction of Ukraine from EU and even German money in the name of our long-term political strategy. While building its own position in the region as a safety leader. If we take care of the military possible and conduct our own policy in this area, then in the average and long word (after the Ukraine has recovered) Ukraine will decide to build the future based on cooperation with Poland.
Polish-German relations are an insoluble conflict of interest?
It would be naive to number that the Berlin authorities themselves recognise Warsaw as a full partner and a political centre that is co-responsible for the direction in which the European Union would follow. Germany has a abroad policy with a calculator. The German economy is inactive six times bigger than Polish. In the eyes of the Germans, another issues do not matter.
In global politics, no 1 will willingly take a plate off of anyone else. We ourselves must fight for more participation in the European Union and prove to Germany that economical indicators are not everything. The proof must mean the political triumph of Poland. Only then will German politicians rise their eyes from the calculator. The triumph will be to make – even a tiny – political bloc within the Union, which would act and vote together. This block must be created with Ukraine already part of the EU. So this is simply a policy strategy for at least a twelve years. No snapping, no twisting, no swinging, no shoaling. The implementation of long-term strategies with awareness of the short-term costs.
Of course, you can besides let go. defy your political projects on cooperation with Germany. In the hope that they would let us even partial autonomy and not limit our safety needs. This approach would be much easier and more convenient. However, at the same time, it is highly risky, and possibly even in the long word suicidal. And surely naive. The times have changed and we do not live in the planet before 2014. Giving individual else a cup of sugar could only go without consequence erstwhile the road led through a friendly land of milk and honey flowing. The area behind our carriage's window has changed importantly and has become dangerous. In that case, it's time to catch the reins.
In turn Germany does not want to let the construction of the Polish military power. For military possible besides becomes a political tool, and thus increases the independency and area for diplomatic manoeuvre of a given country. At the same time, Germany cannot let a Polish-Ukrainian alliance on any level. For specified a partnership would automatically increase Warsaw's political possible and make the assertive attitude of Polish political elites towards Germany. In these areas Germany and Poland have an insoluble conflict of interest. The increase in Warsaw's political strength weakens Berlin.
In addition, counting Germans in terms of safety would be very naive. If, after all these historical and contemporary experiences, our country's destiny depended on Berlin politicians, we would not deserve independence. You gotta admit it openly. German politics over the last decades have led to disaster. Not only did they not prevent the outbreak of the war in Europe, but they besides made a crucial contribution to this (the agreement on Nord Stream II after the 2014 invasion of Ukraine). Hardly, if aid to Ukraine depended only on the decision of Germany, Kiev would most likely already be occupied by Russia. The Polish state's rationale is to make the appropriate military possible and to take on a much greater part of the work for own safety and east neighbours. It is in Polish interest to make a military, political and economical partnership with Ukraine. Our destiny depends on both of these objectives. At the same time, Poland's implementation of these tasks will necessarily give it more area for manoeuvre and increase the assertiveness and opposition to pressures from Berlin. Hence the opposition of Germany. However, if Berlin does not accept Polish ambitions in the above mentioned area, Poland will be forced to implement its state's right against Germany's will. Germany proved to be an unbelievable partner due to its own fault. So, from the Polish position it is simply a game to be or not to be. Either we take care of ourselves, or we are in danger of another war or another peaceful demolition of Poland.. The question is whether politicians in Berlin realize our position and – for the sake of the Union, Poland and Germany themselves – accept the fresh function of Warsaw or pretend that nothing happened between 2014-2023 and Poland should return to the function of a pariah. The way Polish-German relations will go depends mostly on Berlin decision-makers. It is their work to realize the situation in Europe, Poland and Ukraine. We, in turn, will account for future generations from whether we have taken care of their future. Therefore, it seems essential to realize that in the face of present and future threats, we must do everything we can to guarantee our safety. Even if our actions give emergence to opposition in Berlin. With all the consequences.
On the another hand, if German decision-makers do not change their perception of the future of relations with Poland and of the EU as a whole, Germany itself will lead to a division within the Union. Which will weaken and not strengthen this organization. The desire to federalise and weaken the position of smaller states raises objections. Not just in Poland. Especially since everyone has already seen how Germany "takes care" of a common EU interest. They do this, too, to the French who are considered to be large EU egoists, especially in the west and south of Europe. As expressed by president E. Macron's last visit to China and French communicative after it. The Paris-Berlin duo has no chance of regaining credibility and trust, especially erstwhile force is inactive being exerted to increase EU integration. Which, within the meaning of the French and Germans, means simply giving them work for the destiny of another EU members.
At the same time, the strategy of a strong and confrontational return to the concept of subordination of Mitteleuropa and Poland, including Poland, will make an additional division in the EU. And it will be received unfavorably by the Baltic States and Romania. These countries – like the not-attached Ukraine yet – would like to trust on Poland in terms of safety than on Germany. It is the work of the Berlin authorities themselves to accept the mistakes they have made and to bear the consequences and the political costs.
If this does not happen, the creation of a Union of 2 speeds will not only be possible, but rather certain. This in turn will lead to the situation that France and Germany will accomplish the other effect. alternatively of expanding the coherence and federalisation of the EU, there will be a discord and slow disintegration. Which would be no good to anyone.
Krzysztof Wojchal
Geopolitics, politics, economy, law, taxes – blog
