On 8 October Putin appointed Gen. Sergei Sorowikin as commander-in-chief of Russian invasion troops in Ukraine. A day later Kiev, Lviv, Zaporoże, Mikołajów and another Ukrainian cities were under fire by Russians – a Russian consequence to the harm to the Crimean bridge. It is said that it was Surowikin who was to personally press for intense shootings of Ukrainian cities – thus replicating the tactics he successfully utilized during the command of the Russian contingent in Syria. Interestingly, it was the successes that the Russians had during their stay in Syria that were expected to decide to appoint him commander-in-chief of the invasion troops in Ukraine. Let's see what Sorowikin's stay in Syria looked like and what we can anticipate from him in Ukraine.
Surowikin became commander of the Russian contingent in Syria in March 2017. The Russian intervention lasted about 1.5 years then, and the presence of Russian aviation had definitely already crossed the scales of triumph in favour of Assad (thanks to the Russians in December 2016, Assad's forces captured Aleppo).
The triumph of government troops in the conflict of Aleppo was a landmark minute in the past of the Syrian civilian War. The rebel troops suffered a severe defeat, and despite taking respective more local offensives in the following months, they never took the initiative in this war. After Aleppo's fall, the rebels were no longer able to endanger Assad and began to focus on their own survival.
At the end of 2016, ISIS forces were besides in a phase of slow decomposition. In October 2016, the Iraqi army launched an attack on Mosul. A period later, in November 2016, US-backed Kurdish forces launched an offensive on Syrian Rakka – the capital of ISIS.
Therefore, in March 2017, erstwhile Surowikin took command of Syria, the situation was very favourable to Assad and the Russians. Sorowikin did not gotta focus on taking over the strategical initiative in the war. All he had to do was follow the punch and kill the rebels and ISIS fighters. Sorowikin did his job.
Upon the arrival of Surovikin 2017, Assad's army launched an offensive in the Syrian Desert, in June reaching the border with Iraq, and in October unlocking the garrison of the city of Dayr az Zaur (besieged by ISIS since 2014). Support for Russian aviation proved crucial in these successes.
Offensive in the Syrian Desert and unlocking the city of Dajr az Zaur, 2017.However, the successes of the government army and the Russian contingent are hard to attribute to the character of Sorowikin himself. He was mostly “drinking cream” from the successes of his predecessors – in peculiar Gen. Dwornikov and Cranelov, who planned and conducted the conflict for Aleppo. Sorowikin faced a powerfully weakened opponent, and all he had to do was not let him rest.
Still, you can't say no to Surovikin 1 thing. He was doing very well in command of combined land and air forces. During the offensive in the Syrian Desert, coordination on land and in the air stood at a very advanced level and allowed very fast progress.
Surovikin besides became celebrated for his ruthlessness, without hesitating to lead the massive shooting of Syrian cities. A good example here is the conflict for the city of Daara in the south of Syria when, in order to halt the rebel offensive, Russian aviation began to compare the city to the ground.
Apparently during his stay in Syria, Surowikin gained sympathy among Syrian officers, and president Assad was to personally praise the Russian general in his talks with Putin.
As of the end of 2017, Surovikin was recalled from his position as commander of the Syrian contingent (standard procedure, Russians conducted intensive rotation of their forces in Syria). However, this was not the end of the Syrian episode in Sorovikin's history. In 2019, he returned to Syria for 4 months, but at the time the war was on its way to an end, and – due to the Turks' entry into northern Syria – the government army was no longer conducting major land operations,
From left: Sergei Surowikin, Sergei Szojgu and president Bashar Assad, during Vladimir Putin's visit to Syria, 2017.Did Surovikin shine in Syria “tactic genius”? Nope. But he showed up on the good side, as an efficient organizer, peculiarly afraid about coordinating actions on land and in the air, which had a key function for the success of Russian intervention in Syria. Surovikin's successes were due not to the war “in advanced gloves”, but to large ruthlessness. The enemy defeated not so much the maneuvering war (such as Dvornikov and Cranelov in the already mentioned Aleppo), but a ruthless force. Surovikin did not want to force the enemy to retreat, but to complete annihilation.
For his command in Syria, Surovikin received the highest Russian honorary title of Hero of the Russian Federation. His successes in Syria, however, were not his own work, and the foundation for this success was laid by his predecessors, who commanded the Russian contingent from 2015 to 2017.
The conclusions of the war in Syria are hard to translate into a Russian-Ukrainian war, due to the fact that in Syria Russia fought poorly armed rebels alternatively than a regular army. How deluded lessons can be drawn from Syria is shown by the example of Gen. Dwornikov and Żuravlov, who presented themselves very well in Syria as capable tactics, but in Ukraine they have not repeated these successes.
However, if I should be tempted to measure what to anticipate after the appointment of Sorovikin as the commander-in-chief of the Russian troops in Ukraine, it will be 3 things:
- Terrorizing cities – specified attacks as yesterday will be repeated regularly;
- Managing with a hard hand with his subordinates – already in the past there have been accusations of intellectual abuse against Surovikin over his subordinates (even suicides occurred);
- Intensification of aviation use. Surovikin believes in the force of aviation, saw in Syria how the aviation is able to change the course of even the most hard conflict and now he will want Russian aviation to yet start playing the right function besides in Ukraine. However, this will be difficult. The problem is Ukrainian anti-aircraft defence systems, which the Russians have not destroyed since the beginning of the war. However, knowing Surowikin's temperament, I wouldn't be amazed if he pressed for the declaration of Ukraine a “great air battle” aimed at another effort to dismantle Ukrainian p-lot defence – even at the price of large losses in the Russian air force (no wonder that after fresh attacks on Ukrainian cities there is more and more talk about delivering more Ukrainians p-lot defence systems).
