French game for Armenia

Analysis briefly:

• French policy towards Armenia shows that the thought of a "balance power" is inactive alive in France. Russia, engaged in many regions of the world, began to push France out of its key spheres of influence, specified as Africa, and destabilise safety in Europe by conducting war in Ukraine. In consequence to these actions, France besides challenged its rivalry with Russia in its strategical spheres of influence, including Armenia.
• The fall of the mountainous Karabach was a breakthrough for France's commitment to Armenia, as it created a crucial operational chance in the political and defence sphere. Russia's failure to comply with the established safety guarantees introduced Armenia on the tracks of a violent search for a fresh ally.
• In the French initiative, Greece and Cyprus intend to take action to reduce the impact of Turkey and its allies. Therefore, the activity aimed at cooperation with Armenia is to be counterweight to the Turkish-Azerian alliance in the Caucasus region.
• Intensification of Indian presence in the Caucasus is evident in the context of military cooperation. In 2023 India became the main supplier of arms to Armenia, pushing Russia, who had previously held that position, from this place.

French game for Armenia

The concept of a “balance power” based on Gaullist abroad policy is the nonsubjective of France's global operation[1]. A first-rate multipolarity in the conduct of politics and the construction of spheres of influence in the world, it assumed to reduce US influence and build dialog with another powers, including Russia and China. This thought is besides found in France's "strategic autonomy" that the European Union should decision towards power and decision-making independence.[2]. The outbreak of the war in Ukraine thwarted France's plans and forced it to change its approach on the Moscow issue, which put off balance policy and turned relations between them into rivalry tracks. In the face of the failure of influence in Africa and the expanding threats in Europe, Paris is taking steps to reconstruct its global strength balance. In retaliation for Kremlin actions France began to influence key areas of Russian influence, including east Europe, Central Asia and South Caucasus[3].

The economical and military costs incurred by Russia in carrying out armed actions in Ukraine have reduced its engagement in matters related to the Organization of the Collective safety Agreement[4]. This resulted in the fall of Mountain Karabach in 2023, which forced the exodus of 100,000 people surviving in the region. Armenia, disappointed by the attitude of her safety guarantor, suspended her participation in the OUBZ and began searching for fresh allies, fearing Azerbaijani aspirations to make a communication corridor for the Nachichevan enclave[5]. Just 2 weeks after the fall of Mountain Karabach, France entered the framework of this demand, which, seeing the strategical position of the position of Armenia while at the same time weakening Russia internationally, began to support the Armenians militarily. In order to keep and increase its impact, Paris encourages another countries to make a fresh safety order in the region. They are curious in: close to and dependent on Paris, Greece. These countries are primarily afraid with safety in the Mediterranean. Thus, seeing the anticipation of gaining more support in the context of resisting Turkey's revisionist aspirations, Athens and Nicosia take action to support the Armenians[6].

The roots of Franco-Armenian cooperation

The connection between France and Armenia was straight related to the dissolution of the russian Union. France as 1 of the first Western states recognized the independency of Armenia on February 24, 1992 and formed its diplomatic mission on its territory. Despite France's engagement in the Minsk Group, which aimed to resolve the Azerbaijani-Armiaan conflict on the Mountain Karabach, Armenian-French cooperation was not intense. This was due to the skeptical approach of Paris, which for respective years after the dissolution of the USSR treated the CIS countries (the Commonwealth of Independent States) as "seasonal states". In the first place, Paris put forward the implementation of a well-functioning democratic strategy in the Russian Federation, which he considered to be a prospective partner in the future construction of a bipolar safety order in Europe. Erevan in the eyes of the French was at the time solely a region of influence of the Russian Federation, and thus not to pave the improvement of bilateral cooperation, Paris did not take major initiatives in the South Caucasus[8]. The first manifestation of France's interest in the Armenian issue was the designation of the 1915 Armenian genocide on the global phase in 2001, becoming the first country to take that decision. In particular, cultural cooperation was established, which was related to the many Armenian diaspora in France, which inactive has around 600 1000 people and is the 3rd largest Armenian diaspora in the planet (in Russia and the USA)[9].

Armenian Dependency on Russia

Erwania's geographical and political position is primarily linked to bad relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. This established Moscow's position as the main safety guarantor of Armenia. It was through her aid that Yerevan won and proclaimed in 1994 unrecognized on the global arena of Mountain Karabach. As a result, Armenia was eager to join Russian initiatives specified as CIS or OUBZ, and entered into a military alliance with Russia. This agreement allowed Russian troops to be stationed in the territory of Armenia, with a highest of 10,000 soldiers, including 5,000 at the base in Gyumri[10]. This has all contributed to the improvement of Russia's economic, cultural, social and political influences in Armenia [11].

Only the failure of Mountain Karabach in 2023 undermined Moscow's safety policy and began the erosion of the Russian-Armiaan alliance. This prompted the Government of Armenia, headed by Prime Minister Paszynian, to take decisive action to show a change of policy towards Russia. In late 2023, Armenia conducted joint exercises with the American forces[12], sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine and expressed interest in EU membership[13]. In early May 2024, the MFA of Armenia declared that the country would no longer pay financial contributions to OUBZ, after having previously frozen its membership. Furthermore, Armenia introduced a policy to diversify the acquisition of military equipment. As a result, Russian arms acquisition fell from 96% to little than 10% in 2020 to 2024[14]. The culmination of these actions was the agreement concluded on 9 May the same year between Putin and Pasynian concerning the withdrawal of Russian officers, from border and military stations stationed in Tavush, Syunik, Vayots Dzor, Gegharkunik, Ararat and Zvartnots Airport (Erevan) circuits.[15]who have been stationed there since 2020 after the Second Caribbean War[16].

Despite the actions taken, Armenia is inactive forced to cooperate with Russia, mainly due to a serious economical dependency. An example of this is the energy natural material market, which is controlled by the Russian company Gazprom Armenia, which accounts for 87% of all imports of gas to Armenia.[17]. In addition, the sphere of electrification, telecommunications, media and railways is besides in the hands of the Russians. The visible strong ties item data from 2023, which show evidence levels of trade between the parties, which amounted to $7 billion[18]. This ‘success’, according to reports, is due to Armenia's indirect function in the distribution of western goods, mainly electronics, to the sanctioned Russia[19]. In 2023, 40% of Armenian exports went to Russia.[20].

An crucial issue is besides the Armenian diaspora in Russia, which is liable for remittances which represent a crucial origin of income for many Armenian households. With these measures they can afford wellness care or another basic needs, contributing to the overall stableness of Armenia's economy[21].

Armenian-French cooperation with a cure for strategical weakness

The strong influence of the Russian Federation, the endless process of political transformation and its political instability after the dissolution of the USSR discouraged the French side from becoming more active in political and economical issues[22]. Only a real interest in Armenia came in 2018 as a consequence of the "axamite revolution", which removed the corrupt – closely linked to Russia – state elite from power. Governments in the country were then taken over by current Prime Minister Nikol Pasynian, who, without giving up his cooperation with the Russian Federation, tried to introduce a policy of multi-vectority, which encouraged France to intensify cooperation[23].

The partnership became blunt during the ongoing Caribbean wars in 2020 and 2023, in which Armenia failed. Paris condemned the cultural cleansing carried out by the Azerbaijanes in the Armenians. He besides mobilised humanitarian aid, where he donated EUR 27.5 million in 2023 alone, including assistance to refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh[24].

The landmark was the collapse of quasi-states and its acquisition by Azerbaijan. Just 2 weeks after this event, the French abroad Office Catherine Collon appeared in Yerevan, which stressed the importance of Armenia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. From that point on, Paris has made many declarations of sales of French military equipment to Erwanie, including the anticipation of developing relations between the parties. The first signed contract on 23 October 2023 afraid the supply of 3 Ground Masters-200 air defence radars from Thales and short-range Mistral systems[25]. The second contract concluded between France and Armenia afraid the supply of night imagination binoculars from Safran and 50 light armored transporters Bastion[26]. On February 23, 2024 Armenia signed an agreement to acquisition an unspecified number of PGM rifles. Additionally, the French are curious in building the possible of Armenian troops besides took steps in training their officers[27]. The aim of these activities is to diversify and deepen the defence partnership between Armenia and France on a global scale, which is to prevent Azerbaijan's expanding revisionist stance in the future.[28].

In addition, Paris supports Armenian efforts to join the EU. Despite the increasing political, social and cultural cooperation, economical relations are marginal. The overall trade balance between the parties in 2023 amounted to EUR 160.5 million, which ranks France in the second 10 major trade partners of Armenia. abroad direct investment is besides low compared to another countries. In 2022 they amounted to EUR 228 million and their amount was lower than those from Russia (2098 million), Cyprus (841 million), Switzerland (432 million), the United Kingdom (426 million), as well as the British Virgin Islands (376 million)[31].

Greece and Cyprus in the context of the French safety Initiative in the Caucasus

The engagement of Greece and Cyprus in the French safety initiative in the Caucasus has its origin in the joint recognition of threats internationally. In particular, it brings together their partnership for the Mediterranean region, in which they jointly identify the risks stemming mainly from Turkey's revisionist activities, which include its proclamation of the world's unrecognised Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, as well as the fact policy on the Mediterranean continental shelf[32]. The bilateral agreement signed in September 2021 between Athens and Paris on common assistance in the event of armed assault on 1 side was linked to the dangerous maneuvers of the Turkish fleet in 2020. It has raised the precedence of relations and has taken a step towards joint decisions to prevent future dangers[33]. The meanings of the Greek-French and Cypriot-French relations were added by contracts from 2020-2022, which afraid the acquisition of 3 Belharra frigates and 24 fresh and old Rafale fighters produced by Dassault Aviation by Greece[34], and the acquisition of Mistral (ground-air) and Exocet (anti-ship) rockets by Cyprus[35].

Tripartite cooperation in Armenia-Greece-Cypr format has a symbolic form for this moment. It mainly operates at the level of declarations and contracts. An example of this is the agreement on yearly military cooperation signed on 5 July 2023, which aims to strengthen military capabilities through joint exercises of peculiar forces[36].

Indian-French cooperation

In parallel, France is trying to win another players already operating in the Caucasus, including India. The platform for cooperation between France and India is of global rank and is implemented at many levels. Key points of this cooperation, as stated by French president Emmanuel Macron and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in January 2024, include the space sphere, defence production, atomic energy, space research, as well as climate change, wellness and agriculture. Both countries besides combine the already implemented Indo-Pacific strategy and climate change and sustainable improvement initiatives, specified as the Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative and the global Solar Alliance[37] In addition, France expresses its support for India on Kashmir.

In this context, the South Caucasus besides becomes a field where Paris and fresh Delhi can make their relations. Currently, thanks to existing bilateral relations, defence cooperation is proposed in the three-way format Armenia-France-India and four-sided Armenia-France-Greece-India[38].

India – outsider in the Caucasus

The improvement of cooperation between Armenia and India coincides with Armenia's introduction in 2020 of a policy of diversifying weapons sourcing sources, which previously was mainly based on supplies from Russia. The fresh phase of relations between Yerevan and fresh Delhi began initially with a "change of courtesy" on the global stage. In September 2022 India supported Armenia at the UN safety Council after Azerbaijan's aggression, in consequence Armenia supported India's position on Kashmir. This resulted in common visits by Armenian and Indian representatives, during which the foundations for building military cooperation were established.[39]. On 14 May 2024, the first consultations were held in the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Armenia between the Ministry of Defence of Armenia and India led by the Head of the Armenian Department of Defence Policy and global Cooperation Levon Ayvazyan and Joint Secretary for global Cooperation of the Ministry of Defence of India Vishwesh Negi. They agreed on the terms, position and direction of cooperation in the fields of military technology and training of military personnel. This resulted in the signing of the Armenia and India Defence Ministers' Cooperation Plan for the period 2024-2025, and an agreement was reached on the creation of a joint task force[40].

Military cooperation between the parties is developing very dynamically, as early as 2023 India became the most crucial weapon supplier to Armenia. As of 2020, Erevan purchased 4 Swahti radar systems from fresh Dehli for $40 million, while being 1 of their first buyers internationally[41]. In 2022, Erevan placed an order on Pinaka rocket launchers and anti-tank ammunition worth about $245 million. In addition, Armenia ordered in India 90 towed artillery systems (ATAGS) worth $155.5 million, the first batch of which consisted of six 155-millimeter haubic and was delivered in August 2023. The same year the Armenians signed a contract to acquisition respective Zen anti-drone systems, the price of which was $41 million.[42], and on self-propelled barrel 155 mm MARG[43].

Economic issues between Armenia and India are besides beginning to grow, although at this minute insignificant. It is worth noting the interest of Armenia to integrate its payment systems with the Indian unified payment interface UPI, which would facilitate financial transactions between countries[44].

Summary

The French commitment to the Armenian issue gives Armenia the hope of uncovering a fresh safety guarantor. However, this activity is not as intense as the Yerevans request at this point. The military support offered by Paris is tiny at the moment, although the prospects for its growth are large. economical cooperation, despite dynamic growth, is besides also low to be able to deal with another parties. The effectiveness of France is most evident in political and cultural cooperation. The publicisation of the Armenian problem by Paris on the global phase has attracted the attention of larger players, including allies and partners of France, an example of which is commitment to the EU problem.

The decisions taken by the Armenian Government, led by Nikola Pasynian, making fast changes showing a turn towards the West in Armenia's policy, will be increasingly limited in the future. This is linked with the desire of the Russian Federation to keep its influence in the South Caucasus. Despite their comparatively large loss, the Russians inactive have many force tools to usage against Yerevani. These include primarily economical tools. In addition, Russia is able to destabilise Armenia in many fields, especially through the control of the natural resources marketplace without which Armenia is incapable to function. In this context, too, cultural ties, as well as many Russian diaspora for this country, and the inactive stationed Russian army, which, in the event of Russia's interests being threatened, would be willing to take hybrid action against Armenia.

India seems to be the most beneficial partner for Armenia due to their ability to balance between the West, Russia and a firm approach towards Turkey and Azerbaijan. Focusing on the improvement of relations with India gives Armenia the chance to avoid conflicts with another powers, which allows for maintaining comparative neutrality in the region. In addition, cooperation with India aims to safe transit routes and to make counterbalances against the 3 Brothers Alliance, consisting of Azerbaijan, Turkey and Pakistan.

Proposals to extend defence cooperation through the Tripartite Initiatives of Greece-France-Armenia or four-sided Greece-France-Armenia-India may supply Armenia with greater safety against Azerbaijani threats. However, there is simply a hazard that specified initiatives can destabilise NATO's unity due to the fact that France, Turkey, Greece and Cyprus are members of this alliance. The increase in tensions between them may favour the interests of the Russian Federation, which competes with NATO internationally.

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