5.VI-Another W.Putin threats towards the west
At the beginning of June 2024, St. Petersburg held media conference On which W.Putin met a number of journalists from various countries of the world, including the UK or the United States. During the meeting, subjects related to, among others, the ongoing war in Ukraine and the function played by the countries of the collective west.
According to the Russian president, states that supply long-range weapons to Ukraine and let it to be utilized against targets in the FR territory must number for the same consequence from the authorities in Moscow.
The answer is to deploy a akin class of systems in “some regions of the world”, which will endanger strategical facilities in individual countries. At the same time, the Russian president did not specify in which “regions” Russian weapons may be deployed.
Putin's speeches are a clear answer to the latest signals from Berlin, London or Washington. NATO key members in fresh years agreed for the usage of western weapons to destruct a cell in the Russian Federation but only to a limited extent. Undoubtedly, this decision constitutes a kind of novaum in Western states' policies, which previously presented a reluctant position towards utilizing western weapons for attacks on targets located in Russian territory.
During the press conference, W.Putin stressed that Russia was not preparing to attack the North Atlantic alliance, while adding that NATO's transportation of increasingly advanced weapons systems to Ukraine is simply a signal for Russia that the West is actively active in the war.
The Russian president was besides asked about the usage of Russian atomic arsenal, whose use, according to Putin, is “unable”. According to the Russian President, the basis for the usage of Russian atomic weapons is the Russian atomic doctrine of 2020, assuming that atomic weapons can be utilized if the integrity and sovereignty of the state is threatened.
6.VI-Ataki for Russian refineries in Rostów
On June 6, the local media reported a drone attack on refineries located in the city of Nowoszachtyńsk, Rostowski Oblast. The attack was to be carried out in the morning and lead to a fire of over 100 square metres of the plant's surface. The degree of the harm caused by the attack was besides reported by the residents, who placed recordings and photographs showing the resulting harm in social media.
The case was besides referred to by the politician of Rostowski territory who mentioned that as a consequence of the attack, work in the refinery was temporarily suspended and workers evacuated.
At the same time, it was not the first attack aimed at a refinery in Nowoszachtinsk. In April and May, Ukrainian forces besides attacked this plant utilizing kamikaze drones, leading to downtimes in his work.
At the same time, on June 6, there was besides an attack on fuel retention in the town of Stary Oskoł, close Belgorod about which reported Oblast Governor-Wyachesław Gladkov. Both events were not commented by the authorities in Kiev.
In fresh months, there has been an increase in attacks on Russian logistics facilities, especially in the region of Belgorodz region bordering Ukraine. 4 days before the attack on the fuel depot in Stary Oskole and the refinery in Nowoszachtyńsk Russian website informed of the attack on Belgorod in which 6 civilians were to suffer, including 2 city officials.
At the same time, attacks on Russian fuel facilities are not limited to locations close the Russian-Ukrainian border. In April and May the attack on the refinery and production facilities located in Tatarstan, located over 1,200 kilometres from the front line, was reported. akin attacks aimed mainly at the fuel sector were to take place in Bashkortostan, Riazania and Krasnodarski.
It is estimated that this year there have been 14 attacks by the Ukrainian side on oil plants and fuel depots of FR. In addition to the depletion of fuel supplies essential to carry out the war on the first plan, a intellectual origin is besides struck out - by attacks on objects located far from the front line of Kiev sends a clear signal that placing establishments in seemingly safe places does not defend them from destruction. At the same time, a feeling of a failure of safety may increase among Russian society, as “Special Military Operation’ begins to take the form in which the Ukrainian side has a number of instruments threatening the Russian background. For example, in May 2023 there were clashes in the vicinity of Belgorod, in which the volunteer formation “Legion of Free Russia” carried out a journey to the area of the Bielgorod region, entering into clashes with the armed forces of the FR. At the end of December 2023, as a consequence of the Belgorod fire, 25 residents of the city were to lose their lives and nearly a 100 were injured. The fire according to the Russian side was to be caused by the rocket attack of the ZSU, and in turn the Ukrainian side accuses the Russian anti-aircraft defence projectiles of falling into residential districts.
We can presume that in the coming weeks and months we will proceed to witness attacks on Russian logistics facilities, but the impact on objects in the Russian Federation has led to discussions in the Western planet in fresh months, whether the arms transferred to Ukraine should be involved.
14.VI-Russian plans to end the war
14 June 2024. W.Putin in Framework of the public conference met high-ranking officials of the Russian MFA. During the meeting, in addition to indicating the most crucial directions of Russian abroad policy and signaling the request to further deepen ties with areas under Russian occupation, the Russian president presented conditions essential to end the war.
In summary of the Russian president's speech to individual points, the Russian imagination of the end of the Russian-Ukrainian war is presented:
- “The withdrawal of Ukraine's armed forces from the areas of Kherson, Zaporozh and Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republic. More specifically, it is about withdrawing from the administrative borders of individual circuits, based on the Ukrainian administrative division of the state".
- “The designation by the authorities in Kiev of Crimea, Khersonszczyzna, Zaporozhia and the area of Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republic as territories forming part of the Russian Federation”.
- “Demilitarization of Ukraine”- It will cease Kiev's efforts to join NATO and introduce restrictions on the size of the armed forces, as well as the establishment of a nuclear-free region of Ukraine. According to W.Putin, Ukrainian demilitarisation was to be presented as early as 2022 during peace talks in Istanbul.
- “Denazification of Ukraine” - in this case, the Russian president did not specify what the “denazification” should be, but looking at the Russian communicative towards Ukraine after 2014, we can presume that the main nonsubjective is to install the pro-Russian government in Kiev.
- “Recognising the rights of the Russian number in Ukraine”. Here too, there was no concreteisation of Russian demands, but during the speech, W.Putin mentioned that after 2014, the Russian population was persecuted by the Kiev authorities, as the Russian leader referred to as “genocide in the 21st century”.
W.Putin's speech on a possible truce was a brief summary of Russian propaganda about Ukraine. From the words of the Russian president we could hear theories about the persecution of the Russian number and Orthodox Church by the “Kijowska junta” and the designation of Nazism as the basis for building Ukrainian statehood after 2014.
At the same time we can consider W.Putin's communicative on the Russian offensive towards Kiev from February 2022 as an interesting passage. According to the Russian dictator, the goal of the Russian troops was not to storm or occupy the city, but to exert political force on the government in Kiev to start negotiations with Moscow.
In turn, the withdrawal of the FR forces at the turn of March and April 2022 from the Kiev area was to be linked to the accomplishment of a Russian-Ukrainian compromise which was to be broken by the Ukrainian side through “provokations in Buczy” and the refusal to participate in subsequent peace meetings.
The Russian president besides mentioned that on 5 March 2022 in the Kremlin he was staying closer to an unspecified “Western politician” to have the legitimacy of the German, British and U.S. highest officials to accept the function of negotiator between Ukraine and Russia. According to W.Putin, this “western official” was to make the same visit to Kiev, which the Ukrainian authorities did not agree to.
W.Putin stressed that the peace terms are addressed to the authorities of the ultimate Council of Ukraine, which in his opinion is the only legitimate origin of power in Ukraine. In Russian narration, president Volodymyr Zelenski holds illegal power due to the holding of presidential elections which should take place in April this year.
Concerning territorial change, it is worth noting the changes in Russian demands over 2022. Following the referendum in the Donetsk, Lugansk, Khersonsk and Zaporosk regions in September 2023. Russia considered them an integral part of the Federation, as presented in Russian “peaceful” conditions.
Ukrainian side determined W.Putin's proposals for “an ultimatum that cannot be trusted” and the Russian President's actions for the policy led by A.Hitler towards Czechoslovakia on the eve of planet War II.
Russian peace proposals in the ongoing war represent a circumstantial consequence to the June peace summit in Switzerland, which was not recognised by Russia as a definitive solution to the “Ukrainian crisis”. At the same time, the aforementioned conditions, according to Moscow, are non-negotiable, thus constituting tough demands, alternatively than a possible compromise. Nevertheless, the possible signing by Kiev (which is highly unlikely) of the peace treaty on Russian terms would lead to the vassalization of Ukraine towards Moscow. At the same time, with territorial losses as the population Ukraine would become an economical pariah, heavy dependent on abroad economical aid. In turn, political change for permanent would halt the pro-west course in Kiev politics, visible since the overthrow of president W. Janukovich during the “revolution of dignity” at the turn of 2013 and 2014.
14.VI-What do the Russians think of Poles? Results of the Levade centre
On 14 June 2014, an independent sociological investigation centre appeared on the website of the Left-Russian centre test results in which the Russians judged which countries they considered friendly to Russia and which were hostile and how they had relations with individual countries.
Russian respondents considered Belarus (81%), China (61%), Kazakhstan (33%), India (33%) and Iran (32%) to be the most friendly countries.
At the other poles they placed the USA (76 %), large Britain (51%), Germany (49%), Ukraine (38%) and Poland (37%).
The Russians' opinions about Poland can be considered an interesting result.
As part of a survey in which respondents assessed their own attitude towards the countries afraid (from very good to very bad). The first place was taken by Poland with a score of 74% (bad or very bad), only 15% of respondents had a good or very good attitude towards it. The second place was Ukraine, to which 72% of the respondents (bad or very bad) were described as negative.
The most anti-Polish sentiments are seen among a group of respondents aged 55 and more, among which 81% indicated their attitude towards Poland as bad or very bad, while the most pro-Polish sentiments were seen in the group 18-24 in which 31% of respondents rated their approach to Poland as very good or good, and 56% as bad or very bad.
Strong anti-Polish moods, surpassing even the anti-Ukrainian moods among the respondents may be amazing - it is worth mentioning that the authors of the investigation besides recalled archival results, according to which at least in May 2011 57% Russians had a very good or good opinion about Poland. Undoubtedly, however, anti-Polish accents have been visible in Russian communicative for respective years now, as early as 2020 and 2021, the Russian president during his speeches stressed That Poland is liable for the outbreak of the Second planet War, among others, which carried out the partition of Czechoslovakia with Germany.
At the same time, after 24 February 2022 an anti-Polish offensive began in Russian propaganda. In Russian propaganda Poland is not only presented as a “Trojan horse” of the USA in Central and east Europe, but besides as a real threat to the safety of Belarus. In Russian as well as Belarusian narrative, the progressive modernization of the Polish Army is intended to service submission to Belarus, but besides areas belonging in the past to the First Republic. In the Russian communicative in Ukraine, troops of the Polish Army are to fight, and Warsaw is to be liable for the effort to overthrow A.Łukashenko in the summertime of 2020.
From the position of the Kremlin, the activities of the Polish authorities after 24 February 2022 became a threat, due to the assistance given to Ukraine in key moments of conflict, as well as by repeatedly expanding the request to increase NATO's presence in the “eastern flank” alliance. At the same time, it is worth mentioning that anti-Polish propaganda is not a novelty in Moscow's politics, as already in the 20th century Poland was referred to by the Russians as “the Slavic traitor” and “the sleazy bastard of the Treaty of Versailles”.
16.VI and 23.VI-Rostow riots and Dagestan bombing
On 16 June, a series of clashes between prisoners and prison service took place in 1 of the prisons located close Rostov on Don. The fighting in prison resulted in the taking as hostages of 2 prison service officers by six prisoners, identifying themselves as militants of the muslim state. At the same time on the same day within the framework storm OMON units have released the hostages and liquidated the attempted kidnappers.
Nevertheless, the riots in the Rostov prison are not only a marginal event, but they form part of a increasing sense of threat to muslim terrorism in Russia, as well as an always clearer spiral of force swept through Russian society.
In March 2024, Russia shook the attack at the Moscow buying centre “Crocus City Hall” to which the muslim state was to confess. The March terrorist attack drew the attention of observers to the problem of an expanding threat from Muslim extremism, 1 of which is to be increasing number of Muslim prisoners, as well as expanding mutinies and riots inside criminal establishments.
At the same time, Russian state spending on prison service is decreasing, and the number of prisoners per year is increasing, which highlights the problem. At the same time, veterans of “Specializations” have a large proportion of crimes committed - frequently heavy, which is besides a problem for Russian prisons.
On 23 June 2024 a series occurred assassinations in the Dagestan Republic. Terrorists attacked the Synagogue, the Church, and the Machachkale Police Station. The action was to be carried out by the muslim state, and it was marked by the planned operation - 5 attackers were active in it. At the same time, any of the attackers were to be connected with local politics, Member of the Putin organization “One Russia”.
Due to the bombings throughout the Dagestan republic, the state of panic operation was introduced and additional forces were sent to the site.
The events of the end of June bring a strong spiritual origin - the Orthodox Church and the synagogue were attacked, it is worth paying attention to powerfully anti-Israeli sentiments in the North Caucasus. Last October it happened A circumstantial storm At the local airport where the Tel Aviv plane landed. A crowd of about 150 people ran into the airfield plate looking for Jews getting off the plane, paralyzing over a fewer hours of airport operation.
The Republic of Dagestan through its religious-ethnic strategy is 1 of the points of inflammation on the map of the Russian Federation - in erstwhile years in the region there have been a series of spiritual incidents, and the republic itself as in the lens I focus the main problems of the Russian caucasian- Muslim extremism and terrorism.
At the same time, the ongoing war in Ukraine diverts the attention of the national authorities from the problem of the Caucasus, which importantly facilitates the operation of the terrorist group. Additionally, in favour of developing muslim movements in the region, demography is active, as the northern caucasian republics evidence the fastest demographic growth in Russia, thereby expanding Muslim participation in the overall structure of Russia's population.
The events in Dagestan, as well as the Sub-Moscow bombing, may be a announcement of further escalation of the threat from muslim terrorism, which could pose a serious challenge to the Moscow authorities. At the same time, the problem of the North Caucasus besides ignites Russian society for economical reasons, the Ingushetia Republic or Dagestan are 1 of the largest beneficiaries of national subsidies, and the Russians themselves frequently rise the slogan “enough feeding of the North Caucasus”. Further terrorist attacks and acts caused by Russian citizens from the northern caucasian region may exacerbate cultural disputes in the country, thus causing an increase in xenophobic sentiments among cultural Russians.
24.VI-New European Union Sanctions
At the end of June, 27 members of the European Union adopted another, 14 sanction package aimed at the Russian Federation. The 14th package includes energy, trade and finance sectors. At the same time, Joseph Borell-Chief of EU diplomacy stressed that the latest sanction package includes 116 people and entities whose activities straight affect the safety and integrity of Ukraine.
It is worth mentioning that the EU's 14th sanction package has highlighted Russia's problem of circumventing sanctions by importing goods through companies located in non-sanctioned countries. In order to prevent parallel imports, the EU has imposed the request to include in the agreements appropriate provisions prohibiting companies from transferring arms production know-how in products that can be transferred to the FR. 61 entities have besides been sanctioned, which have been shown to break EU restrictions in their activities.
On finance, the EU Council besides decided to ban STransfer of Financial Communications (SPFS), a Russian consequence to EU action on restrictions on freedom in global transactions.
According to J. Borell, the EU's erstwhile actions in the area of sanctions are an effective tool in combating Russian aggression: ”Our sanctions have already importantly weakened the Russian economy and prevented Putin from implementing his plans to destruct Ukraine, although he continues to engage in illegal aggression against the civilian population and civilian infrastructure,“
At the same time, the Russian side has repeatedly stressed that sanctions in fact pose a greater threat to the economies of the European Union countries than to Russia itself. However, the withdrawal of many western companies from the Russian marketplace undoubtedly affected the state of the Russian economy. 1 of the most striking examples of the impact of sanctions on the Russian economy is the aviation sector. In addition to the ban on Russian airline flights to EU countries, Russian airlines were cut off from access to spare parts and service services of western companies specified as Boeing or Airbus. This importantly affected safety of air travel and forced Russian companies to start the process of “cannibalizing” existing machines to get spare parts.
The Kremlin's consequence to sanctions against FR is to be counter-sanctions, as well as to replace the presence of Russian companies through increased presence of Chinese and native companies.
The full list of changes introduced in the 14 sanction packages is available on European Council website.
President Putin's Tournée
Last June was an highly intense time for the abroad travel of the Russian President. After 24 February 2022, the number of abroad visits of W.Putin decreased significantly, as well as the number of destinations that the head of the Russian state may visit.
The ellipse of states prepared to host the Russian president is limited to states that have not recognised the decision of the global Criminal Court in The Hague to arrest the Russian president and have not joined Western sanctions. For this reason, as of 24 February 2022. Putin was hosted only in China, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Belarus, Armenia and the United arabian Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
At the same time, this year's “tournée” of the Russian president only included states with which Russia had previously maintained friendly relations. From 16 May to 21 June, Putin visited China, Belarus, Uzbekistan, North Korea and Vietnam respectively.
A crucial signal to the planet is that for the first time abroad travel after this year's swearing in, W.Putin chose China. This makes it clear that, as in fresh years, China will besides play a crucial function in Russian abroad policy. At the same time Putin visited 2 countries included in the Russian strategical thought among the alleged “near foreign”-Belarus and Uzbekistan.
During abroad visits of the Russian president, the importance of Asia as a continent for Moscow is seen. 4 of the 5 countries in which the authoritative visits were made by W.Putin are in Asia, it is worth mentioning in this case that after 2014, a turn towards Asia can be seen in the Russian strategical thought to respond to the cooling of contacts with NATO and EU European countries.
However, fresh abroad visits made by W.Putin do not constitute a novelty in Moscow's abroad policy, but signal the continuation of the current course. The issue of abroad visits by W.Putin was further discussed in a survey published on the fresh Europe Insitus website, International Tournée Vladimir Putin.
War Report
- Attacks on Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure
On June 1, there was a massive rocket attack on Ukrainian energy facilities. According to Ukrainian data, Russia utilized 53 maneuvering missiles and 47 Shahed 131/136. The targets of the attacks were all over Ukraine, and the consequences of the attack were, among others, temporary power outages, or as in the case of the Dnieprzanska Water Power Plant - its exclusion from work. The Russian Federation has been trying for a long time to methodically destruct Ukrainian energy facilities, in order to impede the work of the economy as well as to reduce morale in Ukrainian society. At the same time, Russian attacks on energy targets in Ukraine do not go unanswered- in addition to attacks on Russian logistics facilities, Ukrainian authorities increasingly stress the request to supply advanced anti-aircraft defence systems specified as Patriot. In June the Patriot batteries, as well as another modules of the system, were donated by Germany, the Netherlands or Italy. At the same time in Western press, including among others “Politico“ There have been articles confirming the Romanian decision to donate the Patriot batteries to Ukraine.
- French and American announcements to supply military support
On June 6, France's president, Emanuel Macron announced that France is ready to deliver to Ukraine the French Mirage 2000-5 aircraft, as well as begin the process of training Ukrainian crews. At the same time, the French president did not find how many aircraft units Ukraine is to receive, nor erstwhile precisely they will be transferred. At the same time, the French ideas of handing over fighters to Ukraine are not a novum in NATO states policy. Already at the time of the NATO summit in Vilnius in June 2023, it was proposed to make an “F-16 coalition” in which individual NATO states agreed to begin the process of training Ukrainian pilots and groundhandling. In turn, aircraft would come from warehouses of the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, the USA and Belgium. The transfer of French aircraft paradoxically can pose a logistical problem for Ukrainian aviation. The process of transforming Ukraine's air force into F-16 aircraft is simply a major logistical challenge for Ukrainians who previously utilized only russian constructions specified as MiG-29 or SU-27. In this case, the introduction of 2 completely different types of machinery of Western origin may lead to a number of logistical problems, while at the same time the question of how many pilots I have in Ukraine remains to be questioned in order to be able to direct any crews to training while not neglecting combat missions. However, in the event of the ongoing war, in order to keep the efficiency of Ukrainian aviation, it is essential to transform it into western constructions - although individual NATO members have transferred post-missile constructions from their armies, it is inevitable in the long word that Western aircraft will be adopted.
In addition to declarations related to Mirage 2000-5 aircraft, president Macron besides announced the creation of a brigade of 4,500 soldiers, armed and trained by the French military.
On June 7, another aid package announced Washington. A fresh package worth $225 million is expected to contain ammunition for HIMARS rocket systems, 155 mm artillery missiles, and 200 M113 transporters.
- The war in Ukraine in global optics. Conference for the reconstruction of Ukraine in Berlin and the Swiss peace summit
A joint Ukrainian-German conference was held in Berlin on 11 June, focusing on the reconstruction of Ukraine. erstwhile editions of the conference were held in Lugano in 2022, and in London in 2023. During the meeting, the issues of cooperation in the energy, social and climate spheres were addressed. The conference was attended by the Ukrainian president, who besides met with German Chancellor-Olav Scholz.
Although the conference focused mainly on the reconstruction of Ukraine, especially in the context of Ukrainian energy problems, president Zelenski called for further intensification of military aid for the fighting Ukraine.
However, without the financial assistance of EU countries and NATO, the post-war reconstruction of the Ukrainian economy and society will require immense financial resources, during the conference the Ukrainian president stressed that Russia destroyed the energy infrastructure in Ukraine, which generated electricity comparable to that needed in Berlin and Munich. In turn World Bank suggests that in the next decade Ukraine will request $500 billion to rebuild destroyed cities or factories.
A peace summit was held in Switzerland on 15-16 June, attended by representatives of 93 countries, of which 78 signed End message, which requires the transfer of control of the Zaporosk atomic Power Plant to Ukraine, the request to respect territorial integrity Ukraine and the return of prisoners of war and civilians, as well as securing the anticipation of exporting Ukrainian agricultural products across the Black Sea.
At the same time, the peace summit itself does not constitute any breakthrough in the issue of the ongoing war. In addition to the absence of Russian representatives, there was besides no Chinese delegation in Switzerland. In turn, the signed final communication is simply a de facto repetition previous declarations coming from Kiev, specified as the request to return to the borders of 1991, or to halt utilizing “nuclear blackmail” on the Zaporošska EJ. It can so be assumed that the main nonsubjective of the Ukrainian side during the summit was to effort to research the moods of the global community in the issue of the ongoing war, as well as to signal to Western partners that Kiev did not change its conditions for ending the war.
- Social sentiments in Ukraine
At the beginning of June, the Kiev centre for sociological investigation published report, on the social sentiments of Ukraine. Respondents answered questions about their relation with mobilization, W. Zelenski's actions and compromises during negotiations with Russia. The survey active 2,000 Ukrainian citizens from different regions of the state. At the time of the survey only persons who did not leave Ukraine after 24 February 2022 were considered.
One of the questions afraid the support for president Volodymyr Zelenski's power, to the question "Zelenski should be president until the end of martial law“ 70% said yes, 22% opposed. In turn, 56% of respondents support the Ukrainian President's policy, while 37% are against it.
The respondents expressed their views on possible peace negotiations with the Russian Federation, which could include territorial concessions for the Kremlin. To the message ‘The Ukrainian authorities should not compromise in negotiations. Ukraine will proceed to fight as long as necessarye' agreed 58% of respondents, in turn 30% were against. At the same time, this represents a slight fall in support of the deficiency of compromise in negotiations with Russia, as in May 2022 80% of Ukrainians expressed their support for continuing the fight as long as necessary.
With respect to the changes in the mobilization law, 34% of respondents were in favour of it, and 54% were against it. At the same time, the authors of the survey emphasize that disapproval of the message is not the same as that respondents are entirely opposed to mobilization as such, but may express disapproval of certain elements of the fresh law (such as a change in the age of conscription from 27 to 25, or the removal of the evidence of demobilization of soldiers after 36 months of service).
A full test study is available under this link.