Written by Ksawery Stawiński, Adam Jankowski
10.09 – The unclear function of Belarus during the Russian drone raid
Belarusians played an interesting function during the raid of Russian drones into Poland. General of the Staff of Belarus – Paweł Murawejko informed about Minsk's unexpected cooperation. According to Reuters, the Belarusian services were to inform Poland and Lithuania about the incoming unknown objects over their territories. This information was expected to prepare Poles for an imminent threat, which allowed them to choice up the machines that shot down enemy objects in advance. Moreover, the General assured of his commitment to further cooperation – "The Republic of Belarus will proceed to fulfil its obligations in the framework of the exchange of information on the situation in the airspace with the Republic of Poland and the Baltic countries".
This unexpected assistance from the east neighbour comes in tandem with further crucial news about Belarus. The day after the drone attack, John Coale, a peculiar envoy of president Trump, arrived in Minsk in Belarus. The intent of the visit was to effort to normalise relations between both countries. As a motion of goodwill, the Americans decided to abolish sanctions against Belavia's Belarusian airline. Lukashenko in turn decided to release 52 political prisoners. The reopening of the U.S. Embassy in Minsk is announced, and John Coale himself argued that he wanted to further make the relationship.
This event can be interpreted in 2 ways: either as an American carrot for Moscow by showing that America is indeed prone to concessions, or as showing Belarus that it is not doomed to Russia and can mimic its influence in the country. The OSW argues that the photograph of the sanctions from Belavia will not consequence in the unblocking of a stream of money for Belarus, and Russia itself does not seem afraid about Washington's actions, while Minsk exaggerates the importance of this contact. However, a fresh chapter in American-Belarusian relations has just begun.
28.09 – Massive drone attack on Kiev and Ukraine critical infrastructure
Russia carried out an extended strike operation on Ukraine, covering dozens of rockets and hundreds of drones. The main goal was the Kiev regions and another strategical areas of the country. As a consequence of attacks, at least 4 people lost their lives and dozens were injured. The Ukrainian defence claims that Russia fired 595 drones and 48 rockets, of which the defence forces managed to shoot down 568 drones and 43 rockets. The attacks lasted over 12 hours, covering civilian and military facilities.
Ukraine's President, Volodymyr Zelenski, described Russia's actions as "bad hits" and called on the global community to act decisively. He said that while the UN General Assembly is sitting, Russia "uses all moment, all hr to attack Ukraine". Russia, on the another hand, announced that the mark of the attack was military-industrial facilities including airports and repair facilities as well as energy infrastructure and elements of the military base.
The Kremlin assures us it's not hitting civilian targets. Impacts were besides felt in the capital itself, residential buildings, production facilities and power stations were damaged. At least 1 individual died in 1 of the cardiology facilities in Kiev, and there is besides a kid among the victims. In addition, Zaporozhe suffered from attacks, where nearly 40 wounded were reported.
28.09 – Russia leaves the European Convention against Torture
Vladimir Putin, signed a bill that formally withdraws the Russian Federation from the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture. This information was announced by government sources. This decision constitutes the implementation of an earlier vote in the Russian parliament according to which Russia was to retreat from this global treaty, which it had been organization to since 1998. The authoritative justification for leaving the Convention shows that Moscow has chosen this step as a consequence to the refusal of the Council of Europe, which did not grant Russia a seat on the Committee supervising the implementation of the Convention. This step is seen as another component of Russia's drift distant from the European institutions and weakening the mechanisms of global human rights control. At the same time, it means limiting Russia's formal obligations to counter torture and to complain to independent supervisory bodies.
29.09 – expanding mobilization into the military in the Russian Federation
Vladimir Putin signed a decree that from 1 October to 31 December 2025 a mass conscription to the army was planned as “the largest autumn recruitment in 9 years”. Moscow Times, points out that the number of people to be called into service reaches 135 000 candidates aged between 18 and 30 years, an increase of around 2,000 compared to the same period of the erstwhile year. So far, the largest autumn intake took place in autumn 2016, erstwhile the authorities planned to appoint 152,000 people to active service. In fresh years Russia has regularly held recruitments: in the autumn of 2022 120 000, in 2023 130 000, in 2024 133 000.
In addition to the fall draft, Russia traditionally besides organises spring calls in 2025, the number of these conscriptions reached around 160 000, which shows that recruitment is simply a crucial component of complementing the structure of the armed forces. Moreover, the Russian parliament was working on changes that could make the draft year-round alternatively than limiting it to the present 2 spring and autumn periods. The task envisages extending the time limits for recruitment from 1 January to 31 December. It is worth noting that since the beginning of the war in Ukraine in February 2022, Russia did not issue a formal decree ending the partial mobilisation then announced by Putin. Meanwhile, the primary intake continues to include men aged 18–30. Under war conditions, legal contract service is besides becoming increasingly important, which is the main way of complementing forces in fresh years.
30.09 – Russia announces a partial ban on diesel exports
W Moscow has been announced to have a partial ban on diesel exports by the end of 2025 and the existing ban on petrol exports will be extended for the full year. This decision is motivated by the request to guarantee the stableness of the fuel marketplace in the country after a series of Ukrainian attacks on refineries. The Russian authorities point out that the fresh restrictions are part of the efforts to keep balance in the interior market. The ban on petrol covers all exporters, while restrictions on diesel exports concern dealers and wholesalers excluding producers themselves.
Experts believe that these measures are improbable to origin a sharp decline in the supply of fuels in Russia, as there was already a very advanced export tariff for diesel for non-producers. The reasons for the decision emphasise that the escalation of Ukrainian drone attacks on refinery infrastructure importantly depleted Russia's production capacity. Problems with fuel availability are already noticeable in any regions, among others, in Nizna Novgorod and the Far East. Therefore, limits on the acquisition of fuel (maximum 30 litres at a time) were introduced in Crimea and petrol prices were frozen to avoid public discontent.
03.10 The European Union extends sanctions against Russia for hybrid actions and information manipulations
The EU Council decided to extend for another year the resolution imposing restrictions on individuals and entities liable for destabilising activities carried out by Russia outside its borders. The fresh restrictions will apply until 9 October 2026. 47 people and 15 entities were included in the list of sanctions. These persons and organisations shall, inter alia, be prohibited from entering or transiting through the EU. Furthermore, their assets have been frozen and EU citizens and companies operating in the Union have no right to make funds, assets or economical resources available to those persons or entities. This decision stems from increasing concerns about Russia's hybrid activities, including the phenomenon known as "Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference", i.e. manipulation of external information and interference aimed at associate States and EU partners. The information section of the paper recalled that earlier, on 8 October 2024, the EU Council adopted a framework for restrictive measures against Russia due to destabilising measures. The aim of these measures is to counter the policies and actions of the Russian Government which undermine the value of the fundamental principles of the European Union, specified as the security, independency and integrity of the associate States. In May 2025, the framework was extended to include fresh aspects: among others, sanctions were imposed on assets related to Russia's destabilizing activity, supporting it financially, and it was besides possible to suspend broadcasting licences for Russian media active in spreading misinformation.
03.10 "Dron Wall" – ambitious concept, hard reality
The European Union is increasingly talking about the request to strengthen borders against fresh forms of threats, especially from the Russian Federation. In this context, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen proposed the creation of the alleged "dron wall" of a European defence strategy against unmanned aircraft. The thought is to build an integrated network of drone detection, tracking and neutralisation, which is increasingly utilized in both military and hybrid operations.
The task was driven by many incidents, including breaches of associate States' airspace by Russian drones. Von der Leyen stressed that conventional consequence methods, specified as shooting down drones with fighters, are cost-effective. It believes that Europe needs a modern, technological solution that will enable it to respond effectively to specified threats without overburdening defence budgets. The task does not envisage the construction of a physical wall, but the creation of a digital and electronic barrier – a radar system, sensors, disruptive devices and specialized drones to monitor the east flank of the Union.
The first phase is to cover countries bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and the strategy would then be extended to the full Union. The Commission's nonsubjective is to guarantee that basic infrastructure elements are created within a fewer years so that full operational capacity is achieved by the end of 2027. However, an ambitious plan collides with a hard reality. The construction of specified an extended network requires immense financial resources and coordinated cooperation between all associate States. any of them are skeptical of the project, especially as regards the European Commission's backing and competence in defence. Experts besides point out that even if the strategy is implemented, it will not solve all safety problems. Drones are only 1 of the many elements of modern threats equally crucial are cyber attacks, energy sabotage or misinformation.
The thought of a "drone wall" so has a symbolic dimension. It shows that Europe recognises the request to build its own defence capabilities and can no longer trust solely on NATO allies. It besides reveals how hard it is to translate political declarations into concrete actions. If the plan succeeds, it can become an crucial step towards European strategical autonomy. However, if it is stuck in bureaucratic disputes, it will only stay an ambitious slogan that will not translate into real safety for EU citizens.
06.10 Angela Merkel on Europe's mistakes towards Russia – an interview that caused a storm in Poland
Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel in a fresh interview with the Hungarian net channel Partizán returned to themes related to Europe's relations with Russia and the circumstances that she felt led to a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Merkel recalled that even in 2021, a fewer months before the outbreak of the war, she and then the French president tried to convince the European Union to make a fresh format of dialog with Moscow. In her opinion, the existing agreements, specified as the alleged Minsk format, ceased to be effective and required renewed political contact with the Kremlin. She admitted that the thought was not enthusiastic for all EU members. Poland and the Baltic countries, who feared that talks with Putin could be perceived as a sign of weakness and an incentive for further aggression, first of all expressed their opposition. Merkel pointed out that she regretted failing to scope a common position on Russia at the time, suggesting that the deficiency of unanimity in the EU made it hard for later diplomatic action to take place.
Following the publication of the interview in the Polish media, there were headlines suggesting that the erstwhile Chancellor blames Poland for co-responsibility for the war in Ukraine. However, independent analyses, including reports dealing with the investigation of misinformation, showed that Merkel did not attribute Poland's responsibility for the Russian invasion. Her words referred alternatively to the deficiency of a common European strategy for Moscow, not to the work of any state. Experts point out that the way any media presented Merkel's message was importantly different from its actual sense. The erstwhile Chancellor spoke of diplomatic difficulties and the request to make a common approach within the EU, not of a "partner" in the countries of east Europe.
10.10 Information related to the war in Ukraine in the first half of October
In the period from October 3 to October 10, 2025, Russia increased the pace of military action within the framework of the war in Ukraine, simultaneously facing expanding interior challenges. On the Ukrainian front, Moscow carried out respective large attacks, among others, on October 5, the intelligence revealed that Russian forces fired as many as 53 missiles (including 2 hypersonic “Kinżal”) and nearly 500 drones in 9 regions of Ukraine. At least 5 people were killed as a consequence of these actions and extended energy infrastructure was damaged. 5 days later, on the night of October 9-10, the Russians carried out another mass attack: about 465 drones and 32 rockets hit Ukrainian power and gas systems, causing temporary power outages for more than 1 million inhabitants.
In Russia, there have been increasingly frequent drone attacks: they have even reached the Ural and Tyuma regions, which puts the effectiveness of Russian air defence at issue. As far as land facilities are concerned, during the week ending 7 October, Russian forces occupied the next 34 square miles of Ukrainian territory, an increase of 162 percent compared to the erstwhile week erstwhile 13 square miles were taken. Within 4 weeks (9 September – 7 October), this increase was 166 square miles. Vladimir Putin declared to have captured nearly 5,000 km2 (about 1,9330 square miles) of Ukraine's territory in 2025, although independent data indicated about 3,153 km2 (about 1,217 square miles) since the beginning of the year.
In the field of global relations, the key subject was the proposal for Donald Trump to sale long-distance "Tomahawk" missiles to NATO countries that could hit Ukraine. Trump admitted on 6 October that he had "to any degree made a decision", but wanted to first learn about Ukraine's plans to usage them. Russia responded with a informing about "serious escalation" – Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Pieskov stated that these missiles could carry atomic warheads. It is worth noting that high-ranking Russian parliamentarians even suggested the anticipation of hitting the Polish base in Rzeszów – a key transit point for military aid to Ukraine. As regards arms control, Russia proposed to extend the fresh START Treaty 1 year after its expiry in February 2026. Trump considered it a good thought in an interview, but did not specify the conditions or his authoritative answer. The Kremlin accepted this with average optimism, but at the same time stressed that there is no certainty about restoring the inspection or data exchange, which leaves questions about Moscow's real intentions.
13.10 Russian matrimony charged with espionage and attempted assassination in Poland
In fresh proceedings conducted by Polish law enforcement authorities before the territory court in Sosnowiec, he received an indictment against the matrimony of Russian Federation citizens to the man Igor R. and his wife Irina R. According to the prosecutor's office, both were to cooperate with the Russian peculiar Service of the FSB, collecting and providing information that could harm the Republic of Poland. Investigative findings show that from February to August 2022, Igor R. worked for the FSB against Poland, including by collecting data on Russian opposition activists residing in Poland and on persons and institutions supporting these activists.
This data was to be transmitted to his wife Irina, who was then to send it from the territory of Poland or through an intermediary for Russian intelligence. At the same time, the man was accused of sending a courier package containing explosives in July 2024 with 2 people (two Ukrainian citizens and 1 Russian). The package was to be located in a warehouse of a courier company in Łódź Voivodeship.
In the opinion of experts from the interior safety Agency (ABW), the consignment contained nitroglycerin, Soviet-produced combat electrical detonators, a fabricated powerbank, an initiating device, a thermos with a cumulative cartridge and a powdered aluminium bag. The full was defined as a ‘cumulative bomb’ which could have caused crucial harm to the infrastructure. The matrimony was detained in July 2024 and has been in temporary custody so far.
16.10 Frozen assets
At the time of the war, Russia held its assets in western financial institutions. Of this, around EUR 200 billion located in EU countries. Most of this money went to Euroclear – a private institution, a securities depositor, based in Belgium. It has about EUR 185 billion of the amount under consideration, now mostly converted into cash. The question of the usage of frozen Russian assets has appeared in the infosphere since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine. A fresh beginning of the debate on this solution launched by the European Commission was observed in October.
There is no law that would let the European Union to get any country's financial resources from a private financial institution. While fresh cases were already established through the EU decision to confiscate the generated interest on the amount in question to finance Ukraine's military effort, the confiscation of the full first amount is cumbersome. Russia could usage arbitration institutions and analyse its rations, e.g. at the global Court of Justice, where the law would stand on its side.
To overcome this problem, Urszula von der Leyen came up with the following solution: the European Central Bank will release a zero-cocoupon bond, which will then be full bought by Euroclear, utilizing cash left in Belgium by the Russians. The EU will then usage the above-mentioned means to cover the Ukrainian military's needs, thus incurring a debt to Russia. However, repayment of the debt will be conditional on the fulfilment of a number of Moscow requirements for reconstruction of Ukraine and repayment of war reparations by the EU. In this way, Russia would besides pay for the anticipation of Europeans paying back their debt to it. The real warrant of repayment of Russian funds would be individual European countries, among which this fresh debt would be distributed in relation to the size of their economies. In view of the multiplicity of the associate States, the recovery process would surely be hampered by Russia due to the fact that it would require an individual procedure each time.
The European Commission has thus addressed the problem of the deficiency of legal mechanisms for the simple confiscation of another country's resources. While the opposition of Slovakia and Hungary could be circumvented either by voting in favour of a qualified majority resolution, or by simply excluding those countries from the plan, by allocating their financial commitments to another EU members, Belgium itself raises its objections. While the EU is convinced that financial commitments will re-establish associate States, it is presently the Belgians who are liable for the Russian account and the decision to pay the funds may weigh the integrity of their financial institutions for abroad investors. In view of the opposition of the curious parties themselves, the case was stuck, along with Russian assets.
16.10 Europe wants to be ready to fight Russia by 2030
The European Commission has published a paper proposing to address Europe's current military condition. It defines it as a threat to its safety the Russian Federation and presents military areas that request to be strengthened to be ready for conflict.
Areas include:
– Air and rocket defense
– strategical capabilities (e.g. connectivity, diagnosis, logistics)
– Artillery systems
– Military mobility
– Rockets and ammunition
– Cybersecurity, artificial intelligence and electronic war
– Drones and drone systems
– Land forces
– Navy
The improvement of Europe's military situation is to be achieved by creating a number of different, [military] associate States' [military] capacity Coalitions, which are to work together to improve their chosen area. These bodies will be in constant contact with the Council for abroad Affairs (defence), which will improve the financing of individual projects from EU funds.
The expected deadline for achieving the circumstantial objectives of the plan is as follows:
1. make a Coalition of Capability in all precedence areas, appoint lead and co-chair countries, and make appropriate implementation plans by 2030 by the first 4th of 2026.
2. Collect preliminary data on the capabilities of the EU defence manufacture in precedence capacity areas, with appropriate Commission support by mid-2026.
3. Launch projects in all precedence areas – in the first half of 2026.
4. Organize at least 40% of defence contracts as joint contracts – by the end of 2027.
5. guarantee the implementation of the projects, contracts and backing needed to address key capacity gaps in precedence areas by the end of 2028.
6. Implement all contracts financed under the SAFE programme, contributing to all capacity gaps in precedence areas by the end of 2030.
Key projects will be:
– creation of a comprehensive anti-drone strategy on the east flank.
– creation of a pan-European rocket shield
– creation of a European space defence system
– introducing legislative changes to improve the production of VW equipment
– Deeper cooperation on safety with Ukraine
– improvement of the military market
– Refinancing of projects
The paper presents all these projects together with corresponding timetables and milestones.
Although the diverging perception of safety in Europe will surely not force all associate States to participate in this project, it is simply a good tool for Poland to usage EU funds for its own needs and a affirmative direction towards the improvement of military cooperation between associate States.
22.10American sanckje on Rostnief and Łukoil
After a spectacular fiasco of the Russian-American gathering in Budapest, Trump hit Russia with economical sanctions. This is the first specified decision made by the president of the United States during his second term. The subject of the restrictions are the largest Russian oil companies – Łukoil and Rosnieft, their subsidiaries and their partners both American and foreign.
In this case, penalties shall mean:
- cutting off companies from the banking strategy and US financial institutions,
- prohibition of any cooperation with Łukoil and Rosnieft imposed on US entities,
- the prohibition of any cooperation with Łukoil or Rosnieft subsidiaries (i.e. 1 in which 1 of the companies has more than 50% share),
- The threat of imposing secondary sanctions on non-American, abroad entities that cooperate with Łukoile Rosnieft or their subsidiaries.
It is hard to overestimate the importance of this decision for the continued functioning of the Russian state. For example, in 2023 oil and refined oil accounted for 31% and 13.5% of the Russian Federation's income respectively, a full of 44.5%.
In fresh years, Rosnieft has been liable for 30–50% of Russian oil exports and Łukoil from 12 to 14%, a full of 42 to 64% of full oil exports. Companies are liable for 6 and 2% of global production respectively. They supply India – the second largest importer of Russian oil in the planet – with about 60% of the goods imported from Russia. Moscow's biggest client, China, must number on US sanctions to cover a full of 45% of this natural material imported from the northern neighbour.
Trump's decision has already contributed to reducing request for Russian oil in these 2 countries, as companies importing Russian goods do not want to become victims of secondary sanctions that could at worst cut them off from US financial institutions. At the same time, global oil prices per barrel have not experienced dullness, and OPEC+ intends to increase mining by replacing Russian oil produced in the mediate East.
All this makes Moscow very difficult. So far, the Kremlin has underestimated the importance of sanctions, to which Trump answers: “We will see what happens in six months.”
23.10 Nineteenth Sanctions Package
While the American decision was alternatively unexpected, a long-awaited, next 19th package of sanctions was introduced in Europe. It is an extension of the European policy of expanding force on Russia, which updates all six months those affected by economical restrictions which limit backing measures for the Russian war.
In addition to the standard procedure for extending the list of ships from the shadow fleet, limiting the sale of dual-use items, limiting access to Europe for individual Russians, the 19th package of sanctions introduced 2 interesting changes.
The first is the ban on bringing Russian LNG into Europe, which will be implemented from January 2027 (including Slovakia and Hungary).
Secondly, Chinese companies will be sanctioned, which either bring in large amounts of Russian oil or aid Russians celebrate sanctions.
The Chinese issue is so crucial that it happened in tandem with an American decision, the coordination of which increased Western force on Russia's most crucial client.
24.10 Negative economical forecast for Russia
While Russia's economy continues to function smoothly, its condition continues to deteriorate.
The Central Bank's policy so far has been autonomous towards the interests of the Russian arms manufacture and has stood in contrast to its needs (mainly by imposing very advanced interest rates – 21% inactive in April of this year). The slow simplification in interest rates over the last six months (after the last simplification of 24 October this year is presently 16.5%) can be argued that the Kremlin is risking inflation by providing business with more favourable operating conditions. possibly this is simply a symptom of the falling autonomy of the Central Bank of Russia, whose head to that time stood up to the interests of large state companies. Elvira Nabiulina informed journalists that in 2026 interest rates would be continuously reduced to around 13-15%.
The late published Central Bank of Russia paper – ,,The monetary policy assumptions for the period 2026–2028”, defining its policy for the coming years, while maintaining current macroeconomic trends, assumes a baseline script in which Russia's GDP growth in the period 2025–2028 is projected at 1.5–2.5%. The BCR aims to accomplish inflation at a unchangeable level of 4% the following year.
In fact, BCR seems to be a affirmative scenario, as the global Monetary Fund has a completely different definition of Russia's future in the coming years. According to this institution, the increase in Russian pkbs in 2025 is only 0.6%. This represents a very large decrease compared to 4.3% of growth in 2024.
If the Central Bank actually reduces interest rates to the expected level, this can contribute to the negative script foreseen in the BCR – ,,proinflationary – document, in which the BCR anti-inflationary activities will prove ineffective and request will proceed to exceed supply. This will besides mean continuing competition for workers and expanding wages. An additional origin that can influence the implementation of specified a script will be the sancje which will encourage Russia to subsidise goods imported from abroad home production.
Given the actions of the U.S. administration, calculated to reduce request for Russian oil, and the negative forecasts of the IMF, 2026 could pose a major challenge for the Russian economy – recession in the civilian sector and inflation driven by request for weapons manufacture products resulting in stagflation.
