Developing the east flank of NATO in the light of the concept of deterrence

Main points:

• The changes in the global safety environment between 2014 and 2024, including Russia's full-scale aggression to Ukraine, revealed deficiencies in NATO's defence capabilities on the east flank, which resulted, among others, from the earlier restrictions on military presence and defence plans.

• NATO has taken action to strengthen deterrence on the east flank, specified as the creation of multinational combat groups and the increase in fast consequence forces, but these actions were insufficient to the scale of the threat from Russia.

• Russia's aggression to Ukraine in 2022 forced further decisions by the Alliance, specified as the transition from a forward presence strategy to a forward defense, but infrastructure constraints and deficiency of political will continued to prevent adequate reinforcement of NATO's east flank.

Changes in the safety environment in the transatlantic area that took place between 2014 and 2024 can be defined in 2 ways. On the 1 hand, they are revolutionary. In the immediate vicinity of NATO we are dealing with a transition from a state of peace, through a creeping war, to the full-scale aggression of Russia to Ukraine. This is simply a unique situation in Europe since planet War II. However, what happened in east Europe can besides be treated as a logical series of events started many years earlier. Russian neo-imperialism, remilitarisation and return to politics through war are besides present before 2014 and annexation of Crimea. Vladimir Putin has already at least since 2005 in his public appearances provided hard evidence of attachment to rebuilding the geopolitical position that Russia lost after the collapse of the USSR[1]. Moscow's fierce opposition to the thought of taking over Georgia and Ukraine with the NATO programme Membership Action Plan In the spring of 2008, and the ensuing war in Georgia were successive stages of rebuilding Russian influences in post-Soviet space.

The assessment of the scale of the threat posed by Russia varied NATO associate States. Even in the 2010 NATO strategical Concept, it was pointed out that relations with Russia should be built on the rule of "real strategical partnership"[2]. Even after annexing Crimea and continuing fighting in east Ukraine after 2014, NATO maintained a two-track approach to relations with Russia[3]. The return to the concept of deterrence was to proceed to be accompanied by dialog held on many organization levels[4]. Western European countries remained an advocate for this approach to Russia. A much more realistic assessment of the safety situation was presented by the countries of the east flank of NATO (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) and the Bucharest 9 Region[5]. The most noticeable change in NATO's relation to Russia followed the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. However, in order to better realize the evolution of NATO's perception of the Russian threat, the causes of the Alliance's weaknesses and possible ways to overcome them, it is worth tracing the improvement of the concept of deterrence on the example of the functioning of the east flank of NATO.

Fear based on Promise

The 4 key facts that marked the first years of NATO's erstwhile east bloc state membership are: the deficiency of deployment (until 2014) of US troops (or natowskis) in the countries of the erstwhile Warsaw Pact; the deficiency of defence plans for the Baltic countries; the waiver of plans to deploy permanent bases; the exclusion of fresh associate States' participation in the nuclear-sharing programme[6]. The symbolic sign of the Alliance's forces on the east flank was only to patrol the Baltic airspace within the mission Baltic Air Police located since 2004 in Lithuanian Szawlach[7]. The extension of NATO to Central and east Europe was so devoid of a fundamental valor—the physical and continuous presence of military structures constituting an adequate deterrent against Russia's possible attack. During the Cold War NATO deployed troops in areas of geopolitical tensions, primarily in West Berlin. The number of American troops in Europe was able to scope as many as 300,000 soldiers. In the reasoning of the Natian strategists, this was not an offensive threat, but only an outstretched informing showing readiness for a collective consequence in defence of each associate of the Alliance[8]. Regardless of the various stages of the Cold War confrontation, it was a paradigm that remained valid until the early 1990s.

After 1991, the presence of American troops in Europe decreased dramatically and the Alliance departed from the cold-war concept of advanced presence. It was decided to reduce the number and readiness of the NAT consequence forces, now located in the ‘central region’, while maintaining the ability to mobilise reserve forces. It is thus returned to the concept of "refugee as a promise" or "terrence by alliance". It was characteristic of the early years of NATO's existence, and the strategy of protecting the most peripheral members of the Alliance ("tripwire"[9]) was only undertaken as a consequence of the Korean War[10]. Regardless of the importance of the successive stages of NATO's enlargement to Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary or the Baltic countries, many commentators have observed that in terms of the balance of military conventional forces in the B9 region, Russia was the decisive and overwhelming factor. "The position of NATO's conventional forces in the post-winter era was fundamentally dictated by Russia's aggressive actions in its self-proclaimed "near foreign": rather akin to the way the conventional forces of the Alliance evolved in consequence to the Korean War during the Cold War"[11].

The quality of NATO membership of Central and east Europe has been greatly influenced by the negotiations of the NATO-Russia Act concluded in 1997. Although it has never been a legally binding treaty and has never imposed a ban on NATO's extension to east Europe, it has importantly influenced developments in this part of the transatlantic world. NATO has recognised that it will "execute its collective defence missions (...) by providing the essential interoperability, integration and capacity to strengthen, alternatively than by additional permanent deployment of crucial combat forces" in the NATO territories of the states of the erstwhile Warsaw Pact[12]. NATO and the US, in order to keep flexibility, did not precisely find what the word "significant combat forces" meant. However, back in the 1990s, with a treaty agreement with Russia to deploy conventional forces, The Alliance accepted the Kremlin's proposed limit of 1 brigade per country. As it later turned out, this advanced boundary became a mention point for negotiations to strengthen the east flank of NATO[13]. At the same time, it was a useful tool for opponents of the advanced presence in this part of the Alliance.

In addition, NATO declared that the rule of "three times no" (no intentions, no plans, no reasons) for placing atomic weapons on the territory of the fresh NATO States[14]. All these principles were considered to apply in a ‘current and predictable safety environment’[15]. Thus, they were defined by the realities of the second half of the 1990s, so radically different from those of the decades that followed. Especially from the position of the last 2 decades, NATO has adopted the terms of the agreement, which have limited the anticipation of freely deploying the Alliance's defence forces. On the another hand, Moscow, with the passing of years (until 2014,) has increasingly demonstrated its deficiency of respect for agreements concluded with Western countries. Russia has broken, among others, the provisions of the Treaty on the conventional armed forces in Europe (CEF), the Treaty on the Elimination of average and Short scope Missiles (INF), the Treaty on Open Skys (OST) or the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (CWC)[16]. Russia has repeatedly violated the provisions of these agreements. The West, on the another hand, did everything to sustain the spirit of cooperation, which lay a shadow on the safety guarantees of the NATO flank.

With the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the war by Russia in east Ukraine in 2014, it may have seemed that NATO would return to the doctrine of deterrence and take a more firm stand towards Moscow. It only happened in part. In consequence to Russia's aggressive actions, the US sent their fighters to Poland and the Baltic countries in spring 2014. This bilateral action was supplemented by the deployment of rotational quotas of company size to safe this operation. In the autumn of the NATO summit in Newport, the Readiness Action Plan was introduced, and within it it decided to establish logistics bases equipped with weapons and ammunition capable of accepting troops if necessary. At the NATO Summit in Warsaw, it was decided to introduce from 2017 4 rotating multi-national conflict groups (within the framework of Enhanced Forward Presence) in Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with a full of about 4,500 soldiers[17]. NATO besides importantly increased the number of soldiers in consequence forces (NATO consequence Force – NRF) up to 40 000 and accepted that fast consequence forces (Very advanced Readiness Joint Task Force – VJTF) will be ready for action within 48 hours.

Crisis-based deterrence

NATO described these decisions as "the top strengthening of the collective defence of the alliance in a generation". Russia's full-scale aggression on Ukraine in 2022 showed that the Alliance's actions on the east flank were disproportionate to the increasing threat. In many dimensions, contrary to appropriate intentions, they could have been even more of a show of weakness than sending a informing signal to the Kremlin[18]. They pointed to the deficiency of political will to extremist reorientate the position towards the increasing Russian threat. There were respective factors involved.

Firstly, no of the actions taken before 2022 broke the letter of the NRFA Act, and the West returned to dialog with Russia in 2016 within the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). Although the Kremlin was increasingly ignoring the forum over time, the leaders of the country inactive wanted to build relations with Russia based on reciprocity, transparency, predictability and non-escalation[19]. Secondly, even the theoretical confrontation of military potentials in the region of Central and east Europe clearly pointed to the deficiency of ability of the east flank to defend against Russian aggression. According to the 2016 RAND simulation, Russia would request a maximum of 60 hours to occupy the Baltic countries. Already then, experts pointed to the request to deploy about 7 brigades in the region, including 3 dense armored brigades, in order to prevent the aggressor from taking the territory so quickly[20]. Meanwhile, NATO operated forces of only a fewer battalions, deployed in rotational alternatively than permanent bases. Their operation was based on the rule of deterrence by punishing, not by not allowing. So it assumed a liberation war, with the arrival of military reinforcements which would gotta cross the Suwalski Pass either by sea or air. Each of these roads was within scope of Russian anti-access systems located in Kiliningrad[21]. Thirdly, before 2022 NATO focused primarily on expeditionary emergency consequence operations outside the Alliance's territories. As a result, it was not adapted to a large-scale conflict, which would require, among another things, the improvement of mechanisms allowing the spread of crucial military forces to liberate a possible victim of aggression. The armies of the largest Western European countries were shrinking, underinvested and unmodernised, and the east flank was sometimes more utilized for mediate east conflicts than for the Russian threat[22]. Even in 2013, the head of the British Defence Staff Sir Nicholas Houghton warned that even the most advanced military equipment requires an army of appropriate sizes. Since then, the British armed forces have decreased by 19%, reaching about 138,000 soldiers[23]. The problem of the European armies has become not how to increase the number of armies, but how to halt their numbers at the current level[24]. Despite the announcement of the German Chancellor of the German Army's growth to more than 200,000 troops by 2031, only between 2022 and 2023 about 2 1000 soldiers left the German Army[25].

Eastern flank of NATO after Russia's invasion of Ukraine

Russian aggression on Ukraine has caused a number of NATO initiatives. The Alliance has activated consequence forces to the east flank, introduced fresh combat groups in Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania, reinforced its presence within the existing eFPs, and committed to rebuilding and expanding advanced readiness forces from 40,000 to 300,000 military[26]. The door to the Alliance for Finland and Sweden was opened, and the strategical Concept adopted at the Madrid Summit considered that NATO would place a greater emphasis on deterrence and defence and identified Russia as the biggest and most direct threat[27].

Nevertheless, many experts, diplomats and military actions of the Alliance have inactive remained inadequate. Reactions to Russian aggression have shown a increasing disparity between US military capabilities and framework states (Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada) in guaranteeing the safety of the east flank[28]. The war realities brutally verified the capabilities of Western European states in the expansion of military bases under their command. In the face of the problems of their own armed forces and infrastructure constraints in the Baltic States, the framework countries were incapable to guarantee that no full brigade was stationed on the east flank[29]. At the Madrid Summit, a compromise version of the allocation of additional forces to the Natatian militant groups was made, which would form forces corresponding to the size of the brigade only in a crisis situation. The Baltic States, not satisfied with this decision, have partially exerted effective force on the framework countries. Agreements signed in 2023 and 2024 began the process of forming single brigades in Lithuania and Latvia[30]. At the NATO summit in Vilnius in 2023, an crucial decision was made to change NATO's forward presence, which meant moving from the possible request to regain occupied territory to the defence against invasion[31]. The Alliance adopted regional plans for deterrence and defence for the Nattish regions, including the Baltic States.

In the light of these difficulties and compromises, however, military opinions cannot be surprised, which believe that 2022 did not bring a real breakthrough in the parameters of the functioning of the east flank. As 1 of the commanders of the Estonian NATO Combat Group pointed out, “it was always understandable that it was not a precise reflection of forces on the another side (Russian-BŚ forces). Apart from the increased level of commitment, the core strategy is the same as in 2017”[32]. U.S. diplomat Wess Mitchell made his opinion even more clear, calling NATO a "dual-level alliance": "Under the headings of the increased budgets and the fresh paper brigades lies the harsh reality of a fundamentally two-level alliance in which the United States and east members bear the main burden of risk, and the second do not enjoy the same privilege of supposing the ability to accept the permanent presence of large-scale troops that all members who joined NATO before 1997"[33].

Conclusion

The definitive end of the peaceful dividend age puts many complex challenges ahead of the North Atlantic Alliance. The prolonged war in Ukraine, the mediate east conflict and the threat of the Chinese invasion of Taiwan awakened the Natian leaders from the peaceful lethargy. NATO countries have begun to increase their defence budgets, buy fresh weapons and improve their defence industries' production capacity. The experience and conclusions of Russia's military invasion of Ukraine clearly indicate that the pace and scale of these changes are, however, far insufficient.

The Alliance made many crucial decisions after 2022 to improve the safety of the east flank of NATO. However, more can and should be done to effectively deter Moscow from possible attack. Announced by NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, "the defence of all inch of NATO's square territory" requires the implementation of the enhanced NATO presence on the east flank. This means that the deployment of brigades in the Baltic States is implemented as rapidly as possible and that the dead letter of the NATO-Russia Act must be rejected in full and consistently. The Alliance should besides depart from the preceding Act of limitation of forces in the east to a maximum of 1 rotating brigade. Only in this way would NATO leaders prove that they understood Russia's aggression against Ukraine. The Russian invasion has shown how hard it is to recover erstwhile occupied territories. Indirectly, this discredited the chances of success of a long-term concept of deterrence by punishing, or liberating occupied territories. Russian aggression has besides illustrated the Kremlin's ability to wage a crushing war on destruction, in which Moscow is able to constantly supplement its human fighting forces, usage massive artillery shelling, put dense weapons in large quantities[34]. The reinforced NATO presence on the east flank besides means the request to invest in military infrastructure without the improvement of which in the future permanent NATO bases capable of accepting military brigades will be impossible[35]. In addition to the increase in defence spending of all NATO countries, the location of allied troops should become an crucial indicator of gathering allied commitments[36]. In addition, Poland's inclusion in the atomic arms division programme (especially with respect to the deployment of specified weapons in Belarus[37]) and the greater participation of Sweden and Finland in operational activities and in the chain of command (e.g. the creation of a fresh joint forces command, JFC North), would clearly strengthen the resilience, consistency and deterrence on the east Alliance flank.

Russia has encountered quite a few problem in Ukraine. First of all, it failed to implement its main presumption of effective conduct of fast war and annexation of Ukrainian territories. However, this does not change the fact that the Kremlin is inactive counting on the weakness that the West will show erstwhile designing future peace and defining a safety model in Europe. The war found armies of most European countries in a weak and sometimes dramatic state. A declining number of troops, the deficiency of large units capable of carrying out military activities on a immense scale, hardware shortages, defence industries adapted to the times of peace, protectionist tendencies to invest exclusively in national ammunition factories, dubious capabilities to deploy NATO's mass forces and to wage long-term war on them, a chain of command geographically inadequate to current realities, and yet a society mostly unwilling to defend its own country[38]. This is just a partial set of problems facing the overwhelming majority of NATO associate States today. Without their clear improvement, the collective defence of the Alliance will only be a theoretical concept. Today, these pains make the North Atlantic Alliance far from full and effectively implementing the basic principles of deterrence. He lacks adequate and adequate military capabilities, thus having difficulty maintaining the credibility of his actions (crediability) and effectively communicating his commitments to defy expanding threats (commitment)[39].

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[36] Ibid.

[37] W. Verstraete, Strength the Political Crediability of NATO Extended atomic Deterrence, EGMONT POLICY BRIEF 332, pp. 2-4, https://www.egmontinstitute.be/app/uploads/2024/02/Wannes-Verstraete_Policy_Brief_332.pdf?type=pdf.

[38] According to Gallup, only 32% of EU citizens study a tendency to fight in the event of an armed conflict. In the U.S. it is 41% and in Canada it is 34%. In turn, residents of Western Asia (77%), the mediate East (73%) and India (76%) are much more prepared to fight for their country. See: Fever People are Willing to Fight for Their Country Compared to 10 Years Ago, https://www.gallup-international.bg/en/48127/fewer-people-are-willing-to-fight-for-their-country-compared-to-ten-years-ago/.

[39] M. Malskoo, NATO’s..., p. 535.