In Poland, under the partitions in the early 20th century, there was an effort at a settlement policy with Tsarsk Russia based on political realism by Roman Dmowski, leader of the endation. The ND ideologist tried to base his attitude on, among others, the alleged neo-Slavic movement, which, before the outbreak of planet War I, covered all Slavic countries. Abstract from earlier forms of 19th century philoslawism in Poland, we can presume that the fresh philoslawism (political alternatively than cultural) which Dmowski introduced into his party's programme, he obtained his substantive announcement in the Slavic Club, which was created respective years earlier. Although 1 of the main publicists of this association called for the separation of this activity from the old panslawism, which has abroad and abroad roots, the Polish philoslovans failed to avoid the later patch of “prorossiness”. This resulted in a large divided and a crisis in the womb of origin.
The Slavic Club, founded in 1901 in Krakow, was led by a prominent Polish philosopher, philologist, messianist from Vilnius – Marian Zdzechowski. The club had its own press organ: “Słowianski World”, edited by Felix Koneczny (in the times of later prominent philosopher of civilization, which is interesting for a extremist occultist). The club's profile was eminently intellectual, apartial and apolitical. all evening poetic meetings were held, presenting Slavic creativity, and theoretical discussions were held. The "Slavish World" initially focused mainly on the Russian issue. With development, its subject moved to Balkan problems. Among the characters associated with the club was the desire to cut off technological and cultural vocabulary from misconstrued Russian panslawism, which is an aggressive political ideology – in fact permeated by the Asian spirit[1]. It is hard to say that the Slavic Club has a direct ideological influence on Dmowski and national movement. His uprising and activity should alternatively be read as an indirectly related sign of time indicating interest in this issue in Polish thought. Issues regarding the concept of Slavic political cooperation can be found in the work “Germany, Russia and the Polish issue” (1907).
Most of Dmowski's biographies agree that his neoslavism did not have any ideological or cultural connotations, it was only "integrated mechanically" into the doctrine of the Endeck – officially as 1 of the ways of striving for Poland's autonomy. In fact, to put the Polish case on the global phase – and consequently – to gain a favourable attitude of Russia and Western powers to the Polish issue. This was intended to make good ground for future active diplomatic action (in connection with the envisaged armed conflict in Europe). Only Wilhelm Feldman claims that in the neo-Slavic action, first of all, it was about legal concessions to the Kingdom of Poland[2].
Dmowski himself was negative about the thought of panslawism, as presented by the Russian thought in the Danilewski edition. According to ideologists, panslawism wanted only a complete russification of all Slavic nations and was a tool of Russian imperialism, which was incompatible with Polish nationalism. This attitude perfectly reflects the passage in which Dmowski describes his view of the so-far-old Russian Balkan policy: “How the Russian panslavism contained small real sympathy for the Slavs, and was actually possessive nationalism towards them, is evidenced by the Russian policy in Bulgaria after its liberation from the Turkish yoke. After the war, which gained charm and gratitude for Russia in Slavic peoples, this policy did everything to destruct this moral result. The Russians who were left in Bulgaria (the mission of General Kaulbaras) began to work immediately to bring Russian captivity to the Turkish place. In this way, they set up an anti-Russian policy in Bulgaria, the main talker of which was Istanbul, which in Russia was recognised as proof of Slavic ingratitude."[3].This is simply a negation of panslawism in 1 of his basic postulates: the liberation of the confederate Slavs from the Turkish yoke.
The Panslavist thought in the older edition was besides compromised in the eyes of another Slavs by Russia's attitude towards Polish nationality. The Russians, who so far effectively discredited Poles in the eyes of the Slavs – as evidence of Polish uprisings and rooted “rusophobia” – faced a changed situation between 1905 and 1908.
At this point it is worth to stay over a conviction of Dmowski from “German, Russian and...”,which was a summary of old panslawism by Roman Dmowski, and was rather passionately commented on by Dmowski's biographers, as well as to his contemporary ones. This is the following sentence: ‘The authoritative Russian vocabulary has actually gone bankrupt’[4].Wilhelm Feldmann accused Dmowski of a contradiction in this place, and the charge was developed by R. Wapiński. Dmowski was accused that this conviction constituted an empty phrase towards the practice of the Russian authorities. R. Wapiński saw 3 obstacles that pointed to the unrealisticity of the concept of neoslavism as a way to independence. Firstly, in the pursuit of independence, it was essential to make specified a plan which clearly outlined the simultaneous unification of all occupations and the precise definition of the territorial scope of the future Polish state; secondly, the main possessive states have been striving for decades to yet erase the issue of Poland as a national problem; thirdly, the Polish case disappeared from the global arena even as its object during the last 4th of the century. I cannot full agree with the position of both prominent authors on the reality of neoslavism as a way to Poland's independence. The second charge falls, in the context of Russian reforms of 1905, the number 3 charge in the context of the Polish thread in the fresh Russian-Japanese conflict besides fails to withstand criticism. It is worth noting that although representatives of the Russian government actually made contact with the initiators of the neo-Slavic movement in Prague, this did not mean that they had an exclusive influence on it. The neo-Slavic movement itself in Russia was called by liberal and opposition centres in relation to the then government[5]. The concept of Poland's borders presented by Dmowski was rather clear, any doubts left only in the issue of the Taken Lands – straight belonging to Russia; weakening Russia after 1905, giving any limited rights to the Congressional woman, showed that the Russians did not have the strength to finalize Poles; finally, the confusion in the Balkans at the beginning of the 20th century, together with the specified number of nations having their interest in the neo-Slavic movement and most friendly-looking Poland, truly put hope of rediscovering the Polish case into a wider global arena.[6].
After losing the war with Japan, Russia's charm among Slavs clearly weakened. At the same time, kindness towards Poles among Slavic peoples rose significantly. This was explained by 2 aspects:
- Thanks to the actions of the Poles as a society, they did not turn against Russia during the revolution. So they lost weight on these arguments, which Russia traditionally raised against Poles as traitors and sects of Slavic origin. This aspect besides had another bottom: politicians from Slavic countries sympathized alternatively than with constitutionalists and Russian liberals, arguing against bureaucracy. This caused natural sympathy for Poles fighting for autonomy and caused suspicions about the Russian government denying Poles autonomy, which politicians of Slavic countries would besides want with a possible political and economical relation with Russia.
- At the time of Germany's expansion to the southeast, Poles advanced to the first line of the Slavic fight against Germanytermed “the eternal enemy of Slavic”[7].
In view of the above arguments, Dmowski warned Russia against simultaneously conducting pro-Slavian politics and suppressing Poles. “If a fresh Slavic direction is created in Russia, it must go against the government primarily in Polish politics, otherwise there is no more serious view of moral gains than Russia” .As a consequence of dishonesty towards Poles who are Slavs, Russia will lose its listen, and consequently, the outbreak of Slavs will make outside the Russian community. This will in fact prevent a truly Slavic policy, due to the fact that through Poland Slavic current will increasingly turn against Russia at the same time, it will paralyze any Western policy[8]. As a consequence of this analysis, Dmowski made a postulate, it would seem impossible to implement – a fundamental transformation of Russian patriotism from chauvinist, Greater-Russian and then oriented pro-Germanically into a new, not bureaucratic interests – leading to the collapse of the state – but alternatively a "slavic" attitude. It is hard to find whether Dmowski wrote this honestly and was deluded by specified a diametric transformation of Russia, or whether it was part of any complex diplomacy. Although there were any reasons for specified demands – the control of Russia's regulation was captured by constitutional, liberal spheres that wanted a sincere in-depth improvement of the state[9]. Dmowski has provided guidelines for the fresh circles of the ruling Russia and, above all, the Western Allies: in Central and east Europe, Poles present the most many element, which traditionally opposes German expansion for centuries, and finally, at the defeat of the past of which the power, leading in Germany, the Prussian statehood, grew.[10].
"The triumph of the Polish aspirations in Russia would mean an agreement of 2 large Slavic strains, and consequently, a fresh revival current in the interior life of the state and in its external policies, which would become truly Slavic, would receive strong foundations in the west". Poles gaining more influence in Austria and maintaining Polishness in the Prussian partition would halt German expansion and keep it in check. Despite the declared democratisation, liberalism of the neo-Slavic movement, there is simply a certain ideological exception to the rule of equality of all Slavic nations, above all in relation to Ukrainians and (as it seems) not only in Russians. For Dmowski, “Rusini” were straight an agent of German imperialism which reconciled to the improvement of Polishness in Galicia. Although a akin hostile attitude towards the developing Ukrainian nationality was besides characteristic of Russia and the Czech Republic, this is another argument against Dmowski's real commitment to the neo-Slavic movement. In Poland, the movement of real Slavophiles was alternatively favourably directed towards east cultural minorities of the erstwhile 1st Republic of Poland[11].
Apart from the endeks, conservative politicians from the Kingdom of Poland, who remained in the alliance with the Democratic-National Party, referred favorably to the neo-Slavic action – however, for over a year this alliance has been wobbly in positions due to the political monopoly of the intention in the Kingdom. A peculiar brochure of the neo-Slavic issue was devoted to the politicians of Duma associated with the organization of Real Politics – Henryk Potocki[12]. In his publication Potocki, entitled “Neoslavism and Poles 1906-1910”, he emphasized that in view of the complex political situation of a large part of Slavic nations, the movement must have external loyalistic features in relation to the powiatal order – 1 could not afford to irritate possessive empires with the concept of changing borders in Europe, this would have crossed out the neo-Slavic movement at the start. While raising a akin argument as Dmowski, he nevertheless stressed the strictly anti-German nature of the neo-Slavic issue itself. In his opinion, the neo-Slavic movement has no possessive features, it consists only in raising the cultural and economical level of Slavic nations – this puts the panslavism in clear contrast to the Pangerman movement, which is militaristic, possessive and chauvinist (which the public could remember from the times of the Boer wars). An example in Poland was Hakata's activity in Wielkopolska and fresh policy curizampfu the biggest harm done in Prusai Zabor. Potocki besides reiterated Dmowski's argument by showing the danger of German colonization throughout the Russian state and the threat of losing the “Russian” character of the Empire[13]. In the event that the hopes of Polish politicians to cooperate with the cadet organization in I and II Duma failed, engagement in the neo-Slavian movement was a necessity to get concessions from the Russians in the Kingdom of Poland[14]. With the support of conservatives (unpopular) and the deficiency of explicit approval from the public of the Kingdom, Dmowski decided to engage the full moral credit of SDN with difficulty gained for years in a completely fresh global movement, contrary to the Polish insurance tradition, and whose crucial pillar was Russia.
According to Stanislaw Głąbiński, he was a Czech nationalist politician, Karel Kramarz, who prompted Dmowski to participate in the neo-Slavic movement.[15]. The full movement began to form for good in view of the situation in the Balkans, where Slavic states felt threatened during the national revolution in Turkey. A increasing problem besides took on the position of Bosnia – since 1878 militarily occupied by Austro-Hungary, politically linked to the Second German Reich. 1 of the main initiators of the neoslavist ideological movement was Russian liberal writer Wsiołod Swatkowski. Swatkowski in his writing advocated the national constitutional model of Russia and another Slavic states, equally politically and economically entitled. He besides called for the resolution of the “Slavic question” in Russia itself, that is, designation of Polish autonomy in the legislature Kingdom, which naturally brought Swatkowski closer to SDN and SPR politicians. 2 societies were formed to advance modern Slavic thought: the Slavic Culture Society founded by prof. Korsz and the Slavic Mutuality Society led by Piotr Chomiakov. The key issue was to get the representation of Slavic peoples in the Vienna Parliament for the movement, which is why Kramarz organized a gathering of Slavic MPs on 12 November 1907. Polish politicians did not participate in it because, in most cases, Galician leadership, led by Stanisław Głąbiński, was loyal to Austria.[16]. So far, in Poland only the publicist individual and tiny intellectual environments, specified as the said "Słowiański World" environment, have advocated the Panslavian idea.However, they had no strength to convince the Polish society, to support the movement, associated mainly with russification. This could only be done by an endecia, with broad public support, led by Roman Dmowski. And so it did.
At a preparatory gathering on 19 March 1908, organized by the Social Action Club (related to the politicians of the centre in Duma), alongside the old idealists and their panslawist slogans, retired military Gen. Włodzimierz Wołodimirov appeared. In his speech he presented the request for renewal of the movement through the slogan "freedom, equality, fraternity and unity" and the request for Russian-Polish reconciliation. So these were typically liberal slogans in the spirit of Swatkowski and Chomiakov, which found applause among Octoberists and cadets, centre-right factions, with which Dmowski hoped to cooperate. General Wołodimirov made a journey to Austria to get the politicians there; and in Prague, and Vienna, participation in the announced legislature was dependent on the consent of Poles, which gave hope to the endeks the rightness of their fresh ideas. Finally, on 26-30 May 1908, Slavic Week was organized in St. Petersburg to organize a future legislature in Prague. Among the guests were: Tomasz Masaryk, Karel Kramarz, Dr. Hlibowieckia, Dr. O. Hribar. Poles reported their accession to the neoslavist movement, which Dmowski argued for the increasing threat from Germany. Hr. Olizar even made a loyalist message that independent Poland under present conditions is simply a geopolitical impossibility. The Polish delegation obtained from the Russians from the Social Activists Club to guarantee cultural and economical improvement in the Kingdom of Poland. After obtaining the consent of Poles, neo-Slavians were ready to convene a congress[17].
Representatives of most political groups from Vienna and representatives of all parties from Duma took part in the Polish legislature held in July 1908. Only the representatives of the Prussian business were missing, which were prevented by the German authorities. Thanks to Kramarz and Krassowski tactics The disputed issues were avoided, which the representatives of the Russian far right tried to bring into discussion. The congress's final message stated the request for designation and equality of improvement on the basis of free national and cultural development. In the opinion of neo-Slavic supporters, most of the Poles were talked about representations at a convention from Russians and another Slavs[18].
Shortly after the congress, Dmowski's fresh policy's goal seemed real. However, neoslavian enthusiasm lasted only a fewer months. The collapse came along with the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 October 1908 by Austro-Hungary; thus 1 of the main ideas of liberal neo-Slavians in Russia collapsed – geopolitical approximation with Austria. Neo-Slavic publications in Russia re-introduced the "Axakov spirit", while the Tsarist government returned to repressive politics in the Kingdom.
From the beginning, neo-Slavistic ideas have found harsh criticism among younger members of the National League. The most violent attack was by endecci journalists, who were influenced by the arguments of Władysław Studnicki: Zygmunt Makowiecki and Tadeusz Grużewski. The authors wrote a number of critics of the fresh panslawism articles appearing in the SDN body (still for a fewer weeks) "Morning and Evening Dawn". A fewer weeks before the visit to St. Petersburg, the reading of the distinguished philologist Prof. Jean Baudouin de Courtenay (notabene in II of the Republic of Poland candidate for the office of President). The basic thesis of this reading was: “There is no Slavic nation, just as there is no all-Romanian or all-German nation. There are, however, a number of nations with distinct interior and external characteristics, which we consider to belong to a single strain only due to a certain linguistic similarity." The specified linguistic resemblance cannot be the only binder of the Slavic community. In addition, Baudouin de Courtenay stated that the Slavs do not have any common "historical memories". Reaching for irony, the prof. besides stated that even specified qualities as cruelty, illiteracy, or foolishness (in those times commonly attributed to the Slavs) a priori) cannot be regarded as common features of the Slavs. The weaker the Slavic people, the more they look at Russia and the panslavist ideas – this thesis will besides be repeated by Władysław Studnicki. Petersburg professor, referring to the neoslavist action, besides pointed out to the Russians the hypocrisy: “medicine curate ipsum (...) Only this country would have a moral right to intervene on the oppression of its own people, which would have been without charge in this respect" – which naturally referred to the persecution of Poles in the Kingdom by the carat[19].
SDN's desire to participate in the neo-Slavic movement was compared to a cruise on a rough sea. Dmowski was warned about the anticipation of an open rebellion against this issue: “This part of the malcontents [SDN and LN supporters—the author] even claims that the prepared ships will not get in, the admirals will not perceive and, of horror, effort to drill holes in the hulls of the ships. Until now they are only threats, but we think that this time they can take on real shapes, for no 1 wants to be stingy and, God forbid, drown in deep water." The journalists “Gossip” emphasized the possessivity of new/old panslawism, quoting “New Wremija“ “The Russians will destruct you... you must perish, give yourselves to our grace and displeasure, be a Slavic stream, falling into the Russian sea, that it may not dry.” besides quoted is the opinion of the Studnicki, that if we are to die, it is better to merge with the civilization which gave us so much (i.e. with Germany, belonging to the same civilization), than to join the civilization of the "lower". The hope was expressed that the Polish ellipse in Duma would not respect participation in the future Slavic Congress[20]. Sigismund Makowiecki stressed that neoslavism is an artificial thought that aims to “refresh” the ageing Russian society. Resisting the German threat, exhibited in “Warsaw Gazette” –The fresh main organ of SDN, it was emphasized that the Wielkopolska society has spoken against the congress, and the German threat itself is exaggerated. On the contrary to the claims about the threat of Poznań – Wielkopolska are effectively based on Germanization, are the richest, grow in strength, losses are minimal in relation to the national revival in Silesia or more demographic losses of Poland in the east Borders. Makowiecki emphasized the existing hazard that the Russians could usage the legislature for their own purposes, or even postpone for respective years and thus usage Poles for their own purposes and then turn against them[21].
The strongest form of criticism of Dmowski's politics and neoslavism has been taken in the writings "Votum Separatum’ published by Władysław Studnicki (previous title) "National and State". 1 of the numbers of this magazine, devoted entirely to neo-slavic action, was copied in respective 1000 copies and courtesy of the publisher of the “Morning and Evening Bishop” – Alexander Zawadzki – was attached to the diary and sent to subscribers, on whom, most of them consisted of an intelligent layer, connected to the National League ideologically.[22]. It is noteworthy that “Votum Separatum“ Studnicki, Grużewski and another publicists consistently usage the word panslawism, avoiding the prefix “neo-”. They thus stressed that there was no crucial difference in practice between the 2 movements. "Panslawism is not an old settlement, it is not a simplification of national aspirations to the legal framework of a given system, it is something much deeper and essential. It's subservient to the sense of national tribal feeling, not the beginning of the end, but the very end of the collective self-knowledge of the historical nation. This is the degradation of the nation to the Slavic strain.” These words constitute the most general extract of the criticism of SDN leaders, who denied the first thought of the Polish League irredent. In ‘Votum Separatum“The sense of national honor was appealed to; even if the Polish nation is doomed to destruction, the choice of a civilisational option in which agony would take place is not indifferent. By choosing the pro-Russian option, apart from vitality, we besides lose national dignity, shaped by insurgent generations. In defence of this dignity, the erstwhile endek Władysław Studnicki utilized very harsh rhetoric. About the activities of the Polish ellipse in Duma, he wrote: “You would like to turn national banners for farm usage on weekdays, you would like to have cloths from them and you think they will return to the function of banners.” Participation in Slavic politics and the consensuality of the perfect threatened to blur national consciousness, and above all collective dignity of individuality, which for Studnicki was like a flame, which should be constantly fueled. In response, he stressed to his settlers that the thought is not permanent, but alive, and that it “changes, transforms, grows or shrinks, withers, dies. The words and external forms stay the same, but the surviving content that flows through them is constantly changed”[23]. Endectic leaders are putting the dignity and national ideas at risk, claiming that independency must be put aside in modern times, dealing solely with organic work and gaining the favour of the Russian authorities. The intention has been accused of maintaining numbness among the intelligent layer, as the intent of its policy exploits only apathy and passiveness characterizing the general intelligence of the Kingdom of Poland[24]. Surprisingly, among realistic geopolitical and historical arguments, the treble in his anti-endetic rhetoric takes emotional arguments that appeal to the planet of romance.
Neoslawism according to Studnicki was “recovered” by the Russian government in a circumstantial political situation. As evidence of the Studnicki article, he gives an example of Peter Struve’s writing. A prominent publicist, Struve, feared the unfavourable after the 1905 war between Russia and Austro-Hungary in the friendly neutrality of the German Empire. According to his predictions, this war could consequence not only in the failure of the Kingdom of Poland, but besides in the Baltic provinces in favour of Germany. Therefore, he advocated a liberal policy in the Kingdom of Poland as a countermeasure. Panslawism is simply a periodically excavated doctrine of Russia's global policy for the chess of Austria and Turkey. Through this purely political aspect of panslawism, Studnicki divides panslawist ideology into active and passive. Active Panslawism is characteristic of the Russians only. They search to take over the Balkan area and to liberate the political Slavic peoples, to be manifested in joining these nations to the Russian empire. The passive panslavism is characteristic of the remainder of Slavic nations – the lower the cultural level they present, the more panslavistic they are and the more they desire liberation from Russia. As an example of passive panslawism, the Czechs are given – a nation richer economically than Polish and with a advanced “German” civilization, but about “low” national culture (as opposed to Polish) and without continuous tradition – a nation founded only on negation towards Germans[25]. The newness of neoslavism was denied; indeed, Russian culture, founded on Orthodoxy and conquests, was besides an essential component of the alleged "Russian soul" at the time, and even though panslavism was a component of the Russian left or right, it must by its essence be utilized in politics as an expression of imperialism. The good intentions of the convention participants were not believed. Kramarz wanted to prosecute Czech national interests in Austria through his participation in the neo-Slavic movement, which he besides wanted to usage Poles for; Hlibowiecki was seen as a russifier of east Galicia, and Hribar was assigned the desire to enrich himself in the future Slavic bank[26].
The final defeat of the hope connected with the neo-Slavic movement was the gathering of the Executive Committee in St. Petersburg, which lasted with interruptions from 1909 to 1910. Although equality and the anticipation of free cultural improvement of Slavs were re-established, Octoberers and cadets slow withdrew from their desire to settle with Poles. During the reunion, respective unsuccessful provocations of representatives of the far right of Russia occurred – they were, among others, a question of "harassing Russians" in Chełmszczyzna and east Galicia, which, however, paralyzed the agreement. There was an unexpected violent turn of anti-Polish Vladimir Bobrianski, and the Polish delegation in consequence condemned the Russian government's russification tendencies, threatening to be absent at the next legislature in Sofia. Polish-Russian disputes due to K. Kramarz was to be the subject of a peculiar committee meeting, whose deliberations were later discontinued by Mr Bobrinski. In this situation, Poles went to the Sofia legislature only as observers and journalists[27].
Already the first signal of the alleged Frondy, according to Stanisław Kozicki (the closest co-worker of Roman Dmowski), was discontent with the vote of representatives of the Polish ellipse in the State Duma (mostly composed of SDN) for the expansion of the recruit quota for the Russian army[28]. Although the publicists of “The Bishop”and supporters of Alexander Zawadzki hoped that Dmowski's policy could be changed to definitely opposition. Commenting on the splits in the National League Kozicki mostly stated that this was a dispute between political realism and political romance. “This phenomenon (partitions – author's) can be explained – after all, the League has been conducting propaganda and educational work in its political organization for respective years. It caused the right choice of people. There were those in the League who thought politically and understood the essence of the fresh school of national thought, its fundamentals real alternatively than romantic. But there were besides those who were drawn to the League by her national and patriotic slogans, who skillfully and self-sacrifice their efforts for educational work, but they had small thought of politics, and thus succumbed to the romanticist atmosphere which over the full 19th century hovered over Poland. For people of this type, Dmowski's policy was apostasy, entering a slippery way of settlement and concessions towards Russia... It was a conflict between realism and romanticism of political thought in Poland”[29]. In June, straight at the time of the top triumphs of neo-Slavism under the Dmowski and Democratic-National organization politics, respective people appeared from the National League. Historians in peculiar mention 3 main names (previously mentioned): Aleksander Zawadzki, Zygmunt Makowiecki, Tadeusz Grużewski. They took the journal. Bishop, whose publisher was Zawadzki and the editor of Makowiecki[30]. The same mentions these figures Stanislaw Kozicki, although "the first place to mention is the activity of Władysław Studnicki, who appeared as the most violent opponent of Dmowski's politics". Kozicki recalls that from the beginning of the Studnicki's rapprochement to an end, her leaders referred to him with a large reserve, identifying him as a fantasy. In order to realize and decently measure Studnicki, 1 must realize that the dominant feeling in his heart was hatred of Russia. He came from Inflant, externally he was russified, better spoken and wrote in Russian than in Polish, but Russia hated warmly. While the argument of organic rusophobia served endecist publicists to discredit political opponents, and in various cases it can be argued for its legitimacy or unwarrantedness, in the case of Studnicki it is indeed possible to discuss whether his attitude towards Russia and the Russians was not xenophobic. Studnicki himself emphasized his own dislike of Russian revolutionaries, previously irradiated with heroism, in later times he besides cited straight racist arguments, writing with reluctance about the mongoloid faces of Russians met in Siberia.
Wladyslaw Studnicki himself besides credits himself with calling the separations in the ending. Years later, he recalled: “I thought I would crash the ND. In 3 months, I needed 3 years, but I did my job.” Although Studnicki was incapable to formulate a broad program due to censorship, after breaking up with SDN in 1905 he started a fierce anti-Russian campaign. This was to be served by the publication “History of Russia’s System”, and in peculiar the magazine “National and State” established in 1906, renamed later as the aforementioned “Votum Separatum’. Although the writings did not have a broad audience and besides many subscribers, according to Studnicki, it came to the hands of the National League politicians, whose large part of them took up his argument[31].
Aleksander Zawadzki is described by Kozicki as a fantasy and political conspirator, so he was not amazed by his speech from the National League. Sigismund Makowiecki is seen differently: “He surely had a political head and worked with us for a long time in full agreement. However, it was a alternatively harsh head, and it besides had a tendency towards exuberant individualism.” Taking into account Kozicki's subjective image, it should be realised that most likely his motives for leaving were influenced by the fact that he was very active in educational activities in the Kingdom of Poland (in June 1908, he observed the fall of the education policy of TON related to LN). The motives attributed to the departure of Tadeusz Grużewski – formerly an outstanding publicist “The All Poland Review” and co-worker of Dmowski – are very characteristic. "It began to say that he simply repeated Dmowski's thoughts. It hit Grużewski and began to pay urgent attention not to be just an echo of Dmowski. This in turn led him to decision distant from his erstwhile master, and yet to defy him at all turn and all opportunity.”[32].
Roman Dmowski's consequence to the splits was rather laconic. In his writing, he did not callback the names of the splitters – as if he wanted to emphasize the tiny weight of Frondy. Dmowski limited himself to a akin argument given by Stanisław Kozicki – an argument about the political reality of SDN, incapable to be accepted by romanticist minds: “It is simply a constant repetition that we have actually returned to the times before the war and that we should be closed back to the same degree of activity as we had before the acute phase of the crisis in the country – it shows that many people here can no longer learn anything new. erstwhile they came out of the state of political illiteracy, learning the first letters of political abecadacle, they stood and said they had had had enough. These mediocre people think that the 1903 Democratic-National Programme and the articles that developed it or justified it were the alpha and omega of political wisdom. They do not realize that, in the eyes of the authors themselves of this programme and these articles, if they stood on a reasonably advanced level and understood their own work well, it was just an introduction to national policy, not its full system”[33].
At the end of 1908, the youth organization Zet, formerly founded by Zygmunt Balicki, yet breaks off with the National League, which had previously suspended relations with LN. In November, the National Workers' Union created by the Endection is besides out to regain influence among workers. The following year, the alleged “Republic Group” with Edward Dubanowicz and Stanisław Stroński was dropped.[34]. The crisis was besides affected by the LN Central Committee – Stanisław Grabski and Stanisław Bukowicki (notabene An outstanding geopoliticist in the years II of the Polish Republic) voted in favour of the pro-austrian direction, most members of the Galician SDN supported their position a small more moderately, only Marian Seyda and Józef Hłasko spoke for Dmowski. However, they besides had reservations about Dmowski's "sharity" policy. In the fall of 1909 the crisis reached its peak, KC LN members placed their mandates on the hands of M. Seyda and J. Hłaski. After years, Seyda described the critical situation as follows: “In the reflections with Hłaska we agreed on our position in the sense that, despite considerable doubts about tactics, the destiny of L.N. To entrust Dmowski and Balicki: erstwhile due to their fundamental political lineage and the second due to the fact that they represented creative thought and organizational energy, while the another side was exhausted in political resonation (...) we turned to Dmowski and Balicki to co-opt the uniform composition of the Central Committee.”[35]. Despite the powerful crisis, it was decided to trust Dmowski's talent and hazard the future not only of the party, but besides of the Kingdom of Poland itself. The face and destiny of appointments – thus the politics of the Second Republic of Poland – have been determined for decades.
A large part of the National League members and the wide intraparty opposition caused a stalemate among the serial SDN members. Even if it is attempted to show any benefits which Poles have achieved through a two-year participation in a neo-Slavic event, they prove to be distant and not useful in immediate political action. The first is to exposure the intentions of the Russians on the issue of equality of Slavic peoples, indeed most Slavic politicians – in peculiar Kramarz – supported the freedom of Poles, critically looking at the position of Russians. Secondly, although the main nonsubjective – an agreement with the Russian centre – was not achieved, the Polish case was briefly brought to a broader forum than the Russian one. The ideas of equality and free cultural and economical improvement were besides expected to echo at the peace conference in Paris, ending planet War I – although they were straight linked alternatively to the broad democratic-liberal ideology of the main architects of victory: France, the United States and the United Kingdom, the political activity of Slavic nations besides contributed to the right to self-determination.
In summing up the neo-Slavic issue, it must be admitted that the decision involving a policy conquered and torn into 3 parts of the nation in an experimentation with the neo-Slavic movement, in the minds of LN activists specified as Makowiecki and Grużewski, added effective ideological fuel to the fire fueled against Roman Dmowski's politics – the reconciliation in Duma combined with neo-Slavic tendencies gave an external impression of a reflexive prorosity of an ideological character. It looks amazing if we consider that Roman Dmowski, who was a good political strategy and tactics, did not make any tactics that could neutralize the interior opposition. While the pro-Russian phrase itself (interpreted besides by Dmowski as pro-French and pro-Pro-British), could be interpreted by rational politics (e.g. by referring to the effectiveness of the actions of Fr Adam Jerzy Czartoryski in the Kingdom of Poland), neither Dmowski nor the publicists of the emerging Endek pro-Russian "orthodox" have been able to undertake an effective polemic with Studnica and Grużewski (trying to convince the members of the LN behind them) due to the fact that the second have effectively appealed to the emotions and national feelings profoundly hurt by the Russian governments and the panslavist politics – in our conditions since the 19th century it has meant brutal rusification. It was decided to stick to a hard line, allowing the disengagement of shaky and uncertain members.
Roman Dmowski played a advanced stake with a advanced hazard and lost at that point. He lost the staff of respective twelve prominent activists and publicists and a young generation of intelligence. If we actually took the position of Wapiński, Kawalc and Mikevski, who assumed that participation in the neo-Slavic movement was only 1 of the elements of the diplomatic game, then it must be admitted that it was a very risky play for the political camp that he led. Dmowski surely won the monopoly on power in himself—and in part—as the most influential politician in the Kingdom (although he had given the mandate of an MP). possibly erstwhile considering possible shuffling in his own party, he was certain that after the death of Jan Ludwik Popławski in March 1908, his influence on SDN and LN would not be undermined even by Makowiecki, Grużewski or, above all, Głąbiński, who was besides a leader of a large format, but a local Galician leader?
The last thing Dmowski won (in the long term) was to preserve despite the major political crisis, which allowed him to be at the head of the Polish National Committee a fewer years later, as a typical of the winning country in the Western state camp.
Kovalski Everywhere
The article was published in No. 24. "National Policy".
[1] W. Feldmann, The past of Polish political thought in the post-district period, Warsaw 1986, p. 328; L. Gawor, Slavic planet (1905-1914), "Sofia. diary of Slavic Countries philosophers", 2004, No. 4, pp. 347-352.
[2] W. Feldman, p. 328.
[3] Mr Dmowski, Germany, Russia..., pp. 102-103; Nikolai W. Kaulbars, mentioned by his diplomatic activity: opposition to the return to the throne of Alexander I Battenberg, the fight against liberal-national politics of Istanbul, led to a break in Russian-Bulgarian relations.
[4] R. Dmowski, Ibid. p. 164.
[5] Mr Wieczorkiewicz, Polish participation in the Neoslavian Movement and Polish-Russian political relations, [in:]‘Slavic Diary’, t. 28, 1978, pp. 137-138.
[6] W. Feldman, p. 328; R. Wapiński, Roman Dmowskipp. 169-170.
[7] Mr Dmowski, Germany, Russia and...pp. 163-164.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid., pp. 179-180.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Mr Dmowski, Germany, Russia and..., pp. 185-186.
[12] H. Potocki – landowner, MP for II Duma, acted as an independent, taking into the SPR forced 'political leave', 1908-1912 associate of the State Council, associate of the State Council, last president of SPR 1915-1923
[13] H. Potocki, Neoslawism and Poles 1906-1910, pp. 3-7.
[14] Ibid,p. 9.
[15] M. Kułakowski, pp.
[16] P. Wieczorkiewicz, pp., pp. 133-140.
[17] Ibid., pp. 141-146.
[18] Ibid. p. 148; H. Potocki, pp. p.10-17.
[19] About the Slavic agreement, "Evening Bishop", 1.05.1908, p. 2.
[20] Z. Makowiecki, Careful!, “Evening Bishop", 14.05.1908, p. 1.
[21] The same, Neo-panslawism, "Morning Bishop", 28.05.1908, p. 1-2.
[22] See W. Studnicki, People, ideas, actions.
[23] The same, At Road Breakdowns, ‘Voltum Separatum’, 1908, No 4, pp. 2-3.
[24] Ibid., pp. 4–7.
[25] W. Studnicki, Modern Panslawism, "Voltum Separatum", 1908, No. 4, pp. 7-12.
[26] W. Rawicz-Szczerbo (W. Studnicki), In the chariot of panslawism, ‘Votum Separatum’, 1908, No. 5, pp. 2-5; W. Studnicki, Slavic Action in Petersburg, ‘Voltum Separatum’, 1908, No 4, pp. 21-22.
[27] Mr Wieczorkiewicz, pp.pp. 157-168.
[28] The president Diary : 1876-1939, development. M. Mroczko, Słupsk 2009, pp. 187-189.
[29] Ibid.
[30] See Zygmunt Makowiecki, slogan [in:] "Polish Biographical Dictionary", Vol. 19, Kraków 1974, p. 232.
[31] W. Studnicki, Political indications of the Polish irredentist, pp. 31-33.
[32] S. Kozicki, p.., pp. 187-189.
[33] Old Nationalist (R. Dmowski), Reflections from the day of the breakthrough, ‘National Review’, No 3, 1908, p. 280.
[34] The president Roman Dmowski... p. 189.
[35] M. Kułakowski, pp. 339-340.
