The NATO summit in Vilnius behind us can so be tempted to take a brief summary and measure this event, besides – and possibly above all – from the Ukrainian perspective. The dimension of the symbolic summit was rather obvious. The gathering of NATO leaders in the Lithuanian capital lying 20 km from the border with Belarus and 170 km from Minsk was a demonstration of unity, self-confidence and the will to defend even the most endangered associate States (p. Baltic). This was the first summit attended by Finland as a fresh associate of the Pact. At the same time, president Volodymyr Zelenski was invited to Vilnius. Which is surely to be considered a success of Kiev.
The summit started with 2 strong accents. The first was Emmanuel Macron's declaration on French equipment assistance to Ukraine, which will include long-range maneuvering missiles (SCALP). specified a decision – in the context of E. Macron's communicative for respective months – is simply a clear signal that France joins NATO’s “hawks” with respect to Russia’s policy and the war in Ukraine.
This information was almost immediately overshadowed by the declaration of the president of Turkey R.T. Erdogan, who agreed to forward the request for Sweden's accession to NATO to the Turkish Parliament and assured that it would be ratified. This means that Swedish membership of the Alliance is almost certain and will become a fact in the coming months. At the same time, the Turkish agreement to extend the Alliance besides has a symbolic dimension. NATO has shown that it can scope compromises in hard times to accomplish strategical goals. At the same time, Sweden's fast accession path, as well as Finland's early admission to the Alliance, show the efficiency, determination and will of NATO. A signal for Ukraine that When the time comes, Kiev can besides number on fast membership.
From a method perspective, Vilnius continued to work on a fresh defence strategy approved in 2022 in Madrid (repeating, defending all metre of NATO territory, a combat preparedness program: 100,000 soldiers in 10 days and 300 000 in 30 days). Defence plans were created for individual NATO flanks, so that the Alliance and individual members have clearly defined methods and objectives for the conduct of defences. This in turn allows you to focus on the executive plane. Adjusting individual armies to their tasks. It was besides noted that alongside Russia, which is simply a rival of NATO, China being a challenge, there is inactive a threat to the safety of the Alliance from Belarus.
However, the decisions everyone had been waiting for active Ukraine's membership of NATO and its assistance in the war.
NATO for Ukraine
In this respect, the Alliance agreed shortening the accession process Ukraine to 1 stage. The Map (Membership Action Plan) request has been removed. The MAP is simply a kind of aspiring country reporting programme that reports annually on the actions and reforms undertaken. NATO is thus examining advancement in gathering the requirements and expectations of membership. This kind of concession by NATO should be considered a success of Ukraine, even though Sweden and Finland did not gotta undergo the above procedure (but they were peculiar NATO partners and "host countries" for many years). However, from the position of the Alliance, this may have negative consequences, as NATO will have limited ability to monitor the advancement of the future associate in gathering requirements and standards. Apparently, the Alliance felt that in the case of Ukraine, another tools would gotta suffice.
In addition, the summit decided to set up NATO – Ukraine Councils, which is to replace the erstwhile communication between the Alliance and Kiev at committee level. What should undoubtedly besides be read in the category of positives for Ukraine.
In addition, a multi-stage introduction was agreed support programme for Ukraine, whose task will be: reconstruction of the Ukrainian arms industry, modernization of equipment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, introduction of NATO-VW doctrine in the SZ UA.
At the same time, a communication was sent that Ukraine's authoritative invitation to NATO will be issued erstwhile the conditions for improvement are met: anti-corruption, democratic and security.
Furthermore, the Alliance has expressed its determination to proceed supporting Ukraine – including through the transportation of military equipment – as long as it will be essential to repel Russia.
G7 for Ukraine
On the occasion of the NATO summit in Vilnius, the G7 states (US, Japan, Germany, large Britain, France, Italy and Canada) declared long-term support for Ukraine in the context of the ongoing war. Assistance was besides declared to halt possible further Russian aggression in the future. The Groups promised to warrant Ukraine's safety until it joined NATO.
Failed Expectations
President Zelenski left no uncertainty that Ukrainian expectations were not met. On the first day of the summit – seemingly inactive during the negotiations – he sent public tweet, in which he stated that Ukraine deserves respect and:
"It is unprecedented and absurd erstwhile there is no fixed time frame either for the invitation or for Ukraine's membership of NATO. There seems to be no readiness to invitation Ukraine to NATO or make it a associate of the Alliance."
Which was not taken well and faced the reaction of British minister Ben Wallace. This suggested that the Ukrainian attitude does not aid him to break the skeptical attitude towards Ukraine's aid among, for example, any American partners. At the same time, he maliciously commented that Britain is not an Amazon, in the context of sending equipment to Ukraine according to lists made in Kiev. Although British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak has cut himself off from this statement, it is not possible to get the impression that Ben Wallace expressed his opinion, which is supported by any of the politicians in the West.
Zelenski tried to ease the situation in a alternatively circumstantial way stating:
"I don't understand. We were always grateful and always thanked. I just don't know how else to thank you. We can wake up all morning and thank the minister. Let him compose me how to thank me and I will thank him this way.”
Apart from the unusual – almost mocking – speech of speech towards a partner who is 1 of the most active in helping Ukraine, this last quoted conviction is significant. It illustrates rather well the level of Ukrainian diplomacy, which displays a very passive attitude and cannot even adjust the form of thanks to a peculiar partner.
The NATO summit concluded: "The results of the NATO summit are good, but if Ukraine were invited to the Alliance, these results would be perfectIt’s okay. ”
It is clear from the above context that Ukraine had much higher expectations of NATO, especially in the context of specifics. For example, the time periods or agenda associated with the invitation and accession of Ukraine to NATO were expected. Zelenski drove to the summit in Vilnius with the belief that decisions would be made on him far more profoundly than those concerning Ukraine in 2008 in Bucharest. Thus, the Ukrainians themselves judged that their diplomacy had failed. Although it should be added here that not everything depended on the Ukrainians themselves, so this failure was not due to the mistakes made by Kiev.
NATO gave as much as needed
Apart from the Ukrainian theme, the NATO summit in Vilnius must surely be considered a success of the Alliance. A success that wasn't decently sold in the media. The Alliance has made its defence plans and safety requirements concrete. He started working with a fresh associate (Finland) and besides broke the deadlock on Sweden's admission. If it was so good, why should it be convinced that it was not so bad?
Because the Ukrainian subject has heavy weighed on the general image of the summit. The inflated balloon with expectations was pierced by Zelenski himself, and the bang associated with it clouded the atmosphere in the sitting room. What did Ukraine truly receive and what could the Alliance not give?
Ukraine's biggest success is that The West made it clear that it would support the Ukrainians in the war as long as necessary. This has already been signaled respective times by individual leaders of Western countries. The message for Ukraine is 1 thing: in terms of support you can sleep peacefully, take care of the fight, due to the fact that the destiny of the war is mostly in your hands. This besides means that Ukrainians will decide erstwhile and under what conditions they want to make peace with Russia. Many Western leaders, including Emmanuel Macro, mentioned before the summit. This is highly important. Zelenski received a signal that there was no force that would impact on Ukrainian military decisions. For example, there is no reason why Ukrainians now gotta run any kind of militaryly pointless operation (e.g. a large offensive that could prove a disaster). Plans to support Ukraine are long-termSo there is no force of time or a clear date until they should have settled on the battlefield.
Such assurances are highly important, but the Ukrainians hoped for more. For formal steps towards the admission of Ukraine to NATO (although the invitation was sent). Is that right?
It's not in NATO's interest to hold hands.
As I pointed out in the May survey on: “New NATO and the function of Poland in the Alliance towards the war in Ukraine“ in the interests of all NATO (but besides Poland) is the future membership of Ukraine in the Alliance. Among another things, only NATO guarantees can defend Ukraine from a 3rd Russian invasion, which would be highly likely even after peace was made. Simplifying the situation: the defeat of Ukraine would be fatal to the Alliance. Meanwhile, Ukraine would not last the 3rd strike (it is not yet known whether it will win the current clash). If so, Russia must be prevented from reaching triumph now and another future aggression prevented. This can only be done through real actions and iron guarantees. Any half-measures would be tested by Putin. I explained these in the above article.
However, what should be stressed with a firm head While it is in NATO's interest to become a future associate of Ukraine, it is not in the interests of the Alliance to make decisions about this today.
It's the opposite. The Alliance should not specify precisely the timetable and framework for Ukraine's accession to NATO during the ongoing war. For respective reasons:
- Membership in NATO depends on the fulfilment of certain conditions, not the dimension of the application for accession to the Pact.
- The announcement of “mile steps” and a precise time frame would aid Russians torpedo Ukraine and NATO plans. The Russians would know precisely what they cannot let and how much time they gotta take concrete action. As a consequence – during the ongoing war during which almost everything can be done – the Russians could not let certain conditions to be fulfilled in the assumed time. Thus, they would hit the image of the full NATO, and at the same time could torpedo Ukrainian participation in the alliance. To wage war as long as necessary.
- The definition of a timetable for Ukraine's accession to NATO would mean the imposition of time force on Ukraine. In fact, it could make it hard for Ukrainians to meet conditions in a rigid period. Now the Russians must defeat Ukraine. However, if they could destruct NATO's plans only by carrying out armed action and not giving way, then they could adopt a defensive/awaiting stance on the front. In view of the current situation, the Ukrainians would have been forced to attack (and now a mistake has been made by pumping the balloon with expectations of the offensive). It should be remembered that depending on intentions, the same situation on the battlefield means something else. Today, the fact that Russians keep the front line (but stand still!) we perceive as their success and defeat Ukraine. In a situation where no 1 expected an offensive from the Ukrainians, the exact same passiveness of the Russians would be read as their failure and inability to break through the Ukrainian defence.
- The invitation of Ukraine to NATO during the war, and what is worse, the introduction of the mechanics of automatic acceptance into the Alliance after the war ceased, would be a commitment for NATO alternatively than for Ukraine. In the meantime, it should be the opposite. NATO has the right to require future members to meet certain conditions. There must be mechanisms that motivate countries applying to the Alliance to carry out the essential reforms. In the context of a circumstantial promise of membership, Ukraine could abandon the reforms by assuming that "and so we are due." Joining NATO cannot be the consequence of pity. Joe Biden rightly stressed late that Ukraine would be subject to the same requirements as those applied to another countries joining the Alliance. There can be no sacred cows.
- The Alliance cannot clearly promise Ukraine's membership of NATO, since it is unknown how and erstwhile the war will end. What will Ukraine look like after the war? What if Ukraine loses the political war and Kiev is ruled by a Russian warlord? How, then, can we deal with our earlier promise? Break her up or take a Trojan horse to NATO?
There are 2 levels concerning the Ukrainian issue. Political plane (NATO interests) and diplomatic (negotiation/talking)). While the strategical benefits of Ukraine's membership are rather obvious, freedom of action and decision-making should be preserved in the diplomatic layer for the future, as well as tools to mobilise Ukrainians to carry out appropriate reforms.
In this context, the Ukrainian communicative says that the West and NATO are guilty of Ukraine's ruthless and unconditional assistance to the degree that Kiev will require it. This is due to the fact that Ukraine fights for the West, in his name and for his defence. It sounds messianic, but it's not real. The fact is, after the fall of Ukraine, the West would have managed. It would be harder, the cost of competing with Russia would be much higher, it would last longer and be more risky (especially for Poland), but NATO would manage. Putin would not have chosen any open attack on the Alliance either, as Russia would not have been able to win the war. As a result, a clean political account shows that Ukrainians fight primarily for their independence, independency from Russia,territory and society (including their own families). Ukraine fights in its own interest, and its happiness is that this interest is mostly in line with the interests of the West and NATO. He can number on aid and receive it.
The charge that can be directed towards NATO (but not all, only to individual countries) concerns consequence times. This should be at earlier stages of the war faster and more determined. And this could be the case, which is shown by the case of Poland, which in almost all stages of support Ukraine clearly led by proving its actions that it was indeed possible to transfer military equipment to the fighting Ukrainians: faster, more efficient and more numerous. In this context, the fear of Russia's possible reaction proved unfounded. On the another hand, moving to the events present and accounting for NATO from what is going on and what is to be done in the future: it can be said that the Western device has yet gone up and going in the right direction.
Ukrainian diplomatic failures
It is actual that Ukrainians may feel frustrated by the fact that as a consequence of certain shortcomings (although in military equipment) they endure further losses all day. And action on the front doesn't precisely go their way. But that doesn't change the fact that Ukrainians can inactive fight only with the aid of NATO. They can't number on anyone else.. president Zelenski suggested at the Vilnius conference that Ukraine – apart from showing gratitude – there was no more area for manoeuvre in paying for aid. This is not true, although in the interests of the Ukrainians it is for the West to believe it. Ukrainian payments for Western aid during the ongoing war must be determined in structural reforms of the Ukrainian state. It is actual that on certain levels the West will have any tools to mobilise Ukrainians in this area. Kiev will request funds to rebuild the state, so it should besides meet certain requirements. Western investments will entail costs on the Ukrainian side. This will not only be seen on the political but besides economical and business level.
Ben Wallace fired harsh words towards Ukraine, but indeed the Ukrainians may have nothing to offer to the British present but expressions of gratitude. Ukraine is in a state of war, economical collapse, financial disaster, demographic disaster, and inactive in danger of humanitarian crisis. And possibly president Zelenski's unusual reaction was not a mockery, but more a symptom of disarming sincerity and desperation. However, Zelensky's attitude at the NATO summit should be assessed harshly. Let's repeat, Ukraine was attacked by Russia (not NATO) and defends itself to this day only with aid from the West. It is not fresh that the Ukrainians, along with thanks for their support, frequently signaled that it could be greater. Yet, so far, they have been able to sense a subtle boundary, so that the Adversaries did not feel ungrateful. This boundary was crossed by Zelensky in Vilnius. What can happen to him and all Ukraine to take revenge in the future (if it has not already taken revenge).
One can at this point justify the president of Ukraine that his people are now fighting on the front and the country is destroyed by an aggressor. However, this has nothing to do with cool politics and skillful diplomacy. This skill has late been lacking for Ukrainians. Ukraine is simply a political patient whose life hangs on a NATO drip. It counts and waits for the treatment that gives it a chance to last (a welcome to NATO/EU, reconstruction of Ukraine). In specified a situation, it is foolish to annoy a surgeon, accuse him of incompetence, and exert force to accelerate the operation.
Friends from Poland
The allegation of misconducting diplomacy is even more serious looking from the Polish perspective. due to the fact that Poland with Ukraine has a plane on which Kiev could completely cost-freely show its willingness to repay for aid and has not yet been done. Ukrainian authorities are incapable to work decently for Polish-Ukrainian relations, despite the fact thatPoland provided more assistance to Ukraine than anyone in Ukraine could have expected before 24 February 2022.
For respective decades Warsaw has been seeking approval to exhume corpses and worthy of burial for Polish victims of Ukrainian genocide in Volyn, which took place during planet War II. Poles do not even ask for repentance and an apology at the minute (which must yet happen), but for the right to a worthy burial. The issue of appropriate consents would not cost Kiev anything, but a motion and printing of the paper on which appropriate signatures would be filed. It is clear that at a time erstwhile the hours and days of fighting conducted on the front decide the destiny of the country, there is small time. The precedence is to defend the state. Poland understood this and sent arms and supplies to Ukraine at an express rate. Faster than anyone else. However, the war in Ukraine has been going on for a year and a half and there was adequate time to see what the partners (including Poles) wanted and to take active action to show good will. Ukrainian authorities like to specify Poles as their friends, but from the position of Poland it is not a relationship erstwhile only 1 side can trust on another – not the another side (talk about political friendship, not emotional or frequently selfless).
Ukrainian diplomacy – both in relations with Poland and the full West – can indicate what it needs and thank you erstwhile aid comes. It lacks an active attitude, 1 that would aid partners not gotta lower their expectations. It's not Ben Wallace who should call Zelensky and explain how the another guy's expected to thank. Warsaw should not be the 1 seeking for months to celebrate the victims of the Volyn massacre in Lutsk together with president Zelenski. president Zelenski should call and ask what he can do for Poland on the occasion of the anniversary of specified a delicate topic. More importantly. It is the Ukrainian side that should depend more on the disarmament of the Volyn bomb, which is utilized by the Kremlovian propaganda to divide Warsaw and Kiev. For any reason, the Ukrainian side cannot or does not understand. possibly this is due to the fact that the subject of Volyn is to be a bargaining chip for the post-war time, erstwhile we will gotta search Polish funds to rebuild Ukraine?
This attitude is simply a mistake that can cost more in the future than simply symbolic concessions in history. Poland will manage without reconciliation with Ukraine on Volyn. Can Ukraine afford to make this issue a shadow on the current and future Polish-Ukrainian relations? The zeal of the Polish society – which is the driving force of aid to Ukraine – can importantly weaken as a consequence of the passive attitude of Ukrainian diplomacy. This will affect not only the aid organised from the bottom up (number of collections, individual commitment etc.), but it can besides affect Polish politicians. Already now, political environments skeptical of aid to Ukraine are gaining expanding support, which will have a reflection after the parliamentary elections in Poland. Ukrainian diplomacy should see that it is in her interest to neutralise the anti-Ukrainian political narrative, especially before the elections. The current attitude of the Kiev authorities does not peculiarly aid organizers of aid to Ukraine in convincing people who do not see the Polish reason for the state, but are delicate to historical-cultural-social issues.
To the condition of July 2023, 1 can say with full work that Ukrainian website failed erstwhile it came to building Polish-Ukrainian relations, especially in the context of convincing Polish society that Ukraine appreciates Polish aid. It's the opposite. Ukrainians lose sight of Poles. And this is not even about Volyn himself but about showing intent, goodwill and willingness to scope compromises in the future. Since Ukraine is not even ready for a symbolic motion in a situation of life's danger and receiving immense assistance from Poland, it is not good for future cooperation in the eyes of Poles. Even if it is good on another – but little socially bearable – levels. It happens that Polish-Ukrainian relations are marked by the past of Volyn. Underestimation by the Ukrainian side of how delicate the Polish society is about the subject of the Volyn massacre orders to issue a low note of Ukrainian diplomacy in terms of taking care of relations with Warsaw.
Perhaps Ukrainians should be curious in relations on the Polish-Lithuania line. Equally – and frequently more – complicated over fresh decades than those Polish-Ukrainian ones. The Polish number in Lithuania was treated at times worse than Poles surviving in Belarus ruled by Lukashenko. However, after the first aggression against Ukraine in 2014, Poland and Lithuania rapidly outlined the framework of common interests. Diplomacy between these countries has repaired disastrous relations. The Lithuanians not only rebuilt the tracks leading to the Polish refinery in the Lithuanian Mojejki, but besides primarily changed the law and proceedings against the Polish national minority. On the another hand, Poland supports Lithuanian safety and, at the same time, thanks to investment in the Polish section of via Carpathia, the Lithuanian port in Klaipeda will have a chance to make and accomplish higher profits. The social tension between Poles and Lithuanians has been minimised and the image of Lithuania and Lithuania has improved importantly in Poland. This makes it easier for politicians to prosecute policies to deepen relations between countries. Both sides contributed to this.
Cereal scandal
Interestingly, erstwhile writing this text, the Kiev authorities continued to supply further materials for analysis on Polish-Ukrainian relations. On 20 July the Ukrainian Prime Minister posted on twitter false information that Poland intends to block exports of Ukrainian grain to the EU. What is not true, due to the fact that Warsaw intends to block only its own import of Ukrainian grain in fear of destabilising the Polish market. Poland has no objection to the transit of Ukrainian grain through its territory for export to 3rd countries. What is it that Prime Minister Morawiecki made clear?.
This did not prevent the Ukrainian Prime Minister from comparing Poland's friendly actions to that of hostile Russia (the breaking of the grain agreement) and to put Warsaw in charge of possible food crisis worldwide.
One thing must be clear about this. It is not a problem that Ukrainians conflict for their interests to play the European Union Commission against Poland on the issue of – generalising – cereals. Poland had previously given Ukraine the impression that the subject of the stableness of the Polish agricultural marketplace and the economical interests of Poland is separate from the Ukrainian military, logistical, supply or humanitarian aid. We Poles treat this issue separately and we intend to defend our market, to which we have the full right, especially since Ukraine does not belong to the EU.
Similarly, Ukraine has the right to take action to exploit its difficult, warlike situation in order to make the most of the interests in the agricultural market. Both countries are trying to take care of their own interests regardless of the circumstantial situation surrounding the war in Ukraine.
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However, The Ukrainian Prime Minister shot in the Ukrainian knee selling false content about the Polish attitude, while placing moral charges against Poland. Comparing Poland's efforts to defend its own marketplace with Russia's actions, which in the course of the war with Ukraine tries to destruct its economy, among others. specified a communicative – which should be regarded as taking hostile action against Poland on the level of information war –is harmful to Polish-Ukrainian relations, and so to Ukraine itself. Let's repeat, Poland can do without Ukraine. Can Ukraine afford to open another war front (though on a communicative plane)? due to the fact that in Poland there are environments that would gladly open not only this front, but besides put the full Polish society on it.
At this point, of course, it is possible to nuance and indicate that Ukrainian abroad policy is not monolith. That Prime Minister Shmyhal is not peculiarly fond of Zelenski, and the second is simply a supporter of closer ties with Poland. Problem is, it has nothing to do with anything. president Zelenski, erstwhile we first faced a grain problem, came to Warsaw for negotiations, and a fewer days later in Brussels besides urged the EU Commission to “solve the problem”, which was an apparent effort to play Poland on the issue of grain. Now Shmyhal does the same. Only in much worse, harmful to Polish-Ukrainian kind relations.
It is besides worth noting that the usage of red-black flags during diplomatic events is simply a symptom of complete ignorance of those liable for preparing the Ukrainian side for the event. The red-black flag has only negative connotations in Polish society. specified failures show the fundamental deficiency of cognition or sensitivity of those liable for diplomatic protocol.
Poles are not curious in who is more or little open to rapprochement with Poland among Ukrainian politicians. Polish society evaluates the whole. On the another hand, the Polish authorities cannot turn a blind eye to Ukrainian "falls" in the hope that possibly in the future the people liable for them – who do not realize the crucial community of interests between Poland and Ukraine – will vanish from the circles of Kiev's power. Poland cannot passively wait for all Ukrainian politicians to realize the Ukrainian state's right. In fact, for the sake of both parties, she should react.
Ukraine itself forces the West to accentuate differences of interest
For many months, Poland has been conducting a political and information run to convince another Western countries that the war in Ukraine is besides their war. I wrote the text myself, and then I published a book called: "#This is our war". Indeed, in the strategical interest of Poland, the EU and all NATO, Ukraine should defend itself. What's more, everything that has been achieved so far in the area of assistance to Ukraine has been essential and appropriate. Poland has done everything in its power and national interest. The West has stalled with any issues, but we have seen advancement over months.
However, knowing of the Polish state's ration for support for Ukraine does not exempt decision-makers from NATO and Warsaw from the work to carry out appropriate diplomacy. In the interests of the West – including Poland – it is not to give Ukrainians the knowing that they will receive everything, always and everywhere, whatever they require. It is in the interests of NATO and Poland to specify the limits of their interests in relation to the Russian-Ukrainian War. And everything that lies outside these borders to be treated as the subject of negotiations with Ukraine. Of course, we are talking about the level of interstate arrangements and communication between the ruling. For, on the another hand, in the interests of Poland and the West is public communication of determination and willingness to aid Ukraine and its justification. For example, in order to convince their own societies and signal Russia's unity in this subject. Thus, it is essential to separate policy towards societies – which the rulers must sometimes convince to bear the costs of war and aid of Ukraine – from cabinet policy.
This leads to a place where you should look for differencesthe interests between the West and Ukraine or the levels where these interests do not overlap.
For example, it is in the interests of Poland and NATO to keep Ukraine's independency from Moscow. The fall of Kiev would be fatal. Many months ago, I described that Russia could not cross the Dnieper line. This kind of threat should trigger a strong consequence on the NATO side. However, Ukraine declares that its war nonsubjective is to recover all areas occupied by Russia and return to the 1991 borders. Is this in the Polish and NATO business? Nope. If the war were to end faster, Russia would have been badly beaten, but Ukraine would have lost, for example, Donbas – specified a script would have been more beneficial to us than further months or years of struggles to regain the full territory by Ukrainians. First, due to the fact that this fight is at our expense. Literally. Secondly, Europe suffers economically due to the conflict in its east part. Thirdly, neither Poland nor the EU nor, finally, NATO is afraid about the Russians introducing into our political and economical region a Trojan horse in the form of disloyal to Kiev regions. Imagine a situation in Ukraine, which is part of the EU and NATO, where the "rebellion" in Donbasa erupts again and hybrid military action begins... Imagine that people with Ukrainian passports have freedom of movement across the EU and are carrying out sabotage or terrorist attacks. These are likely threats to be considered. Ukraine is somewhat smaller, but more compact and uniform in terms of patriotic and political views would be a more valuable NATO associate than Ukraine is larger but divided. Unstable and a origin of additional threats.
The attitude of the Ukrainian authorities not only does not encourage the West to aid Ukraine more selfless, but even seems to force the West to rise the issue of differences of interest in the area of unofficial communication. And playing that card. It is in the interest of Poland and NATO to formally declare the assistance of Ukraine – even due to the Russians – but not to accept far-reaching commitments. On the another hand, on the level of confidential political communication, it is essential to clarify clearly the expectations of Ukraine. due to the fact that diplomats in Kiev are seemingly incapable – or unwilling – to read these expectations.
Political Realism and Reality
In all this, 1 crucial argument should not be forgotten. If we respect Western support for Ukraine as a manifestation of political realism alternatively than a symptom of selfless assistance, then we cannot anticipate Ukraine to be grateful. After all, all this is just pure business. A game of business. Right?
This conclusion is not entirely true. For example, due to the fact that the West is not 1 virtual being and the attitudes of individual states should be nuanced. I measure – which can never be done objectively – which was due to the request and which aid exceeded the scope of cold calculations.
Another attitude towards Ukraine was presented by Poland and another e.g. Germany. This was not only due to differences in interests between the 2 countries. The Polish government does much more than dictate it only to geopolitical interests. From the point of view of statistic and hard interests, the Polish government was not and is not obliged to organize assistance for Ukrainians or to introduce various types of facilitations and programs. From Warsaw's perspective, the transfer of arms and supplies – which is essential for the conduct of the war – could be adequate action. However, Poland does much more. All was passed Act on assistance to Ukrainian citizens, whose regulations make it easier for Ukrainians to get jobs, social benefits, children's places in Polish schools and nurseries. Ukrainians were facilitated access to Polish healthcare, business and access to social premises. Finally, a large amount of money was allocated to organise the full aid scheme.
Social engagement must besides not be overlooked, in which Poles seem to be leading. And this 1 Helping Polish society is simply a sign of moral attitude, not any calculating. Poles from private pockets lay for arms collection, equipment and humanitarian aid for Ukrainians. Polish hospitals receive wounded Ukrainians, and any Poles went to Ukraine to fight, risking their lives. Many others engage in travelling to Ukraine or taking Ukrainian women and children from the Polish-Ukrainian border to bring them to safe places or even providing shelter. Poland and Poles are doing everything possible on humanitarian and social level to support Ukrainians and their families. What the Ukrainian Government has done on a social level (though historical) To thank you for that?
It is in the Ukrainian interest to guarantee that Polish-Ukrainian relations make in an undisturbed way. Ukraine should effort to neutralize all threats in this area. The Ukrainian authorities should be the spokesperson for Ukrainian gratitude to Polish society. The impression that in this respect Ukrainian politicians deficiency sense and desire, which can negatively affect Ukrainian citizens, cannot be underestimated. Both those receiving aid from Poles in Ukraine and those staying in Poland.
Ukrainian political elites clearly neglect in terms of impact on Western societies in a situation where Ukraine is completely dependent on external assistance and on convincing Western societies to support Ukrainians. Which may later translate into little effective aid from Western governments.
Krzysztof Wojchal
Geopolitics, politics, economy, law, taxes – blog
